JUDGMENT : This appeal is placed before me on the note by the Registry regarding maintainability of the claim of the counsel for the appellant that Court Fee payable in an appeal filed against an order rejecting the plaint cannot be the same Court Fee that would be payable if the suit has been disposed of on merits. 2. The appellant had paid Court Fee Rs.5/- along with appeal and the Registry had raised an objection regarding the quantum of the Court Fee payable. The learned counsel for the appellant had made an endorsement claiming that since the Order challenged is only an order made in the application seeking rejection of the plaint it is incapable of valuation and therefore, the Court Fee of Rs.5/- paid along with appeal is correct. The Registry has raised doubts regarding the claim of the counsel on the Court Fee payable. The appeal has been filed against an order rejecting the plaint in a suit for specific performance on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 3. An Application filed by the defendant seeking rejection of the plaint in IA.No.295 of 2012 was allowed by the Trial Court on 27.07.2012. While valuing the appeal in the Memorandum of grounds it is stated as follows : MEMO OF VALUATION Value of the Suit Rs. 71,00,000.00 Court Fee Paid Rs.5,33,250.50 Value of the I.A. Incapable Court Fee Paid Rs.2.00 Value of the Appeal Incapable Court Fee Paid Rs.5/- 4. When the papers were placed before me by the Registry, I heard Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and reserved orders on 11.07.2017. Since the matter relates to the payment of Court Fee and decision there on would have wider ramifications, I requested Mr. V. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General to assist the Court in arriving at a just decision on the issue relating to the Court Fee payable in the appeal filed against an order rejecting the plaint under order 7 of the Rule 11 (a) or (d). Therefore, I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General also on the question of Court Fee payable. 5. Mr. Therefore, I have heard the learned Additional Advocate General also on the question of Court Fee payable. 5. Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that though an order rejecting a plaint is deemed to be a decree, what is under challenge is the correctness of the order rejecting the plaint alone and not entire subject matter of the suit. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, it is Article 3 of Schedule II of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 that would apply to the case on hand and not Article 1 of Schedule I. Article 3 of Schedule II governs the Court Fee payable on a Memorandum of appeal from an order inclusive of an order determining any question under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not otherwise provided for. If the appeal is filed in any Court other than the High Court, the fee payable would be Rs.5/- and if it is presented to the High Court it shall be Rs.50/-, when value exceeds 5000 rupees and in any other case it is 20 rupees. Referring to Article 3 of Schedule II, Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel would contend that though an order under Order 7 Rule 11 rejecting a plaint is deemed to be a decree, an appeal against such an order would come under Article 3 of Schedule II in the category of cases "not otherwise provided for". 6. An alternative submission is also made by Mr. Lakshminarayanan, learned counsel that even assuming Article 1 of Schedule I would apply the Court Fee payable is on the amount or value of the subject matter in dispute. According to the learned counsel, the subject matter in dispute in an appeal against the order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 Clause a or Clause d which is not capable of valuation. Since, it is only the right of the plaintiff to initiate the suit that is in question. He would further contend that if an appeal against the order rejecting the plaint is allowed the Appellate Court could only remit the matter to the trial Court for entertaining the suit and deciding it on merits. The Appellate Court cannot decide the suit on merits by itself because there will be no evidence on record to arrive at a decision on the dispute on merits. 7. The Appellate Court cannot decide the suit on merits by itself because there will be no evidence on record to arrive at a decision on the dispute on merits. 7. Inviting my attention to the Judgment of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Maharaj Kumarika Subarna Rekha Mani Devi and others v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo and others reported in AIR 1968 Andhra pradesh 239. Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, would contend that the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court has made a distinction between a rejection of a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 Clauses a and d on the one hand and Clauses b and c on the other. Pointing out that the Full Bench has substantially followed the Division Bench of this Court in SR No.1923 of 1923. It is also pointed out that the said judgment of Full Bench has been followed by the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Nagabhairava Medhini Devi and others v. Perumalla Kasi Rao and Another, reported in 2013 (4) ALD 720 . Reference is also made to the Judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Sehgal Industrial Works v. Tru-Temp Industries and others reported in (1986) 11 DRJ 71 , wherein the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court has followed the judgment of Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1968 Andhra Pradesh 239 referred to supra. 8. Upon my request, the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. V. Ayyadurai, would make the following submissions : The first limb of the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Ayyadurai is that only Article 1 of Schedule I of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 would apply to the case on hand and not Article 3 of Schedule II. He would point out that the Article 3 of Schedule II is confined to an appeal against orders and would include only a determination under Section 144 of Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, an order rejecting a plaint which is deemed to be a decree cannot under any circumstance fall under Article 3 Schedule II of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Answering the contention of Mr. Therefore, an order rejecting a plaint which is deemed to be a decree cannot under any circumstance fall under Article 3 Schedule II of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act. Answering the contention of Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, learned Counsel for the appellant that even assuming that it is Article 1 of Schedule I would apply, the Court Fee payable would be only an amount or value to the subject matter of an appeal and not the subject matter of entire suit, Mr. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General would contend that the scheme of Court Fees Act would have to be looked into. Contending that the relief of rejection of plaint is an ancillary relief, the learned Additional Advocate General would rely upon the proviso to Section 6(1) of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and contend that the Court Fee is chargeable only on the value of the main relief and not the ancillary relief. He would also rely upon the words “Save as otherwise provide for”, in Section 7 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, to contend that where the Fee payable depends upon the market value of the property, such value is determined as on the date of the presentation of the plaint. According to him, unless it is shown that there is some other provision in the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 which would indicate a different procedure for valuation of the suit, or appeal, the same will be on the basis of the market value of the property or as per the relevant provision of Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, which makes a specific provision for levy of Court Fee in a suit of a particular kind. 9. The learned Additional Advocate General would also refer to Section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 to point out that the provision of Sections 10 to 14 relating to a determination of levy of fees on plaint in suits will apply Mutatis and Mutandis to the determination and levy of fee on the memorandum of an appeal or an application. Referring to Sections 30, 42 and 50, the learned Additional Advocate General would contend that these Sections would make provision for determination of Court Fee in different kinds of suits and therefore, the same procedure should be adopted in the appeal also. Referring the Section 52 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, the learned Additional Advocate General would contend that a fee payable on a memorandum of an appeal shall be the same as the Fee payable in the Court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal. According to him, once an order rejecting the plaint is deemed to be a decree, the subject matter of an appeal against such order would be the whole suit and nothing else. 10. Pointing out Explanation 4, which according to him, could be considered against the revenue, the learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the relief prayed for in the appeal in a case of rejection of plaint is not a relief different from what is prayed for in the suit. He would also rely upon the Judgment of a Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh Court in M.G. Tipnis v. The Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Union of India, New Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1970 MP 5 ; P.U.K. Menon and others v. Excelads (P) Ltd, reported in AIR 2005 Kerala 166; Mr. S. Marimuthu v. G. Kumaraswamy and others, reported in 1997 (1) LW 76 and Satheedevi v. Prasanna and Another reported in 2010 (5) SCC 622 . 11. On the above rival contentions the following legal positions emerge :- 1. An order rejecting the plaint is deemed to be a decree. 2. The rival contentions of the parties on merits is not gone into while the rejection of plaint is considered under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) or Order 7 Rule 11 (d). 3. An order rejecting a plaint cannot be treated as determination of the rights of the parties on merits of the controversy. 