JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. 1. The eight appellants have been convicted under Sections 302/149 and 148 of the Penal Code. They have been sentenced to suffer life imprisonment under Sections 302/149 of the Penal Code and imprisonment for three years under Section 148 thereof, both sentences running concurrently. In addition, they have been fined Rs.5,000/- each with a default clause for another two years in prison upon failing to pay the fine. 2. The incident is of November 13, 2008. The case made out by the prosecution was that these appellants, along with several other accused persons who have been acquitted of the charges, unlawfully assembled at the place of occurrence and committed the murder of Momin Sheikh. The grounds on which the order of conviction and the consequent sentence have been challenged include the alleged contradiction in the testimonies of the eye-witnesses and the oral evidence of the widow of the victim. It is also contended on behalf of the appellants that there was no evidence that the injuries allegedly inflicted by the appellants on the victim could, in the usual or ordinary course, lead to death. The alternative case made out is of a lesser offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 3. One of the sons of the victim lodged the written complaint scribed by another villager. The complainant alleged that at about 2 pm on November 13, 2008 when his father was digging holes for fixing pillars to mark the boundary of an agricultural land or putting up a temporary construction thereat, several persons, including all the appellants herein, sought to resist the father. The complaint went on to narrate that upon an altercation taking place between the several persons named in the complaint on the one hand and the complaint’s father, the persons opposing the work called upon one Sadek Sheikh, whose house was close by, to bring iron rods, crow-bars and lathis. Upon Sadek Sheikh bringing the weapons, such persons rained blows on the victim resulting in his instantaneous death. The complaint also spoke of several persons trying to intervene to protect the victim, including the victim’s wife, who were mostly beaten up and suffered injuries. 4. An inquest was conducted over the lifeless body of the victim later the same afternoon. Upon Sadek Sheikh bringing the weapons, such persons rained blows on the victim resulting in his instantaneous death. The complaint also spoke of several persons trying to intervene to protect the victim, including the victim’s wife, who were mostly beaten up and suffered injuries. 4. An inquest was conducted over the lifeless body of the victim later the same afternoon. The inquest report prepared under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 by the investigating officer recorded that there was an altercation between the victim and four of the appellants herein in course whereof such appellants “hit to Momin with iron rod and crow-bar and Momin Sk. died on the spot.” The complainant signed as a witness to the inquest report. It is asserted on behalf of the appellants that since the names of at least four of the appellants did not figure in the inquest report, it is evident that the complainant did not name them and the complainant levelled grievous charges against them in course of the oral evidence at the trial by way of an afterthought. At any rate, it is submitted on behalf of the appellants that the serious anomaly in the complainant signing the inquest report that identified only four assailants instead of the several named by the complainant in his written complaint and, later, in his oral evidence, would warrant both the written complaint and the testimony of the complainant to be disbelieved or scrutinised with a fine toothcomb. 5. In course of his testimony at the trial, the complainant began by asserting that his father was engaged in the installation of poles on his land when the eight appellants “came to the spot ... started using abusive language and assaulting my father”. He claimed that on hearing the shouting he came out (possibly from his house) and found the appellants beating up his father. He recounted that the second appellant instructed Sadek Sheikh to bring rods, sabol and lathis “and thereafter they killed my father.” He said that some of his relatives, including PWs 12, 13 and 14 and his mother, came to the spot and a scuffle and assault followed. He recalled that the police came to the place of occurrence at or about 4.30 pm. He proved the written complaint that he filed with the police at the place of occurrence upon it being scribed by PW-5. He recalled that the police came to the place of occurrence at or about 4.30 pm. He proved the written complaint that he filed with the police at the place of occurrence upon it being scribed by PW-5. He also proved the inquest report to which he was a signatory. 6. PW-2 Sabir Ali was not an eye-witness. As would be evident from his statement in course of his cross-examination, he was at the school where he was a teacher and he came to the place of occurrence after getting information regarding the incident over telephone from one of the villagers. It is also apparent from his evidence that he arrived at the spot after the victim had died. 7. Piltun Sk was next examined by the prosecution and he claimed that all the appellants herein and some others who were the accused in the court below resisted Momin while Momin was “digging a hole to fix up a pole there …” He also asserted that several relatives of Momin, including his wife, tried to intervene, but they were also assaulted by the assailants. He claimed to have witnessed the entire incident from a distance of “50 hands away.” He claimed that he was initially at his residence but later walked over to the spot. He, however, acknowledged that it was only during the trial that he revealed that he had witnessed the incident. He was steadfast in his denial of the suggestions put to him by the defence. 