ORDER : Shri Anil Kumar Shukla, J. 1. This revision is directed against the judgment dated 07.07.2004 passed by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund in Criminal Appeal No. 269/2002 by which the learned Additional Sessions Judge, modifying the judgment dated 24.10.2002 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund in Criminal Case No. 1141/2000 convicting applicant No.1, Barsadi under section 326 of IPC and under sections 25 (1B)(b) and 27 (1) of the Arms Act and Applicant No. 2, Mast Ram under section 326/34 of IPC, convicted and sentenced the applicants as follows - Conviction Sentence Under Section 324 IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and Fine of Rs. 1000/-, Under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Arms Act Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and Fine of Rs. 500/- Under Section 27(1) of the Arms Act Rigorous Imprisonment for three years and Fine of Rs. 500/- All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. (Fine amount has already been deposited) Applicant No.2, Mast Ram - Conviction Sentence Under Section 324/34 IPC Rigorous Imprisonment for one year and Fine of Rs. 1000/- (Fine amount has already been deposited) 2. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, the applicants have preferred the present Criminal revision. 3. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 29.08.2000, at about 1.30 PM, complainant Bajirao, along with his brother Dulla, was returning home after selling mutton at Swami Chowk, Mahasamund near wine shop. When they reached near Ashirwad Lodge, the applicants met them there and said Bajirao that he had become proudish. Thereafter, Applicant Barsadi took out a sword from his back and assaulted him on his hand with a sword due to which blood began to ooze out from his hand. Rajan Dewar intervened and Dheeraj Dewar went to the house of Bajirao to inform about the incident. On returning to the spot, Dheeraj Dewar came to know that Dulla had taken Bajirao to the hospital, therefore, he also went to the hospital, where he lodged Dehatinalishi (Ex.P-1). On the basis of the Dehatinalishi, later on, First Information Report (Ex.P-9) was registered by Police Station Mahasamund against applicants Barsadi and Mast Ram for offence punishable under section 324/34 IPC. Complainant Bajirao was medically examined. Dr. On the basis of the Dehatinalishi, later on, First Information Report (Ex.P-9) was registered by Police Station Mahasamund against applicants Barsadi and Mast Ram for offence punishable under section 324/34 IPC. Complainant Bajirao was medically examined. Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7) examined complainant Bajirao and gave his report (Ex.P-4) in which he found one incised wound in the size of 10X5 cms X bone deep near thumb of left hand in the front portion and he also found that the blood vein was cut and there was sever bleeding. He had advised for x-ray for left hand. He opined that the injuries were grievous in nature. X-ray report is Ex.P-5. On 31.08.2000 the Police seized blood stained full-pant and shirt of complainant Bajirao vide Ex.P-3 and on 04.09.2000 seized a sword from applicant Barsadi vide Ex.P-2. This sword was sent to Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7) vide Ex.P-6(A) for examination, who, after examination of the same, gave his report Ex.P-6. Statements of witnesses were recorded. 4. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet was filed against the applicants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund. Charges were framed against the applicants. They denied the guilt and claimed for trial. After conducting the trial, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund convicted applicant Barsadi under section 326 of IPC and under sections 25(1B) (b) and 27(1) of the Arms Act and sentenced him there under to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-, rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 500/- and rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 500/-. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate convicted applicant Mast Ram under section 326/34 of IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 1000/-. 5. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund, the applicants preferred an appeal, being Criminal Appeal No. 269/2002 before the Court of Session at Mahasamund. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund altered and modified the conviction imposed upon the applicants by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned in the first paragraph of this order. Hence this revision. 6. The learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Mahasamund altered and modified the conviction imposed upon the applicants by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned in the first paragraph of this order. Hence this revision. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the applicants argued that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is erroneous and not sustainable in the eyes of law. None of the independent witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution. The trial Court has ignored the material contradictions and omissions occurred in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. Learned counsel urged that the prosecution has not proved the relevant notification issued under section 4 of the Arms Act before the Trial Court. Therefore, on these grounds, she has prayed that the applicants be acquitted of the charges framed against them. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the State, supporting the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, opposed the arguments advanced by learned counsel appearing for the applicants. Learned State counsel submitted that the impugned judgment is impeccable and does not warrant any interference by this Court. 8. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties at length and have also perused the record with utmost circumspection. 9. The questions arising for consideration before this Court are- (i) Whether the applicants voluntarily caused injury to the complainant by a sharp edged dangerous weapon with a common intention? (ii) Whether the findings arrived at by the Court below are perverse? 10. To hold the applicants guilty, the prosecution examined Bajirao Dewar (PW-1), Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2), Shobharam Dewar (PW-3), Asha Bai (PW-5), Durlabh @ Dulla (PW-6), Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7), Sub Inspector P.S. Tirkey (PW- 8), Head Constable Gyansingh Chandel (PW-9). The applicants did not examine any witness in their defence. 11. Bajirao Dewar (PW-1) deposed at para-2 of his evidence that while he was returning home after selling mutton the applicants met him on the way and they dragged him towards the wall of Ashirwad Lodge, thereafter, applicant No.1 Barsadi took out a sword like gupti from the bag hanged on his bicycle. Rajan had caught hold one of his hands. Applicant Barsadi tried to stab the gupti into his abdomen. On this he caught hold the gupti from his other hand. Applicant Mast Ram was slapping him from one side. Rajan had caught hold one of his hands. Applicant Barsadi tried to stab the gupti into his abdomen. On this he caught hold the gupti from his other hand. Applicant Mast Ram was slapping him from one side. They were three persons. As far as Rajan is concerned, he is not an accused in the instant case and according to Dehatinalishi (Ex.P.-1), Rajan had intervened between them. Bajirao Dewar (PW-1) has further stated in his evidence that when applicant Barsadi began to assault on his abdomen by the gupti, he caught hold the gupti with his other hand and tried to push with his hand then one person fell down to the other side. Thereafter, when he kicked on the abdomen of applicant Barsadi, the gupti left from his possession. The handle of the gupti remained left in the hand of applicant Barsadi and the sharp edged portion of the gupti remained in his hand due to which the vein of middle portion of the thumb and pointed finger got cut. Thereafter, he fled from there. The evidence of this witness has been corroborated by the evidence of Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2). Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2) has also deposed about the causing of injury to Bajirao (PW-1) on his left hand and finger by the gupti and smearing of clothes of Bajirao with blood. The statement of complainant Bajirao (PW-1) about causing him injury has remained un-rebutted in his cross-examination. 12. Bajirao Dewar (PW-1) deposed at para-12 of his deposition that the place of occurrence was a crowdy place. As far as taking out of the sword by applicant Barsadi from his back or from the bag is concerned, there is contradiction between the statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. and section 164 Cr.P.C. But, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of causing of injury to complainant Bajirao with a gupti like weapon by applicant Barsadi and the case of the prosecution is proved by immediate lodging of the FIR after the incident, and medical examination of injured complainant Bajirao on the date of incident itself, i.e. 29.08.2000 by Doctor Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7). Since, the injury was not caused on the vital part near the left thumb of the complainant nor the injured complainant remained under intense pain for 20 days so that the eighth clause of section 320 IPC may be satisfied and Head Constable Gyansingh Chandel (PW-9) has deposed at para-7 of his deposition that he met with the complainant at his house on 31.08.2000 after he had been discharged from the hospital and had returned home, therefore, the statement made by the complainant that he remained hospitalized is unsustainable. 13. From the evidence of complainant Bajirao Dewar (PW-1) and Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2), who are eyewitnesses and that of Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7), who medically examined the injured complainant, it appears that there is no error in imposition of conviction under section 324 IPC on applicant Barsadi. Therefore, the conviction imposed on applicant Barsadi under section 324 IPC is affirmed. 14. As far as the conviction of Applicant Barsadi under sections 25(1B)(b) and 27 (1) of the Arms Act is concerned, the length of the sharp edged portion of the weapon, with which complainant Bajirao (PW-1) was assaulted by applicant Barsadi, was 30 inches and the width was 1 inch. The handle of the weapon of assault was made of wood and its length was 5 inches and the handle was covered with rubber. Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2) has stated at paragraph-5 of his deposition that complainant Bajirao (PW-1) was assaulted with the gupti which was produced in the trial Court as Article-A. Shobha Ram Dewar (PW-3) has deposed that police had seized a sword from applicant Barsadi vide Ex.P-2. This witness has also stated about the seizure of a sword as Article-A and that the handle of the sword was made of wood and covered with rubber. In cross-examination, at paragraph-4, this witness has clarified that the seized weapon (Article-A) which was being addressed by him as a sword was also being addressed by him as a gupti. Head Constable Gyansingh Chandel (PW-9) has stated in his evidence about the seizure of an iron sword, whose length was 25 inches, length of the handle of the sword was 5 inches and thickness was 5 inches, before the witnesses on 04.09.2000 vide Ex.P-2. The seized weapon was examined by Dr. Head Constable Gyansingh Chandel (PW-9) has stated in his evidence about the seizure of an iron sword, whose length was 25 inches, length of the handle of the sword was 5 inches and thickness was 5 inches, before the witnesses on 04.09.2000 vide Ex.P-2. The seized weapon was examined by Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7), who in his report Ex.P- 6, has stated that the length of the sword was 30 inches, the width of the handle of the sword was 1 inch and the handle was made of wood and its length was 5 inches. Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7) has also examined injured complainant Bajirao (PW-1). The doctor has opined in his report Ex.P-6 that the injuries suffered by complainant Bajirao could be caused by the seized sword. Thus, the weapon of assault, i.e. the sword (Article-A) was legally seized and was produced before the trial Court as an evidence. 15. As far as the conviction of Applicant No.2 Mast Ram under Section 324/34 of IPC is concerned, complainant Bajirao (PW- 1) has at para-2 of his deposition deposed that while the assault by applicant Barsadi, applicant Mast Ram was slapping him continuously. Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2) has at paragraph-2 of his deposition deposed that applicant Mast Ram had caught hold of complainant Bajirao (PW-1) and was assaulting him. From these evidence, it is established that applicant Mast Ram was also a participant of the assault given to complainant Bajirao (PW-1). Therefore, the conviction imposed on applicant Mast Ram under section 324/34 IPC is affirmed. 16. Learned counsel for the applicants has argued that for making out a case against applicant Barsadi under Sections 25(1B)(b) and 27(1) of the Arms Act, the prosecution has not proved the relevant notification issued under section 4 of the Arms Act before the Trial Court and, therefore, applicant Barsadi cannot be convicted under sections 25 (1B) (b) and 27 (1) of the Arms Act. In support of her contention, she placed reliance on Raju alias Judge Khan v. State of M.P. (Now C.G.), 2013 (4) C.G.L.J. 100, in which, in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13, it is held as follows :- “10. In support of her contention, she placed reliance on Raju alias Judge Khan v. State of M.P. (Now C.G.), 2013 (4) C.G.L.J. 100, in which, in paragraphs 10, 12 and 13, it is held as follows :- “10. In the instant case, Inspector Sanjay Borkar (PW-3) did not speak regarding the description of the seized knife (chaku) and the seized knife (chaku) was not marked as an article/exhibit nor was there any evidence taken on record in the trial Court regarding its specification. Although recovery memo (Ex.P/4) mentions its size and specification but Inspector Sanjay Borkar (PW-3) did not speak regarding the description and specification of the seized knife (chaku). 12. As the prosecution has failed to prove or bring on record the notification regulating possession of arm of the class or description in a particular area, the accused could not be convicted for offence under Section 25(1B)(b) of the Act, 1959. 13. In the result, the appeal deserves to be and is hereby allowed. The conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant under section 25(1B) (b) of the Arms Act are set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge framed against him. It is stated that he is on bail. His bail bonds are continued for a period of 6 months from today.” 17. Learned counsel appearing for the applicants also placed reliance on Vridhichand v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2014 CRI.L.J. 4312 in support of her contention against the conviction imposed under the Arms Act. 18. As far as non-proving of the relevant notification issued under section 4 of the Arms Act before the Trial Court by the prosecution is concerned, it appears that the prosecution has placed on record a photocopy of the said notification, which reads as under : “[47] Notification No. 6312-6552-II-B (i) dated the 22nd November, 1974.