JUDGMENT : Biswanath Somadder, J. This appeal has been preferred against a judgment and order dated 14th November, 2011, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP 17296 (W) of 2009 (Smt. Jayanti Paul & Ors. v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors.). It appears that the writ petitioners had approached the learned Single Judge questioning a decision of the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the KMDA) dated 15th September, 2009. By the said decision, the offer of allotment of plot no. C-15, HIG made by the KMDA was cancelled and possession of land delivered stood withdrawn. The lease deed so executed also stood cancelled. 2. It appears that the learned Single Judge, without even considering the merits of the case on its factual background or testing the action on the touchstone of reasonableness as opposed to arbitrariness, merely referred to and relied upon his own decision rendered in Haldiram Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (2009) 1 Cal LT 158 (HC) in order to hold that the decision of the KMDA to cancel the lease was "in exercise of its pure private law contractual right flowing solely from the terms and conditions of the lease". The learned Single Judge further held that an authority that is a State within the meaning of Article 12 is under an obligation to exercise powers conferred on it in consonance with the provisions of Article 14, meaning thereby that the action must be fair, reasonable and free from arbitrariness. But, when an authority exercises a right conferred on it by a private contract, the said authority is not under any corresponding obligation to exercise the right in consonance with the principles of fairness, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness in State action as enshrined in Article 14, for there is a clear distinction between a public law power and a private law right. 3. 3. A pure and simple question of law, therefore, arises in the instant case and that is, whether applicability of Article 14 of the Constitution of India can be wholly excluded - based on our understanding of the Constitutional scheme - in respect of private law contracts entered into by and between an authority, being a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and a private person, even if there is arbitrariness present in an action which emanates from a right under a contract ordinarily governed by private law. 4. The personality of the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot co-exist. The Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the Preamble. Thus, exclusion of Article 14 in contractual matters is not permissible in our Constitutional scheme. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters, but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion, as sought to be held by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order, merely by following Haldiram (supra). Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, it can be said that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in contractual matters. Therefore, it would be difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14. Therefore, it would be difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, from the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14. Thus, the wide sweep of Article 14 undoubtedly takes within its fold, the impugned decision rendered by the KMDA dated 15th September, 2009, which was so rendered upon invocation of one of the conditions contained in the lease deed, without even taking into consideration the reasonableness of its invocation or the genesis of the lease deed itself, in the factual backdrop of the instant case. In this context, we may take notice of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in AIR 1991 SC 537 . 5. Much prior to Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra), the Supreme Court in Maru Ram v. Union of India & Ors. reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147 made the following observations in paragraphs 63 and 64 of its judgment:- "63. The jurisprudence of constitutionally canalised power as spelt out in the second proposition also did not meet with serious resistance from the learned Solicitor General and, if we may say so rightly. Article 14 is an expression of the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution and is a clear pointer that arbitrariness is anathema under our system. It necessarily follows that the power to pardon, grant remission and commutation, being of the greatest moment for the liberty of the citizen, cannot be a law unto itself but must be informed by the finer canons of constitutionalism. In the International Airport Authority case (1979) 3 SCC 489 at pp. 511-512: ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ), this court stated: The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Government which we have discussed above must apply equally where such corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it likes at its sweet will, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. This rule also flows directly from the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14. It is now well settled as a result of the decisions of this Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 SCR 348 : ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ), that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory; it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations, because that would be denial of equality. The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is projected by Article 14 and it must characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of executive power without making of law. Mathew, J. in V. Punnen Thomas v. State of Kerala, AIR 1969 Ker 81 (FB) observed: The Government, is not and should not be as free as an individual in selecting the recipients for its largesse. Whatever its activity, the Government is still the Government and will be subject to restraints, inherent in its position in a democratic society. A democratic Government cannot lay down arbitrary and capricious standards for the choice of persons with whom alone it will deal. If we excerpt again from the Airport Authority case (1979) 3 SCC 489 at Pp. 504-505: ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ). Whatever be the concept of the rule of law, whether it be the meaning given by Dicey in his "The Law of the Constitution" or the definition given by Hayek in