JUDGMENT : (Delievered by Dinesh Kumar Singh, J.) 1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated 24.8.1982 passed by the Sessions Judge, Sultanpur in Sessions Trial No.51 of 1982. The learned trial court vide the impugned judgment and order had convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant under Section 302 Indian penal code for life imprisonment. 2. The Appeal was admitted on 30.9.1982 and the accused/appellant was granted bail by this Court on the same day. However, the accused/appellant could submit the bail bonds etc., after 11 years and even thereafter, he could not be released on bail for the reasons not discernable from the record. 3. There has been virtually no assistance either from the counsel representing the accused or the State. The Court has to help itself in deciding the appeal virtually without any assistance. 4. It also transpires from the record that the accused/appellant was mentally sick and, therefore, he was sent to Mental Hospital, Varanasi on 24.02.1986 from Central Prison Naini, Allahabad and, thereafter, only on 9.3.2007 he was sent back to the prison from the Mental Hospital, Varanasi. Despite the bail order dated 03.09.1982, he could be released from the prison on 10.3.2007 after he came back for the Mental Hospital. 5. It is also evident that no one was appearing on behalf of the accused/appellant for very long time and later on it got transpired that Shri S. P. Shukla, learned Advocate who was engaged initially in the matter who had died and, therefore, vide order dated 14.9.2015 a notice was issued to the accused/appellant through C.J.M., Sultanpur to engage another counsel. The learned C.J.M., Sultanpur sent a report that vide letter dated 5.11.2015, notice was served upon the accused/appellant to that effect. However, even after service of the notice on the accused/appellant, there was no appearance on behalf of the accused/appellant and, therefore, this Court issued non bailable warrant against the accused/appellant on 02.12.2015 through C.J.M. concerned. Thereafter, again in pursuance of the order dated 2.12.2015, the accused/appellant was arrested and sent to the District Jail, Sultanpur on 15.2.2016. Since then he has been in jail. 6. It is quite disturbing to note that even thereafter, the counsel representing the accused either has not been appearing or has been seeking adjournment on one pretext or the other on every date whenever the case was listed. Since then he has been in jail. 6. It is quite disturbing to note that even thereafter, the counsel representing the accused either has not been appearing or has been seeking adjournment on one pretext or the other on every date whenever the case was listed. From perusal of several orders of this Court it is clear that from 2015 to 2016 either no one appeared in the appeal or adjournment was sought on behalf of the accused/appellant. In these circumstances, the appeal could not be argued and decided on merit. Instead of arguing the appeal on merit, on 04.03.2016, an application was filed seeking bail of the accused/appellant. This application also remained pending. 7. From the documents annexed with the said bail application, it is clear that the accused/appellant remanded in jail from the December 1981 to 10.3.2007 despite the order of bail passed by this Court on 30.9.1982. He had been receiving the treatment in the Mental Hospital, Varanasi where he remained admitted for more than 21 years i.e. from 24.2.1986 to 9.3.2007. Again after he was arrested on 15.2.2016 in compliance of the Order dated 2.12.2015 passed by this Court, he was sent to the Mental Hospital, Varanasi on 15.3.2017 where he is presently admitted. 8. On the information having been received from the Mental Hospital, Varanasi the Superintendent District Jail, Sultanpur has written letter dated 18.5.2017 to Rajkumar and Laxman sons of the accused/appellant that the accused/appellant is seriously ill and his sons have been requested to look after the ailing father who is admitted in the Mental Hospital, Varanasi and provide assistance to the administration in the treatment of the accused/appellant in the Mental Hospital, Varanasi. This is the sad part of the case. 9. We express our deep anguish and deprecate unprofessionalism which results in deprivation of justice to the hapless consumers of justice and as a result thereof they languish in jail. The rule of law in a democracy becomes the first victim if the justice is delayed. Who all are parts of the justice delivery system must bear in mind that justice delayed is justice denied. The most important fundamental right of life and liberty guaranteed under our constitution is denied if a person is in jail without finality attached to the sentence. 10. After accepting brief not arguing the case and seeking adjournment is highly unprofessional conduct. The most important fundamental right of life and liberty guaranteed under our constitution is denied if a person is in jail without finality attached to the sentence. 