JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. M. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. S. Sarma, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 2. Owing to the nature of the dispute raised in this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not deem fit for the time being to issue notice on the respondent No. 4, i.e., the Branch Manager, State Bank of India, SME, Dibrugarh Bajar Branch, as this case is essentially a dispute between the petitioners on one side and respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 on the other side. 3. This revision has been filed challenging the legality and validity of the orders dated 21.03.2016 and 26.09.2016 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge (FTC No. 3), Kamrup (M), Guwahati, in connection with Misc. (Arb) Case No. 12/2016. 4. By virtue of the said order, the learned Court below, as an interim measure, under the powers vested by Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘said Act’), directed the parties to maintain status-quo regarding invocation of 7 numbers of bank guarantees and for forfeiting the security deposited by the petitioners therein in respect of the contract agreement dated 20.10.2014. This order passed on 21.03.2016 was made absolute till proper adjudication of the matter by the Arbitral Tribunal by order dated 26.09.2016, which was passed after hearing of the concerned parties. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner No. 1 is the National Small Industries Corporation Limited (“NSIC”, for short) and the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the concerned officers of the petitioner No. 1. The petitioner No. 1 was set up to assist and growth of micro and small enterprises and it helps the entrepreneurs by extending raw materials to them and also as a financer for the small scale industries to enable them to procure raw materials and other requisites against the purchase order/sale note etc., received from the Government agencies, Department and canalized agency. In this respect, the petitioner No. 1 provided bank guarantee to the State Bank of India on behalf of the customers, i.e., the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to facilitate them to procure raw materials for working on a contract for the employer, i.e., Oil India Limited. In this respect, the petitioner No. 1 provided bank guarantee to the State Bank of India on behalf of the customers, i.e., the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to facilitate them to procure raw materials for working on a contract for the employer, i.e., Oil India Limited. The petitioner No. 1 provided 7 numbers of bank guarantees for a total amount of Rs.2,74,00,000/-. The petitioner No. 1 invoked all the 7 bank guarantees by their two letters dated 12.11.2015, requiring the Branch Manager of State Bank of India to remit the guaranteed amount to the beneficiary, i.e., the petitioner No. 1. It is submitted that despite the invocation of the said bank guarantees, the State Bank of India did not make payment to honour the said bank guarantees and therefore, 2 (two) reminders/letters were issued on 05.12.2016 for remitting the amount covered by the said bank guarantees. 6. The respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3, thereafter, approached the Court of competent jurisdiction at Guwahati and filed an application under Section 9 (D) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which was registered and numbered as Misc. (Arb) Case No. 12/2016. The learned Addl. District Judge (FTC) No. 3, Kamrup (M), Guwahati passed the direction contained in order dated 21.03.2016 to the parties to maintain status-quo in respect of the said bank guarantees. The State Bank of India, who was the respondent No. 4 in the said case, by virtue of the said order dated 21.03.2016, did not release the amount to the petitioner No. 1 under the said guarantees. The said order was an ex-parte order and on receipt of notice on the said case, the petitioners herein appeared and contested the matter by filing their written objection. The said learned Court, after hearing the counsel for the parties, by its order dated 26.09.2016, made the orders of status-quo as passed on 21.03.2016 to continue for proper adjudication of the matter by an Arbitral Tribunal. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that beyond the time prescribed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the said Act, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 issued a notice under Section 21 of the said Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. It is submitted that as the Arbitrator was not appointed, the respondent Nos. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that beyond the time prescribed under Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the said Act, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 issued a notice under Section 21 of the said Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. It is submitted that as the Arbitrator was not appointed, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 herein had preferred an application under Section 11 (6) of the said Act before this Court for appointment of an Arbitrator, which is pending for adjudication. 8. Mr. Choudhury submits that the impugned order is vitiated essentially on 4 counts, i.e., (i) The contention precedent about the existence of fraud in connection with the invocation of the bank guarantee, (ii) irreparable injustice with the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 would suffer if the injunction as provided under Section 9 is not granted by the competent Court, (iii) the lapse of time granted under Section (2) of Section 9 of the said Act for instituting and for commencement of the arbitral proceedings, and (iv) the order is vitiated on the ground that it overlooked the well settled position as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of grant of interim measure under Section 9 of the said Act in respect of invocation of bank guarantee. On the aforesaid grounds, Mr. Choudhury submits that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. 