JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Appellant-plaintiffs have laid this appeal under Order 43, Rule 1(r) read with section 104 CPC to challenge order dated 23rd of September 2017, passed by Addl. District Judge, Jodhpur District, Jodhpur (for short, 'learned trial Court'). By the order impugned, learned trial Court has rejected the application of appellant-plaintiffs under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 read with section 151 CPC for temporary injunction in a suit for cancellation of sale-deeds and perpetual injunction. 2. It is, inter-alia, averred in the plaint that the agricultural land situated at Village Gumanpura, Tehsil Shergarh, District Jodhpur in Khasra No.1009 measuring 83 bigha 3 biswa, and Khasra No.1008 measuring 4 biswa, was given to Shri Laxman Singh alias Lichman Singh for cultivation and after death of Laxman Singh, Kishore Singh and Sujan Singh, the real brothers, started cultivating the land. In the plaint, it is also averred by the appellants that their father Kishore Singh died in Samvat 2008 but their mother was alive, however, as per the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, she being lady, her name was not entered in the revenue record, and therefore, at the time of settlement, the entire agricultural land was recorded in the name of Sujan Singh. The plaint further unfurls that uptil her death, appellant-plaintiffs' mother was jointly cultivating the land with Sujan Singh as she had half share in the land. A specific averment is made in the plaint that after death of their mother, appellant-plaintiffs filed a revenue suit before Sub Divisional Officer, Shergarh and also applied for temporary injunction wherein the learned revenue court granted status-quo order. A fact is also pleaded in the plaint that it has come to the knowledge of the appellant-plaintiffs that respondents No.1 to 3 have sold 7/24th share of the agricultural land to respondent No.4, and respondent No.5 to 8 have sold 7/16th share of the land to respondent No.9 Uda Ram, by executing sale-deeds dated 23rd October 2008 and 10th of July 2010 respectively. Asserting in the plaint that the sale-deeds are void insofar as their rights are concerned, appellant-plaintiffs craved for cancellation of both these sale-deeds and for perpetual injunction. Asserting in the plaint that the sale-deeds are void insofar as their rights are concerned, appellant-plaintiffs craved for cancellation of both these sale-deeds and for perpetual injunction. Along with the suit, an application under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 read with section 151 CPC is also filed with identical pleadings for seeking restraint order against the respondents not to interfere with their possession and cultivation of land and furthermore not to alienate the disputed agricultural land. 3. The application for temporary injunction is contested by respondent No.1 & 2 denying all the averments made therein. It is specifically pleaded in the return that land was exclusively cultivated by Sujan Singh and Kishore Singh was not his brother. It is also averred in the return that Sujan Singh's father Laxman Singh was never allotted any agricultural land for cultivation by the then Jagirdar of Dechu and as a matter of fact in Samvat 2006 corresponding to year 1949, the Marwar Tenancy Act and the Marwar Revenue Act were in force, which provided for issuance of Parcha in the name of cultivator. The reply further states that in the event of death of tenant, if he is not survived by any male legal heir, then his widow and minor daughters are entitled for tenancy rights. While specifically pleading in the reply that the appellants have no right over the land in question their positive assertion about the land being cultivated by their mother is absolutely false and misleading. In the reply, this averment is also specifically denied that after death of Laxman Singh, Kishore Singh and Sujan Singh remained in join possession of the disputed agricultural land. It is also averred in the reply that Sujan Singh transferred the land during his lifetime in the year 1959 and subsequently the land was transferred to other incumbents from time to time. As regards, revenue suit pending before Sub Divisional Officer, Shergarh, it is specifically averred in the return that respondents never received any notice from revenue court. Making a positive assertion in the reply that initially the land was transferred by Sujan Singh in the year 1959, it is submitted by the respondents in the reply that the appellant-plaintiffs have filed the suit without any foundation after 55 years and as the suit itself is misconceived no temporary injunction can be granted. Making a positive assertion in the reply that initially the land was transferred by Sujan Singh in the year 1959, it is submitted by the respondents in the reply that the appellant-plaintiffs have filed the suit without any foundation after 55 years and as the suit itself is misconceived no temporary injunction can be granted. In the specific objection, a fact is mentioned by the respondents that the land was partitioned by a competent court among the khatedars and then in the year 1959 Sujan Singh sold land to Mangla Ram, Takhta Ram, Panna Ram and Achla Ram S/o Teja Ram Nai and subsequently Panna Ram sold his share of land to his brother Takhta Ram in 1989, by a registered sale-deed, and accordingly their names were entered in the revenue records. Respondents also contended in the reply that appellant-plaintiffs were neither in possession of the land, nor they are cultivating the same. Appellant-plaintiffs in support of their application for temporary injunction, submitted three affidavits besides their own affidavits and e.converso five affidavits were submitted on behalf of respondents. 4. The learned trial Court, thereafter, heard arguments and by the order impugned found that neither there is any prima facie case in favour of the appellant-plaintiffs nor other two ingredients are available to them for grant of temporary injunction. With this finding, learned trial Court rejected the application for temporary injunction. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants as well as learned counsel for the respondents at length. Learned counsel for the appellants, in support of arguments, has placed reliance on following precedents: (1) Meghmala & Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy & Ors. [2011(3) Civil Court Cases 6 (S.C.)], (2) Mohammed Sadiq & Ors. v. Abida & Ors. [2010(3) DNJ (Raj.) 1274], and (3) Ramkishore Kumawat v. Madan Lal Kumawat & Ors. [2013(1) DNJ (Raj.) 170]. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on following judgments: (1) Vimla Devi v. Jang Bahadur (1977 RLW 326), and (2) Kailash Chand v. Bajranglal & Ors. ( AIR 1997 Raj. 205 ) 5. Before I proceed to examine the impugned order, it would be appropriate to examine the power of appellate Court to interfere with the discretionary order of trial Court passed under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 CPC. 6. ( AIR 1997 Raj. 205 ) 5. Before I proceed to examine the impugned order, it would be appropriate to examine the power of appellate Court to interfere with the discretionary order of trial Court passed under Order 39, Rule 1 & 2 CPC. 6. In Vimla Devi (supra), an authoritative pronouncement of this Court, scope of judicial review, against an order granting or refusing temporary injunction, has been discussed threadbare, and the Court held: "I have given my earnest consideration to the contentions raised on behalf of the defendant-petitioner. The order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily Court of appeal will not interfere with the exercise of discretion passed by the trial Court and substitute for it its own discretion. The interference with the discretionary order, however, may be justified if the lower Court acts arbitrarily or perversely, capriciously or in disregard of sound legal principles or without considering all the relevant records. In the light of the above observations, I have now to see whether it was open to the learned District Judge to interfere with the order of the learned trial Court. It is well settled that the grant of temporary injunction is a discretionary order and the decision of the first Court could not be easily interfered with by the appellate Court vide Musa v. Badri Prasad, ILR (1953) 3 Raj 257. The mere possibility of the appellate Court coming to a different conclusion on the same facts and evidence will also not justify interference vide Wazir Sundar Singh v. Mst. Farida Khanam, AIR 1920 PC 132 . Another well established principle while disposing of the application under O. 39, Rr. 1 and 2, C.P.C. is that when the Court while dealing with the case for grant of temporary injunction decides the question of prima facie case, it should apply its judicial mind to the materials which are placed on the record and if it does not do so then it commits illegality in the exercise of jurisdiction and in that case the High Court is competent to interfere in revision in such a case vide Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra). The view taken in Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra) has been followed by Kan Singh J. in Girdhari Lal v. Mahadevi Sharma, AIR 1968 Raj 237 . The view taken in Musa v. Badri Prasad (supra) has been followed by Kan Singh J. in Girdhari Lal v. Mahadevi Sharma, AIR 1968 Raj 237 . It has been held in this case that the appellate Court should be slow in upsetting a decision of a trial Court in a matter relating to grant of temporary injunction unless the decision of the trial Court is arbitrary, perverse or is not based on sound legal principles. It has been further observed in that case that when the appellate Court does not apply its judicial mind on all the materials brought on the record then in that case the approach of an Appellate Court would be wrong and contrary to the well established principles laid down by the High Court, more so when the appellate Court does not deal with the reasoning that has prevailed with the trial Court and further when it does not apply its judicial mind on the materials placed on the record." 7. Supreme Court, in a latter judgment, Wander Ltd. & Anr. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. [1990 Supp(1) SCC 727], examined the scope of interference by appellate Court with the exercise of discretion of the Court of first instance in the matter of interlocutory injunction in an appeal under Order 43 CPC. The Court held: "The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721) "... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton ' the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case'." The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 8. Thus, the legal position is no more res-integra that interference is warranted when the learned trial Court has acted perversely or dehors the sound legal principles governing the province of temporary injunction. Upon examining the impugned order in that background, I am at loss to say that the learned trial Court has not committed any legality in recording finding against the appellants regarding prima facie case. While examining prima facie case, learned trial Court has taken note of a very vital fact that for the agricultural land admeasuring 83 bighas and 7 biswas, which is the subject matter of dispute, situated in Khasra No.1008 and 1009 of Village Gumanpura, the appellant-plaintiffs have not produced any documentary proof to substantiate their claim. The learned trial Court has noticed that in none of the revenue records their names find mention. Besides that, learned trial Court has also noticed a very significant fact that after conferment of khatedari rights over the agricultural land, Sujan Singh executed a registered sale-deed on 28th of March, 1959 in favour of four incumbents mentioned to supra and later on out of them Panna Ram transferred his land to Takhta Ram and corresponding revenue entries are also made in their names. Therefore, the learned trial Court, while taking note of the fact that appellant-plaintiffs agitated for their so-called claim after a lapse of almost five decades, recorded a negative finding regarding prima facie case. It is the settled legal position that injunctory relief is an equitable relief founded on the principles of equity, justice and good conscience and delay defeats the equity. Thus, in totality, by no stretch of imagination finding of the learned trial Court regarding prima facie case cannot be categorized as perverse, infirm or contrary to the sound legal principles. Likewise, the learned trial Court has also recorded requisite finding regarding other two ingredients, viz., balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The legal precedents, on which the learned counsel for appellants has placed reliance, are factually distinguishable, and therefore, cannot render any assistance to their cause. In this behalf, suffice it to observe that in Mohammed Sadiq & Ors. (supra), the Court has declined to interfere with the status-quo order passed by learned trial Court. Similarly, in Ram Kishore Kumpawat (supra), this Court granted status-quo order in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and same cannot be cited as a precedent in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case. 9. In Meghmala & Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court has simply held that a person in illegal occupation of land has to be evicted by following the procedure prescribed under law. The said judgment too cannot render any assistance to the appellants for the reason that appellants have prima facie failed to substantiate their claim for possession over the land in question with support of any documentary evidence. 10. Undeniably, granting or refusing injunction is the prerogative of the Court of first instance and power of the appellate Court to interfere with the discretionary order of trial Court is very much limited and circumscribed. Upon examining the matter in its entirety, I am unable to find any infirmity in the impugned order so as to exercise appellate jurisdiction for upsetting the discretionary order, by applying the principles laid down in Wander Ltd. & Anr. (supra). 11. Resultantly, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed.