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Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 2880 (ALL)

SAURABH GUPTA v. UNION OF INDIA

2017-12-08

SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Sri Sanjay Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ashok Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri A.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following relief: “issue, a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the second respondent-Register, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to send the file of petitioner relating to S.A. No. 559 of 2013; Saurabh Gupta v. Oriental Bank of Commerce to Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad in pursuance to Notification No. SO454(E)[F.No. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15.2.2017 (Annexure-2) conferring the jurisdiction of District Shahjahanpur to DRT Allahabad as requested in the application/letter dated 14.7.2017 (Annexure-3) sent by the petitioner through counsel.” 3. This writ petition was heard on 11.10.2017 and 24.10.2017. On 15.11.2017 learned counsels for the parties were heard at length and the following order was passed : “Heard Sri Sanjay Maurya holding brief of Sri Deepak Kumar Jaiswal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the respondents. Pursuant to the order dated 11.10.2017, Sri Mehrotra has stated that instructions have been received from the Registrar, Debts Recovery Trubinal, Lucknow. He submits that pursuant to an order dated 3.8.2017 passed by a Division Bench in Misc. Bench No. 4330 of 2017 (Debts Recovery Tribunal Bar Association through V.C. Rajiv Mishra v. Union of India through Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services, New Delhi) the Under Secretary has issued a letter dated 18.9.2017 advising the Presiding Officer, D.R.T. Lucknow to comply with the order dated 15.9.2017 passed by the Lucknow Bench of the High Court. Another letter dated 10.10.2017 has been issued by the aforesaid Under-Secretary requesting the D.R.T. Lucknow to deal with all similar cases as mentioned in para-1(2) of the Department of Financial Services, letter of even number dated 18.9.2017. Copies of these letters dated 18.9.2017 and 27.9.2017 have not been placed before this Court. From perusal of the order dated 3.8.2017 in the case of Debts Recovery Tribunal Bar Association through V.C. Rajiv Mishra (supra), it appears that the whole concern was with respect to cases relating to eight districts of Uttar Pradesh transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal established at Dehradun (Uttarakhand) and in view thereof, the Central Government was advised to reconsider it. It was observed that allocation of districts of Uttar Pradesh which were adjoining to the State of Uttarkhand does not appear to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Central Government was advised to reconsider this aspect and modify the notification impugned. It was further observed by the Division Bench that it would be appropriate to advise the Central Government to reconsider its decision for allocation of districts to the Debt Recovery Tribunal particularly established at Dehradun before transmitting the records to the respective Tribunals. Thus from the order dated 3.8.2017, it transpires that the Division Bench not stayed the operation of the Notification No. 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] DATED 15-2-2017 issued in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Recovery Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993). By the aforesaid order, the Division Bench has not interfered with the functioning of the Tribunal at Allahabad with respect to the jurisdiction assigned to it by the aforesaid Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act, which is a statutory instrument issued in legislative exercise of powers. No direction has been issued by the Division Bench to defer the Notification. The said notification is stated to have been issued after due approval of the Cabinet. Under the circumstances, I do not find any good reason for the respondents to take the stand that in the light of the aforesaid Division Bench order, the pending cases falling under jurisdiction of D.R.T. Allahabad, could not be transferred so far from the D.R.T. Lucknow. That apart, litigants were not before the Lucknow Bench in the aforesaid case rather the writ petition was filed by Debt Recovery Tribunal Bar Association. Before this Court, the present writ petition has been filed by a litigant who wants that his case be heard at the D.R.T. Allahabad which has the jurisdiction to hear the case as per Notification issued under Section 3 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, prima facie, it appears that the respondents are deliberately not giving effect to the notification under Section 3 of the Act with respect to the D.R.T. Allahabad, which is backed by a cabinet decision and has been issued in legislative exercise of powers. The matter is serious. However on the request of learned counsel for the respondents, the matter is adjourned for today to enable him to seek further instructions. Put up on 17.11.2017” 4. The matter is serious. However on the request of learned counsel for the respondents, the matter is adjourned for today to enable him to seek further instructions. Put up on 17.11.2017” 4. Again this writ petition was heard on 21.11.2017, 22.11.2017, 27.11.2017, 29.11.2017, 5.12.2017 and finally today with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri A.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the respondents. Facts : 5. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) has established a Debt Recovery Tribunal at Dehradun w.e.f. 16.2.2017 and also notified the territorial jurisdiction of three Debt Recovery Tribunals, namely at Allahabad, Lucknow and Dehradun vide Notification No. SO 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017. By the aforesaid notification issued in supersession of the earlier notifications, the territorial jurisdiction over 55 districts of State of Uttar Pradesh including the district Shahjahanpur has been conferred upon the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad. With respect to 12 districts of Uttar Pradesh, the territorial jurisdiction was conferred to Debt Recovery Tribunal at Lucknow. Eight districts of State of Uttar Pradesh were brought within the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal at Dehradun. 6. Since the territorial jurisdiction of District Shahjahanpur has been conferred by the aforesaid notification under Section 3 of the Act to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad, therefore, the petitioner enquired through his counsel as to whether file relating to his case being S.A. No. 559 of 2013 (Saurabh Gupta v. Oriental Bank of Commerce) has been transferred from Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad or not? On enquiry, he came to know that file has not been transferred by the Registrar, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad. Consequently, the petitioner approached the Registrar, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to remit the records of the aforesaid case to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad but he has not transferred the file. On enquiry, he came to know that file has not been transferred by the Registrar, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad. Consequently, the petitioner approached the Registrar, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow to remit the records of the aforesaid case to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad but he has not transferred the file. Consequently, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition for issue of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the second respondent, i.e. Registrar, D.R.T., Lucknow to remit the records of the aforesaid case to the Debt Recovery Tribunal at Allahabad in pursuance to Notification No. SO454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 which confers jurisdiction of cases of District Shahjahanpur to D.R.T. Allahabad. Submissions on behalf of the petitioner : 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the territorial jurisdiction of Shahjahanpur lies with the D.R.T. Allahabad in terms of the Notification No. 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 issued by the Government of India in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad is bound to hear and decide the case of the petitioners being S.A. No. 559 of 2013 (Saurabh Gupta v. Oriental Bank of Commerce) but the respondent No. 2 is not remitting the Case File and as such the case is not being proceeded with. He further submits that financial matters should be decided expeditiously, particularly when a Tribunal in debts matter has been specially constituted but by not sending the case file, the respondent No. 2 is not only committing breach of his statutory duties but also obstructing disposal of cases. He, therefore, submits that a direction may be issued to the respondent No. 2 to remit the records of the aforesaid case to the D.R.T. Allahabad so that the case of the petitioner may be decided expeditiously. Submissions on behalf of the respondents: 8. Sri Ashok Mehta, learned Additional Solicitor General of India submits that the aforesaid Notification dated 15.2.2017 has been issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Act specifying the territorial jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunals at Allahabad, Lucknow and Dehradun. It is within the sole domain of the Central Government to notify the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunals under Section 3 of the Act. It is within the sole domain of the Central Government to notify the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunals under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the aforesaid three Debt Recovery Tribunals are under statutorily bound to exercise jurisdiction and discharge its duties under the Act with respect to the area or jurisdiction assigned to each of it in Column-4 of the Notification dated 15.2.2017. He submits that the order dated 3.8.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 4330 of 2017 (Debts Recovery Tribunal Bar Association through V.C. Rajiv Mishra v. Union of India through Ministry of Finance, Department of Financial Services, New Delhi) is with respect to the Tribunal established at Dehraduan in the State of Uttarakhand to which jurisdiction of some of the districts of Uttar Pradesh was conferred. Therefore, the aforesaid order has to be read with reference to the Debts Recovery Tribunal established at Dehradun. By the aforesaid order, this Court has not interfered with the notification dated 15.2.2017 rather it has been advised to the Central Government to reconsider its decision for allocation of districts to the Debts Recovery Tribunals particularly established at Deharadun before transmitting the records to the respective tribunals. 