JUDGMENT : DR. A.K.RATH, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 23.1.1989 and 6.2.1989 respectively passed by the learned 1st Addl. District Judge, Ganjam-Berhampur in Money Appeal No.11 of 1988 reversing the judgment and decree dated 14.7.1988 and 22.7.1988 respectively passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Berhampur in Money Suit No.72 of 1987. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit for realisation of Rs.15,658/-from the defendants. The case of the plaintiff is that it deals in forms, registers and stationeries etc. The Block Development Officer, Raikia, defendant No. 2, in his official capacity having agreed to the terms and conditions and rate of the plaintiff placed an order for supply of forms and registers etc. Therefore, the plaintiff supplied all the articles on four different occasions and submitted a consolidated bill amounting to Rs.10,370/-. As defendant no.2 did not make any payment against the said bill, it issued a statutory notice under Section 80 CPC 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The case of the defendants is that defendant no.2 was not empowered to place orders for local purchase worth more than Rs.10,000/-. The plaintiff had violated the terms and conditions of the agreement by not supplying all the articles in time, for which the defendant had incurred huge expenses by deputing a messenger and transporting some of the articles sent by the plaintiff to Phulbani through a transport company. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court struck four issues. To prove his case, the plaintiff had examined one witness and on his behalf, twelve documents had been exhibited. The defendants had examined one witness and on their behalf, one document had been exhibited. Learned trial court decreed the suit. The defendants filed Money Appeal No.11 of 1988 before the learned 1st Addl. District Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur, which was allowed. 5. The appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law; I. Whether in view of the findings of both the courts below that the B.D.O had placed orders in his official capacity and the articles that were supplied and were utilized by the State Government, Sections 65 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act will come to the aid of the appellants? II. II. When a person lawfully does anything for another person, not intending to do so gratuitously and such other person enjoys the benefit thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to the former in respect of, the things so done or delivered? III. Whether the learned Appellate Court is justified in his interpretation of Ext. A which forms the foundation of the suit?” 6. Heard Mr. P.V. Balakrishna, learned counsel for the appellants and Ms. Samapika Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State. 7. Mr. P.V. Balakrishna, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted that pursuant to the order placed by the BDO, the plaintiff has supplied the goods. The same was received. Thus, the defendants cannot escape its liability on the ground that the BDO had no authority to place the order to the plaintiff. He further submitted that earlier the plaintiff had supplied the goods. Since the defendants did not pay the money, the plaintiff instituted the suit. The suit was decreed. Thereafter, the State of Orissa filed an appeal before this Court and the same was allowed. He relied on the decision of this Court in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Prathibha Prakash Bhavan, AIR 1995 Orissa 62. 8. Ms. Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State, on the other hand, submitted that the BDO was not authorized to place the order to the plaintiff. The defendants are not liable to pay for the action of the BDO. She relied on the decision of the apex Court in the case of M/s. Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and others v. State of Haryana and others, (1981) 1 SCC 11 . 9. In Prathibha Prakash Bhavan (supra), the plaintiff supplied articles pursuant to the order place by the Block Development Officer. Since the bill submitted by the plaintiff was not paid, it instituted the suit for realisation of money. A plea was taken by the defendants that the Block Development Officer was not authorised under financial rules to place orders. This Court held that it was not the case of defendant No.1 that Block Development Officer had received the goods in his personal capacity. Goods were received for being used officially in the block. Such goods were not intended to be handed over by plaintiff gratuitously. This Court held that it was not the case of defendant No.1 that Block Development Officer had received the goods in his personal capacity. Goods were received for being used officially in the block. Such goods were not intended to be handed over by plaintiff gratuitously. If Block Development Officer was not authorised, defendant No. 1 could have informed plaintiff to take back the goods. There was no such intention. When goods were received and used for official purpose and at no stage plaintiff was intimated to take back the goods on account of violation of financial discipline by Block Development Officer, both defendants are liable to pay the price of goods as provided under Section 65 of the Contract Act. The ratio in the said case applies with full force to the facts of this case. 10. Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act provides obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void. The same is quoted below: “65. Obligation of person who has received advantage under void agreement, or contract that becomes void.-When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it, or to make compensation for it to the person from whom he received it.” 11. This Court in Sadasiva Panda v. Prajapati Panda and another (S.A No.217 of 1998 disposed of on 3.3.2017) held thus: “14. The Privy Council in the case of Harnath Kaur v. Indeer Bahadur Singh, AIR 1922 PC 403 , held that the section deals with (a) agreements and (b) contracts. The distinction between them is apparent from section 2. By clause (e) every promise and every set of promises forming the consideration for each other is an agreement, and by clause (h) an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. Section 65, therefore, deals with (a) agreements enforceable by law and (b) with agreements not so enforceable. By clause (g) an agreement not enforceable by law is said to be void. An agreement, therefore, discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by law, and, on the language of the section would include an agreement that was void in that sense from its inception as distinct from a contract that becomes void. xxx xxx xxx 17. An agreement, therefore, discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by law, and, on the language of the section would include an agreement that was void in that sense from its inception as distinct from a contract that becomes void. xxx xxx xxx 17. The principle underlying Section 65 is that a right to restitution may arise out of the failure of a contract though the right be not itself a matter of contractual obligation as held by Privy Council in the case of Babu Raja Mohan Manucha and others v. Babu Manzoor Ahmad Khan and others, A.I.R. 1943 Privy Council 29.” 12. The judgment relied on by Ms. Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel is distinguishable on facts. In Jit Ram Shiv Kumar (supra), the Municipal Committee of Bahadurgarh, established Mandi in Bahadurgarh Town with a view to improve trade in the area. The Municipal Committee decided that the purchasers of the plots for sale in the Mandi would not be required to pay octroi duty on goods imported within the said Mandi. Pursuant to the said decision, a resolution was passed by the Municipality. Hand bills were issued for the sale of the plots on the basis of the resolution. It was proclaimed that such Mandi would remain exempt from payment of octroi. Subsequently the Committee resolved to levy octroi duty on goods. The resolution was annulled by the Punjab Government. Thereafter, the Committee passed a resolution requesting the State Government to cancel the committee’s earlier resolution granting levy of octroi. The Government accepted the same. The appellants being aggrieved by the decision filed writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Full Bench of the High Court rejected the petition. The matter went to the apex Court. The apex Court held that the plea of estoppel is not available against the State in the exercise of its legislative or statutory functions. It was further held that the principle of estoppel is not available against the Government in exercise of legislative, sovereign or executive power. The apex Court further held that Sections 65 and 70 provide for certain reliefs in void contracts and in unenforceable contracts where a person relying on a representation has acted upon it and put himself in a disadvantageous position. The apex Court further held that Sections 65 and 70 provide for certain reliefs in void contracts and in unenforceable contracts where a person relying on a representation has acted upon it and put himself in a disadvantageous position. The Indian Constitution as a matter of high policy in public interest has enacted Article 299 so as to save the Government liability arising out of unauthorized acts of its officers and contracts not duly executed. The apex Court further held that on a consideration of the decisions of this Court it is clear that there can be no promissory estoppel against the exercise of legislative power of the State. So also the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The Government would not be bound by the act of its officers and agents who act beyond the scope of their authority and a person dealing with the agent of the Government must be held to have notice of the limitations of his authority. The Court can enforce compliance by a public authority of the obligation laid on him if he arbitrarily or on his mere whim ignores the promises made by him on behalf of the Government. It would be open to the authority to plead and prove that there were special considerations which necessitated his not being able to comply with his obligations in public interest. 13. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the action of the BDO was unauthorized. In view of the same, the decision in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar (supra) is distinguishable on facts. Furthermore, in earlier occasion the plaintiff had supplied the goods. The money was not paid on the ground that the BDO was not authorized to place the order. This Court has negatived the contention of the State and decreed the suit. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 14. Before parting with the case, it is apt to refer a decision of this Court in the case of State of Orissa and another v. Sri Dwarika Das Agarwalla, 2017 (I) OLR 256 . This Court held: “No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manne as he wishes. State is a virtuous litigant. This Court held: “No litigant has a right to unlimited drought on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manne as he wishes. State is a virtuous litigant. About 60 years back in the case of Firm Kaluram Sitaram v. The Dominion of India, AIR 1954 Bombay 50, Chief Justice Chagla (as he then was) speaking for the Bench stressed that when the State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and if the State is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one, even though legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as has been said by eminent judges, as an honest person.” 15. In the wake of the aforesaid, the judgment and decree of the learned Addl. District Judge, Jeypore is set aside. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge, Jeypore is affirmed. The suit is decreed. The appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, parties are to bear their own costs throughout.