10. After accepting brief not arguing the case and seeking adjournment is highly unprofessional conduct. It should always be endeavor of all to see that peoples' faith in the judiciary remains intact and does not vanish. This is possible only when justice is timely delivered. Our endeavour should be not to fail the system and hope of the citizens to get justice from the Courts should not withered away. 11. Now coming to the case, the prosecution story as emerges from the record of the appeal is that a written report was given by Bindeshwari Singh, the complainant on 19.12.1981 at the Police Station Baldirai, District Sultanpur that his brother Nageshwar Singh had been pressurizing him for compromise in a civil dispute with Abhimanyu Singh and Shivmangal Singh who were residents of the same village and used to threaten him that if the complainant would not compromise the civil dispute, the accused/appellant would finish of the entire family of the complainant. In furtherance of the aforesaid threat on 19.12.1981 at around 3 pm when his wife Rajeshwari was sitting at the door of their house, she was carrying their younger son on her lap, daughter Sushma Kumari and son Sanjay were also with her and playing. At that pointing time his brother, Nageshwar Singh armed with an axe came there and tried to assault her younger son who was in the lap of his mother. However, his wife could save the younger son and then started running inside the house catching hold of elder son Sanjay. Nageshwar Singh attacked and gave a blow on the hip of Sanjay by axe and due to the injury caused by the axe, Sanjay died on the spot. 12. He further said that he was not present at the house as he went to Sultanpur in the morning to attend some Court case. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, First Information Report Exh. Ka-3, Case Crime No.183 of 1981 was registered under Section 302 Indian Penal Code in the police station against the accused/appellant. 13. The post mortem Exh.Ka-19 was conducted of the body of deceased Sanjay aged around 5 years. On the basis of the aforesaid written report, First Information Report Exh. Ka-3, Case Crime No.183 of 1981 was registered under Section 302 Indian Penal Code in the police station against the accused/appellant. 13. The post mortem Exh.Ka-19 was conducted of the body of deceased Sanjay aged around 5 years. Only one following ante mortem injury was found on the body of the deceased Sanjay:- "Incised wound 12 cm x 5 cm on back of right side 2-1/2 cm below the iliac crest margins clean cut contused extending to 2 cm right to mid line obliquely placed Higher side on left small intestines protruding out on opening the wound it shows sacrum cut out 3rd sacrum piece level completed cesphlets cutting the left iliac pore and extending to right cutting the hip just under lying iliac on left side Cut completely rectum out, only 1 cm portion intact interiorly tissues blood stained, small intestines ruptured and cut two places." 14. In the opinion of the doctor, the death occurred due to the shock and hemorrhage because of the ante mortem injury received. 15. The investigating officer after investigating the crime filed charge-sheet Exh. Ka-18 against the accused/appellant under Section 302 Indian Penal code. The accused was arrested on 20.12.1981 itself. Learned Trial Court framed charge against the accused/appellant for causing death of Sanjay, son of Bindeshwari for the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. 16. The prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and produced 9 exhibits to prove the case against the accused appellant. 17. P.W.-1 in his statement said that the accused/appellant was his brother and he had enmity with his brother, Abhimanyu Singh and Shivmangal Singh. All were the residents of the same village. He had an ongoing civil dispute with Abhimanyu Singh and Shiv Mangal Singh. The accused/appellant, Abhimanyu Singh and Shivmangal Singh were friends. And whenever there was quarrel between the accused/appellant and P.W.-1, the accused/appellant used to threaten him that he would finish his entire family and Abhimanuyu Singh and Shivmangal Singh would support him. 18. He further said that he had three children born from his wife, Rajeshwari namely, Sushma Kumari aged about 7 years, deceased Sanjay was about 5 years old, Ravi Shankar Singh aged about 2 years at the time of the incident. 18. He further said that he had three children born from his wife, Rajeshwari namely, Sushma Kumari aged about 7 years, deceased Sanjay was about 5 years old, Ravi Shankar Singh aged about 2 years at the time of the incident. On the date of incident when he came back from Sultanpur after attending the Court case, he found his son Sanjay lying dead on the door of his house. There was blood on the ground and many residents of the village got collected. His wife, daughter, brother-in-law and nephew were also present. All people present were crying. When he inquired about the incident, his wife told him about the incident. In his cross examination nothing came out on the basis of which it could be said that his statement was unbelievable. 19. Smt. Rajeshwari wife of the P.W.-1 and mother of the deceased Sanjay in her statement confirmed the First Information Report version of the incident. During her cross-examination, the witness remained unshaken and no contradiction worth consideration could come out which would make her statement unbelievable or prosecution case improbable. 20. P.W.-3 Shiv Kumar Singh is another eyewitness. He said that he was sitting with the Arun Kumar, brother-in-law of the P.W.-1 under a neem tree near the place of incident, in front of his house and Rajeshwari was sitting in front of their house having the younger son on her lap. Nearby Sanjay was sitting at a little distance and daughter Sushma was playing. At this point in time the accused/appellant came there armed with an axe and charged towards the younger son of the P.W.-1. However, Rajeshwari stood up holding her younger son and started moving inside the house catching hold of Sanjay's hand. At that point in time, the accused appellant hit Sanjay with axe. Sanjay fell down and died. 21. P.W.-3 further said that he and Arun Kumar reached running and chased the accused but he ran away with axe. Bindeshwari, P.W.