8. Much has been made on behalf of the defence of the evidence of the widow of the victim, PW-4. Since such witness was called by the prosecution and not declared hostile, the appellants claim that the evidence of the widow has to be accepted as sacrosanct and, to the extent the oral evidence of the other prosecution witnesses are at variance with the testimony of the widow, it would be the evidence of widow that would prevail. Widow Halema Bibi testified that on the fateful day her husband “was engaged in digging of the khas-land for fixing a pole there.” She recalled that she was present with her husband when the husband was preparing to affix a pole in a hole that he had dug. Widow Halema Bibi testified that on the fateful day her husband “was engaged in digging of the khas-land for fixing a pole there.” She recalled that she was present with her husband when the husband was preparing to affix a pole in a hole that he had dug. She specifically named all the eight appellants herein and claimed that such persons arrived at the spot where her husband was digging a hole and “they assaulted my husband and killed him with sabol, rod and lathi”. She asserted that the appellants also assaulted her and relatives of her husband Arzed, Laltu, Gajlu, Raju and Montu. She identified all the accused who were present in the trial court and testified that such assailants had killed her husband. In course of her cross-examination, she said the following, which is cited on behalf of the defence to discredit the oral evidence of the other witnesses called by the prosecution and who claimed to have witnessed the incident: “I did not state anything before the IO. Today I am stating for the first time before the Ld Court about the incident seeking for justice. When my husband’s body was lying on the PO, the local people did not assemble there. There was no blood stain or any bleeding injury on the person of my husband. None of my sons/children came to the spot. I was crying seeing the condition of my husband but I was in my full sense then.” 9. The appellants say that if the widow of the victim asserted that none of her children or any villager was present at the spot where the incident occurred, the evidence of the witnesses called by the prosecution and who alleged to have witnessed the incident should be treated with much more than a pinch of salt. The appellants labour on such argument, particularly since the widow was not declared hostile. The appellants exhort that, at any rate, once it is apparent that there are two versions of the same incident, the one better-suited to the accused would have to be accepted. The appellants insist that in the light of the evidence of the widow as recorded above, the trial court ought to have disbelieved that there was any other eye-witness to the incident. 10. The appellants insist that in the light of the evidence of the widow as recorded above, the trial court ought to have disbelieved that there was any other eye-witness to the incident. 10. What is of significance in this context is that despite the widow of the victim somewhat jarring the pitch of the prosecution case, she named all the appellants herein and asserted that “they assaulted my husband and killed him with sabol, rod and lathi.” If the appellants insist that the testimony of the widow has to be preferred over the versions of the incident as claimed by some of the other alleged eye-witnesses, the widow’s specific evidence of the commission of the offence by the appellants can also not be cast aside. Further, there are two other aspects of the matter that ought not to be lost sight of while appreciating the evidence of the widow and the purport of what she said. 11. In the rough sketch-map of the place of occurrence and the surrounding areas as prepared by the investigating officer and exhibited in course of the trial, the place of occurrence is shown to be to the south-east of a waterbody by the name of Thakurpukur. To the immediate north and south of the place of occurrence were agricultural or open lands. The place of occurrence appears to have been an area open to view on all sides from quite a distance with the Ruprampur village and the houses in such village being mostly to the west and north of the place of occurrence at a considerable distance away. There were three other houses to the southeast and south-west of the place of occurrence, but again quite far away from the place of occurrence. Even de hors the rough sketch-map, it appears from the evidence that the incident took place in the middle of a field and open to view from a long distance on all sides. 12. When the widow claimed that there was no one else other than the appellants herein at the place of occurrence, she implied the exact spot where the incident of assault occurred. It was not her evidence, nor may it be construed to mean, that there was no person other than the appellants, the victim and the widow in the vicinity. When the widow claimed that there was no one else other than the appellants herein at the place of occurrence, she implied the exact spot where the incident of assault occurred. It was not her evidence, nor may it be construed to mean, that there was no person other than the appellants, the victim and the widow in the vicinity. When the widow claimed that none of her children came to the spot, she meant that her children did not reach the exact place where her husband was assaulted by these appellants at the time that the assault took place. It was not the widow’s evidence that her sons or other relatives or villagers did not reach the exact spot where the incident occurred even after the assault on her husband took place and he died as a result whereof. 