9. Thus even by the aforesaid order, the Notification dated 15.2.2017 has neither been quashed nor there is any interim order against the operation of the aforesaid Notification. The Notification dated 15.2.2017 is continuing in full force, therefore, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad or its officers cannot refuse to entertain and decide either fresh or pending cases falling under its territorial jurisdiction. The subsequent order dated 12.10.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 24346 of 2017 (M/s Shree Shyam Pulp and Board Mills Ltd., New Delhi v. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi and two others), merely records the proceedings of D.R.T. Lucknow in view of the order dated 3.8.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 4330 of 2017 and, therefore, observations made on the basis of the assurance of the Presiding Officer of the D.R.T. Lucknow is confined to the records of cases which were likely to be remitted to the D.R.T. Dehradun. Discussion and Findings : 10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record before me. 11. There is no dispute that in view of Notification No. SO 454(E)[F.NO. Discussion and Findings : 10. I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record before me. 11. There is no dispute that in view of Notification No. SO 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 issued under Section 3 of the Act, district Shahjahanpur falls within the territorial jurisdiction of D.R.T., Allahabad. For ready reference, the aforesaid Notification No. 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT] dated 15-2-2017 is reproduced below: SECTION 3 OF THE RECOVERY OF DEBTS DUE TO BANKS AND FINACIAL INSTITUTIONS ACT, 1993 - TRIBUNAL - ESTABLISHMENT OF - NOTIFIED DEBTS RECOVERY TRIBUNAL - SUPERSESSION OF NOTIFICATIONS NO. GSR 274(E), DATED 31-3-2000 AND GSR 71(E), DATED 31-1-2002 NOTIFICATION NO. SO 454(E)[F.NO. 1/3/2016-DRT], DATED 15-2-2017 In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and in supersession of the notifications of the Government of India, published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part-II, Section 3, Sub-section (i) vide number G.S.R. 274 (E), dated the 31st March 2000 and G.S.R. 71 (E), dated the 31st January, 2002, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before such supersession, the Central Government hereby establish the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Dehradun with effect from the 16th day of February, 2017 and hereby specifies the area of jurisdiction of the Debts Recovery Tribunals at Allahabad, Lucknow and Dehradun in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, as mentioned in column (4) of the Table below, namely:— S. No. Name of Debts Recovery Tribunal Location Area of Jurisdiction 1. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad 9/2A, Panna Lal Road, Allahabad. Agra, Aligarh, Allahabad, Ambedkar Nagar, Amethi (CSM Nagar), Auariya, Azamgarh, Bahraich, Ballia, Balrampur, Banda, Barabanki, Bareilly, Basti, Bhadohi (Sant Ravidas Nagar), Budaun, Chandauli, Chitrakoot, Deoria, Etah, Etawah, Faizabad, Farrukhabad, Fatehpur, Firozabad, Ghazipur, Gonda, Gorakhpur, Hamipur, Hathras (Mahamaya Nagar), Jalaun, Jaunpur, Jhansi, Kannauj, Kanpur Dehat, Kanpur Nagar, Kasganj, Kaushambi, Kushinagar, Lalitpur, Maharajganj, Mahoba, Mainpuri, Mathura, Mau, Mirzapur, Pilibhit, Pratapgarh, Sant Kabir Nagar, Shahjahanpur, Shrawasti, Siddharth Nagar, Sonebhadra, Sultanpur and Varanasi districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 2. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow 600/1, University Road, Near Hanuman Setu Mandir, Lucknow -226007 (UP). Baghpat, Bulandsahar, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Ghaziabad, Hapur, Meerut, Hardoi, Lakhimpur Kheri, Lucknow, Raebareli, Sitapur and Unnao districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 3. 2. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow 600/1, University Road, Near Hanuman Setu Mandir, Lucknow -226007 (UP). Baghpat, Bulandsahar, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Ghaziabad, Hapur, Meerut, Hardoi, Lakhimpur Kheri, Lucknow, Raebareli, Sitapur and Unnao districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 3. Debts Recovery Tribunal, Dehradun Paras Tower, 2nd Floor, Majra Niranjanpur, Saharanpur Road, Dehradun. State of Uttarakhand and Amroha, Bijnor, Moradabad, Rampur, Sambhal, Muzaffarnagar, Saharanpur and Shamli districts in the State of Uttar Pradesh. 12. Before I proceed to examine the effect of the afore-quoted notification, it would be useful to refer the provisions of Sections 3 and 17 of the Act, as under: “3. Establishment of Tribunal.—(1) The Central Government shall by notification, establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on such Tribunal by or under this Act. (2) The Central Government shall also specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it. 17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.—(1) A Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and financial institutions for recovery of debts due to such banks and financial institutions. (2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain appeals against any order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.” 13. Section 3(1) of the Act confers legislative power upon the Central Government to establish one or more Tribunals, to be known as the Debts Recovery Tribunal, to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred by or under the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 further confers legislative powers upon the Central Government to specify, in the notification referred to in sub-section (1), the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it. Thus, a Tribunal established under Section 3 of the Act can entertain and decide applications of such areas only which have been specified by notification. Therefore, the D.R.T. Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications arising from fifty five districts specified in the afore-quoted notification dated 15.2.2017. Thus, a Tribunal established under Section 3 of the Act can entertain and decide applications of such areas only which have been specified by notification. Therefore, the D.R.T. Allahabad shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications arising from fifty five districts specified in the afore-quoted notification dated 15.2.2017. Thus, in view of the provisions of Section 3 read with Section 17(1) of the Act, the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as ‘D.R.T. Lucknow’) completely lacks jurisdiction to entertain and decide all those applications which fall within the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘D.R.T. Allahabad’). 14. By order dated 3.8.2017, the Lucknow Bench in writ petition being Misc. Bench No. 4330 of 2017 filed by Debts Recovery Tribunal Bar Association, Lucknow observed as under: “Regard being had to the aforesaid submissions we proceed to deal with the matter as follows. The Debts Recovery Tribunals have been established by the Central Government in exercise of power provided under Section 3(1) of the Act, 1993 and in sub-section 2 of Section 3 the Central Government has been empowered to specify the areas within which the Tribunal may exercise its jurisdiction for entertaining and deciding the applications filed before it. Therefore, the notification impugned cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Insofar as the allocation of some of the districts of Uttar Pradesh to the Tribunal established at State of Uttarakhand at Dehradun is concerned, we are of the view that once in the State of Uttar Pradesh two tribunals are established one at Allahabad and another at Lucknow, there is no occasion to notify some of the districts of the state of Uttar Pradesh to be fastened with the Tribunal established at Dehradun in State of Uttarakhand. The administrative difficulty as has been averred to govern the concerned districts with the High Court of Uttarakhand cannot be ignored. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is vested with the jurisdiction to deal with the cases arising out of the districts adjoining to the State of Uttarkhand. The litigants who are resident of adjoining districts of State of Uttarakhand travel to attend the cases at Allahabad. They may not feel any difficulty to attend the pending cases in Tribunal either it is assigned at Lucknow or at Allahabad. The litigants who are resident of adjoining districts of State of Uttarakhand travel to attend the cases at Allahabad. They may not feel any difficulty to attend the pending cases in Tribunal either it is assigned at Lucknow or at Allahabad. The allocation of districts of State of Uttar Pradesh which may be situated adjoining to State of Uttarakhand does not appear to be reasonable. Therefore, it would be appropriate to advice the Central Government to reconsider this aspect and modify the notification impugned. Insofar as inter se dispute with regard to the allocation of cases in two different tribunals one at Allahabad and another at Lucknow within the same very State is concerned, definitely convenience of litigants are the first and foremost factor to be considered by the Central Government, so that they can get the justice at convenient place, particularly once tribunals accessible to them are established at the appropriate places. Therefore, we feel it appropriate to advice the Central Government to reconsider its decision for allocation of districts to the Debts Recovery Tribunals particularly established at Dehradun before transmitting the records to the respective tribunals. With the aforesaid opinion the writ petition stands disposed of finally.” 15. In the order dated 12.10.2017 in writ petition being Misc. Bench No. 24346 of 2017 (M/s Shree Shyam Pulp and Board Mills Ltd. New Delhi) the Lucknow Bench observed as under : “In view of the aforesaid letter dated 10th October, 2017,it has been assured by the Presiding Officer, Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow that since in view of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 3rd August, 2017 passed in Writ Petition No. 4330 (MB) of 2017, the records of the Securitisation Applications filed before 15th February, 2017 are not to be transmitted to other Tribunals till a final decision is taken by the Union of India in respect of the Notification dated 15th. February, 2017, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow shall henceforth, deal with all such matters coming before it. What we mean by such matters is that the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow, shall deal with the Securitisation Applications filed before it prior to 15th February, 2017 in accordance with law, except those, where the records have been transmitted to other Tribunals either by the Tribunal itself or under the orders of the Appellate Tribunal or any other Higher Forum.” 