JUDGMENT & ORDER : This civil revision is directed against the order dated 14-9-2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Unakoti in TA No. 22 of 2013 rejecting the application of the petitioner filed under Section 45, Evidence Act, 1872 for examination of the title deed by a handwriting and thumb expert at the appellate stage. 2. The grounds for rejecting the application in question by the appellate court is found at the last but two paragraphs of the impugned order, which are reproduced below: “It is an admitted fact in this case (sic) on 16-01-2013, the appellant of this case filed similar petition praying for examination of the sale deed for expert opinion but the said prayer was rejected by the Learned Trial Court but the appellant side did not reach before any higher forum challenging the order passed by the Learned Trial court in revision, etc. Moreover, PW-1, the appellant of this case, in his cross-examination admitted that there is no recital in his plaint specifically that there was no signature and thumb impression in the deed dated 02-03-1970 vide no.1-706. The most important fact stated by the appellant in his cross-examination as PW-1 was that he admitted that he did not put any objection during revisional survey operation in respect of the present khatian of the suit land. He also stated in his cross-examination that he did not file any suit for cancellation of deed bearing no. 1-706. Moreover, the sale deed challenged by the appellant side is more than 30 years old. As per Section 90 of the Evidence act it can be presumed that the signature and every other part of such document which purports to be in the handwriting of the appellant is in that person’s handwriting. Moreover, also as per Section 90 of the Evidence Act, in the case of a document executed or attested that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. Moreover, the document challenged by the appellant side is also produced from the proper custody. The appellant, one of the executants of the sale deed also does not deny that (he?) did not put his signature or thumb impression as executant in the deed. Moreover, the document challenged by the appellant side is also produced from the proper custody. The appellant, one of the executants of the sale deed also does not deny that (he?) did not put his signature or thumb impression as executant in the deed. Moreover, DW-2, one of the witnesses of the respondent side, identified the signature of his father, namely, late Jitendra Lal Roy in the sale deed no. 1-706 who was one of the attesting witnesses of the said sale deed. The signature of the said Late Jitendra Lal Roy was also exhibited as Ext. A/1 series. No question was put in his cross-examination that his father identified a wrong person and the person identified by him was not the executant/appellant of his case. Moreover, PW-2 admitted in her cross-examination that her husband Paresh Sutradhar knows to writ and read. Hence, from the above discussion made, I am of the considered opinion that the petition filed by the appellant side for examination of the suit deed by an expert has got no merit and is accordingly rejected.” 3. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. S. Lodh, the leaned counsel for the petitioner, submits that when the case of the petitioner throughout the trial was that he had never gone to the Sub-Registry office for execution of the deed, the appellate court would have been able to resolved the issue by taking the assistance of a handwriting and thumb expert; by refusing to have the deed examined by such expert, there is every danger of perpetuating illegality committed by the trial court. He takes me through the depositions of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 as well as the evidence of the defence witnesses to fortify his submissions. He, therefore, strenuously urges this Court that this is a fit case for interference by this court, and the appellate court should be directed to have the suit deed examined by signature and thumb impression expert. On the other hand, the impugned order is supported by Mrs. P. Dhar, the learned counsel for the respondents, who submits that the appellate court has rightly rejected the application, which was also filed at the belated stage by the petitioner. 4. On the other hand, the impugned order is supported by Mrs. P. Dhar, the learned counsel for the respondents, who submits that the appellate court has rightly rejected the application, which was also filed at the belated stage by the petitioner. 4. In my opinion, the learned Additional District Judge has correctly held that there was no need to send the suit deed to handwriting and thumb expert for examination as the document was an ancient document, which under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, is presumed to be duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. According to Section 90 of the Act, where any document, purporting or proved to be thirty years old, is produced from any custody which the court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the signature and every part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person’s handwriting, and, in the case of a document executed or attested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. For application of Section 90 of the Act, there are two pre-requisites, firstly, that the document is thirty years old and, secondly, that the same is produced from proper custody. If these two conditions are fulfilled, then the court is required to consider whether it is a fit case or not for raising presumption of due execution and attestation of a document. If the court finds that it is a fit case for exercising judicial discretion and raises a presumption, in that event only, a presumption of due execution and attestation can be raised and thereafter necessity of formal proof of the document is waived. 5. If the court finds that it is a fit case for exercising judicial discretion and raises a presumption, in that event only, a presumption of due execution and attestation can be raised and thereafter necessity of formal proof of the document is waived. 5. The appellate court has taken into account the important facts that the petitioner, who was examined as PW-1 in his cross-examination, admitted that there were no specific recitals in his plaint that there was no signature and thumb impression in the deed in question; that he did not raise any objection during revisional survey operation in respect of the present khatian of the suit land; that the petitioner did not deny that he did put his signature or thumb impression as executant of the deed; that DW-2 identified the signature of his father, namely, Jitendra Lal Roy in the said sale deed, who was one of the attesting witnesses to the said sale deed; that no question was put to him in his cross-examination that his father had identified the wrong person or that the person identified by his father was not the executant/the petitioner and that the deed in question is a thirty years old document, which was produced from a proper custody. In my judgment, the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge does not suffer from perversity. The law is now well-settled that in a revision petition, where a court has the jurisdiction to determine a question and it determines it, it cannot be said that it has acted illegally or with material irregularity because it has come to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even of law. 6. The leading authority in this field of law is Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh, (1885) ILR 11 Cal 6 decided by the Privy Council. It was laid down by their Lordships therein that where a court has jurisdiction to decide the question before it and in fact decides the question, it cannot be regarded as acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction merely because its decision is erroneous. In the instant case, the appellate court has undoubtedly decided the question raised by the petitioner as evident from the paragraph extracted above. In the instant case, the appellate court has undoubtedly decided the question raised by the petitioner as evident from the paragraph extracted above. It is not the business of this Court sitting in a revision petition to decide as to whether the decision is erroneous or not. The impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any jurisdictional error warranting the interference of this Court. 7. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this revision petition, which is hereby dismissed at the very threshold, but by directing the parties to bear their respective costs.