13. In assessing the testimony of any ocular witness, it must always be remembered that the object of the exercise is to ascertain the truth, first, in its essence and, if possible, in its incidental details. There are many limitations and approximations that come into play as a witness recounts an incident that he saw; not the least of them being the imperfect recollection of what exactly occurred tinged by the perception of the individual and his personal predilections. Then there is also the hopeless inadequacy of words in capturing the thoughts that are sought to be expressed. Finally, there is the loss of a degree of the nuance and the accuracy of the recollection in the translation. The art is to keep all these in mind and extract the substance of a testimony by testing the credibility of its essence and its details against the corroborating or contradictory versions available. The oral evidence reduced in cold print, sometimes in a language alien to the maker of the statement, is not to be read by counting the undotted i’s or the uncrossed t’s. 14. Several of the other eye-witnesses to the incident – whether they viewed the same from 50 yards or a greater distance away – testified that the victim started out alone, was accosted by the appellants and their supporters and was assaulted by such persons before anyone could try to save or rescue him. Widow Halema Bibi’s oral evidence must also be seen in conjunction with the testimonies of the other eye-witnesses. Widow Halema Bibi’s oral evidence must also be seen in conjunction with the testimonies of the other eye-witnesses. As much as the widow claimed that no local person nor her children was at the spot at the time that her husband was beaten to death, she also maintained that it was the appellants herein who beat her husband to death and assaulted her and her brothers-in-law. Of the others that the appellants injured, the widow named Arzed Sk and Gajlu Sk, two brothers of the victim, as well as Laltu, Raju and Montu. 15. The scribe of the complaint, Nayarul Sheikh, was examined as PW-5. Though it is evident that he did not witness the assault on the victim (“When I came to the spot, I found Momin – dead.”), he claimed to have witnessed the subsequent assault between the supporters on the rival sides which led to several of the relatives of the victim being hospitalised or needing medical attention. Nayarul was also the person who informed the officer-in-charge of Murarai police station of the incident, which prompted a police party headed by the officer-in-charge as the investigating officer to reach the place of occurrence a short while after the incident. Another eyewitness, Lotif Sheikh, identified all eight appellants in court and named them in his examination-in-chief as the persons who assaulted the victim “with sabol, iron rod and lathi”. Such witness narrated that he was returning from the field when he heard the shouting and witnessed the assault on Momin Sk. Much is made, on behalf of the appellants, of a line in his cross-examination that when he reached the spot he found the victim dead. However, even after making the above statement, the witness went on to assert that “I have seen the accused persons assaulting Momin Sk.” 16. Another son of the victim, Khabirul Sk, was examined as PW-8 but it does not come through from his evidence that he may have witnessed the assault on his father. He claimed to have seen, inter alia, Nayarul at the spot. But it was Nayarul’s evidence as PW-5 that Nayarul reached the place of occurrence after Momin Sk had been killed. 17. He claimed to have seen, inter alia, Nayarul at the spot. But it was Nayarul’s evidence as PW-5 that Nayarul reached the place of occurrence after Momin Sk had been killed. 17. A brother of the victim, Gajlu Sk, claimed that there was a dispute between the victim and the family of the first appellant herein pertaining to the land whereat the victim was engaged in digging holes for fixing poles on the relevant day. Though it is not clear from his evidence as to where exactly such witness may have been when the matter flared up between the victim and the appellants herein, he asserted that all the appellants herein rushed to the spot where the victim was working and assaulted the victim. He claimed that on seeing such assault on his brother, “myself, Arzed, Raju, Basar, Montu, Laltu and Halema came to the spot to rescue Momin Sk from the accused persons.” In his cross-examination, he claimed that the appellant no. 7 herein assaulted the victim “with lathi, on his chest and just beside the ear.” 18. It may be relevant at this stage to refer to the post-mortem report and the evidence of the autopsy surgeon in such regard. The first injury recorded was a lacerated wound around the left ear of the victim. The victim also suffered a fracture of the left parietal bone and fractures to his sternum and ribs. The victim’s anterior chest wall was damaged, both his lungs were ruptured and there was hemorrhage in and around his chest area. Several of the witnesses, including the widow, claimed that the victim did not shed any blood following the grievous assault that he faced. The injuries that the post-mortem report recorded were, as the autopsy surgeon later confirmed, such as “may be caused on assaults by iron rod, sabol lathi etc.” The injuries to the chest and the ear, as recounted by Gajlu Sk, stand corroborated. 