Judgment and Order : 1. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the office order No. 106/order/2016-Estt dated 10.10.2016 [Annexure P/6 to the writ petition] whereby the petitioner has been transferred, in suppression of the office order No. 106/order/2016-Estt dated 11.07.2016, from the BCDI, Agartala to the National Centre for Design and Product Development, Hall No.1, 3rd Floor, Rajiv Gandhi Handicraft Bhawan, Baba Kharak Singh Marg, Cannaught Place, New Delhi-10001. The petitioner has also been released from the BCDI, Agartala with effect from 20.10.2016 [Afternoon] with a direction to report for the duty as National Centre for Design and Product Development, (‘NCDPD’ in short) at New Delhi. Even his travelling allowances has been allowed for purpose of enabling him [the petitioner] to join the new place of posting. Earlier by the office order No. 106/order/2016-Estt dated 11.07.2016, the petitioner was transferred from BCDI, Agartala, to Integrated Design and Technical Development Project in Jute Craft Jajori, Nagaon (Assam). But the petitioner by filing the writ petition being WP(C) No. 802 of 2016 had challenged the said order on several grounds. By the judgment and order dated 16.09.2016 [Annexure P/12 to the writ petition] this court had interfered with the said transfer order with the observation that the transfer is an incidence of service and the National Centre for Design and Product Development (NCDPD) shall remain within its authority to transfer the petitioner in terms of law, in a post which is not inferior to the post presently held by the petitioner. The said judgment and order has remained unchallenged and it has reached its finality. As it appears that the present office order dated 10.10.2016 [Annexure P/6 to the writ petition] is an outcome of fresh exercise and now the National Centre for Design and Product Development has passed the said office order in the said exercise. The petitioner has raised the similar objection that the transfer order has not been issued by the “competent authority”, despite the above observation in the earlier writ petition. That apart, the petitioner has raised a fresh issue that earlier the respondents had stated that unless the petitioner is transferred to the Integrated Design and Technical Development Project in Jute Craft Jajori, Nagaon, Assam, the programme in the said development project would suffer a huge setback but now the petitioner has been transferred to the NCDPD, New Delhi. That apart, the petitioner has raised a fresh issue that earlier the respondents had stated that unless the petitioner is transferred to the Integrated Design and Technical Development Project in Jute Craft Jajori, Nagaon, Assam, the programme in the said development project would suffer a huge setback but now the petitioner has been transferred to the NCDPD, New Delhi. This fact itself, according to the petitioner, shows that the object of the respondents particularly the respondent No.4 is to somehow remove the petitioner from the BCDI at Agartala. Ex-facie, such act is malicious and colourable exercise of power. 2. Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in support of her contention as referred above, has submitted that in Para 21 of the writ petition the petitioner has asserted the above fact. Moreover the petitioner has asserted that “therefore with malafide intention the respondent No.4 with the help of the respondent Nos. 5 and 7 has issued the impugned office order dated 10.10.2006.” According to Ms. Guha, learned counsel that by virtue of the memorandum of agreement dated 27.08.2009, entered between the Development Commissioner (Handicrafts) DC(H) in short, and the NCDPD, the Empowered Committee never took a decision to authorize the Executive Director, NCDPD to transfer the employees of BCDI. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has further submitted that the recruitment along with placement including transfer falls under the administrative authority of the said Empowered Committee as the same committee was established for operationalisation of the BCDI, Agartala. Thus according to her, the Executive Director, NCDPD is not the competent authority for transferring an employee from the BCDI without the permission and sanction of the Empowered Committee. In this regard, she has referred to a letter of the respondent No.5, the consultant of the NCDPD. In the said letter dated 20.10.2016, [Annexure P/10 to the writ petition] the said respondent No.5 has clearly stated as follows : “As regards your query that which is Competent Authority, it is intimated that Executive Director Cum Secy of NCDPD is the Competent Authority. Orders dated 10th October 2016 were having the approval of the aforesaid Competent Authority. In the said letter dated 20.10.2016, [Annexure P/10 to the writ petition] the said respondent No.5 has clearly stated as follows : “As regards your query that which is Competent Authority, it is intimated that Executive Director Cum Secy of NCDPD is the Competent Authority. Orders dated 10th October 2016 were having the approval of the aforesaid Competent Authority. As regards hard copy of the order, the same was sent through speed post on 14.10.2016 which might have been received at your end by now.” It has been further asserted in the said letter dated 20.10.2016 of the respondent No.5 as follows : “Owning to late receipt of the orders, Competent Authority permitted 5 days grace period and accordingly you are relieved of your duties from BCDI w.e.f. 25.10.2016. Your leave application dated 20th October 2016 was put up to the Competent Authority and same was not agreed too as your services are urgently required at new place of posting. As such, you are advised for strict compliance of the orders.” 