JUDGMENT Hon’ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the order dated 1.8.2012 passed by the District Magistrate, Chandauli rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Janhit Guarantee Act, 2011 and the order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chakia, district Chandauli dated 27.12.2010, by which he has cancelled the Domicile Certificate issued by the petitioner dated 30.6.2010 by the Sub Divisional Magistrate for Village Hariya Bandh, Post Office Shamsherpur, Tehsil Chakia, District Chandauli. 2. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner’s husband was originally resident of village Bhawanipur Tehsil Robertsganj, district Sonbhadra. Later on the husband of the petitioner purchased Arazi No. 78 measuring 0.250 hectare in village Hariya Bandh by a sale-deed dated 1.7.2002. The petitioner and her husband after constructing a house in the village are residing in village Hariya Bandh. The petitioner applied for and issued Domicile Certificate on 30.6.2010 showing her Domicile as village Hariya Bandh. The petitioner’s husband also got his name expunged from Pariwar Register of village Bhawanipur, Tehsil Robertsganj, district Sonbhadra. The name of husband of the petitioner is also recorded in the khatauni of village Hariya Bandh in terms of the sale-deed dated 1.7.2002 and also in the Kisan Bahi and the voter list of village Hariya Bandh. 3. On 12.8.2010, the petitioner was selected for the post of Anganbadi Karyakarti by Gram Sabha Chuppepur. Thereafter some complaints were made, which were enquired into and a report dated 3.2.2011 was submitted by the Tehsildar showing the petitioner to be resident of village Hariya Bandh. This report dated 3.2.2011 has been filed as annexure 9 to the writ petition. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that before such report was submitted by the Tehsildar, the Sub Divisional Magistrate had passed an order on 27.12.2010 without giving opportunity to the petitioner cancelled her Domicile Certificate. 5. This report dated 3.2.2011 has been filed as annexure 9 to the writ petition. 4. It is the case of the petitioner that before such report was submitted by the Tehsildar, the Sub Divisional Magistrate had passed an order on 27.12.2010 without giving opportunity to the petitioner cancelled her Domicile Certificate. 5. Aggrieved by the order dated 27.12.2010, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 5379 of 2011 (Smt. Mamta Devi v. State of U.P. and others), in which writ petition initially an interim order was granted on 29.1.2011, but in the meantime due to enforcement of the U.P. Janhit Guarantee Act, 2011 and provision of forum of appeal against the order of cancellation of Domicile Certificate, the said writ petition was disposed of on 20.5.2011 directing the petitioner to prefer an appeal. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the District Magistrate, Chandauli, which was registered as Appeal No. 2 of 2011. In the meantime Bal Vikas Pariyojana Adhikari i.e., Child Development Project Officer cancelled the appointment of the petitioner on 27.6.2011 on the ground that she was not resident of village Hariya Bandh, and therefore, could not have been appointed as Anganbadi Karyakarti of Mauja Chuppepur. The petitioner preferred a Writ Petition No. 39551 of 2011 against the order of Child Development Project Officer, which was dismissed on 19.7.2011 by this Court on the ground that right of the petitioner to the post of Anganbadi Karyakarti can be determined only after disposal of her appeal filed before the District Magistrate against the cancellation of Domicile Certificate. The appeal of the petitioner remained pending and was later dismissed by the order dated 1.8.2012 by the District Magistrate. 6. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner and her husband are residing in village Hariya Bandh since 2002 and name of husband of the petitioner is recorded in the Khatauni, Kisan Bahi and voter list of the village concerned. It is true that they originally belonged to village Bhawanipur, Tehsil Robertsganj, district Sonbhadra, but original place of residence cannot dis-entitle a person for applying for and getting a Domicile Certificate from a place where a person ordinarily resides. 7. It is true that they originally belonged to village Bhawanipur, Tehsil Robertsganj, district Sonbhadra, but original place of residence cannot dis-entitle a person for applying for and getting a Domicile Certificate from a place where a person ordinarily resides. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the Government Order dated 18.2.2003 issued from General Administrative Department, Government of U.P., wherein it has been specifically mentioned in paragraph 3(3) that Domicile Certificate can be issued to an applicant, whose parents either original residents of a particular place or where the applicant has been ordinarily residing for the past three years. 8. Relevant paragraph of the Government Order No. 157/Three-2003-77(11)/83 dated 18.2.2003 is being quoted herein below: ^^¼3½ izek.k i= ikus ds fy, ;g vko';d gS fd vkosnd ;k mlds ekrk firk ml tuin ds ewy fuoklh gks vFkok og vLFkk;h :i ls xr rhu o"kZ ls ml tuin esa fuokl dj jgh gksA** 9. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the basis of judgment rendered by this Court in Devesh Kumar v. Smt. Ram Devi and others, 2013(2) ADJ 319 , that ordinarily place of residence is to be determined as that place where a person actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business. Domicile Certificate can be issued to a person on the basis of his ordinary residence in particular place and not on the basis of where his parents or he himself was originally resident of that particular place. 