Research › Search › Judgment

Kerala High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 277 (KER)

BIJU M. K. , W/O. SYED MUHAMMED v. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT

2017-02-08

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. The writ petitioner is the appellant. 2. The petitioner constructed a building in an item of land belonging to her. When notice under Section 9(2) of the Kerala Building Tax Act, 1975, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', was issued to her, she claimed exemption. Instead of referring that application for exemption to the Government in accordance with Section 3 of the Act, the Tahsildar concluded the assessment and issued assessment order and demand. Those were challenged by the petitioner before this Court through W.P.(C) No.29425 of 2010. The afore-noted facts are discernible from the judgment rendered in that writ petition on 29.09.2010 whereby this Court found fault with the Tahsildar having concluded the assessment without forwarding the application for exemption to the Government for consideration in accordance with law. The assessment and demand were set aside and the Tahsildar was required to forward the application for consideration of the Government which is provided for under Section 3(2) of the Act. Thereafter, the Government issued Ext.P2 order dated 03.01.2014 denying exemption. That was challenged before the learned single Judge and that writ petition was dismissed. Hence, this writ appeal. 3. Hearing the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner and the learned Senior Government Pleader for the Department of Commercial Taxes and perusing the materials, we see that the one and the only ground on which Ext.P2 order has been issued by the Government is that exemption under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act cannot be claimed by a person who has inducted a tenant and is deriving income by way of rent. No other question is decided through Ext.P2. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the provision in Section 3(1)(b) of the Act is founded on the use and has no nexus to the ownership of the building. Per contra, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the question of exemption would be relevant only with reference to the point of time of levy in terms of the charging provision contained in Section 5 of the Act. We see that the provisions for assessment and recovery also depend upon the building and not the owner or occupier. 5. Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to, buildings used, inter alia, as factories or workshops. We see that the provisions for assessment and recovery also depend upon the building and not the owner or occupier. 5. Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of the Act provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to, buildings used, inter alia, as factories or workshops. There is no indication in that provision as to the need or requirement that the owner should be the user to claim the exemption under that provision. While the learned Senior Government Pleader is justified in saying that the facts and factors which may be relevant to decide a claim of exemption ought to be relatable to the date of levy on the basis of the charging provision, particularly when, the building tax imposed through the Act is a one time tax, that question has to be decided depending upon the user of the building at the time of completion and irrespective of whether the activity in the building at that relevant point of time is carried out by the owner or by any other person in possession or occupation. For this reason, we are of the view that Ext.P2 which was impugned before the learned single Judge and the decision of the learned single Judge holding that the fact that the writ petitioner has leased out the building will by itself be destructive of her claim for exemption cannot be upheld. We accordingly set aside Ext.P2 specifically on the ground that such order could not have been issued merely for the reason that the appellant/writ petitioner had leased out the building to another. Since Ext.P2 does not decide any other relevant issue in the course of consideration of the application for exemption, we cannot but require the Government to decide on all other questions relevant to the application for exemption de novo. The learned counsel for the appellant also referred to the decision of this Court in Appukuttan v. State of Kerala [ 2013 (2) KLT 533 ]. We have considered the said decision and we approve the ratio thereon. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment is vacated and Ext.P2 is quashed holding that it does not stand on the reason stated therein. It is ordered that this judgment will not stand in the way of the Government reconsidering all other relevant factors. We have considered the said decision and we approve the ratio thereon. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment is vacated and Ext.P2 is quashed holding that it does not stand on the reason stated therein. It is ordered that this judgment will not stand in the way of the Government reconsidering all other relevant factors. The Government shall take up the writ petitioner's application for exemption and consider the same de novo in the light of what is stated herein above. The petitioner is directed to mark appearance in the office concerned on 08.03.2017.