JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Appellant-employer has laid this appeal under Section 30 of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 (for short, 'Act of 1923') to challenge judgment & order dated 20.09.2000, passed by Workmen Compensation Commissioner, Chittorgarh (for short, 'Commissioner'). By the impugned judgment & order, learned Commissioner adjudicated claim of the respondent-claimants under Section 20 read with Section 22 of the Act of 1923 and awarded compensation to the tune of Rs. 53,492. Likewise, partly aggrieved by the impugned judgment & order, respondent-claimants have filed cross-objections for claiming interest on compensation amount as mandated under Section 4A(3) of the Act of 1923. 2. Succinctly stated, the facts of the case are that respondent-claimants preferred a claim petition under Section 20 read with Section 22 of the Act of 1923 against the appellant quantifying compensation of Rs. 72,377. It is inter-alia averred in the claim petition by respondent-claimants that their father Ramgopal was in employment of appellant and on the fateful day of 24th July 1986 he died in an accident, arising out of and in the course of his employment while accomplishing the task of delivering official Dak, due to drowning in Gunjali river. It is stated in the claim petition that when he was crossing the river, its water level was shallow but on account of sudden excessive flow of water and its thrust he fell and swayed away, and the calamity eventually engulfed his life due to drowning at the age of 50 years. Asserting the factum of employment of their father with appellant, the respondent-claimants also pleaded in the claim petition that at the time of his death he was he was earning wages @ Rs. 870 per mensem. By applying relevant factor for working out lumpsum compensation amount, as per Schedule IV to the Act of 1923, the respondent-claimants quantified total amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 72,377. Besides staking claim for lumpsum compensation, the respondent-claimants also craved for grant of interest on the compensation amount as well as penalty. The claim petition on behalf of respondent-claimants was presented belatedly, therefore, at their behest, endeavour was also made for seeking condonation of delay by invoking Section 10 of the Act of 1923 as well as section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 3. The appellant contested the claim petition and also joined issue with the respondent-claimants on belated filing of the claim petition. 3. The appellant contested the claim petition and also joined issue with the respondent-claimants on belated filing of the claim petition. Although on behalf of respondent-claimants, respondent No. 1 has submitted his affidavit in support of application for condonation of delay but the appellant instead of filing a separate reply to the said application submitted a composite reply of the claim petition as well as application for condonation of delay. Without filing any counter affidavit, the appellant simply pleaded in the return that claim petition is presented after inordinate delay of 10 years, and therefore, it merits rejection. 4. The learned Commissioner, on the strength of the pleadings of rival parties, settled five issues for determination. In order to substantiate their claim, five witnesses were examined by respondent-claimants including respondent No. 1 Harish Kumar Sharma, besides tendering documentary evidence. Per contra, on behalf of appellant, one witness Jitendra Luhadia testified on oath to authenticate its defence. Upon conclusion of the evidence of rival parties, learned Commissioner partly allowed the claim petition of respondent-claimants and awarded lumpsum amount of compensation to the tune of Rs. 53,492. 5. Mr. N.S. Rajpurohit, learned Addl. Government Counsel, espousing cause of the appellant, has argued that the impugned judgment & order of learned Commissioner, Chittor is contrary to law and facts of the case. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Commissioner has erroneously awarded lumpsum amount of compensation to the respondent-claimants inasmuch as there was no reliable evidence available on record. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that learned Commissioner has also seriously erred in condoning the delay sans any sufficient cause for inordinate delay of more than a decade in presentation of claim petition. Lastly, learned counsel contends that, in all, three substantial questions of law are involved which require adjudication by this Court. Repudiating cross-objections of the respondent-claimants, learned counsel Mr. Rajpurohit submits that inordinate delay and laches in laying claim disentitles them for any interest on the compensation amount. 6. E. Converso, Mr. Abhishek Mehta, appearing for respondent-claimants, has strenuously urged that the impugned judgment & order requires no interference to the extent it has quantified and awarded lumpsum amount of compensation. Mr. Rajpurohit submits that inordinate delay and laches in laying claim disentitles them for any interest on the compensation amount. 