JUDGMENT : G.R. UDHWANI, J. 1. The award passed in various references akin to reference LCA No. 1625of 2007 rejecting the reference is challenged in these petitions. The issue and the facts involved in all the petitions being similar, Special Civil Application No. 13668 of 2016 is treated as lead matter and the facts pertaining to the said matter are being mentioned for the purpose of decision in all the five matters. 2. The petitioners workmen claim to have been employed with the respondent Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (“employer” for short) in 1992 on daily wage basis as Blacksmith. In March, 1996, their services were sought to be put an end to and on apprehension, different Civil Suits including Civil Suit No. 1397 of 1996 came to be instituted wherein Notice of Motion was also taken out and the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad, directed maintaining of status quo which was eventually confirmed by allowing the Notice of Motion against which various Appeal from Orders being A.O. No. 116 of 2001 to 120 of 2001 came to be instituted in this court which were eventually allowed by order dated 2.5.2001. Thus, the petitioners were continued on daily wage basis from March, 1996 onwards till 18.5.2001. This court directed the employer to employ the petitioners and to give the work as was being given to them on the date of filing of the suits and previously thereto. The Suits were expedited and were eventually dismissed in the year 2002 for want of jurisdiction while reserving the right for the petitioners to approach the jurisdictional forum. The petitioners moved the machinery under the Industrial Disputes Act, in 2007. 3. It appears that while rejecting the reference the Labour Court excluded the period of service rendered by the petitioners under the interim orders of the court and the said finding is sought to be assailed by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the ground that while such services may not be taken into account for regularisation, it would qualify for consideration under section 25B of the Industiral Disputes Act as the petitioners had actually worked during the said period as well. The learned counsel would also assail the finding of the Labour Court that the workman had not completed 240 days of service during the 12 calendar months before retrenchment on the ground that such a question did not arise in view of the fact that the workman was in continuous service between 1992 and 1996 within the meaning of sub-section (1) of section 25B of the Act. While referring to section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned counsel would submit that the said provision does not define the expression ‘continuous service’. While referring to section 25B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the learned counsel would contend that the definition of ‘continuous service’ under said sub-section was satisfied by the petitioners because, according to the learned counsel, admittedly the petitioners were in uninterrupted service between 1992 and 1996. It was contended that the petitioners were daily wagers and interruption in service as indicated in exception to section 25B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, more particularly, cessation of work not attributable to the workman would not and cannot be understood as derogating the right of the petitioners who were ready to work but for the assignment of the work to them. In his submission, the petitioners were at the disposal of the respondent employer at all points of time and therefore, merely because the work was not assigned to them, it cannot be said that there was cessation of work on account of fault of the petitioners. The learned counsel submitted that section 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be invoked only when the workmen is not in continuous service within meaning of section 25B(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that in the instant case, such a situation was not obtained. The learned counsel would submit that therefore, the Labour Court was in serious error in rejecting the reference. 4. It was argued that delay of five years in approaching the conciliating Officer after dismissal of the suit in the year 2002 was not fatal to the case of the petitioners for the reason that the delay, if any, might have been explained to the conciliating Officer who, without such explanation, could not have submitted the report reporting the existence of the industrial dispute. It was argued that being conscious about the delay, when the report was submitted by conciliator, and the reference is made by the appropriate Government, delay should not be considered as fatal to the case of the petitioners. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent – employer drew the attention of this court to the facts indicated in the impugned judgment and award and supported the findings rendered therein with the submission that on appreciation of evidence, finding of fact about the workmen having not completed 240 days in the last preceding 12 calendar months of retrenchment was recorded and that, in fact, during 28.1.1992 and March, 1996 which was the period before injunction was issued by the court only 34 days work was completed by the workmen in the last preceding 12 months and even if subsequent period i.e. 1.4.1996 to 18.6.2000 was to be considered, in the last preceding 12 months of 18.6.2000, the workmen had completed less than 240 days which is short of the requirement for retrenchment compensation and the notice pay. The learned counsel also would contend that the delayed reference for stale demand was not maintainable in absence of the petitioners establishing the fact that, in fact, the dispute was a live dispute as indicated by the Apex Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Another (2015) 15 SCC 1. The learned counsel would contend that no error much less perversity or illegality or any other similar infirmity can be found in the Labour Court’s award while rendering the findings of fact and this court may not interfere with the same under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Having considered the rival contentions, it is noticed that the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner proceed on the premise that as the workman was ready and willing to do the work, the interruption caused by not giving the work to him is the interruption not attributable to the workman within the meaning of section 25B of the Act and therefore, the workman was in continuous service within the meaning of the said provision. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether section 25B(1) of the Act comprehends such a situation when it uses the expression “uninterrupted service”, “cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman”. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether section 25B(1) of the Act comprehends such a situation when it uses the expression “uninterrupted service”, “cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman”. For a better appreciation, sub-section(1) of section 25B of the Act is quoted hereinbelow: “Sec. 25B – Definition of continuous service – For the purposes of this chapter - (1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman.” 7. It can be noticed from the above provision that to be in continuous service for a period, a test of ‘uninterrupted service’ must be applied and while doing so interruption caused on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock-out or a cessation of work not attributable to the fault of the workman must be excluded therefrom. It can be noticed that interruption of service on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident are interruptions on account of necessity and the interruptions on account of strike which is not illegal or lock-out are legally permissible interruptions. Once the cause of being absent on account of sickness or leave or accident or strike or lock-out expires, there would be resumption of service. Thus, interruptions as contemplated in the said provision are required to be excluded and cannot be treated as interruption of service. The work may cease on account of reasons other than those discussed hereinabove and if the cessation of work is not due to any fault on the part of the workman and if for that reason there is an interruption in service of the workman, such interruption will have to be ignored while construing the term “continuous service” under sub-section (1) of section 25B of the Act. The very nature of expression “interruption” implies temporary cessation of the service before or after such interruption; the service may resume thereafter. The very nature of expression “interruption” implies temporary cessation of the service before or after such interruption; the service may resume thereafter. In the opinion of this court, sub-section (1) of section 25B of the Act talks of only temporary cessations and not cessations by reason of non-availability of the work at all with the employer. In such situation, even if the workman is ready and willing to do the work, it cannot be said that there is no interruption in service. In other words, where the workman is rendered surplus for want of work, sub-section (1) of section 25B of the Act cannot come to his rescue in support of the contention but for non-provision of the work to him, he was in continuous service for a specified period. Thus, no substance is found in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to hereinabove. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners did not dispute that for the period between 1991 and 1996 the workmen had not done the work beyond 49 days, 79 days, 89 days, and 74 days respectively and concededly, in the last preceding 12 months of the date of retrenchment in 1996, the workmen had not completed 240 days of service. In such a scenario, in the opinion of this court, the case was rightly decided on the touchstone of section 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 9. It is noticed that on account of status quo granted by the City Civil Court, the respondent employer was under compulsion to continue the petitioners, may be without substantial work. Such continuation, therefore, must be taken out from the consideration and what was relevant in the facts of the present case was termination of service effected or sought to be effected in 1996 and not termination effected after lifting of the injunction by this court. Therefore, in the opinion of this court, the period post 1996 was rightly excluded from consideration under section 25B(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Even if the said period was to be considered, it is noticed that in the last preceding 12 calendar months the petitioners had completed less than 240 days and therefore, also on facts, there was no evidence of the workmen having completed more than 240 days of service in the last preceding 12 months of the later retrenchment. 10. Even if the said period was to be considered, it is noticed that in the last preceding 12 calendar months the petitioners had completed less than 240 days and therefore, also on facts, there was no evidence of the workmen having completed more than 240 days of service in the last preceding 12 months of the later retrenchment. 10. Apropos the question of delay reference may be made to Prabhakar (supra). While it has been settled that the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act (except where the Limitation is specifically provided under the Act itself), the appropriate Government would be obliged to address itself whether industrial dispute on the date of reference was a live industrial dispute. A mere passive demand without pursuing the matter actively, for a long period would not revive a dormant dispute. The disputant would be obliged to demonstrate concrete steps taken by him to keep the dispute live during the period under consideration. In the instant case, after the judgment was pronounced in Civil Suit in 2002, it was only in 2007 that the jurisdiction of the conciliating Officer was invoked without explaining the delay of five years. There is nothing on record to infer the explanation having been supplied by the workmen for the said long period of five years to conciliating Officer or the Labour Court. It is settled law in Prabhakar (supra) that decision of the appropriate Government to make reference is subject to judicial review and the judicial authority under the Industrial Disputes Act would be within its jurisdiction to address the question of delay even if not raised, for ascertaining whether there existed a live dispute at the time of reference. Therefore, merely because the conciliating Officer submitted a report indicating existence of industrial dispute and merely because reference was made by the appropriate Government without addressing itself on the question as to whether there existed a live industrial dispute on the date of reference, it cannot be contended that the question of delay was irrelevant. 11. It may be noted that the workmen were daily wagers having worked hardly during four years and that too for a negligible number of days indicated above, and for subsequent block between 1996 and 2001, they were continued under the interim orders of the court. 11. It may be noted that the workmen were daily wagers having worked hardly during four years and that too for a negligible number of days indicated above, and for subsequent block between 1996 and 2001, they were continued under the interim orders of the court. Their appointment was also not in accordance with the recruitment procedure and had not completed 240 days of service as discussed in greater detail hereinabove. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the respondent to comply with section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. In view of above, this court is unable to find any substance in the petitions. The petitions are liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the same are dismissed with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.