-1 was not there when the incident took place. He came back at about 5 p.m and then he was told about the incident. This witness also remained unshaken during his cross examination. 22. P.W.-4 Suryabhan Singh is witness to the recovery of the axe. Lal Dev, the Investigating Officer has been examined as P.W.-6 who conducted investigation and filed the charge sheet. P.W.-8 Dr. He came back at about 5 p.m and then he was told about the incident. This witness also remained unshaken during his cross examination. 22. P.W.-4 Suryabhan Singh is witness to the recovery of the axe. Lal Dev, the Investigating Officer has been examined as P.W.-6 who conducted investigation and filed the charge sheet. P.W.-8 Dr. K. K. Mehrotra who conducted the post mortem examination proved the post mortem report and said that the injury could have been caused by heavy cutting weapon. 23. The accused/appellant in his statement recorded under 313 Cr.P.C. denied the allegation and said that he had no enmity with anyone. When he was asked that why he had been implicated in this case, he said that he did not know the reason. When he was put the question that why the witnesses had deposed against him he said that he did not know the reason. 24. The trial court on the basis of the aforesaid documentary and oral evidence vide impugned judgment and order dated 24.8.1982 concluded that it was the accused/appellant who killed Sanjay with axe. It was also held that he caused the injury by axe with the intention of causing death and he knew that injury would likely to cause death of deceased Sanjay and, therefore Trial Court awarded the sentence of life imprisonment to the accused/appellant. 25. We have considered the evidence and perused the impugned judgment carefully. It cannot be said that the set of facts set out above do not disclose the offence of murder because prosecution could not prove that there was an intention to inflict a bodily injury that was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Section 300 "thirdly" reads as under: " If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." 26. Section 300 "thirdly" reads as under: " If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." 26. It is settled law and no longer res integra that if there is intention to inflict an injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, then the intention is to kill and in that event "thirdly" of Section 300 of IPC would be unnecessary because then act would fall under the first part of the section, i.e. " if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death". 27. We find no force in the argument that the accused gave only single blow and he had no intention to cause death of deceased Sanjay or he did not know that the injury inflicted by him would cause death. The injury noted above was extremely brutal as the axe was struck with so much force, that it cannot be said that accused- appellant did not have intention of causing death or that he did not know that result of injury would be death of the victim of the offence. The prosecution has proved the injury and established the nature of the injury which was stuck at the hip so deep that it cut the vital organs of the deceased and he instantly died. Therefore, it cannot be said that the accused/appellant had no intention to cause injury on the deceased which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; the inference is only one that the injury was caused with the intention to kill. 28. We do not find any error in the judgment of the trial court and, therefore, we uphold the judgment of conviction of the accused appellant under section 302 IPC. However, the question which is required to be considered is that whether the life imprisonment awarded to the accused appellant can be converted to fix term imprisonment beyond 14 years? It is important to note that the accused has been in imprisonment for more than 26 years and most of the time he has been admitted in the Mental Hospital Varansi and at present also he is in the said Mental Hospital where his condition is reported to be very serious. It is important to note that the accused has been in imprisonment for more than 26 years and most of the time he has been admitted in the Mental Hospital Varansi and at present also he is in the said Mental Hospital where his condition is reported to be very serious. 29. Section 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows: 1. A High Court may pass any sentence authorised by law. 2. A Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law; but any sentence of death passed by any such Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. 3. An Assistant Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law except a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life or of imprisonment for a term exceeding ten years. 30. The aforesaid Section provides that the High Court can pass any sentence "authorised by law and Sessions Judge or Additional Sessions Judge may pass any sentence authorised by law but for any sentence of death passed by any such judge shall be subjected to confirmation by the High Court. 31. Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:- "386. Power of the Appellate Court. 31. Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:- "386. Power of the Appellate Court. After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may- (a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re- tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law; (b) in an appeal from a conviction- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re- tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the Same; (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re- tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same; (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order; (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper; Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal." 32. From reading of the Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure extracted above, it is clear that the appellate court may dismiss, alter or enhance the sentence depending upon the fact situation when an appeal is preferred, but it cannot impose any sentence that does not have sanction of law. 33. Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code provides punishments in following manner:- "53. Punishments.--The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are-- (First) -- Death; 1[Secondly.--Imprisonment for life;] 2[***] (Fourthly) --Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions, namely:-- (1) Rigorous, that is, with hard labour; (2) Simple; (Fifthly) --Forfeiture of property; (Sixthly)- --Fine." 34. Section 302 Indian Penal Code provides punishment for murder i.e. death or imprisonment for life with fine. 35. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India versus V. Sriharan (2016) 7 SCC 1 answered certain questions which were framed for consideration by the constitution bench. The questions inter alia include "whether imprisonment for life means for the rest of one's life with any right to claim remission?" 36. The constitution bench after referring to the decision in Maru Ram versus Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 , Gopal Vinayak Godse vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 and State of M.P. versus Ratan Singh, (1976) 3 SCC 470 has held that the life imprisonment only means the entirety of the life unless it is curtailed by remissions legally granted under the Criminal Procedure Code by the appropriate Government in exercise of the constitutional powers vested under Articles 72 and 162 of the Constitution of India in the President or the Governor of the State respectively. 37. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar @ Golu versus Union of India and others, (1991) 3 SCC 498 in para 15 held as under:- "15. 37. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar @ Golu versus Union of India and others, (1991) 3 SCC 498 in para 15 held as under:- "15. It will thus be seen from the ratio laid down in the aforesaid two cases that where a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life the remissions earned by him during his internment in prison under the relevant remission rules have a limited scope and must be confined to the scope and ambit of the said rules and do not acquire significance until the sentence is remitted under section 432, in which case the remission would be subject to limitation of section 433A of the Code, or constitutional power has been exercised under Article 72/161 of the Constitution. In Bhagirath's case the question which the Constitution Bench was required to consider was whether a person sentenced to imprisonment for life can claim the benefit of section 428 of the Code which, inter alia provides for setting off the period of detention undergone by the accused as an undertrial against the sentence of imprisonment ultimately awarded to him. Referring to section 57, IPC, the Constitution Bench reiterated the legal position as under: "The provision contained in Section 57 that imprisonment for life has to be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years is for the purpose of calculating fractions of terms in punishment. We cannot press that provision into service for a wider purpose." These observations are consistent with the ratio laid down in Godse and Maru Ram's cases. Coming next to the question of set off under section 428 of the Code, this Court held: "The question of setting off the period of detention undergone by an accused as an undertrial prisoner against the sentence of life imprisonment can arise only if an order is passed by the appropriate authority under section 432 of section 433 of the Code. In the absence or such order, passed generally or specially, and apart from the provisions, if any of the relevant Jail Manual, imprisonment for life would mean, according to the rule in Gopal Vinayak Godse, imprisonment for the remainder of life." We fail to see any departure from the ratio of Godse's case; on the contrary the afore-quoted passage clearly shows approval of that ratio and this becomes further clear from the final order passed by the Court while allowing the appeal/writ petition. The Court directed that the period of detention undergone by the two accused as undertrial prisoners would be set off against the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them, subject to the provisions contained in section 433A and, `provided that orders have been passed by the appropriate authority under section 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure'. These directions make it clear beyond any manner of doubt that just as in the case of remissions so also in the case of set off the period of detention as undertrial would enuse to the benefit of the convict provided the appropriate Government has chosen to pass an order under sections 432/433 of the Code. The ratio of Bhagirath's case, therefore, does not run counter to the ratio of this Court in the case of Godse or Maru Ram." 38. The Supreme Court in the case of Swamy Shraddananda (2) vs State of Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 in para 92 held as under:- "92. The matter may be looked at from a slightly different angle. The issue of sentencing has two aspects. A sentence may be excessive and unduly harsh or it may be highly disproportionately inadequate. When an appellant comes to this court carrying a death sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court, this Court may find, as in the present appeal, that the case just falls short of the rarest of the rare category and may feel somewhat reluctant in endorsing the death sentence. But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment that subject to remission normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. What then the Court should do? But at the same time, having regard to the nature of the crime, the Court may strongly feel that a sentence of life imprisonment that subject to remission normally works out to a term of 14 years would be grossly disproportionate and inadequate. What then the Court should do? If the Court's option is limited only to two punishments, one a sentence of imprisonment, for all intents and purposes, of not more than 14 years and the other death, the court may feel tempted and find itself nudged into endorsing the death penalty. Such a course would indeed be disastrous. A far more just, reasonable and proper course would be to expand the options and to take over what, as a matter of fact, lawfully belongs to the court, i.e., the vast hiatus between 14 years' imprisonment and death. It needs to be emphasized that the Court would take recourse to the expanded option primarily because in the facts of the case, the sentence of 14 years imprisonment would amount to no punishment at all." 39. The majority in V. Sriharan's case (Supra) approved the aforesaid law as laid down in the Swamy Shraddananda's case(supra) and in para 79 the Supreme Court held as under:- "79.In this context, the submission of the learned Solicitor General on the interpretation of Section 433-A CrPC assumes significance. His contention was that under Section 433-A CrPC what is prescribed is only the minimum and, therefore, there is no restriction to fix it at any period beyond 14 years and up to the end of one's lifespan. We find substance in the said submission. When we refer to Section 433-A, we find that the expression used in the said [pic]section for the purpose of grant of remission relating to a person convicted and directed to undergo life imprisonment, it stipulates that "such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment" (emphasis supplied). When we refer to Section 433-A, we find that the expression used in the said [pic]section for the purpose of grant of remission relating to a person convicted and directed to undergo life imprisonment, it stipulates that "such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment" (emphasis supplied). Therefore, when the minimum imprisonment is prescribed under the statute, there will be every justification for the court which considers the nature of offence for which conviction is imposed on the offender for which offence the extent of punishment either death or life imprisonment is provided for, it should be held that there will be every justification and authority for the court to ensure in the interest of the public at large and the society, that such person should undergo imprisonment for a specified period even beyond 14 years without any scope for remission. In fact, going by the caption of the said Section 433-A, it imposes a restriction on powers of remission or commutation in certain cases. For a statutory authority competent to consider a case for remission after the imposition of punishment by court of law it can be held so, then a judicial forum which has got a wider scope for considering the nature of offence and the conduct of the offender including his mens rea to bestow its judicial sense and direct that such offender does not deserve to be released early and required to be kept in confinement for a longer period, it should be held that there will be no dearth in the authority for exercising such power in the matter of imposition of the appropriate sentence befitting the criminal act committed by the convict." 40. Further with respect to the powers of the High Court and Supreme Court for awarding modified punishment within the punishment provided in the penal code for specified offences, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment held below in paras 103, 104, 105:- "103. Further with respect to the powers of the High Court and Supreme Court for awarding modified punishment within the punishment provided in the penal code for specified offences, the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment held below in paras 103, 104, 105:- "103. In fact, while saying so we must also point out that such exercise of power in the imposition of death penalty or life imprisonment by the Sessions Judge will get the scrutiny by the Division Bench of the High Court mandatorily when the penalty is death and invariably even in respect of life imprisonment gets scrutinised by the Division Bench by virtue of the appeal remedy provided in the Criminal Procedure Code. Therefore, our conclusion as stated above can be reinforced by stating that the punishment part of such specified offences are always examined at least once after the Sessions Court's verdict by the High Court and that too by a Division Bench consisting of two Hon'ble Judges. 104. That apart, in most of such cases where death penalty or life imprisonment is the punishment imposed by the trial court and confirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court, the convict concerned will get an opportunity to get such verdict tested by filing further appeal by way of special leave to this Court. By way of abundant caution and as per the prescribed law of the Code and the criminal jurisprudence, we can assert that after the [pic]initial finding of guilt of such specified grave offences and the imposition of penalty either death or life imprisonment, when comes under the scrutiny of the Division Bench of the High Court, it is only the High Court which derives the power under the Penal Code, which prescribes the capital and alternate punishment, to alter the said punishment with one either for the entirety of the convict's life or for any specific period of more than 14 years, say 20, 30 or so on depending upon the gravity of the crime committed and the exercise of judicial conscience befitting such offence found proved to have been committed. 105. 105. We, therefore, reiterate that, the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal only by the Supreme Court and not by any other Court in this country. To put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the Supreme Court and not by any other inferior Court." 41. The Supreme Court in the case of Vikas Yadav vs State of U.P. (2016) 9 SCC 541 has upheld the judgment of the Delhi High Court which modified life imprisonment awarded by the Trial Court to Vikas Yadav, Vishal Yadav under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC to 25 years actual imprisonment without consideration of remission and to accused Sukhdev Yadav, 20 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission with fine. Delhi High court had imposed the following sentences (Vikas Yadav Case versus State of U.P., (2015 SCC OnLine Del 7129)):- For commission of offences under Sentences awarded to each of Vikas Yadav & Vishal Yadav Sentence awarded to Sukhdev Yadav Sections 302/34 IPC Life imprisonment which shall be 25 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission, and fine of Rs.50 Lakhs each Life imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission, and fine of Rs.10,000/- Upon default in payment of fine, they shall be liable to undergo rigorous imprisonment of 3 years Upon default in payment of fine, he shall be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for one month Sections 364/34 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with a fine of Rs. 2 Lakhs each 10 years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5000 Upon default in payment of fine, they shall be liable to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months Upon default in payment of fine, he shall be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days Sections 201/34 IPC Rigorous imprisonment for 5 years and a fine of Rs.2 Lakhs each 5 years' rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.5000 Upon default in payment of fine, they shall be liable to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months Upon default in payment of fine, he shall be liable to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days 42. The Supreme Court in the case of Vikas Yadav (supra) held that High Court has the power to enhance the life sentence to death but this power is to be very sparingly used. If the High Court instead of imposing death sentence, sentence the accused for fixed term beyond 14 years taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, The High Court cannot be found fault with on that score. 43. In the present case, the accused/appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and the trial court could have imposed the death sentence. However, the trial court had awarded life imprisonment to the accused appellant. 44. The accused/appellant has been in jail for almost 26 years. Out of which he has spent around 22 years in the Mental Hospital, Varanasi and currently also he is receiving treatment in the Mental Hospital, Varanasi. It is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused/appellant killed 5 years old Sanjay, his own nephew in a most brutal manner. The child could not have any enmity with the accused/appellant. It appears that he was depraved mind at the time of committing the crime and, therefore, he committed the most heinous crime of murdering an innocent child Sanjay. The Court cannot have any sympathy towards the accused/appellant while awarding the sentence once he has been found guilty. 45. The Trial Court, as mentioned above instead of giving death penalty has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant for life imprisonment. The Court cannot have any sympathy towards the accused/appellant while awarding the sentence once he has been found guilty. 45. The Trial Court, as mentioned above instead of giving death penalty has convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant for life imprisonment. Considering the fact that the accused/appellant has been in jail for almost 26 years and out of which he has been in Mental Hospital, Varanasi, for almost 22 years, this Court is required to consider what would be the appropriate sentence which can be awarded to the accused/appellant considering the facts and circumstances of the case. 46. It is no longer res integra that the High Court has power to award any modified punishment within the punishment provided for in the Indian Penal Code for such specified offences. 47. Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we deem it appropriate while upholding the life sentence to the accused/appellant awarded by the Trial Court, instead of the punishment for entirety of the accused appellant's life, we hereby sentence him for 26 years of actual imprisonment without consideration of remission. Since the accused/appellant has already served out the aforesaid sentence, we hereby direct to release the accused/appellant forthwith. The bail bonds are cancelled and sureties are discharged. The trial Court judgment is modified to this extent. 48. With the aforesaid modifications in the judgment, the appeal is dismissed.