6. E. Converso, Mr. Abhishek Mehta, appearing for respondent-claimants, has strenuously urged that the impugned judgment & order requires no interference to the extent it has quantified and awarded lumpsum amount of compensation. Mr. Mehta would urge that learned Commissioner, upon appreciation of evidence, has recorded its findings on all the issues with clarity and precision and the said finding of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Mr. Mehta has vehemently argued that the instant appeal is bereft of any question of law much less substantial question of law and the so called substantial questions of law proposed in the memo of appeal are purely questions of fact. While laying emphasis on the legislative intent envisaged under Section 30 of the Act of 1923, Mr. Mehta submits that existence of substantial question of law is sine qua non for maintainability of appeal. 7. Buttressing claim for grant of interest on the lumpsum amount of compensation, Mr. Mehta would contend that interest on lumpsum amount of compensation from the date it fell due is mandated by Section 4A(3) of the Act of 1923, and, therefore, cross-objections merit acceptance for awarding interest on the compensation amount. Mr. Mehta further submits that legislative intent is clear and unequivocal under Section 4A of the Act of 1923, and therefore, upon favourable adjudication of a claim, awarding of interest is necessary corollary. Lastly, Mr. Mehta for substantiating cross-objections has urged that after condonation of delay by the learned Commissioner, decks were clear for grant of interest, which discretion learned Commissioner ought to have exercised. 8. I have bestowed my consideration to the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned judgment & order and thoroughly scanned the materials available on record. 9. The Act of 1923 is a welfare legislation which was conceived on the general principle that compensation should ordinarily be given to workmen who sustained personal injuries by accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. The basic tenets of interpretation of statutes is that social welfare legislation warrants liberal construction to extreme limits for achieving the objects of the legislation. The basic tenets of interpretation of statutes is that social welfare legislation warrants liberal construction to extreme limits for achieving the objects of the legislation. Therefore, while interpreting a welfare legislation, Courts are bound to be vigilant to see that the benefits conferred by it are not defeated by subtle devices. Where ingenuity is expanded to avoid welfare legislation, it is expected of the Court to get behind smoke screen and discover the true state of affairs. Supreme Court, in Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd v Employees State Insurance Corporation, (2015) 1 SCC 142 , while construing the definition of "factory" in Section 2(12) of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, held that preparation of food items in kitchen of the club is a "manufacturing process" so as to fall within the definition of factory, thereby treating its employees within the ambit of the Act. The Court further held that a beneficial piece of legislation is aimed on securing the well being of the employees and a narrow interpretation, which will have the effect of defeating the objects of the Act, should not be adopted. 10. Adhering to the general principles of interpretation of statutes vis-a-vis a social welfare legislation, if the afflictions of the appellant-employer are examined in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the instant case, then, it would ipso facto reveal that there is no quarrel on master-servant relationship between appellant and deceased Ramgopal. The other relevant question, which has cropped up in the matter is death of Ramgopal due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 11. For substantiating their claim, respondent-claimants have examined five witnesses including the first respondent son of deceased P.W.1 Harish Sharma. Apart from the evidence of P.W.1 Harish Sharma, P.W.2 Abdul Karim - a co-employee of deceased Ramgopal, has also proved this fact that Ramgopal died in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Contrary to the evidence of respondent-claimants, appellant submitted a very vague and evasive reply to the claim petition, a bare perusal of of which clearly reveals that factum of accidental death of Ramgopal arising out of and in the course of employment is denied in want of knowledge. In the considered opinion of this Court, this sort of reply sufficiently denotes that it was drafted without seeing the relevant records. In the considered opinion of this Court, this sort of reply sufficiently denotes that it was drafted without seeing the relevant records. In this behalf, evidence of P.W.5 Mahendra Singh, under whom deceased Ramgopal was working, is crystal clear. That apart, the evidence tendered on behalf of appellant by Jitendra Luhardia, Assistant Engineer, in the form of D.W.1, is absolutely vague and cryptic inasmuch as he was not abreast about the facts of the case even on the basis of official records. During his deposition, he has clearly stated that neither he is having personal knowledge about the case nor on the basis of official records. Therefore, this sort of testimony deserves no credence whatsoever and rightly discarded by the learned Commissioner. 12. The learned Commissioner, in such a situation, has, therefore, rightly decided Issue No. 1 in favour of respondent-claimants and against the appellant, and the said finding and conclusions of the learned Commissioner cannot be faulted or categorized as infirm by any stretch of imagination. That being the position, the finding of fact recorded by learned Commissioner on this issue is neither perverse nor based on misreading of evidence or no evidence. Therefore, on overall appreciation of evidence, unhesitatingly, I record my satisfaction for the findings and conclusions recorded by learned Commissioner on this issue so as to conclude that on this aspect no question of law much less substantial question of law is emerging out. 13. Adverting to Issue No. 2, learned Commissioner has made sincere endeavour to ascertain monthly wages of the deceased on the basis of his service record and by relying on the pay scale, which was admissible to him, rightly concluded his monthly salary @ Rs. 643 per mensem. 