- Whereas the State Government is of the opinion that having regard to the prevailing conditions in the State of Madhya Pradesh, it is necessary and expedient in the public interest that the acquisition, possession and carrying of sharp edged weapons with a blade more than 6 inches long 2 inches wide and spring actuated knives with a blade of any size in public places should also be regulated. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 4 of the Arms Act, 1959 (No. 54 of 1959) read with the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Notification No. G.S. R. 1309, dated the 1st October, 1962, the State Government hereby directs that the said section shall apply with effect from the date of publication of this Notification in the “Madhya Pradesh Gazette” to the whole of the State of Madhya Pradesh in respect of acquisition, possession or carrying of sharp edged weapons with a blade more than 6 inches long or 2 inches wide and spring actuated knives with a blade of any size in public places only. [Published in M.P. Rajpatra Part I dated 3-1-75 page 20]” 19. In regard to proving of a notification, Clause (a) of Article 13(3) of the Constitution of India may be referred to, which says as under: “13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamental rights.- xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxx xxxx (3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires,- (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law;” 20. Likewise, Section 57(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 says as under : “57. Facts of which Court must take judicial notice.- The Court shall take judicial notice of the following facts :- (1) All laws in force in the territory of India;” 21. Therefore, in view of the notification and the provisions of the Constitution of India and the Indian Evidence Act, quoted herein above, I am of the considered opinion that a notification issued by the Government and published in the gazette is presumed to be law and Court must take judicial notice of the same and it does not need to be proved. In this regard, in State v. Gopal Singh, 1956 CriLJ 621, a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held as follows: “8. In this regard, in State v. Gopal Singh, 1956 CriLJ 621, a Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has held as follows: “8. For the foregoing reasons, my answers to the questions referred to the Full Bench are that judicial notice can be taken of a notification issued by the Government or any competent authority in the exercise of delegated power of legislation; that judicial notice cannot be taken of a notification issued by any authority in the exercise of its executive functions; that (under the last paragraph of Section 57, Evidence Act, a Court has a discretion to refuse to take judicial notice of a notification made in the exercise of delegated power of legislation, unless the notification is produced.).” 22. It appears that the Full Bench’s decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Gopal Singh case (supra) was not placed before this Court while deciding Raju alias Judge Khan case (supra). 23. The notification of Section 4 of the Arms Act has been issued by the Government under Legislative delegation of power. Therefore, such notification, taking the same within the purview of Article 13(3)(a) of the Constitution of India, can be presumed to be law and this Court can take judicial notice thereof. In view of this position, the notification in question was not required to be proved by the prosecution before the trial Court. Therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel appearing for the applicants in this regard is rejected. 24. The first difference between the case laws cited by the learned counsel appearing for the applicants and the present case is that photocopy of the relevant notification is available on the record of the trial Court and there is a mention of the notification at serial No. 8 of the list of documents enclosed to the final report which was filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mahasamund. In the present case, the seized iron sword had been produced before the trial Court, which was proved by Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2) in the trial Court as Article-A. Shobha Ram Dewar (PW-3) has also stated about the seizure of the sword (Article-A). Dr. In the present case, the seized iron sword had been produced before the trial Court, which was proved by Dheeraj Dewar (PW-2) in the trial Court as Article-A. Shobha Ram Dewar (PW-3) has also stated about the seizure of the sword (Article-A). Dr. Girdharilal Chandrakar (PW-7), who examined the seized sword and gave his report vide Ex.P-6, in his deposition at paragraph -4, has deposed that the length of the sword was 30 inches, the width of the handle of the sword was 1 inch and the length of the handle of the sword was 5 inches. 25. Thus, the facts relating to the seized weapon of assault, i.e. regarding proving of the relevant notification and the size/measurement of the weapon are not akin to the facts of Raju alias Judge Khan case (supra) and Vridhichand case (supra) relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the applicants in support of her contention and, therefore, both the case laws are held distinguishable on facts. 26. In view of the foregoing reasons, the Criminal Revision fails and is hereby dismissed. Revision is dismissed.