16. Bare perusal of the afore-quoted order dated 3.8.2017 leaves no manner of doubt that the Division Bench has held that the notification dated 15.2.2017 does not suffer from lack of jurisdiction. The Division Bench shown its concern for allocating territorial jurisdiction of eight districts of State of Uttar Pradesh to D.R.T. Dehradun observing that there is no occasion to notify some of the districts of Uttar Pradesh to be fastened with the Tribunal established at Deharadun in the State of Uttarkhand, therefore, such allocation to D.R.T. Deharadun does not appear to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Division Bench advised the Central Government to reconsider this aspect (allocation of certain districts of Uttar Pradesh to the D.R.T. Deharadun) before transmitting the records to the respective Tribunals. The subsequent order dated 12.10.2017 in Writ Petition No. 24346 of 2017 (M/B) has been passed on the assurance of the Presiding Officer, D.R.T. Allahabad in view of the order dated 3.8.2017 in Writ Petition No. 4330 of 2017 (M/B). Thus a conjoint reading of both the afore-quoted orders of the Division Bench shows that it mainly advised the Central Government to reconsider its decision of conferment of territorial jurisdiction over eight districts of Uttar Pradesh to the D.R.T. Deharadun (State of Uttarakhand). 17. Apart from above, the clear stand taken on behalf of Union of India by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India reiterating the territorial jurisdiction of the D.R.T. Allahabad to be the districts specified in the notification dated 15.2.2017, leaves no manner of doubt that only the D.R.T. Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide applications of districts as specified in the notification dated 15.2.2017. 18. Learned Additional Solicitor General of India has admitted and stated before this Court that it is within the sole domain of the Central Government to notify the territorial jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunals under Section 3 of the Act. Therefore, the D.R.T. Allahabad and D.R.T. Lucknow may exercise jurisdiction and discharge duties under the Act to entertain and decide applications falling within the territorial area of jurisdiction assigned by the afore-quoted Notification dated 15.2.2017. District Shahjahanpur is within the territorial jurisdiction of the D.R.T., Allahabad, therefore, the case of the petitioner can be decided only by the jurisdictional Tribunal i.e. D.R.T. Allahabad and not by the D.R.T. Lucknow. 19. District Shahjahanpur is within the territorial jurisdiction of the D.R.T., Allahabad, therefore, the case of the petitioner can be decided only by the jurisdictional Tribunal i.e. D.R.T. Allahabad and not by the D.R.T. Lucknow. 19. Since the stand on behalf of the Union of India has been clearly stated by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India as afore-noted, therefore, there remains no doubt that the D.R.T. Allahabad has territorial jurisdiction with respect to 55 districts and the D.R.T. Lucknow has jurisdiction with respect to 12 districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh as specified in the afore-quoted notification dated 15.2.2017. Conferment of Jurisdiction : 20. Conferment of Jurisdiction is a Legislative function. It can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior Court. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the statute. Even the doctrine of waiver does not apply in matters of conferment of jurisdiction. 21. In the case of A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another, (1998) 2 SCC 602 (Paras-39 and 110), a seven judges Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the power of Court to create or enlarge jurisdiction and held as under: “[Per Sabyasachi Mukharji J (for himself, Oza and Natrajan, JJ.] 39. .......The power to create or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character, so also the power to confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. Parliament alone can do it by law and no Court, whether superior or inferior or both combined can enlarge the jurisdiction of a Court or divest a person of his rights of revision and appeal. .......... [Oza, J. (supplementing)] 110. It is clear from the opinions of learned brothers Justice Mukharji and Justice Misra that the jurisdiction to try a case could only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature and this Court could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law and it is this error which is sought to be corrected. Although it is unfortunate that it is being corrected after long lapse of time. I agree with the opinion prepared by Justice Mukharji and also the additional opinion prepared by Justice Misra.” 22. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Thr. Lrs., (1990) 1 SCC 193 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “17. Although it is unfortunate that it is being corrected after long lapse of time. I agree with the opinion prepared by Justice Mukharji and also the additional opinion prepared by Justice Misra.” 22. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Thr. Lrs., (1990) 1 SCC 193 , Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “17. In Barton v. Fincham, [1921] 2 KB, 291, 299 it was held that: “Parties cannot by agreement give the Courts jurisdiction which the Legislature has enacted they are not to have. .... the Court cannot give effect to an agreement whether by way of compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.” 18. In Peachery Property Corporation v. Robinson, [1966] 2 All ER 981, 983 Winn, Lord J. took the same view.