19. Eye-witnesses Anaruddin Sk and Ainuddin Sk, who were neighbours of the victim, named all the appellants herein as the assailants of the victim. Anaruddin claimed to have been working at a nearby field and witnessed the incident. In his cross-examination, he could not name the owner of the agricultural land where he worked on the relevant day as a labourer but he claimed to have been cutting paddy at such field. Anaruddin claimed to have been working at a nearby field and witnessed the incident. In his cross-examination, he could not name the owner of the agricultural land where he worked on the relevant day as a labourer but he claimed to have been cutting paddy at such field. He said that he saw the incident from the southern side of the place of occurrence and the victim was engaged in digging the earth for inserting poles at the land by the side of a pond. The place of occurrence was adjacent to the Thakurbari pond. He was more specific in his testimony that after the victim dug one hole and proceeded to dig the next, the first appellant herein arrived at the spot. However, he could not recollect whether he saw the victim coming to the place of occurrence before the incident. The recollection of the incident by Anaruddin appears credible and the answers to the myriad suggestions put to him by the defence did not detract from the essence of his testimony. Ainuddin claimed that when the appellants herein commenced their assault on the victim, several persons including Arzed, Gajlu, Basar, Raju, Halema, Anaruddin and himself rushed to rescue the victim. Both Ainuddin and Anaruddin claimed to have been injured in the subsequent assault that followed in the scuffle with the appellants after the death of Momin. The evidence of these two witnesses are questioned on behalf of the appellants for the delay of about 40 days in the case of Anaruddin and about 15-30 days in the case of Ainuddin in their statements being obtained by the investigating officer. But Anaruddin claimed that he returned from the hospital on December 23, 2008 and his statement was obtained by the investigation officer on the same day. He claimed to have named all the appellants herein as the assailants of the victim. 20. Basar Sheikh was called as PW-12, but there is nothing of note in his testimony. Arzed Sheikh, a brother of the victim, was examined as PW-13 and he claimed to have witnessed the assault on Momin Sheikh. He recalled that he, along with Basar Sk, Laltu, Montu, Gajlu, Raju Sheikh and Halema Bibi, attempted to rescue Momin and suffered serious injuries in the process. He claimed to have fractured both his hands. Arzed Sheikh, a brother of the victim, was examined as PW-13 and he claimed to have witnessed the assault on Momin Sheikh. He recalled that he, along with Basar Sk, Laltu, Montu, Gajlu, Raju Sheikh and Halema Bibi, attempted to rescue Momin and suffered serious injuries in the process. He claimed to have fractured both his hands. In his cross-examination, he said that he was washing his hands and feet at the Thakurpukur pond when the incident occurred, though he admitted that he had not revealed earlier that he was at the pond when he witnessed the assault on Momin Sheikh following which he rushed to try and rescue the victim. 21. Another eye-witness, Raju Sheikh, was a nephew of the victim. He repeated the description of the incident of assault on the victim much in the same manner as several witnesses before him. He was asked in his cross-examination whether any of the appellants had a hansua (a sharp-cutting weapon) at the time of the assault on Momin. He replied that none of the appellants had a hansua, but volunteered that the eight appellants, who he named, were armed with “lathi, sabol and rod …” Though he did not indicate in his examination-in-chief exactly where he was present when the assault on Momin Sheikh commenced, in his cross-examination he clarified that he was sitting on a mancha (scaffolding or temporary structure) about 10 to 15 cubits away from the place of occurrence. He also claimed to have informed the investigating officer exactly where he was at the time of the incident. 22. The autopsy surgeon testified that the victim died of the injuries noted in the post-mortem report. According to him, the injuries were ante-mortem and homicidal in nature and “Such injuries may be caused on assaults by iron rod, sabol, lathi etc.” He added that most of the injures that were discovered upon dissection the body were “the effect of external injuries sustained by the deceased …” The usual attempt by the defence to discredit the autopsy surgeon’s testimony was made, but he remained steadfast and unshaken in his opinion. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that it was not the evidence of the autopsy surgeon that the nature of the injures were such that in the ordinary and usual course they would lead to the death of the victim. It is submitted on behalf of the appellants that it was not the evidence of the autopsy surgeon that the nature of the injures were such that in the ordinary and usual course they would lead to the death of the victim. However, such submission has to be seen in the context of the autopsy surgeon’s assertion that the death was caused on account of the several injuries recorded in the post-mortem report and repeated by the surgeon in his testimony and the further opinion of the surgeon that the nature of injuries were consistent with an assault by iron rod or sabol or lathi. 23. The two doctors who treated some of the others who were injured in the scuffle and assault that followed the death of Monin Sheikh were also examined. It is evident that such doctors treated, inter alia, Gajlu Sheikh, Basar Sheikh, Raju Sheikh, Arzed Sheikh and Ainuddin. Though the appellants refer to the testimonies of these two doctors for the purpose of demonstrating that the injured persons did not name their assailants to the doctors, it must be kept in mind that the appellants have not been convicted for their alleged assault on the relatives of Momin Sheikh and the consideration now is confined to the conviction under Section 148 of the Penal Code and Section 302 thereof read with Section 149. 