10. This Court has perused the Government Order dated 18.2.2003 and also the judgment rendered in Devesh Kumar (supra) and it finds that in the aforecited judgment, this Court was considering the case of the person, who was native of district Fatehpur, but was posted at Etawah and had constructed a house at Kanpur, but never resided therein. When such person died in an accident at Etawah, a Succession Certificate was applied for by his widow under Section 371 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and question arose as to whether such an application under Section 371 of the Act could be entertained by the District Judge at Etawah or District Judge at Kanpur. This Court considered several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in cases where Domicile Certificate of a person was in question and has observed in paragraphs 9 to 14 as under: “9. This Court considered several judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in cases where Domicile Certificate of a person was in question and has observed in paragraphs 9 to 14 as under: “9. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Doodh Nath Prasad, AIR 2000 SC 525 , held that concept of domicile and residence may carry the same meaning and both refer to a permanent home but in common use the two things may differ. Domicile may take many colours such as domicile of residence, domicile of choice, domicile by operation of law or domicile of dependence. On the contrary, the concept of ordinarily resident is different and may shift from place of ordinary domicile as a person may have lived at one time in a particular village of a State and may own some property there but may subsequently start living elsewhere and in these circumstances for all purposes the person may be treated to be ordinarily residing in the subsequent place. 10. It is settled view that a person is deemed to be residing at a place where he actually and voluntarily resides and carries on business. He cannot be said to be residing at a place where he has a family and visits occasionally. The term ‘residence’ is a flexible one and it connotes the ordinary and general place of residence of a person and not casual or occasional place of his visit. 11. In Munna Lal and others v. Paneychand and others, AIR 1958 Rajasthan 166, in interpreting the word “actually and voluntary resides” as used in Section 20 C.P.C., it was held that a person has his residence at a place where he normally lives and carries on his business and not at the place where his forefathers lived and left immovable property or where the person goes off and on, on occasions of marriage and other ceremonies. The fact of his having his ancestral home at a certain place and occasionally visiting it do not make it a place of his actual and voluntary residence. 12. The ownership of the house in which the person resides is also not material for the purpose of determining his ordinary place of residence which connotes the place where a persons sleeps, eats and drinks and not a place which is owned by him. 11. 12. The ownership of the house in which the person resides is also not material for the purpose of determining his ordinary place of residence which connotes the place where a persons sleeps, eats and drinks and not a place which is owned by him. 11. This Court in the case of Arvind Kumar v. State of U.P. and others, 2012 (2) ALJ 354, has considered the law relating to “domicile” and has observed in paragraphs 14, 17 and 18 thus: “14. “Domicile” does not mean always the place of ancestors or place of residence of forefathers of the incumbent concerned. Albeit in a different context the Apex Court in Central Bank of India v. Ram Narain, AIR 1955 SC 36 , referred to the Writers on “Private International Law” and said that generally they are agreeable that absolute definition of “domicile” is impossible to day down. The simplest definition of this expression is said to have been given by Chitty, J. in Cragnish v. Craignish, [1892] 3 Ch. 180, observing “that place is properly the domicile of a person in which his habitation is fixed without any present intention of removing therefrom.” This definition, however cannot be said to be absolute one. The term ‘domicile’ lends itself to illustrations but not to definition. In English Law most of the jurists agrees that two constituent elements for existence of domicile are (1) a residence of a particular kind, and (2) an intention of a particular kind. There must be the factum and there must be the animus. The residence need not be continuous but it must be indefinite, not purely fleeting. The intention must be a present intention to reside for ever in the country where the residence has been taken up. It is also a well established proposition that a person may have no home but he cannot be without a domicile. The law may attribute to him a domicile in a country where in reality he has not. In other words, one of the constituents giving birth to domicile of a person is the place where he was born. 17. It is also a well established proposition that a person may have no home but he cannot be without a domicile. The law may attribute to him a domicile in a country where in reality he has not. In other words, one of the constituents giving birth to domicile of a person is the