JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner challenges the order passed by the authority notified vide SRO 146 of 1999, in exercise of the powers conferred under Subsection 1 of Section 3 of the Jammu & Kashmir Commission of Enquiry Act, 1962. The material facts in brief are as under:- 2. The petitioner had applied for the post of Rehbar-e-Taleem Teacher (ReT) in Government Primary School, Nandpur, Nandni, Tehsil and District Jammu. Against this post, one Rekha Kumari, wife of respondent No. 4 came to be selected in the panel prepared for such an appointment. 3. With a view to overcome this difficulty, the petitioner challenged the eligibility of Rekha Kumari on the ground that her husband-respondent No. 4, namely, Surjit Singh was infact not a permanent resident of the State of Jammu & Kashmir and had obtained his Permanent Residence Certificate fraudulently. A complaint thus came to be filed by the petitioner before the authority constituted vide SRO 146 of 1999, consisting of the Chairman – a retired Judge of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court and another member being a retired District & Sessions Judge. 4. The Commission upon enquiry returned a finding that the PRC issued in favour of respondent No. 4 had been issued on the basis of relevant documents and that even the fore-fathers of the said respondent were bona-fide state subjects of the J&K State. Needless to say that the conclusion was arrived at by the Commission after perusal and inspection of various documents and reports of the concerned revenue agencies, details whereof are mentioned in the order itself. 5. In the present petition, the petitioner challenges the order impugned on the ground that no opportunity of being heard was provided to the petitioner by the Commission and there were certain documents with the petitioner, which if permitted to be produced would enable the Commission to arrive at a different conclusion. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court rendered in case titled “Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union Of India” 1978 AIR 597 to suggest that the right of the petitioner of being heard had been violated and thus was in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ehsan Mirza, learned Dy. Union Of India” 1978 AIR 597 to suggest that the right of the petitioner of being heard had been violated and thus was in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Ehsan Mirza, learned Dy. AG appearing on behalf of the official respondents supported the conclusion arrived at by the Commission and stated that there was no need for the Commission to afford an opportunity of being heard to the complainant and that the conclusion arrived at by the Commission was after a detailed enquiry conducted by the Commission in regard to the issuance of the PRC. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. From the record it appears that upon receiving a complaint from the petitioner, the Commission had taken pains to inspect the relevant records, which included a copy of the voter list, of 1957 State Assembly elections, in which the name of the father of the respondent No. 4, namely, Shanker Singh is stated to have existed. The Commission also inspected the PRC issued in favour of Shankar Singh, father of the respondent No. 4, as also the documents existing in the name of Kripa Singh, grandfather of the said respondent. The requisite reports obtained from the Tehsildar Settlement issued on 16.03.2013 were also considered. On a cumulative appreciation of the entire material on record, the Commission returned a finding, which is impugned in the present case. 10. Assuming that the petitioner had any right of being heard in the matter, yet in view of the specific findings recorded by the Commission based upon the documents before it, clearly suggested the genuineness of the certificate issued not only in favour of the respondent No. 4, but even the father of the said respondent, it will be a “useless formality” to set aside the order impugned with a view only to enable the petitioner to be heard by the said Commission. 11. The Apex Court in case titled “Aligarh Muslim University and ors, v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000)7 SCC 529 , propounded the “useless formality” theory and followed the law as laid down in the case of S.L. Kapoor (supra) and in paragraphs 23 and 35 observed as under:- “23. 11. The Apex Court in case titled “Aligarh Muslim University and ors, v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000)7 SCC 529 , propounded the “useless formality” theory and followed the law as laid down in the case of S.L. Kapoor (supra) and in paragraphs 23 and 35 observed as under:- “23. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in S.L. Kapoor case laid down two exceptions (at SS p.395) namely, if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case, the principle that breach of natural justice was in itself prejudice, would not apply. In other words if no other conclusion was possible on admitted or indisputable facts, it is not necessary to quash the order which was passed in violation of natural justice. Of course, this being an exception, great care must be taken in applying this exception. 35. Thus, in our view, in the above peculiar circumstances, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that even if Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan had been given notice and he had mentioned this fact of job continuance in Libya as a reason that would not have made any difference and would not have been treated as a satisfactory explanation under Rule 5(8)(i). Thus, on the admitted or undisputed facts, only one view was possible. The case would fall within the exception noted in S.L. Kapoor case. We, therefore, hold that no prejudice has been caused to the officer for want of notice under Rule 5(8)(i). We hold against Mr. Mansoor Ali Khan under Point 5.” 12. In Ashok Kumar Sonkar vs. Union of India & ors, (2007)4 SCC 54 , the Apex Court has held as under:- “A court of law does not insist on compliance with a useless formality. It will not issue any such direction where the result would remain the same, in view of fact situation prevailing or in terms of legal consequences. This was a case where the appellant before the Apex Court was not qualified on the cut-off date. Being ineligible to be considered for appointment, it would be a futile exercise to give him an opportunity of being heard.” 13. This principle laid down by the Apex Court was further followed in the case of State of Chattisgarh v. (2009) 13 SCC 600 . 14. Being ineligible to be considered for appointment, it would be a futile exercise to give him an opportunity of being heard.” 13. This principle laid down by the Apex Court was further followed in the case of State of Chattisgarh v. (2009) 13 SCC 600 . 14. Even on the issue of judicial review, the Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to judge the correctness of otherwise of the decision but it is only the decision making process, which has to be looked in to by the Court to judge it on the touchstone of perversity or procedural irregularity. 15. The Apex Court in case titled “Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons V/s Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay” (1989) 3 SCC 293 in paragraph 31 held as under:- “31. ………………... In our opinion, it is necessary to remember that judicial review, in the words of Lord Brightman in that case, is not concerned with the decision, but with the decision making process. As observed by Prof. Dias in 'Jurisprudence' (5th Edn. at p. 91) unless the restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. It is therefore necessary to bear in mind the ways and means by which the court can control or supervise the judicial action of any authority which is subject to judicial control. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the observations of Lord Justice Templeman in re Preston v. I.R.C., [1985] 2 WLR 836 and the observations of Lord Justice May in Regina v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, [1986] 2 WLR 144. It is not within the purview of a court to substitute a decision taken by a constituted authority simply because the decision sought to be substituted is a better one. ………..…..” 16. Reference in this regard can also be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Heinz India Private Limited and anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors (2012) 5 SCC 443 , wherein it was held as under:- “77. ………..…..” 16. Reference in this regard can also be made to a decision of the Apex Court in Heinz India Private Limited and anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors (2012) 5 SCC 443 , wherein it was held as under:- “77. In the light of the legal position stated in the earlier part of this order, it is neither feasible for us to embark upon an exercise of re-appreciating the entire material or to substitute our own findings for those recorded by the Mandi Samiti and the Director/Mandi Parishad. So long as the findings recorded by the Mandi Samiti and the Mandi Parishad are not irrational or perverse, and so long as the view taken by them is a reasonably possible view, this Court would not interfere.” 17. Be that as it may, in my opinion, the order impugned calls for no interference. The instant petition is found to be without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected MPs. Interim direction, if any in force, shall stand vacated with immediate effect.