14. The third issue was regarding delay in presentation of the claim petition and the learned Commissioner after considering the affidavit submitted on behalf of respondent-claimants, showing yet another tragedy in their family, i.e., death of their mother within six months and their minor age, i.e., 11, 8 & 5 years respectively, in its discretion condoned the delay. While deciding this issue, the learned Commissioner has considered the facts and circumstances which were relevant and germane to the matter and also invoked Section 10 of the Act of 1923 with benevolence to farther the aims and objects of socio-welfare legislation. While deciding this issue, the learned Commissioner has considered the facts and circumstances which were relevant and germane to the matter and also invoked Section 10 of the Act of 1923 with benevolence to farther the aims and objects of socio-welfare legislation. In the light of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, unhesitatingly, in my view, discretion exercised by the learned Commissioner for condonation of delay cannot be faulted. The plea sought to be raised and vociferously canvassed by the appellant in this behalf, is, therefore, devoid of any force and bereft of any merit. 15. Expression "sufficient cause" envisaged under Section 10(1) of the Act of 1923 is a not a magic phrase and in legal parlance it means a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking its aid, therefore, to be construed liberally for advancing substantial justice. While construing the said expression, a pedantic view and purely idealistic approach is alien and the Courts are expected to adopt a very pragmatic and practical approach in this behalf. In totality, learned Commissioner has rightly analyzed the entire evidence and factual gamut coupled with the death of mother of respondent-claimants within six months after the calamity and their minority as a plausible handicap in laying claim petition within the prescribed period of limitation. Thus, the finding of Issue No. 3 also requires no interference and the so called question of law proposed in this behalf by no means be even categorized as a question of law much less a substantial question of law. 16. Coming to the findings on Issue No. 4 & 5, in my view, findings on Issue No. 4 are in consonance and conformity with Section 2(d) of the Act of 1923 as the learned Commissioner has rightly concluded that son & daughters of deceased Ramgopal Sharma are his dependents. Undeniably, respondent-claimants tendered requisite evidence to show their status as dependents of the deceased and at the behest of appellant no evidence was adduced to challenge their play, therefore, the learned Commissioner has rightly recorded finding on the said issue in favour of respondent-claimants. Switching on to Issue No. 5, it is clearly evident from the impugned judgment & order that the said finding of the learned Commissioner is a necessary corollary to its affirmative finding regarding Issue No. 1, and therefore, challenge to the same is per se not sustainable. Switching on to Issue No. 5, it is clearly evident from the impugned judgment & order that the said finding of the learned Commissioner is a necessary corollary to its affirmative finding regarding Issue No. 1, and therefore, challenge to the same is per se not sustainable. Learned Commissioner while working out lumpsum amount of compensation has also rightly pressed into service relevant factor as per Schedule IV of the Act of 1923 and worked out just compensation, therefore, impeachment of the said finding of learned Tribunal by the appellant is per se not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the case. 17. Thus, I am convinced that no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved in this appeal warranting interference with the impugned judgment & order. 18. Now I proceed to examine the cross-objections of the respondent-claimants. Precisely, the cross-objections of the respondents are based on Section 4A(3) of the Act of 1923, which mandates grant of interest on lumpsum amount of compensation from the date it fell due. Rival parties have locked horns on this issue with full gusto. Essentially, respondent-claimants are harping on default of the appellant-employer in paying the compensation due under the Act of 1923 when it fell due, by relying on mandatory provision envisaged under sub-section (3) of Section 4A of the Act of 1923. Per contra, appellant is resisting the claim of interest on lumpsum amount of compensation by laying emphasis on belated filing of the claim petition, which was filed after more than a decade. Appellant's positive assertion is that the Legislature has never intended to put premium over serious lapses on the part of a claimant and therefore in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, it would not be appropriate to award interest on the compensation amount. 