9. Per contra, Mr. Sarma supports the impugned order on facts and grounds as narrated in the said impugned orders and further submits that as the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have initiated appropriate proceedings for recovery of amount due from the parties for whom they had executed the contract and therefore, the non-recovery of the amount on one side and the compulsion to pay against the bank guarantee is a situation, which amount to irreparable injury and therefore, while he is not denying that the respondent No. 1 had availed the benefit of bank guarantee to procure raw materials, which he has utilized to do the contract works allotted to him, the invocation of Section 9 was totally justified. 10. In the facts and circumstances as mentioned in the application before the learned Court below, Mr. Sarma further submits that the revision before this Court is essentially an application to correct the mistake of law and fact. 10. In the facts and circumstances as mentioned in the application before the learned Court below, Mr. Sarma further submits that the revision before this Court is essentially an application to correct the mistake of law and fact. He refers to the statements made in paragraph 11 (1) of the present application by submitting that the ground for filing this present application was that the learned Trial Court had misconstrued the laws regarding the bank guarantee and therefore, the correct recourse for the petitioners herein was to avail the remedy prescribed under Section 37 of the said Act, because the said provision provides for filing for of an appeal. He relies to the provisions of Section 37 (1) (b) of the said Act and submits that an appeal shall lie from an order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9. He submits that this extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked as the said Act would have an extra ordinary effect to affect the general laws. In order to support his contention, he relies on the case of Radhey Shyam and another–Vs- Chhabi Nath and others, reported in (2009) 5 SSC 616. Specifically, referring to paragraph 31, he submits that an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not the proper remedy. The said paragraph 31 is quoted below:- “Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and law.” 11. Mr. Sarma further relies the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act and he submits that it was provided by the legislation that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part. It may pertinent to mention herein that Part 1 of the said Act is inclusive of the provisions of Section 1 to Section 43 thereof. It may pertinent to mention herein that Part 1 of the said Act is inclusive of the provisions of Section 1 to Section 43 thereof. He submits that in view of the said provision, the only recourse available to the petitioner herein is to file an appeal, which cannot be bye-passed by filing the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. He further submits that there was no violation of the provision of Section 9 (2) of the said Act, because in the said provision, it is provided that the arbitral proceedings shall be commenced within a period of 90 days from the date of such order passed as the Court may be determined and therefore, the notice for commencement of arbitral proceedings was given time and, as such, there is no vitiation of the impugned order. 12. On due consideration of the submissions made at the Bar, this Court is of the view that as the process for arbitration was initiated, though disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, as the matter for appointment of an Arbitrator is already pending for decision before this Court, the question as to whether there was a compliance of Section 9(2) is left for decision in future because it is for this Court under Section 11(6)and/or for Arbitral Tribunal to decided the issue because the order, if any, is passed by this Court on this issue, the same may cause prejudice to either of the parties, because for that, this Court will have to deal into the merit and the sufficiency of the ground or the causes as shown by both the parties. 13. Mr. Choudhury submits that although in the application under Section 9, the respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had referred to the copies of agreement dated 20.10.2014, which were annexed as Annexures 3, 4 and 5 in the said application, he submits that on perusal of the said agreements, it would be evident that the said agreements were not signed by the petitioners. 1, 2 and 3 had referred to the copies of agreement dated 20.10.2014, which were annexed as Annexures 3, 4 and 5 in the said application, he submits that on perusal of the said agreements, it would be evident that the said agreements were not signed by the petitioners. Hence, they did not constitute a valid agreement between the parties and all the 7 bank guarantees, which are annexed to this revision petition, had expressly provided for that the said bank guarantees were unconditional and the bank had its duty to satisfy the demand notwithstanding any dispute raised before any Court or Tribunal and in this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioners relies on the case citation of Himadri Chemicals Industries Limited –Vs- Coal Tar Refining Company reported in (2007) 8 SCC 110 and the case of Vinitec Electronics Private Limited- Vs- HCL Infosystems Limited reported in (2008) 1 SCC 544 . He contends that the beneficiary must get the value covered by the bank guarantees notwithstanding the claim that may be made by the customers, except if such guarantees are vitiated by fraud and irreparable injury. 