his "Road to Serfdom" and "Constitution of Liberty" or the exposition set forth by Harry Jones in his "The Rule of Law and the Welfare State", there is as pointed out by Mathew J., in his article on 'The Welfare State Rule of Law and Natural Justice" in "Democracy Equality and Freedom" Upendra Baxi, Ed. Eastern Book Co., Lucknow (1978) p. 28. "Substantial agreement in Juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found". Eastern Book Co., Lucknow (1978) p. 28. "Substantial agreement in Juristic thought that the great purpose of the rule of law notion is the protection of the individual against arbitrary exercise of power, wherever it is found". It is indeed unthinkable that in a democracy governed by the rule of law the executive Government or any of its officers should possess arbitrary power over the interests of the individual. Every action of the Executive Government must be informed with reason and should be free from arbitrariness. That is the very essence of the rule of law and its bare minimal requirement. And to the application of this principle it makes no difference whether the exercise of the power involves affectation of some right or denial of some privilege. ...The discretion of the Government has been held to be not unlimited in that the Government cannot give or withhold largesse in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It is insisted, as pointed out by Prof. Reich in an especially stimulating article on "The New Property" in 73 Yale Law Journal 733, "that Government action be based on standards that are not arbitrary or unauthorised!". The Government cannot be permitted to say that it will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue quotas or licences only in favour of those having grey hair or belonging to a particular political party or professing a particular religious faith. The Government is still the Government when it acts in the matter of granting largesse and it cannot act arbitrarily. It does not stand in the same position as a private individual. It is the pride of our constitutional order that all power, whatever its source, must, in its exercise, anathematise arbitrariness and obey standards and guidelines intelligible and intelligent and integrated with the manifest purpose of the power. From this angle even the power to pardon, commute or remit is subject to the wholesome creed that guidelines should govern the exercise even of presidential power. 64. Speaking generally, Lord Acton's dictum deserves attention: Letter to Mandell (later, Bishop) Creighton, April 5, 1887 Historical Essays and Studies, 1907. I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. I cannot accept your canon that we are to judge Pope and King unlike other men, with a favourable presumption that they did no wrong. If there is any presumption it is the other way, against the holders of power, increasing as the power increases. Likewise, Edmund Burke, the great British statesman gave correct counsel when he said: Reflections on the Revolution in France 1790. All persons possessing a portion of power ought to be strongly and awfully impressed with an idea that they act in trust, and that they are to account for their conduct in that trust to the one great Master, Author, and Founder of society." 6. The Supreme Court has gone even to the extent of interfering in case of service contract between the employer, being a Government company and its employee. In a case between Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited v. Brojo Nath Ganguly reported in AIR 1986 SC 1571 - which had its origin in our High Court - the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- "The principle deducible from various precedents is that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however, unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. The types of contracts to which the principle formulated above applies are not contract which are tainted with illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the Court. They are opposed to public policy and require to be adjudged void." 7. Even when a public body deals with its tenants, it must act in public interest and an infraction of that duty is amenable to examination either in civil suit or in writ jurisdiction. The decision rendered by the KMDA - which was the subject matter of challenge before the writ Court - had to be a reasonable decision and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest and not otherwise. Where there is arbitrariness in State action, Article 14 springs in and judicial review strikes such an action down. Every action of the executive authority must be subject to rule of law and must be informed by reason. So, whatever be the activity of the public authority, it should meet the test of Article 14. Every activity of a public authority must be informed by reason and guided by public interest. All exercise of discretion or power by public authorities even when dealing with lessees cannot be treated separately and distinctly. Even in contractual matters, if it fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, such action in that event would be unconstitutional. In this context, we may take notice of the observations made by the Supreme Court in M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in AIR 1989 SC 1642 . 8. The Supreme Court in Mahabir Auto Stores & Ors. v. Indian Oil Corporation & Ors. reported in AIR 1990 SC 1031 made the following observations in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of its judgment:- "18. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the contentions and the dealings between the parties and in view of the present state of law, we are of the opinion that decision of the State/public authority under Article 298 of the Constitution, is an administrative decision and can be impeached on the ground that the decision is arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on any of the grounds available in public law field. It appears to us that in respect of Corporation like IOC when without informing the parties concerned, as in the instant case of the appellant firm herein on alleged change of policy and on that basis action to seek to bring to an end the course of transaction over 18 years involving large amounts of money is not fair action, especially in view of the monopolistic nature of the power of the respondent in this field. Therefore, it is necessary to reiterate that even in the field of public law, the relevant persons concerned or to be affected, should be taken into confidence. Whether and in what circumstances that confidence should be taken into consideration cannot be laid down on any straight jacket basis. It depends on the nature of the right involved and nature of the power sought to be exercised in a particular situation. It is true that there is discrimination (distinction) between power and right but whether the State or the instrumentality of a State has the right to function in public field or private field is a matter which, in our opinion, depends upon the facts and circumstances of the situation, but such exercise of power cannot be dealt with by the State or the instrumentality of the State without informing and taking into confidence, the party whose rights and powers affected or sought to be affected, into confidence. In such situations most often people feel aggrieved by exclusion of knowledge if not being taken into confidence. 19. Such transaction should continue as an administrative decision with the organ of the State. It may be contractual or statutory but in a situation of transaction between the parties for nearly two decades, such procedure should be followed which will be reasonable, fair and just, that is, the process which normally be accepted to be followed by an organ of the State and that process must be conscious and all those affected should be taken into confidence. 20. Having regard to the nature of the transaction, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to state that in cases where the instrumentality of the state enters the contractual field, it should be governed by the incidence of the contract. 20. Having regard to the nature of the transaction, we are of the opinion that it would be appropriate to state that in cases where the instrumentality of the state enters the contractual field, it should be governed by the incidence of the contract. It is true that it may not be necessary to give reasons but, in our opinion, in the field of this nature fairness must be there to the parties concerned, and having regard to the large number or the long period and the nature of the dealings between the parties, the appellant should have been taken into confidence. Equality and fairness at least demands this much from an instrumentality of the State dealing with a right of the State not to treat the contract as subsisting. We must, however, evolve such process which will work." 9. The judgment referred to and relied upon by the learned Single Judge [i.e., Haldiram's case (supra)] cannot be an authority for the proposition that even in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is not maintainable even if there is arbitrariness present in such an action which emanates from a right under the contract. In fact, the legal principle is otherwise, as has been held and is well settled by several pronouncements of the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore and also in ABL International Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & Ors. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 553 (see paragraph 27). In paragraph 28, the Supreme Court has further observed as follows:- "28. However, while entertaining an objection as to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the court should bear in mind the fact that the power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provisions of the Constitution. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. The High Court having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. The Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions in the exercise of this power. (See Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 .) And this plenary right of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ will not normally be exercised by the Court to the exclusion of other available remedies unless such action of the State or its instrumentality is arbitrary and unreasonable so as to violate the constitutional mandate of Article 14 or for other valid and legitimate reasons, for which the Court thinks it necessary to exercise the said jurisdiction." 10. Based on a broad conspectus of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred hereinbefore, we can safely conclude that Haldiram's case (supra) is not good law for the proposition that in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is not maintainable even if there is arbitrariness present in such an action which emanates from a right under the contract. Referring to and relying primarily upon Haldiram (supra) by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and order, therefore, was not proper in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 11. It may be out of context, at this stage, to refer to and rely upon the observations made by the Earl of Halsbury, L.C. in Quinn v. Leathem reported in 1901 AC 495 wherein it was observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be the exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. This fundamental principle of law appears to have overlooked by the learned Single Judge while delivering the impugned judgment and order in the factual backdrop of the present case. 12. It, however, appears that a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev & Anr. This fundamental principle of law appears to have overlooked by the learned Single Judge while delivering the impugned judgment and order in the factual backdrop of the present case. 12. It, however, appears that a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Orissa v. Ram Chandra Dev & Anr. reported in AIR 1964 SC 685 was also referred to and relied upon by the KMDA during the course of hearing before the learned Single Judge. Although this judgment was not dealt with separately by the learned Single Judge, we propose to deal with the same, nevertheless. 