JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard Sri Kushal Kant, learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri R.K.S. Chauhan, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents. 2. The petitioners are Borrowers/Directors/Guarantors in M/s Mohan Agro Mills Ltd. A loan was taken from Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘PICUP’) in the year 1991. Since the company failed to repay the loan, proceedings under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 for recovery of Rs. 5,03,18,400.25 alongwith interest were initiated. A recovery certificate dated 10.4.2002 was issued under the Uttar Pradesh Public Money (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1972”). This recovery certificate was apparently returned to PICUP in the year 2002 itself on the ground that the assets of Guarantors/Directors could not be located. On 26.2.2009 PICUP again sent a request to the District Magistrate to proceed with the recovery certificate as the whereabouts of the petitioners have been found and were located in Delhi. The petitioners being aggrieved by the initiation of fresh recovery proceedings have filed the present writ petition praying that the citation dated Nil issued by the Tehsildar for recovery of Rs. 5,03,18,400.25 plus interest should be quashed and that the original certificate dated 7.2.2002 could not be invoked pursuant to the covering letter dated 26.2.2009 which now indicates a recovery of Rs. 16.30 Crores. 3. The contention of the petitioner is two fold. It was contended that a notification dated 24.1.2004 was issued wherein PICUP was included as a financial institution by virtue of which PICUP would no longer initiate recovery proceedings under the Act 1972 and that the recovery could only be initiated under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “Recovery of Debts Act 1993”). In support of his submission learned counsel has relied upon a decision of Supreme Court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation and others, (2003) 2 SCC 455 , wherein it has been held that a financial institution within the meaning of the term “financial institution” in the Recovery of Debts Act 1993 cannot proceed under the Act 1972. 4. 4. It was also contended that once the recovery certificate was returned by the District Magistrate in the year 2002 the same recovery certificate cannot be processed afresh in the year 2009 thereby subverting the decision of the Supreme Court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) and that it was only open to the PICUP, if any, to proceed under the Recovery of Debts Act 1993, if they so desired by filing a claim petition before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. 5. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners appears to be attractive in the first instance but upon a closer scrutiny, the Court finds that the stand of the petitioner is not tenable in the eyes of law. The reason is not far to see. In Pawan Kumar Jain v. Pradeshiya Industrial and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh Ltd and others, (2004) 6 SCC 758 , the Supreme Court, after considering the amendment made in the definition of “financial institution” under the Recovery of Debts Act, 1993 and the decision in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) held that any action initiated prior to the notification issued by the Central Government would not be barred and would not stand transferred to the Tribunal. The Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar Jain (supra) held : “This authority would have been binding upon us. However, in reply Mr. Bhalla pointed out that in respect of the 1st respondent institution the notification by the Central Government has only been issued on 24.1.2004 whereas the recovery certificate is of a much earlier date. He submitted that therefore, in this cae the proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Act are not barred. He pointed out that under Section 31 of the Debt Recovery Act, it is only suit or proceeding pending before any Court, which stands transferred to the Tribunal established under that Act. In our view, Mr. Bhalla is right. As the action was initiated prior to the notification being issued by the Central Government, the action would not be barred and would not stand transferred to the Tribunal.” 6. In our view, Mr. Bhalla is right. As the action was initiated prior to the notification being issued by the Central Government, the action would not be barred and would not stand transferred to the Tribunal.” 6. Reliance was also made by learned counsel for the petitioner of a Full Bench decision of this Court in Suresh Chandra Gupta and others v. The Collector, Kanpur Nagar and others, AIR 2005 All 320 , wherein the Full Bench held that the recovery proceedings can neither be initiated against the principal borrower nor against the guarantor under the Act 1972 where the debt is more than Rs. Ten lacs, in which case recovery proceedings can only be initiated under the Recovery of Debts Act 1993. 7. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of these, the Court finds that recovery proceedings were initiated by PICUP in the year 2002 prior to the issuance of the Central Government notification dated 24.2.2004. Once action has been initiated by PICUP the same can be enforced. The decision of the Supreme Court in Unique Butyle Tube Industries (P) Ltd. (supra) read with Pawan Kumar Jain (supra) makes it apparently clear that once action has been initiated prior to the notification issued by the Central Government the action would not be barred and the claim is not required to be transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal. On the date of institution of recovery proceedings in the year 2002, PICUP was not a notified as a “financial institution” under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks & Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Hence, no remedy under the said Act could have been availed by PICUP. Further the Full Bench decision of this Hon’ble Court in Suresh Chandra Gupta and others (supra) is not applicable to the facts of this case. 8. In the instant case, we find that recovery proceedings were initiated in the year 2002. The District Magistrate returned the recovery certificate on the ground that the existence of the Directors/Guarantors could not be located. In fact it has been specifically averred by the respondents that the petitioners were evading the recovery proceedings. The petitioners went into hiding to defeat the creditors. Now they are challenging the recovery proceedings on grounds of delay by invoking the statutes of limitation. In fact it has been specifically averred by the respondents that the petitioners were evading the recovery proceedings. The petitioners went into hiding to defeat the creditors. Now they are challenging the recovery proceedings on grounds of delay by invoking the statutes of limitation. Further a mere return of the recovery certificate by the District Magistrate does not mean that the borrowers have been discharged from their liabilities or the recovery proceedings have been dropped. The District Magistrate is not the creditor but the medium through whose office the recovery is effected. The District Magistrate by his acts and omissions cannot discharge the borrowers of their liabilities or drop the recovery proceedings. The recovery proceedings initiated under the Act 1973, in the year 2002 will stand discharged only after the amount due has been made good by the borrowers and confirmed as such by the creditors. The information provided by the PICUP in the year 2009 to the District Magistrate only give a fresh impetus to the recovery proceedings of the year 2002, which had not moved forward as the petitioners managed to successfully evade the recovery for these long years by being in hiding. In the year 2009 PICUP has now informed the District Magistrate about the whereabouts of the petitioners and their property, based on which the PICUP requested the authorities to recover the amount as per the recovery certificate already initiated earlier. No new recovery certificate was issued nor was required to be issued. Only a direction was issued to recover the amount as per the earlier certificate. The action taken by PICUP was not barred and they could not be relegated to recover the amount by filing a claim before Debt Recovery Tribunal. 9. In the light of the aforesaid, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. Both the writ petitions fail and are dismissed.