14. After due consideration of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both sides, the following points of determination arise in this revision, they are:- (1) Whether any question is raised in the present revisions involving correction of mistake of fact or law, which cannot be interfered with in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as projected by the learned counsel for the respondent? (2) Whether the present application is maintainable because the petitioners have not availed the provisions for appeal as provided for under section 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996? (3) Whether the impugned order is liable to be interfered with? 15. Point of determination No.3: This issue is taken up first. (i) On perusal of the application filed under section 9(D) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 by the respondents No.1 to 3 before the learned court below, it was projected in paragraph 6 thereto that - “on being satisfied and having a good past track record, the Respondent No.1 agreed to extend its helping hand in procuring the raw materials, such as, Iron & Steel items, Aluminum, Cement, Sand, Bricks, Bitumen, Chips, Boulders and allied materials to the petitioner No.1 Company. It may be mentioned here that in this respect, on 20.10.2014 an agreement was executed between the Respondent No.1 and the Present Petitioners. Moreover, on the same day, two agreement of personal guarantee was executed between the Petitioner No.2, and 3 with that of Respondent No.1. Copies of the Agreement dated 20.10.2014 and Agreement for personal guarantees dated 20.10.2014 are annexed herewith and marked as Annexures-3, 4 & 5 respectively.” However, on perusal of the said Agreement (Annexure-3), it is evident that it does not contain the seal and signature of any official of the Petitioner No.1 herein, as such, the said agreement is either a unilaterally signed agreement by the respondent No.1 and/or the same is no agreement at all, unless of course the existence of such an agreement can be inferred in terms of the relevant provisions of the Contract Act, 1872, which is not the case presented before the learned court below. Thus, as a result, the only inference that can be drawn by this court is that the Agreement of Bank Guarantee was independent of any other contract by and/or between the contracting parties, i.e. State Bank of India on one part and the beneficiary on the other part and the status of the respondent No.1 in the said context will be only that it is a mere customer of the bank. (ii) On a perusal of the said 7 similarly worded Instrument of Bank Guarantees, it is apparent that the said bank guarantees were unconditional and, as such, the bank owed a duty to satisfy the demand made upon it by virtue of invoking of the said guarantees by the two letter dated 12.11.2015, notwithstanding the existence of any dispute that might have been raised by the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein in connection with the issue of alleged settlement of accounts between the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.1, either before each other, or before the competent court or Arbitral Tribunal, because it is expressly provided in clause (1) of the Bank Guarantee Bond signed and executed by the State Bank of India, SME, Dibrugarh Branch, unequivocally undertook to pay the amounts due and payable under the guarantee without any demur, protest and merely on demand being by the Corporation (Petitioner No.1 herein). In clause (2) thereof, it is provided that the bank had undertaken to pay to the Corporation any money so demanded notwithstanding any dispute or disputes raised by the unit (i.e. the Respondent No.1 herein) in any suit or proceeding pending before any court or tribunal and that the bank’s liability under the said presents were absolute and unequivocal. It was further provided that the payment made under the bond by the bank shall be a valid discharge of bank’s liability for payment thereunder and the unit shall have no claim against the bank for making such payment. (iii) It is further seen that the bank guarantee was valid upto 16.04.2016 and it was invoked by the petitioner No.1 on 12.11.2015, well within its validity period. (iv) As stated hereinbefore, it has been recorded in the impugned order dated 26.09.2016 passed by the learned court below that at the hearing of the matter, the learned counsel for the petitioners herein had relied in the case of Vinitec Electronics Private Ltd. V. HCL Infosystems Ltd., reported in (2008) 1 SCC 544 in support of their contention. However, it appears that the ratio of the said judgment was not at all referred or discussed by the learned court below in its order. This court is of the view that had the learned court below applied its judicial mind on the said cited judgment, it would have definitely noticed the below extracted paragraphs of the said judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court: “11. The law relating to invocation of bank guarantees is by now well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. The bank guarantees which provided that they are payable by the guarantor on demand is considered to be an unconditional bank guarantee. When in the course of commercial dealings, unconditional guarantees have been given or accepted the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. In U.P. State Sugar Corpn. v. Sumac International Ltd. this Court observed that: (SCC p. 574, para 12) “12. The law relating to invocation of such bank guarantees is by now well settled. When in the course of commercial dealings an unconditional bank guarantee is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. The law relating to invocation of such bank guarantees is by now well settled. When in the course of commercial dealings an unconditional bank guarantee is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes. The bank giving such a guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. The very purpose of giving such a bank guarantee would otherwise