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2017 DIGILAW 278 (KER)

GEETHAMANI v. PREMAKUMARI

2017-02-08

B.KEMAL PASHA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Challenging the concurrent findings entered by the Munsiff's Court, Chavakkad in O.S. No.283/1999 followed by those of the I Additional District Court, Thrissur in A.S. No.126/2005, the plaintiff in O.S.No.283/1999 has come up in this Regular Second Appeal. 2. The suit was originally one for declaration that Ext.B3 Will dated 06.04.1984 registered as deed No.4/1984 of the Andathodu Sub Registry Office was illegal and void and that the defendants or any person other than the plaintiff have no manner of right over the plaint schedule property. The plaint schedule property is 22 ¾ cents and a house building thereon. 3. The plaintiff is admittedly the only daughter and sole legal heir of deceased Madhavan Nair. The mother of the plaintiff died in her childhood, when she was only 4 years old. Thereafter, the plaintiff was being looked after and maintained by her maternal uncle and others. Madhavan Nair died on 25.06.1995. It has come out that on 06.04.1984, Madhavan Nair had executed Ext.B3 Will, thereby bequeathing all his properties in equal shares to his sister Parukkutti Amma and defendants 1 to 4. Defendants 1 and 2 are the daughters of Parukkutti Amma, and defendants 3 and 4 are the children of the 1st defendant. Admittedly, Parukkutti Amma predeceased Madhavan Nair. After the death of Madhavan Nair, the legatees of Ext.B3 Will, except Parukkutti Amma, propounded the Will and claimed that the plaint schedule properties have devolved on them through Ext.B3. Plaintiff challenges the validity of Ext.B3 Will on the ground that there are several suspicious circumstances in the execution of Ext.B3 and the defendants, who are four among the legatees in the Will, are duty bound to dispel all the suspicious circumstances. 4. The Munsiff's Court, Chavakkad dismissed the suit, after trial. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred A.S. No.126/2005 before the District Court, Thrissur. The learned I Additional District Judge, Thrissur dismissed A.S. No.126/2005. 5. The Second Appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether courts below were justified in holding that it is for the plaintiff to prove that there are no suspicious circumstances surrounding Ext.B3 Will, when it is for the propounder to remove all the suspicion surrounding the execution of the Will? 5. The Second Appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial questions of law:- (i) Whether courts below were justified in holding that it is for the plaintiff to prove that there are no suspicious circumstances surrounding Ext.B3 Will, when it is for the propounder to remove all the suspicion surrounding the execution of the Will? (ii) When the plaintiff is the only daughter who would have inherited the properties, and she was disinherited by providing a payment of Rs.10,000/- and on the evidence and attending circumstances, whether the courts below were justified in upholding Ext.B3 Will? 6. Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant Sri. K. Ramachandran and learned counsel appearing for the respondents Sri. G. Sreekumar, Chelur. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant, by relying on the decision in Venkatachala Iyengar v. Thimmajamma and others [1959 SC 443], has argued that it is the duty of the propounder of the Will to dispel all the suspicious circumstances in the execution of the Will. It has been pointed out that both the courts below have forgotten the principles enunciated in Venkatachala Iyengar (Supra) and quite unfortunately, have taken the view that the plaintiff, who has challenged the execution of the Will, has to prove the suspicious circumstances in the execution of Ext.B3. 8. This Court had occasion to consider the said question in Vadakkayil Gopalan and others v. Vadakkayil Paru and others [ 2013 (3) KLT 69 ]. It is apparent that both the courts below have gone wrong and made an erroneous approach in dealing with the matter. It is true that one of the attestors of Ext.B3 was examined before the court below as DW2. At the same time, several vital aspects had escaped the notice of both the courts below. When the plaintiff has pointed out some suspicious circumstances, and when the defendants have propounded the Will, it is the duty of the propounder of the Will to dispel all these suspicious circumstances. In Venkatachala Iyengar (Supra), it was held that:- "17. The High Court, on the other hand, has taken a contrary view. The High Court thought that the evidence adduced by the appellant to prove the execution of the will was not satisfactory. In Venkatachala Iyengar (Supra), it was held that:- "17. The High Court, on the other hand, has taken a contrary view. The High Court thought that the evidence adduced by the appellant to prove the execution of the will was not satisfactory. It then examined the said evidence in some detail, criticized the discrepancies appearing in the said evidence, considered the probabilities and concluded that, on the whole, the said evidence would not justify the finding that the will had been duly executed by the testatrix. The High Court also thought that the appellant's version about the instructions given by Lakshmamma to him in the matter of the execution of the will was highly improbable; and, according to the High Court, the whole evidence of the appellant appeared to be unsatisfactory. The