24. Though the appellants suggest that most of the alleged eye-witnesses were relatives of the victim who had an axe to grind against the appellants herein on account of the dispute pertaining to the land, there is little to detract from the individual accounts of the several eye-witnesses and the depiction of the incident as has emerged from the collective. The victim may have been trying to put up a construction on a land in respect whereof there was a dispute with the first appellant and his family. Indeed, the victim may have been acting in derogation of an order pertaining to the land passed by the local panchayat. The appellants found the victim seeking to establish possession over the disputed land and assaulted him with weapons that were capable of killing the victim. All eight appellants appear to have rained blows on the victim. 25. Indeed, the victim may have been acting in derogation of an order pertaining to the land passed by the local panchayat. The appellants found the victim seeking to establish possession over the disputed land and assaulted him with weapons that were capable of killing the victim. All eight appellants appear to have rained blows on the victim. 25. The appellants rake up the fact that all the appellants were not named in the inquest report prepared by the investigation officer shortly after the incident, though the complainant was a signatory to such report as a witness. The appellants insinuate that the complaint lodged by a son of the victim named 19 persons as the assailants of his father and that may have been upon advice and in furtherance of the grudge that he bore against the appellants and the family of the first appellant. It is contended that since the complainant was present when the inquest report was prepared and the complaint chose not to name all the appellants herein as the assailants of his father, such anomaly would discredit both his complaint and his subsequent testimony in court. The appellants also suggest that the other alleged eye-witnesses, mostly relatives of the victim, parroted what the complainant testified at the trial. 26. Upon reading the evidence at length, including the testimony of the autopsy surgeon, the appellants suggest that the failure by the autopsy surgeon to assert that the injuries suffered by the victim could, in the usual or ordinary course, lead to his death, should have resulted in the appellants being found guilty of a lesser offence under the first part of Section 304 of the Penal Code. 27. Several judgments have been cited by the appellants in support of their contentions. A decision reported at (1994) CrLJ 280 (State of Gujarat v. Patel Mohan Mulji) is first placed and paragraph 4 of such report relied upon for the proposition that the evidence of an eye-witness implicating an accused in course of the trial should be seen with considerable suspicion if he was present at the time of the inquest and did not name such accused. The Supreme Court observed at paragraph 4 of the report that the entire case rested on the evidence of the two witnesses, one of whom was the widow of the deceased who also suffered injuries during the incident. The Supreme Court observed at paragraph 4 of the report that the entire case rested on the evidence of the two witnesses, one of whom was the widow of the deceased who also suffered injuries during the incident. The court found serious infirmities in the case run by the prosecution and found no evidence in support of the assertion by the widow that she was assaulted by a sharp weapon on her leg. The court found no evidence of any corresponding injury on the person of the widow. In passing, the court referred to the inquest report where the names of the persons claimed as assailants by the widow did not find any place. The judgment is not an authority for the proposition that a signatory to an inquest report is bound by the contents thereof and cannot testify in excess of what is contained in the inquest report. 28. The inquest in this case was conducted under Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The work required to be undertaken in course of an inquest under Section 174 of the Code is to “make an investigation, and draw up a report of the apparent cause of death, describing such wounds, fractures, bruises, and other marks of injury as may be found on the body, and stating in what manner or by what weapon or instrument (if any), such marks appear to have been inflicted.” While the inquest has to be conducted “in the presence of two or more respectable inhabitants of the neighbourhood”, the investigation reflected in the report would be immediate and preliminary and such preliminary investigation may not have any bearing in the ultimate analysis. Further, it appears that the inquest in this case may have been conducted after the written complaint was made over to the police personnel or around the same time. If the complaint was lodged prior to the inquest being conducted, the complainant had already indicated in detail the names of the persons that he perceived were involved in the commission of the offence. The complainant’s subsequent failure, if at all, to make a further statement would be of no effect. If the complaint was lodged prior to the inquest being conducted, the complainant had already indicated in detail the names of the persons that he perceived were involved in the commission of the offence. The complainant’s subsequent failure, if at all, to make a further statement would be of no effect. Even if the inquest was conducted before the complaint was lodged, they were so close in point of time that it would be hardly of any consequence whether the complainant named all the appellants herein twice over in course of his written complaint and the inquest report, both of which may have been prepared within minutes of each other. 