be defeated. The courts should, therefore, be slow in granting an injunction to restrain the realisation of such a bank guarantee. The courts have carved out only two exceptions. A fraud in connection with such a bank guarantee would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee. Hence if there is such a fraud of which the beneficiary seeks to take advantage, he can be restrained from doing so. The second exception relates to cases where allowing the encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned. Since in most cases payment of money under such a bank guarantee would adversely affect the bank and its customer at whose instance the guarantee is given, the harm or injustice contemplated under this head must be of such an exceptional and irretrievable nature as would override the terms of the guarantee and the adverse effect of such an injunction on commercial dealings in the country. The two grounds are not necessarily connected, though both may coexist in some cases.” 12. It is equally well settled in law that bank guarantee is an independent contract between bank and the beneficiary thereof. The bank is always obliged to honour its guarantee as long as it is an unconditional and irrevocable one. The dispute between the beneficiary and the party at whose instance the bank has given the guarantee is immaterial and of no consequence. In BSES Ltd. v. Fenner India Ltd. this Court held: (SCC pp. 733-34, para 10) “10. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice and a fraud of the beneficiary from which it seeks to benefit. The fraud must be of an egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction. 733-34, para 10) “10. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first is when there is a clear fraud of which the bank has notice and a fraud of the beneficiary from which it seeks to benefit. The fraud must be of an egregious nature as to vitiate the entire underlying transaction. The second exception to the general rule of non-intervention is when there are ‘special equities’ in favour of injunction, such as when ‘irretrievable injury’ or ‘irretrievable injustice’ would occur if such an injunction were not granted. The general rule and its exceptions has been reiterated in so many judgments of this Court, that in U.P. State Sugar Corpn. v. Sumac International Ltd.1 (hereinafter ‘U.P. State Sugar Corpn.’) this Court, correctly declared that the law was ‘settled’.” 13. In Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Co. this Court summarised the principles for grant of refusal to grant of injunction to restrain the enforcement of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit in the following manner: (SCC pp. 117-18, para 14) “14. … (i) While dealing with an application for injunction in the course of commercial dealings, and when an unconditional bank guarantee or letter of credit is given or accepted, the beneficiary is entitled to realise such a bank guarantee or a letter of credit in terms thereof irrespective of any pending disputes relating to the terms of the contract. (ii) The bank giving such guarantee is bound to honour it as per its terms irrespective of any dispute raised by its customer. (iii) The courts should be slow in granting an order of injunction to restrain the realisation of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. (iv) Since a bank guarantee or a letter of credit is an independent and a separate contract and is absolute in nature, the existence of any dispute between the parties to the contract is not a ground for issuing an order of injunction to restrain enforcement of bank guarantees or letters of credit. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee or letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee or a letter of credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” 14. (v) Fraud of an egregious nature which would vitiate the very foundation of such a bank guarantee or letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation. (vi) Allowing encashment of an unconditional bank guarantee or a letter of credit would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned.” 14. In Mahatma Gandhi Sahakra Sakkare Karkhane v. National Heavy Engg. Coop. Ltd. this Court observed: (SCC p. 471b-d) “If the bank guarantee furnished is an unconditional and irrevocable one, it is not open to the bank to raise any objection whatsoever to pay the amounts under the guarantee. The person in whose favour the guarantee is furnished by the bank cannot be prevented by way of an injunction from enforcing the guarantee on the pretext that the condition for enforcing the bank guarantee in terms of the agreement entered into between the parties has not been fulfilled. Such a course is impermissible. The seller cannot raise the dispute of whatsoever nature and prevent the purchaser from enforcing the bank guarantee by way of injunction except on the ground of fraud and irretrievable injury. What is relevant are the terms incorporated in the guarantee executed by the bank. On careful analysis of the terms and conditions of the guarantee in the present case, it is found that the guarantee is an unconditional one. The respondent, therefore, cannot be allowed to raise any dispute and prevent the appellant from encashing the bank guarantee. The mere fact that the bank guarantee refers to the principal agreement without referring to any specific clause in the preamble of the deed of guarantee does not make the guarantee furnished by the bank to be a conditional one.” (v) Applying the said ratio on the facts of the present case, it is seen that the bank guarantee was unconditional and payable on demand and, as such, this Court is of the view that when in course of commercial dealings, unconditional bank guarantees are provided, given or accepted, the beneficiary (Petitioner No.1 in the present case) becomes entitled to realize the effects of such bank guarantee in terms of the demand by the beneficiary up