place where he was born. 17. Recognizing difference in the meaning of word ‘domicile’ in the context of admission in Medical Colleges in a particular State vis-a-vis Private international Law, in Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420 , the Court said that domicile used in the rules regulating admissions to medical colleges framed by some of the States may be interpreted in the loose sense of “permanent residence in the State” in which the medical college is situated and not in the technical sense in which it is used in private international law. 18. In Union of India v. Dudh Nath Prasad, AIR 2000 SC 525 : 2000 (2) SCC 20 , the question of residence and domicile was considered in the context of the question, whether Dudh Nath belong to Scheduled Caste or not. Dudh Nath Prasad was born in State of Bihar (Siwan District) and belong to Nunia community which a scheduled caste in the Presidential Notification for the State of West Bengal but not in the State of Bihar. He was selected in Indian Administrative and Allied Services against a reserved vacancy of Scheduled Caste and appointed as such based on caste certificate issued by Sub Divisional Officer Howrah, State of West Bengal on the basis of Presidential Notification of State of West Bengal. The question to be considered was, whether for the purpose of caste certificate the petitioner would be treated to be resident of Bihar or West Bengal. The relevant instructions in this regard use the words “District in which the parents of the candidate ordinarily reside.” Dudh Nath contended that his parents were not ordinarily residing in District Siwan (Bihar) and therefore, he had rightly been issued caste certificate by the officer at Howrah. It was upheld. The Court held that Dudh Nath’s parents were residing in State of West Bengal since long and for all intents and purpose, they were entitled to be treated as “ordinarily residing” in the State of West Bengal.” 12. It was upheld. The Court held that Dudh Nath’s parents were residing in State of West Bengal since long and for all intents and purpose, they were entitled to be treated as “ordinarily residing” in the State of West Bengal.” 12. This Court in Writ A No. 49616 of 2015 (Manisha Sharma v. State of U.P. and others) decided on 7.9.2017 has also dealt with the question of domicile certificate being granted to a person ordinarily residing in one place for the past more than 3 years. It was observed in para 15, 16, 18, 19, 20 thus: 15. It is clear from the evidence recorded by the District Magistrate on the basis of the report of the Naib Tehsildar submitted to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that although the husband of Manisha Sharma had a ancestral house in the village Sirsiya Khohiya, she alongwith her husband was presently residing in Gopalgarh Tiraha and used visit the village concerned Sirsiya Khohiya only infrequently. 16. In Jagir Kaur and another v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that a person would be said to be residing at a place when it is not a flying visit to or a casual stay in a particular place. There shall be ‘animus manendi’ or an intention to stay for an indefinite period, the length of the period depending upon the circumstances of each case. The Supreme Court observed that it is said that a person “resides” in a particular place if he through choice makes it his abode permanently or even temporarily, but the intention to stay indefinitely at that particular place must be clear from the circumstances surrounding such stay. 18. With regard to Smt. Bechani Devi, the finding of the District Magistrate is based upon documentary evidence produced by her and corroborated by the report of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that although she was married to one Raju Prasad of village Bhurota, she was actually living with her parents in village Sirsiya Khohiya. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that now the petitioner’s name has been included in the Voters List and Family Register of village Sirsiya Khohiya. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that now the petitioner’s name has been included in the Voters List and Family Register of village Sirsiya Khohiya. Clearly this is an admission that the name of the petitioner was not included in the Voter List and Family Register of the village Sirsiya Khohiya at the time when the selection was held for the post of Mini Anganbadi Karyakarti. 20. Therefore, I do not find any factual or legal infirmity in the order passed by the District Magistrate impugned in this writ petition. 13. In view of the fact that the petitioner alongwith her husband has been residing since 2002 in village Hariya Bandh and a report regarding the same has been submitted by the Tehsildar on 3.2.2011, the observation made by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chakia, and the District Magistrate, Chandauli that the petitioner is not the original resident (Mool Niwasi) of the village Hariya Bandh and thus, no Domicile Certificate could have been issued to her from village Hariya Bandh is completely misconceived. 14. The impugned orders are set aside. 15. The writ petition is allowed. 16. Let appropriate orders be passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate regarding restoring of the Domicile Certificate issued to the petitioner earlier from village Hariya Bandh, Tehsil Chakia, District Chandauli within a period of four weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before him.