13. This judgment was rendered by the Supreme Court in a fact situation where before the Orissa High Court six petitions were filed by six ex-Zamindars of Ganjam district. Each of them alleged that they apprehended danger to their respective properties situated in portions of Ganjam Agency tracts known as Maliahs by threat of executive action. The case set out by these Zamindars was that the Ganjam plains, which were partly situated in Orissa and partly in Andhra State, had been permanently settled with them under the provisions of the Madras Regulation No. XXV of 1802. The Zamindaris thus permanently settled on them were acquired by the respective Governments of the two States under the provisions of the Estate Abolition Act. Adjacent west of Ganjam plains lay hilly tracts which were inhabited by aboriginals. These tracts were known as Agency tracts; portions of these tracts were granted to the Zamindars by various Sanads issued by the Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George, Madras, sometime in 1874 and 1875. The areas thus granted by the Sanads were known as Maliahs and the Zamindars to whom the said areas were granted, were described as Muthadars of their respective Maliahs. On 30th March, 1954, the State of Orissa informed the six respective Muthadars, by notices duly served on them, that their 'Muthas' would be resumed with effect from that date. The petitioners claimed proprietary interest in the areas granted to them and contended that the State of Orissa had no right to resume the lands granted to them and was also not entitled to recover possession from them. The petitioners claimed proprietary interest in the areas granted to them and contended that the State of Orissa had no right to resume the lands granted to them and was also not entitled to recover possession from them. On such grounds, the writ petitions were initiated, which ultimately culminated in the judgment and order of the Supreme Court wherein it was held as follows:- "(11) As we have already observed, the High Court did not embark upon the enquiry as to title in the present proceedings, because that is a question which may be appropriately tried in a regular suit. In proceeding to issue a writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court, however, appears to have assumed that the appellant was not entitled to seek to recover possession of the properties after resuming the grants in question. Whether or not the grants in question are resumable, and if they are, whether or not the appellant can recover possession without filing a suit, are questions on which we propose to express no opinion in the present appeals. Ordinarily, where property has been granted by the State on conditions which make the grant resumable, after resumption it is the grantee who moves the Court for appropriate relief, and that proceeds on the basis that the grantor State which has reserved to itself the right to resume may, after exercising its right, seek to recover possession of the property without filing a suit. But apart from this aspect of the matter, it is difficult to see how the High Court was justified in issuing the writ in the present appeals the inevitable consequence of which would be that the respondents would remain in possession of the property until the appellant files a suit against them; and that, in our opinion, would not be justified unless questions of title are determined and it is held that the appellant must file a suit before the respondents can be dispossessed. It appears that in issuing the writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of its conclusion that questions of title cannot be tried in writ proceedings. It appears that in issuing the writ in favour of the respondents, the High Court failed to appreciate the legal effect of its conclusion that questions of title cannot be tried in writ proceedings. Once, it is held that the question of title cannot be determined, it follows that no right can be postulated in favour of the respondents on the basis of which a writ can be issued in their favour under Article 226. (12) Mr. Tatachari, however, has contended that the right on which the petitions of the respondents are founded is a right flowing from the respondents' continuous possession of the properties for many years, and he argues that if such a right is proved, the High Court would be justified in issuing a writ protecting that right. This argument is clearly fallacious. Mere possession of the property for however long a period it may be, will not clothe the possessor with any legal right if it is shown that the possession is under a grant from the State which is resumable. Such long possession may give him a legal right to protect his possession against third parties, but as between the State and the grantee, possession of the grantee under a resumable grant cannot be said to confer any right on the grantee which would justify a claim for a writ under Article 226 where the grant has been resumed. In dealing with this argument, we have assumed without deciding that though a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act would have been incompetent against the appellant, a similar relief can be claimed by the respondents against the appellant under Article 226. Even on that assumption, no right can be claimed by the respondents merely on the ground of their possession, unless their right to remain in possession is established against the appellant, and this can be done if the grant is held to be not resumable." 14. A plain reading of the above observations made by the Supreme Court clearly reveal that the same has no manner of application at all in the facts of the instant case. A plain reading of the above observations made by the Supreme Court clearly reveal that the same has no manner of application at all in the facts of the instant case. This judgment also cannot be held to be an authority for the proposition that in an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or its instrumentality arising out of a contractual obligation is not maintainable even if there is arbitrariness present in such an action which emanates from a right under the contract. 15. For reasons stated above, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated 14th November, 2011, passed by the learned Single Judge in WP 17296 (W) of 2009 (Smt. Jayanti Paul & Ors. v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors.). We remand the matter to the learned Single Judge to decide the case on its own merit. 16. We make it clear that since affidavits have already been exchanged, no further pleadings will be allowed to be used or filed before the learned Single Judge. However, relevant records may be produced, if and so directed by the learned Single Judge. Since a significant time has already elapsed from the date of filing of the writ petition, we request the learned Single Judge to dispose of the writ petition as expeditiously as possible - of course - if the business of the Court so permits. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties. Sankar Acharyya, J. - I agree. Appeal disposed of.