to the extent of the sum guaranteed, irrespective of any dispute that might have been raised later in point of time after the demand was made, as was done in the present case. (vi) This court is of the unhesitant opinion that the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein have not been able to demonstrate either before the learned court below or even before this court that any such circumstances existed by which they could have bona fide resisted the claim made by the petitioners herein by invoking the bank guarantee. Therefore, once the said 7 bank guarantees were invoked by the petitioner No.1, it was incumbent on part of the State Bank of India issuing the said bank guarantees to honour its commitment without any demur in terms of their guarantee bond. (vii) In their application under section 9(D) of the said Act, the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 had, inter-alia, taken a plea before the learned court below that they had submitted running bills before the respondents No.6 and 7 therein and those bills were not released, for which they could not make payment of the amount to the petitioner No.1 herein. It was further pleaded that the respondent No.1 herein had apprised the Petitioner No.1 herein about the difficulties faced by them and requested some time to make the repayment of the balance due, further stating that they had paid interest to the tune of Rs.9,50,000/- to the Petitioner No.1. It was further pleaded that the fact of invoking of bank guarantee came to their knowledge only when the Branch Manager of State Bank of India had issued them a letter dated 08.03.2016 to do the needful for making payment in respect of the said bank guarantees to the petitioner No.1 herein or to resolve the issues with them immediately to avoid any further complication. It was also pleaded that if a reasonable opportunity is not allowed, they would suffer great prejudice and irreparable loss would be caused to them. Further, in paragraph 25 the said application, it was also pleaded that if the petitioners herein are not restrained from encashing the bank guarantees and for forfeiting the security deposit in respect of the Contract Agreement dated 20.10.2014, the same would facilitate the petitioners herein to commit an act of fraud. Further, in paragraph 25 the said application, it was also pleaded that if the petitioners herein are not restrained from encashing the bank guarantees and for forfeiting the security deposit in respect of the Contract Agreement dated 20.10.2014, the same would facilitate the petitioners herein to commit an act of fraud. (viii) Thus, on perusal of the said materials on record, as stated in the preceding sub- paragraph, it is evident that as per the own showing of the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein, it is their pleaded case that the “act of fraud” had not yet been committed as on the date of filing of the application under section 9(D) of the said Act. Moreover, apart from the lack of the pleadings as to “commission of fraud”, there is no legs for the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 to project any fraud on part of the petitioners, firstly, because it is the duly admitted and specifically pleaded case of the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 that “… on being satisfied and having a good past track record, the Respondent No.1 agreed to extend its help hand in procuring the raw materials such as Iron & Steel items, Aluminum, Cement, Sand, Bricks, Bitumen, Chips, Boulders and allied materials to the petitioner No.1 Company….”. It is not the case of the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein that the petitioners had not provided them with the assured help and caused fraud. Therefore, it is evident that instead of any commission of purported fraud, the petitioners herein were merely enforcing their right, by virtue of which they had invoked the 7 bank guarantees offered to them. (ix) This court further finds that the petitioner No.1 herein is a Govt. of India undertaking and the petitioners No.2 to 4 are its officials. The petitioner No.1 is dealing with public money and provides financial support to the “MSEs” (i.e. Medium and Small Enterprises) in the Country and, as such, only when it would be able to recover money from the existing and/or defaulting units, who had availed such financial support that the petitioner No.1 would be able to extent its helping arm to other units desiring such support. (x) Therefore, this court is of the view that the balance of convenience, which is one of the three golden principles for grant of injunction, was very much in favour of refusal of injunction and in favour of the petitioners herein. There was also a total lack of prima facie case for trial before the arbitral tribunal as there existed no valid and written agreement between the parties, because the agreement before the learned court below was not signed by any the petitioners herein and, as such, there was no valid arbitration agreement containing arbitration clause between the contesting parties i.e. Respondents No.1, 2 and 3 and the petitioners herein. Moreover, the grant and/or continuance of the order of injunction in the present case was likely to cause frustration of otherwise validly issued 7 numbers of bank guarantees, it would amount to negate the very purpose for which bank guarantees were issued and accepted in first place. This court is further of the view that as the payment which was required to be made under the said 7 (seven) bank guarantees would be of a specific amount and was quite capable of being computed and/or compensated in terms of money value, therefore, as per the principles for grant of injunction, injunction is liable to be refused where money would be an adequate remedy, there was no element of irreparable loss and/or injury which the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 were likely to suffer in the present case in hand, as the