3. Ms. Guha, learned counsel has however candidly admitted that the decision in the said letter dated 20.10.2016 [Annexure P/10 to the writ petition] has not been challenged in this writ petition. The petitioner however has further urged by this writ petition to restrain the respondents from giving any effect to the impugned order dated 10.10.2016 [Annexure P/6 to the writ petition] in respect of the petitioner. Ms. R. Guha, learned counsel has relied on a decision in Ritesh Tewari and Another versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2010) 10 SCC 677 where the apex court has held that : “It is a settled proposition of law that a party has to plead the case and produce/adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate his submissions made in the petition and in case the pleadings are not complete, the court is under no obligation to entertain the pleas. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana this Court has observed as under (SCC p. 543, para 13) “13…… In our opinion, when a point, when a point, which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter-affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter-affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point ….. there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure and a writ petition or a counter-affidavit. While in a pleading, that is, a plaint or written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter-affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.” There cannot be any quarrel regarding the proposition as laid down in Ritesh Tewari (supra). On the contrary, it has underlined the burden on the writ petitioner to prove the pleaded averments he made in the writ petition. 4. Mr. D.K. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 4, 5 and 7 has submitted that the NCDPD is a registered society for the aims and object as assigned in the memorandum of Association [Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit]. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel thereafter has referred to the engagement letter of the petitioner under No. NCDPD/BCDI/2009-2010/1 dated 05.02.2010 [Annexure P/1 to the writ petition]. The petitioner was appointed by the NCDPD as the junior consultant for working in the BCDI, Agartala. It has been clearly mentioned in the said offer of appointment dated 05.02.2010 that the NCDPD can act on behalf of the BCDI even to terminate his engagement with 15 days’ prior notice or in lieu thereof, by payment of 15 days’ emolument. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has categorically referred to the terms and condition at Clause-6.1 of the said letter of appointment dated 05.02.2010. The said clause provides as under : “6.1 You will be liable to work anywhere in India as per the requirement of work and as directed by Executive Director-NCDPD from time to time. Your place of work presently will be BCDI, Agartala, Tripura and required to travel extensively.” 5. It has been clearly mentioned in the said offer that the petitioner shall accept all the conditions of the said offer of appointment and return the second copy of the offer of appointment dated 05.02.2010 on being duly signed within week’s time, failing which the offer of appointment shall be treated as cancelled. Mr. It has been clearly mentioned in the said offer that the petitioner shall accept all the conditions of the said offer of appointment and return the second copy of the offer of appointment dated 05.02.2010 on being duly signed within week’s time, failing which the offer of appointment shall be treated as cancelled. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel appearing for those respondents have clearly asserted that the petitioner had accepted all the conditions of the said offer of appointment dated 05.02.2010. Therefore, the Clause 6.1 of the offer of appointment is binding upon the petitioner and conveniently he cannot question the authority of the Executive Director of the NCDPD to transfer him. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel later on has submitted that in the BCDI, Agartala there is no work. In Para-7 of the counter-affidavit those respondents have asserted as follows : “In fact, no work being available at Agartala centre, the respondent No.4 could very well terminate the contractual service of the petitioner but on taking a broader view his service instead of being terminated has been placed at the headquarters at Delhi by the impugned order of transfer. There is no infraction of law, no malice in law or in fact.” 6. Mr. Biswas, learned counsel has further submitted that it is settled law that the authority who appoints someone unless otherwise statutorily provided, the same authority can exercise the control over his service either be it termination or for transfer or any other assignment whatsoever. 7. Having appreciated the submissions of the learned counsel, this court finds that the Empowered Committee of NCDPD has been given the authority for running the operation of Bamboo and Cane Development Institute (BCDI) Agartala. It has been given the authority for the recruitment/placement of manpower including Consultants, Director, International Consultant, Technical Consultant, Visiting Experts, Administrative posts or any other appointment whatsoever as approved for the BCDI. The petitioner has highlighted this clause to show that unless the Empowered Committee exercised its power for transferring the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be transferred from the BCDI, Agartala. The petitioner has highlighted this clause to show that unless the Empowered Committee exercised its power for transferring the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be transferred from the BCDI, Agartala. A simple reading of the terms of reference of the Empowered Committee as laid down in the Memorandum of Agreement, signed on 27.08.2009 between the NCDPD and DCH, it can be gathered that the said committee has been empowered for recruitment and placement of the manpower including Consultants, Director, International Consultant, Technical Consultant, Visiting Experts, Administrative Posts or any other appointment, whatsoever as approved for the BCDI. The petitioner was appointed, as it appears, not by the Empowered Committee but by the National Centre for Design and Product Development which is distinctly a separate entity and approval for appointment of the petitioner was taken from the competent authority of the NCDPD. Nowhere, it has been referred that it was with approval of the said Empowered Committee. When someone is recruited by the NCDPD, the said authority inheres the control over the service of that person. From the letter dated 10.10.2016, it has appeared that the competent authority had approved the transfer of the petitioner from BCDI, Agartala to the NCDPD Head Quarters at New Delhi. From the letter dated 20.10.2016, it is apparent that the competent authority is the Executive Director/Secretary of the NCDPD and he had approved the transfer of the petitioner. Even though the petitioner has asserted that the Empowered Committee is the competent authority but for purpose of constitution of the Empowered Committee, as is available from the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated 27.08.2009 it has been provided as under: “10.1 Running & Management of BCDI shall be done by NCDPD. The Board of NCDPD shall be fully empowered to run & manage the affairs of BCDI. 10.2 An Empowered Committee shall be set up by NCDPD board to take necessary decisions and actions for operationalizing BCDI. An officer to be nominated by the DC (H) shall be taken as member of this Empowered Committee and also on any other committee or sub-committee that may be constituted/re-constituted from time to time.” 8. Clause 10.1 of the MOA does not leave this Court to any confusion that the NCDPD has been authorized and empowered to run and manage the affairs of the BCDI. Clause 10.1 of the MOA does not leave this Court to any confusion that the NCDPD has been authorized and empowered to run and manage the affairs of the BCDI. From the communication dated 20.10.2016 it has further appeared that in the NCDPD, the Executive Director/Secretary is the competent authority. Therefore it cannot be held that the impugned transfer order dated 10.10.2016 (Annexure P/6 to the writ petition) has been issued by a person who did not have any authority, inasmuch as the competent authority has earlier approved the transfer of the petitioner and the issuing authority has merely communicated the decision by the office order dated 10.10.2016 and hence, the objection as raised by the petitioner in this regard must fail and accordingly the same is rejected. So far the question of malafide is concerned, there is no material at all to hold that the said action of transferring the petitioner is visited by malice and accordingly in absence of the materials, wherefrom the inference can be drawn of malice, the court cannot interfere with the transfer order. Merely stating that some action is visited by malafide is not enough. It has to be pleaded definitely and proved to the satisfaction of the court that such action is vitiated for malice and accordingly, the objection as raised against the order of transfer or to the related action for being malicious, caves in for absence of substantiating materials. 9. Having held so, this writ petition being bereft of merit is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.