19. Well it is true that claim was laid after a decade, but then a very significant fact that learned Commissioner has condoned delay after recording its satisfaction about sufficient cause for the said delay, cannot be overlooked by this Court, while construing mandatory provision envisaged under Section 4A(3) of the Act of 1923. The learned Commissioner, while condoning delay, has made sincere endeavour to examine cause for delay which includes untimely death of mother of the respondent-claimants and widow of the deceased within six months after death of the bread winner (Ramgopal). The learned Commissioner, while condoning delay, has made sincere endeavour to examine cause for delay which includes untimely death of mother of the respondent-claimants and widow of the deceased within six months after death of the bread winner (Ramgopal). Besides that, the learned Commissioner has also taken note of a very vital fact that at the time of death of widow of the deceased-employee and mother of the respondent-claimants, first respondent - son of the deceased was 11 years old whereas second & third respondents were 8 and 5 years old only. Death of both the parents, when all the respondent-claimants were minors, cannot escape judicial conscience of this Court so as to deprive them from their legitimate claim of interest on wholly technical pretexts. The legislative intent, therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case, cannot be sacrificed at the appellate stage on a jejune plea of delay, which is duly excused by the learned Commissioner. 20. The Supreme Court, in Vedprakash Garg v. Premi Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 1 while examining liability of the employer to pay interest on the compensation awarded by Commissioner, held that employer's failure to pay compensation when it fell due, ipso facto creates liability on him of paying interest on the delayed compensation. The same view is reiterated by the Supreme Court in a latter judgment in case of L.R. Ferro Alloys Ltd. v. Mahavir Mahto & Anr., (2002) 9 SCC 450 wherein the Court held: "The only contention put forth before us is that the entire liability including penalty and interest will have to be reimbursed by the insurance company and this aspect has not been examined by the learned Single Judge in the High Court and needs examination at our hands. In Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 1 this Court after examining the entire scheme of the Act held that payment of interest and penalty are two distinct liabilities arising under the Act, while liability to pay interest is part and parcel of legal liability to pay compensation upon default of payment of that amount within one month. Therefore, claim for compensation along with interest will have to be made good jointly by the insurance company with the insured employer. Therefore, claim for compensation along with interest will have to be made good jointly by the insurance company with the insured employer. But, so far as the penalty imposed on the insured employer is on account of his personal fault the insurance company cannot be made liable to reimburse penalty imposed on the employer. Hence the compensation with interest is payable by the insurance company but not penalty. Following the said decision and for the reasons stated therein, we modify the order made by the High Court to that extent. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly." 21. While considering payment of interest on the amount of compensation vis-a-vis a claim laid belatedly after condonation of delay, the Coordinate Bench of this Court, in RSRTC v. Smt. Anand Kanwar & Ors., (1993) 3 LLJ 566 held: "Coming to the question of interest, it may be stated that once the delay in filing the claim is condoned, it will be deemed that the claim had been filed within time. That being so, the provisions of Section 4A would clearly be applicable. Section 4A makes the amount of claim payable within one month from the date it became due. The claim became due on the date of the death of the employee. Had the employer taken steps to inform the Commissioner or to pay the amount of compensation, the widow would not have suffered for such a long period and, therefore, the award of interest from the date it fell due in this case, cannot be said to be improper." 22. The legal position, which has emerged upon perusal of Section 4 of the Act of 1923 and in the light of legal precedents referred to supra, therefore, unquestionably make out a case for grant of interest to the respondent-claimants on the lumpsum amount of compensation from the date it fell due, i.e., the date of accident. Liability of the employer to pay compensation would arise not when the Commissioner passes the order but on the date workman sustaining injury or dying due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Therefore, failure of the employer to deposit compensation within the statutory period creates ipso facto liability for payment of interest on compensation amount. 23. Therefore, failure of the employer to deposit compensation within the statutory period creates ipso facto liability for payment of interest on compensation amount. 23. Accordingly, the cross-objections filed by the respondent-claimants, seeking partial modification of the impugned judgment & order, i.e. allowing interest on compensation amount from the date fell due, merit acceptance. 24. That upshot of the above discussion is that appellant employer's appeal is dismissed and cross-objections of the respondent-claimants are allowed. Appellant-employer is, therefore, directed to pay interest @12% per annum on the compensation amount from the date it fell due, i.e., the date of accident, within one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of the judgment.