petitioners herein were seeking recovery of the financial assistance given to the respondents No.1, 2 and 3 herein. (xi) This court also finds that the Hon’ble Apex Court has, by judicial pronouncements, have carved out a few “exceptions”, on which injunction can be granted in respect of invoking of bank guarantees and as per the case of Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. V. Coal Tar Refining Co., reported in (2007) 8 SCC 110 , the said “exceptions” are “(i) fraud of an egregious nature committed in the notice of the bank which would vitiate the very foundation of the guarantee of letter of credit and the beneficiary seeks to take advantage of the situation” and “(ii) injustice of the kind which would make it impossible for the guarantor to reimburse himself or would result in irretrievable harm or injustice to one of the parties concerned”. Except for these two exceptions, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred case, has cautioned the courts not to readily issue injunction to restrain the realization of a bank guarantee or a letter of credit. (xii) However, coming to the present case in hand, the essential pleadings required to infer the existence of a purported fraud and irreparable injury is not present and, as such, the foundation for issuing injunction is found to be totally absent in the present case. (xiii) Therefore, in view of the above discussions, this court has no hesitation in holding that the present case is a fit case where the impugned orders dated 21.03.2016 and 26.09.2016 passed by the learned Additional District Judge (FTC) No.3, Kamrup (Metropolitan), Guwahati, in Misc. (Arb.) Case No. 12/2016 are both liable to be interfered with. Consequently, the injunction granted by the said learned court below is set aside by dismissing the said Misc. (Arb.) Case No. 12/2016. 16. The points of determination No.1 and 2 are both taken up together. (a) In this regard, the learned counsel for the respondent had specifically referred to the statements made in paragraph 11(I) of the revision application. This court has examined the statements made in paragraph 11(I) of the present revision application and it is found that the same are the grounds on which the present revision has been filed. It is merely stated therein – “For that the learned trial court has misconstrued the laws regarding the bank guarantees …….”. (b) By no stretch of imagination, this court is persuaded to accept that the statements made by the petitioner in the said ground can be stated to be a call being made before this court for correcting the mistake of law and/or fact that had arisen in the judgment impugned herein. (c) It has already been held hereinbefore that the three golden principles for grant of injunction was not available under the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) Moreover, it has further been seen that the learned court below did not discuss the case law of Vinitec Electronics (supra), reported in (2008) 1 SCC 544 , which was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which if addressed, may have resulted in the learned court below applying the law in its correct perspective. (d) Moreover, it has further been seen that the learned court below did not discuss the case law of Vinitec Electronics (supra), reported in (2008) 1 SCC 544 , which was cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners, which if addressed, may have resulted in the learned court below applying the law in its correct perspective. (e) Further, this court is of the view of it is too well settled in law that powers conferred upon the High Court by Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not confined to administrative superintendence only over courts and tribunals under its jurisdiction but it includes the powers of judicial revision as well and that the power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is essentially to ensure that that the courts and tribunals inferior to High Court have done what they were required to do. Moreover, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it would be open to the High Court to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate court came to a conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse. If any authority is required for the same, reference can be made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Achyutananda Baidya V. Prafulla Kumar Gayen, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 76 : AIR 1997 SC 2077 . (f) Hence, this court is of the opinion that in the present case, this court is not called upon to make correction of mistake of fact or law, committed by the learned court below, but this is a case where the learned court below is found to have exercised jurisdiction vested in it with material irregularity, by not applying the correct proposition of law as expounded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of grant of injunction when commercial instruments like Bank Guarantee is involved. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a case where this court is powerless to interfere with the orders impugned in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the present application is held to be maintainable. Hence, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a case where this court is powerless to interfere with the orders impugned in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Hence, the present application is held to be maintainable. The existence of provisions for filing an appeal under section 37(1)(a) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot deter this court to exercise revisional and/or superintending jurisdiction in the matter under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, having found that the impugned orders are not tenable in the eye of law. Both the said two points are answered accordingly. 17. The present revision stands allowed as indicated above. 18. The parties are left to bear their own cost.