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 23. In Harshad Chimanlal Modi v. Dlf Universal Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 791 (Paras-24, 25, 31, 32 and 34), Hon’ble Supreme Court followed and reiterated the principles of law stated in its earlier decisions in Hakam Singh v. Gamon (India) Ltd., (1971) 1 SCC 286 ; Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and another, (1983) 4 SCC 707 , A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. and another v. A.P. Agency, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 , Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co., (1991) 4 SCC 270 , R.S.D.V. Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 130 , Angile Insulations v. Devy Ashmore India Ltd. and another, (1995) 4 SCC 153 , Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, (2002) 9 SCC 613, New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 , Bahrein Petroleum Co. v. Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634 and also referred to Para 317, Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10 and held as under: “24. Upholding the contention and considering the provisions of the Code as also of the Contract Act, this Court stated : “By Clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay. 10 and held as under: “24. Upholding the contention and considering the provisions of the Code as also of the Contract Act, this Court stated : “By Clause 13 of the agreement it was expressly stipulated between the parties that the contract shall be deemed to have been entered into by the parties concerned in the city of Bombay. In any event the respondents have their principal office in Bombay and they were liable in respect of a cause of action arising under the terms of the tender to be sued in the Courts of Bombay. It is not open to the parties by agreement to confer by their agreement jurisdiction on a Court which it does not possess under the Code. But where two Courts or more have under the Code of Civil Procedure jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding on agreement between the parties that the dispute between them shall be tried in one of such Courts is not contrary to public policy. Such an agreement does not contravene Section 28 of the Contract Act.” (emphasis supplied) 25. Hakam Singh, (1983) 4 SCC 707 , was followed and principle laid down therein reiterated in several cases thereafter. [See Globe Transport Corporation v. Triveni Engineering Works and another, A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. and another v. A.P. Agency, Salem, (1989) 2 SCC 163 , Patel Roadways Ltd., Bombay v. Prasad Trading Co., (1991) 4 SCC 270 , R.S.D.V. Finance Co. (P) Ltd. v. Shree Vallabh Glass Works Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 130 , Angile Insulations v. Devy Ashmore India Ltd. and another, (1995) 4 SCC 153 , Shriram City Union Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Rama Mishra, (2002) 9 SCC 613, New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and others, (2004) 4 SCC 677 ]. 31. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th edn.), Reissue, Vol. 10; para 317; it is stated: 317. Consent and waiver.—Where, by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, a Court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular claim or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the Court, nor can consent give a Court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled. Where the Court has jurisdiction over the particular subject-matter of the claim or the particular parties and the only objection is whether, in the circumstances of the case, the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction, the parties may agree to give jurisdiction in their particular case; or a defendant by entering an appearance without protest, or by taking steps in the proceedings, may waive his right to object to the Court taking cognizance of the proceedings. No appearance or answer, however, can give jurisdiction to a limited Court, nor can a private individual impose on a judge the jurisdiction or duty to adjudicate on a matter. A statute limiting the jurisdiction of a Court may contain provisions enabling the parties to extend the jurisdiction by consent.” 32. In Bahrein Petroleum Co., AIR 1954 SC 340 , this Court also held that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a Court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. It is well-settled and needs no authority that ‘where a Court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing.’ A decree passed by a Court having no jurisdiction is non-est and its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice. 34. The case on hand relates to specific performance of a contract and possession of immovable property. Section 16 deals with such cases and jurisdiction of competent Court where such suits can be instituted. Under the said provision, a suit can be instituted where the property is situate. No Court other than the Court where the property is situate can entertain such suit. Hence, even if there is an agreement between the parties to the contract, it has no effect and cannot be enforced. “ 24. In Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others v. Dir. Health Services, Haryana, (2013) 10 SCC 136 (Para-9, 10 and 11) held as under: “9. Hence, even if there is an agreement between the parties to the contract, it has no effect and cannot be enforced. “ 24. In Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat and others v. Dir. Health Services, Haryana, (2013) 10 SCC 136 (Para-9, 10 and 11) held as under: “9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties nor by a superior Court, and if the Court passes a decree having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to nullity as the matter goes to the roots of the cause. Such an issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The finding of a Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and unenforceable/inexecutable once the forum is found to have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a Court/Tribunal inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate, defeating the legislative animation. The Court cannot derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. In such eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply. [Vide: United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 ; Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lal Ramnarayan and others, (1978) 1 SCC 58 ; Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios and another, (1981) 1 SCC 523 ; and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others, (1999) 3 SCC 722 ]. 10. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (Dead) Thr. Lrs., (1990) 1 SCC 193 , this Court, after placing reliance on large number of its earlier judgments particularly in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S. Wadke and others, (1976) 1 SCC 496 ; Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340 ; and Chandrika Misir and another v. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 held, that a decree without jurisdiction is a nullity. It is a coram non judice; when a special statute gives a right and also provides for a forum for adjudication of rights, remedy has to be sought only under the provisions of that Act and the Common Law Court has no jurisdiction; where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in specified manner, “performance cannot be forced in any other manner.” 11. Law does not permit any Court/tribunal/authority/forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such a authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter. For the reason that it is not an objection as to the place of suing;, “it is an objection going to the nullity of the order on the ground of want of jurisdiction”. Thus, for assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or a tribunal, existence of jurisdictional fact is a condition precedent. But once such jurisdictional fact is found to exist, the Court or tribunal has power to decide on the adjudicatory facts or facts in issue. [Vide: Setrucharlu Ramabhadra Raju Bahadur v. Maharaja of Jeypore, AIR 1919 PC 150 ; State of Gujarat v. Rajesh Kumar Chimanlal Barot and another, (1996) 5 SCC 477 ; Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. and another, (2005) 7 SCC 791 ; and Carona Ltd. v. M/s. Parvathy Swaminathan & Sons, (2007) 8 SCC 559 ].” (Emphasis supplied by me) 25. In Carona Ltd. v. Parvathy Swaminathan and Sons, (2007) 8 SCC 559 (Paras-27 and 28), Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “27. Stated simply, the fact or facts upon which the jurisdiction of a Court, a Tribunal or an Authority depends can be said to be a ‘jurisdictional fact’. If the jurisdictional fact exists, a Court, Tribunal or Authority has jurisdiction to decide other issues. If such fact does not exist, a Court, Tribunal or Authority cannot act. It is also well-settled that a Court or a Tribunal cannot wrongly assume existence of jurisdictional fact and proceed to decide a matter. The underlying principle is that by erroneously assuming existence of a jurisdictional fact, a subordinate Court or an inferior Tribunal cannot confer upon itself jurisdiction which it otherwise does not posses. 28. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol.1, para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol.1(1), para 68, pp.114-15, it has been stated: “Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. 28. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, (4th Edn.), Vol.1, para 55, p.61; Reissue, Vol.1(1), para 68, pp.114-15, it has been stated: “Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, or collateral to the merits of the issue. If, at the inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal has to make up its mind whether to act or not and can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral issue; but that ruling is not conclusive”. The existence of a jurisdictional fact is thus a sine qua non or condition precedent to the assumption of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal.” Law does not permit any Court/tribunal/authority/Forum to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever. Order passed without jurisdiction is nullity : 26. It is well established fundamental principle of law that decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. In Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat’s case (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court declared that law does not permit any Court/tribunal/authority to usurp jurisdiction on any ground whatsoever, in case, such authority does not have jurisdiction on the subject-matter. The law so declared by Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 27. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the every authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. In the case of Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (supra), (Para-10 and 12), Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the law laid down in its earlier decision in Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 SC 340 , and held/observed as under: “10. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, {[1955] 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340 } the facts were that the appellant had undervalued the suit at Rs. In Kiran Singh and others v. Chaman Paswan and others, {[1955] 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954 SC 340 } the facts were that the appellant had undervalued the suit at Rs. 2,950 and laid it in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Monghyr for recovery of possession of the suit lands and mesne profits. The suit was dismissed and on appeal it was confirmed. In the second appeal in the High Court the Registry raised the objection as to valuation under Section 11. The value of the appeal was fixed at Rs. 9,980. A contention then was raised by the plaintiff in the High Court that on account of the valuation fixed by the High Court the appeal against the decree of the Court of the Subordinate Judge did not lie to the District Court, but to the High Court and on that account the decree of the District Court was a nullity. Alternatively, it was contended that it caused prejudice to the appellant. In considering that contention at page 121, a four Judge Bench of this Court speaking through Vankatarama Ayyar, J. held that: “It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the every authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree would be nullities.” 12. This Court has held that it is a well established principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon, and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 28. This Court has held that it is a well established principle that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and the plea can be set up whenever and wherever the decree is sought to be enforced or relied upon, and even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 28. Thus, the Tribunal created under the Act is bound to act and discharge its duties only with respect to the areas falling within its territorial jurisdiction conferred by the Notification under Section 3 of the Act. When Mandamus can be issued : 29. A writ of mandamus is issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself and it is issued against a person who has legal duty to perform but has failed or neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates from either in discharge of a public duty or by operation of law. The object of mandamus is of to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy and whether justice despite demanded has not been granted. 30. In the present set of facts, the Notification dated 15.2.2017 issued by the Central Government in exercise of legislative power under Section 3 of the Act, has conferred territorial jurisdiction upon D.R.T. Allahabad with respect to 55 districts of the State of Uttar Pradesh including the district Shahjahanpur. Therefore, a mandamus needs to be issued to the respondent No. 2 to remit the records to the D.R.T. Allahabad to perform its statutory duty. Mandamus cannot be issue contrary to law: 31. It is well established that neither Court has competence to issue a direction contrary to law nor the Court can direct an authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions or to disobey a statue, Courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to pass the orders or directions contrary to what has been injected by law, vide Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel, JT 2010 (3) SC 189 (Paras-10-12); State of Punjab v. Renuka Singla, (1994) 1 SCC 175 ; State of U.P. v. Harish Chand, AIR 1996 SC 2173 ; Union of India v. Kirloskar Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1996 SC 3285 ; Vice Chancellor v. Dr. Anand Prakash, (1997) 10 SCC 264 ; Karnatka State Road Transport v. Ashraf Ullah Khan, JT 2000 (1) SC 113; Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996 ; State of West Bengal v. Subhas Kumar Chatterjee, (2010) 11 SCC 694 ; A.P. Christians Medical Education Society etc. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1986 SC 1490 ; State of Tamil Nadu v. St.Joseph Teacher Training Institute, (1995) 3 SCC 87; Raghunath Rai Bareja and another v. Punjab National Bank and others, JT 2007 (1) SC 542 (Para-37); Hope Textiles Ltd. and another v. Union of India, 1995 UPTC 82 (SC). Therefore, observations made by the Lucknow Bench of this Court in the order dated 3.8.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 4330 of 2017 and the order dated 12.10.2017 in Misc. Bench No. 24346 of 2017 appears to be not in relation to the D.R.T. Allahabad as also stated by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India on behalf of the Union of India, otherwise it would not only amount to issue direction contrary to Sections 3 and 17 of the Act and the notification issued thereunder but also to confer territorial jurisdiction to D.R.T. Lucknow over such areas which have been notified to be the territorial jurisdiction of the D.R.T. Allahabad. 32. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is allowed. It is held that the D.R.T. Allahabad has exclusive territorial jurisdiction over all the fifty five districts specified in the notification dated 15.2.2017 under Section 3 of the Act to entertain, hear and decide fresh and pending securitisation applications under the Act, which has also been admitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General of India on behalf of the Union of India. Accordingly, the respondent No. 2 is directed to remit immediately the record of S.A. No. 559 of 2013 (Saurbah Gupta v. Oriental Bank of Commerce) to the D.R.T. Allahabad which shall hear and decide the aforesaid application expeditiously. 33. Let a copy of this order be sent by the Registrar General of this Court to the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 for necessary action and compliance.