High Court then considered the question of onus and observed that since the appellant's sons had received a substantial benefit under the will and since he had taken a leading part in its execution, the onus was heavy on him to remove the suspicions attending the execution of the document and to establish that Lakshmamma had really understood its contents, had approved of them and had put her signatures on it when she was in a sound and disposing state of mind. It appears that the High Court also felt that the dispositions made by the will were unnatural and improbable; in particular it took the view that since the appellant had come into the family of Annaji by adoption it was very unlikely that his sons should have received such a substantial benefit under the will. In fact the judgment of the High Court appears to indicate that the High Court was inclined to hold that the testatrix may not have been in a sound and disposing state of mind at the material time. It is on these findings that the High Court reached its final conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove the due and valid execution of the will. 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. It is on these findings that the High Court reached its final conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove the due and valid execution of the will. 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicions circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicions circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English Courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical Courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word 'conscience' in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last will of the testator, the Court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. 22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that it there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson, 50 Cal W N 895 : (AIR 1946 P C 156) "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth," It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilent, cautious and circumspect." 9. From the discussions made above, it can clearly be concluded that the whole approach made by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court in the matter was not in the correct perspective. Another vital aspect that escaped the notice of the courts below was that, one of the legatees in the Will namely, Parukkutti Amma, who is the sister of the testator, predeceased the testator Madhavan Nair. In such case, necessarily, the bequest in her favour must fail and lapse as per Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act says that:- "105. In what case legacy lapses - (1) If the legatee does not survive the testator, the legacy cannot take effect, but shall lapse and form part of the residue of the testator's property, unless it appears by the will that the testator intended that it should go to some other person. (2) In order to entitle the representatives of the legatee to receive the legacy, it must be proved that he survived the testator." 10. Therefore, it is evident that on account of the death of Parukkutti Amma, the bequest in her favour in respect of the 1/5th share of the plaint schedule property lapses and it became the residue of the testator's property. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant is harping upon Illustration (ii) to Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act, which says:- "A bequest is made to A and his children. 11. The learned counsel for the appellant is harping upon Illustration (ii) to Section 105 of the Indian Succession Act, which says:- "A bequest is made to A and his children. A dies before the testator or happens to be died when the Will is made. The legatee to A and his children lapses." Based on the above illustration, it has been argued that on account of the death of Parukkutti Amma, the bequest has lapsed. 12. The illustration deals with the question of limitation and not purchase. The children of A do not become the direct objects, since they are not specifically named. A alone is the direct object of the bequest. Therefore it does not constitute a purchase in favour of the children of A. Here, in the present case, it is a purchase also in favour of defendants 1 to 4 and it is not a case of limitation. Here, in this particular case, through Ext.B3, separate shares have been prescribed to each and everyone of the legatees. What Parukkutti Amma could take was only 1/5th share over the property and in such case, as far as the other legatees are concerned, the said Will was a purchase and not a limitation. When it was not a limitation, the entire bequest will not lapse, whereas, the bequest in favour of Parukkutti Amma alone will lapse. Therefore, 1/5th share of property, which was bequeathed to Parukkutti Amma, who predeceased the testator, lapsed and it became the residue of the testator's property. 13. No doubt, the plaintiff is the only legal heir of the testator. In such case, the said residue of 1/5th share shall necessarily go to the plaintiff. When the other legatees in Ext.B3 are not the legal heirs of the testator, they cannot forward any claim over the said residue of 1/5th share. 