29. On the evidence of widow Halema Bibi (also shown as Alema Biwi), the appellants rely on a judgment reported at (2005) 5 SCC (Cri) 1037 [Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi)] for the proposition that the evidence of a witness called by the prosecution and who is not declared hostile is binding on the prosecution. The principle is enunciated at paragraphs 29-30 of the report. However, as discussed earlier, the widow’s testimony did not contradict the versions of the other eye-witnesses. Apart from the widow’s assertion that only she was present with her husband at the time that he was assaulted to death, she also referred to other relatives and villagers who reached the place of occurrence and were also injured. To repeat, the evidence of Halema Bibi cannot be seen to imply that there could have been no eye-witnesses other than the assailants, since she did not deny the presence of the several eye-witnesses who may not have been at the exact spot of the incident but were within the vicinity and the incident took place in a field open to view on all sides from a considerable distance. To boot, if Halema Bibi’s evidence has to be accepted as sacrosanct and with the degree of strictness as exhorted by the appellants, her assertion that these appellants bludgeoned her husband to death cannot be brushed aside. 30. To boot, if Halema Bibi’s evidence has to be accepted as sacrosanct and with the degree of strictness as exhorted by the appellants, her assertion that these appellants bludgeoned her husband to death cannot be brushed aside. 30. A recent judgment reported at (2016) 3 SCC 317 (Nankaunoo v. State of Uttar Pradesh) has been placed by the appellants for the proposition that if the injury inflicted by the accused was not such as would, in the ordinary and usual course, lead to the death to the victim, the offence would be covered by the first limb of Section 304 of the Penal Code instead of under Section 302 thereof. In such case, the deceased sustained gunshot wounds on the back and inner part of the left thigh and on the front and middle left thigh. The court held that the weapon used and the manner in which the attack was made and the injury inflicted clearly established that the appellant before the court intended to cause the injury. The court then observed that once it was established that the accused intentionally inflicted the injury, “then the offence would be murder, if it is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” Since the injury in that case was to a “non-vital organ” the court observed that “the sufficiency of injury to cause death must be proved and cannot be inferred from the fact that death has taken place.” It went on to add that since the prosecution did not elicit from the doctors that the gunshot injury on the inner part of the left thigh caused the rupture of any important blood vessel or that it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the conviction of the appellant was required to be modified from one under Section 302 of the Penal Code to under Section 304 Part-I thereof. 31. A judgment is an authority for the proposition that it decides in the factual matrix involved in the particular matter. The injury in the reported case, even though by a gun, was to the left thigh. In the usual course, an injury to a limb may not be fatal. It was the nature of the injury which called upon the prosecution in that case to prove that such injury could ordinarily have led to the death of the victim as a direct consequence thereof. In the usual course, an injury to a limb may not be fatal. It was the nature of the injury which called upon the prosecution in that case to prove that such injury could ordinarily have led to the death of the victim as a direct consequence thereof. Such legal principle is completely inapplicable in the present case. Eight adults, armed with iron rods, sabol and lathi assaulted the victim. Several of the blows were to the head, as the post-mortem report reveals, and the viciousness of the blows caused serious internal injuries including the lungs being ruptured. The nature of the injuries was such that it would ordinarily lead to the death of a victim and no expert opinion in such regard was called for. Eight men raining blows with such weapons on a solitary victim cannot be seen to have inflicted injury that would not be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No additional proof was necessary. 32. Finally, the submission of the appellants that the weapons used by the individual appellants were not identified, does not appeal. The assailants numbered more than five and constituted an unlawful assembly. As part of such unlawful assembly, the appellants were armed with deadly weapons or things that could be used as weapons or likely to cause death. In view of the charge brought under Section 149 of the Penal Code and the rule embodied therein, there was no need to identify each appellant with an individual weapon for the prosecution case to be made out or succeed. 33. There is no merit in the appeal and the order of conviction does not call for any interference. The sentences suffered by the appellants appear just and proper. 34. CRA No. 207 of 2013 is dismissed. 35. Copies of this judgment be made over as expeditiously as possible to the appellants and to the correctional homes where they are lodged. The lower court records be sent down forthwith with a direction to the trial court to take immediate appropriate steps in accordance with law. Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J. : I agree.