JUDGMENT : DINESH MEHTA, J. 1. Instant writ petition has been filed by the Revenue Department against the order dated 6.8.2008 passed by the Board of Revenue in appeal No.3444/2004 whereby the Revenue Board has rejected the application for condonation of delay filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act 1963. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the order of the Revenue Board dated 6.8.2008 submitted that the appeal was filed by the State of Rajasthan against the order dated 27.3.01 passed by Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota before the Board of Revenue. He submitted that the appeal in question was filed on 6.8.2004, along with an application seeking condonation of delay. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Court should be liberal in deciding the application for condonation of delay, more particularly when it is filed by the State. He further submitted that each day's delay is not required to be explained, while filing application u/s 5 of Limitation Act. On the last date of hearing, this Court had asked the petitioner to show the reasons stated in the application filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, then learned counsel for the State, sought time to submit certified copy of the said application filed u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, filed before the Board of Revenue. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has filed the certified copy of the application u/s 5 of Limitation Act, a perusal whereof reveals that the Tehsildar, Ladpura contacted the Government Counsel appearing before Revenue Appellate Authority, Kota on 19.7.2004, who informed that against the order dated 27.3.2001, an appeal is required to be filed before Revenue Board, Ajmer. 4. As such on said opinion dated 19.7.04, the Tehsildar, Ladpura took steps to file an appeal and after obtaining taken requisite sanction from the Collector Kota, to file the appeal vide order dated 4-8-2004, he contacted the State Counsel before Revenue Board and without any further delay, the appeal came to be filed before Board of Revenue, Ajmer. 5. A perusal of the contents of the application u/s 5 shows that there is absolutely no explanation worth name for a period of 3 years, lapsed between the date of judgment of Revenue Appellate Authority i.e. 27th March, 2001 and the date of contacting counsel at Revenue Appellate Authority i.e. 19.7.2004. This shows reckless and negligent attitude on the part of Government Authorities. This shows reckless and negligent attitude on the part of Government Authorities. On account of such continued apathetic attitude, the Courts are burdened with applications for condonation of delay and are asked to take a liberal view. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the delay should not be condoned merely because the party seeking condonation is a Government Authority. In support of his arguments, he cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in case Amalendu Kumar Bera & Ors. v. the State of West Bengal,2013(1) WLC (SC) 736. 7. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the respondents lays down that the delay should not be condoned, merely because the applicant is a Government Authority. However, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that somewhat liberal and justice oriented approach should be taken by the Court, when the litigant is the Government. It will not be out of place to refer to the following judgments: "Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr. v. Mst. Katiji and Ors." AIR 1987 SC 1353 :- "3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 (Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order 21 of the CPC, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period) of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grate status. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grate status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. " "G. Ramegowda, Major and Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (1988 )" 2 SCC 142:- "8. In litigations to which Government is a party there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its office Rs. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes 'sufficient cause' for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Governmental decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have 'a little play at the joints'. Due recognition of these limitations on Governmental functioning-of course, within a reasonable limits-is necessary if the judicial approach is not rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision making process. In the opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law-officers of the Government placed the Government in a predicament and that it was one of these cases where the mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to Government. It relied upon and trusted its law-officers. Lindley, M.R., in the Re: National Bank of Wales Ltd. observed, though in a different context: Business cannot be carried on, upon principles of distrust. Men in responsible positions must be trusted by those above them, as well as by those below them, until there is reason to distrust them. In the opinion of the High Court, it took quite sometime for the Government to realise that the law-officers failed that trust. While a private person can take instant decision a "bureaucratic or democratic organ" it is said by a learned Judge "hesitates and debates, consults and considers, speaks through paper, moves horizontally and vertically till at last it gravitates towards a conclusion,-unmindful of time and impersonally." Now at the end, should we interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court? Shri Datar criticised that the delay on the part of Government even after 20.1.1971 for over a year cannot be said to be either bona fide or compelled by reasons beyond its control. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. This criticism is not without substance. Government could and ought to have moved with greater diligence and dispatch consistent with the urgency of the situation. The conduct of Government was perilously close to such inaction as might, perhaps, have justified rejection of its prayer for condonation. But as is implicit in the reasoning of the High Court, the unarticulated thought, perhaps was that in the interest of keeping the stream of justice pure and clean the awards under appeal should not be permitted to assume finality without an examination of their merits. The High Court noticed that the Government pleader who was in office till 15.12.1970 had applied for certified copies on 20.7.1970, but the application was allowed to be dismissed for default. In one case, however, he appears to have taken away the certified copy even after he ceased to be a Government Pleader. In a similar context where delay had been condoned by the High Court, this Court declined to interfere and observed: Having regard to the entirety of the circumstances, the High Court thought that the State should not be penalised for the lapses of some of its officers and that in the particular circumstances there were sufficient grounds justifying the condonation of delay in filing the appeals. It was a matter for the discretion of the High Court. We are unable to say that the discretion was improperly exercised...." 8. Having heard the arguments of the parties. Looking to the fact that the appeal before Revenue Board was filed by the State Government, though after a period of more than three years, this Court feels that the delay should be condoned in interest of the justice. 9. However, for the undue hardship and harassment caused to the respondents on account of negligent attitude of the Tehsildar concerned this Court deems it appropriate to award a cost of Rs.25,000/- to the respondents, to balance the equity and meet the ends of justice. 10. The amount of Rs.25,000/- shall be recovered from the Tehsildar concerned, who was having charge on the date of passing of the order i.e. 27.3.01. The appeal filed before Revenue Board shall be restored only on production of receipt of Rs.25,000/- paid to the respondents. 10. The amount of Rs.25,000/- shall be recovered from the Tehsildar concerned, who was having charge on the date of passing of the order i.e. 27.3.01. The appeal filed before Revenue Board shall be restored only on production of receipt of Rs.25,000/- paid to the respondents. If the amount of cost is not paid to the respondents, after being recovered from Tehsildar concerned within a period of 3 months from today the order of the Revenue Board dated 6.8.2008 shall remain intact. 11. The writ petition is allowed, the order dated 6.8.2008 is set aside, as above. The Board of Revenue shall register the appeal and hear it on its merit, of course, after giving notices to all the parties concerned.