14. Over and above it, another grave illegality had perpetrated, which also escaped the notice of both the courts below. The second attestor to Ext.B3 was examined as DW2 to prove the execution of the Will, as per Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act read with Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act. The first attestor in Ext.B3 is one Sivadasan, who is none other than the husband of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant is also one of the legatees to whom another 1/5th share has been bequeathed. The first attestor in Ext.B3 is one Sivadasan, who is none other than the husband of the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant is also one of the legatees to whom another 1/5th share has been bequeathed. May be because of that fact, the first attestor was not examined before the trial court. 15. Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act says that:- "67. Effect of gift to attesting witness - A Will shall not be deemed to be insufficiently attested by reason of any benefit thereby given either by way of bequest or by way of appointment to any person attesting it, or to his or her wife or husband; but the bequest or appointment shall be void so far as concerns the person so attesting or the wife or husband of such person or any person claiming under either of them." 16. In such case, when the first attestor happened to be the husband of the 1st defendant, the bequest in favour of the 1st defendant shall be void when her husband became the 1st attestor to the Will. Therefore, the 1/5th share of property from the plaint schedule property bequeathed to the 1st defendant through Ext.B3 also became void and it reverted back to the testator. When the plaintiff is the only legal heir of the testator, she is entitled to the said 1/5th share also. Matters being so, nobody can challenge the status of the plaintiff to claim 2/5th share out of the plaint schedule property, she being the sole legal heir of Madhavan Nair. 17. It is true that some suspicious circumstances are there as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, in the execution of Ext.B3. At the same time, it is a fact that the plaintiff was being taken care of by her maternal relatives and ultimately, she got detached from the family of her father. The legatees to the Will were residing along with Madhavan Nair till his death. It was in such circumstances, deceased Madhavan Nair had gone to the extent of executing Ext.B3 Will by almost leaving his only daughter. Only pittance were granted to his daughter through Ext.B3 and the whole properties were bequeathed to his sister, sister's daughter and grandchildren. It is true that he has not mentioned the reasons by which he has left his only legal heir out of the bequest. Only pittance were granted to his daughter through Ext.B3 and the whole properties were bequeathed to his sister, sister's daughter and grandchildren. It is true that he has not mentioned the reasons by which he has left his only legal heir out of the bequest. At the same time, the aforesaid circumstances have come to light. 18. During the pendency of this appeal, the plaintiff has amended the plaint by incorporating two alternate reliefs. A relief has been incorporated to the effect that the plaintiff may be granted her share of property to which she is legally entitled, as an alternate relief. A further relief for the separate possession of such share has also been incorporated. When findings of facts are made by both the courts below regarding the execution of the Will, this Court is of the view that presently, this Court cannot interfere with the findings of facts made by both the courts below. At the same time, in legal parlance, the plaintiff is entitled to 2/5th share in the property. In order to have a quietus for all, and to maintain the relationship between the parties, this Court is of the view that without driving the parties to yet another round of litigation, which may take at least 25 years more, it is better to grant the alternate reliefs to the plaintiff. In the result, the Regular Second Appeal is allowed in part. It is declared that the bequest in favour of Parukkutti Amma in respect of 1/5th share of the plaint schedule property had lapsed and the same became the residue of the testator's property. Similarly, it is declared that the bequest in favour of the 1st defendant in respect of 1/5th share of the plaint schedule property is void in view of Section 67 of the Indian Succession Act and, therefore, the said property also became the residue of the testator's property. The plaintiff being the only legal heir of deceased Madhavan Nair, is therefore, entitled to 2/5th share over the plaint schedule property. She is entitled to have 2/5th share over the plaint schedule property and further, she is entitled to have her such shares partitioned by metes and bounds and can possess the same separately. The reservations and equities can be decided at the time of passing the final decree and such question can be relegated to the stage of final decree. She is entitled to have 2/5th share over the plaint schedule property and further, she is entitled to have her such shares partitioned by metes and bounds and can possess the same separately. The reservations and equities can be decided at the time of passing the final decree and such question can be relegated to the stage of final decree. A preliminary decree of partition and separate possession as aforesaid is hereby passed. The matter is remitted to the trial court for passing the final decree. The plaintiff can approach the trial court for getting the final decree passed. Till then, the suit will remain as sine die. In the nature of this appeal, the parties shall bear their respective costs.