4. What is decided is only the right of the plaintiff to maintain a suit. 12. Though Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, would strenuously contend that an appeal filed against an order rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) or Order 7 Rule 11 (d) would fall under Order 3 Schedule II. 4. What is decided is only the right of the plaintiff to maintain a suit. 12. Though Mr. V. Lakshminarayanan, would strenuously contend that an appeal filed against an order rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (a) or Order 7 Rule 11 (d) would fall under Order 3 Schedule II. I am unable to accept the said contention for the following reasons : Order 3 of Schedule II only governs appeals against an Order and not a decree. A Careful analysis of the Code of Civil Procedure Code would go to show that an order rejecting a plaint and an order determining any question relating to restitution under Section 144 alone or deemed to be decrees, Article 3 Schedule II specifically refers to determination of a question under Section 144, but does not include a rejection of the plaint. So it must be taken that the legislature has consciously omitted to include an order rejecting a plaint within the ambit of Article 3 of Schedule II. The very fact the legislature had chosen to include a determination under Section 144 and omit an order rejecting a plaint in Article 3 would show that the legislature did not intend to include a rejection of a plaint as an appeallable order with in the ambit of Article 3 of Schedule II. 13. Once Article 3 of Schedule II is held to be inapplicable it only Article 1 of Schedule I that would apply for an appeal against an order rejecting a plaint. Article 1 of Schedule I before the amendment by an Act 6 of 2017 reads as follows : Article Particulars Proper fee 1. Plaint or written statement pleading a set-off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal presented to any Court When the amount or value or the subject matter in dispute- (i) does not exceed five rupees [Forty naye Paise] (ii) exceeds five rupees, for every five rupees, or part thereof, in excess of five rupees, upto one hundred rupees; [Forty naye Paise] (iii) exceeds one hundred rupees, for every ten rupees, or part thereof, in excess of one hundred rupees; [Seventy-five naye Paise] The said provision after the amendment by Act 6 of 2017 reads as follows : Article Particulars Proper fee 1. Plaint or written statement pleading a set-off or counter claim or memorandum of appeal presented to any Court 3% of the amount or value of the subject matter (Subs: Act 6/17) 14. Except the percentage of the fee payable there is not much of a difference between the amended and the unamended provision. A reading of Article 1 of Schedule I would show that the Court Fee payable is adveloram at a certain percentage on the amount or value of the subject matter of the appeal. Therefore the 1st question that is to be addressed is "what is the amount or value of the subject matter of the appeal filed against an order rejecting the plaint?" Order 7 Rule 11 Clauses a to d provide for various groundso for rejection of the plaints. Insofar as the Clauses b and c are concerned, there could be no difficulty inasmuch as they provide for determination of the value of the subject matter by the Trial Court and if it is found to be lesser than the valuation arrived at by the Court, then the Court could call upon the plaintiff to make good the deficit. And if he fails to do so, the plaint can be rejected. Therefore, in an appeal against the rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 (b) or Order 7 Rule 11 (c) the Court Fee payable would be on the difference between the value adopted by the plaintiff and the value fixed by the Court, in cases falling under clause b or the deficit Court Fee determined as payable in cases falling under Clause c. The difficulty as to what would be the subject matter of the appeal would arise only in cases where the plaint is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 Clause a or d. 15. A Division Bench of this Court had, as early as in 1923 considered such situation and Schwabe, C.J. speaking for the Bench had observed as follows : The second question raised is, assuming this is to be treated as a memorandum of appeal from a decree what is the subject-matter in dispute? Because it is the subject-matter in dispute which governs the rate of fee payable. On the one hand it is contended that either it is incapable of valuation and therefore comes under Sch. Because it is the subject-matter in dispute which governs the rate of fee payable. On the one hand it is contended that either it is incapable of valuation and therefore comes under Sch. II, Art.17(b), in which case there would be a fixed-fee payable of Rs.100/-, or alternatively that the subject-matter in dispute is the difference between the stamp claimed by the lower court and the stamp which the plaintiff is prepared to pay, namely Rs.1,487-6-0. The Crown, on the other hand, contends that the subject-matter in dispute in the suit, that is to say, if the suit involves title to lands of, say of the value of a lakh of rupees, and the question on appeal was whether the stamp charge should be a hundred rupees or a thousand rupees, the court-fees payable on appeal would be on the lakh value of the land. It is agreed that the subject-matter in dispute means the subject-matter in dispute on appeal, and it would indeed be strange if the position were this: that if the whole case had been heard and there had been a decision of one point upon which the plaintiff wished to appeal, he would in coming up to this court only have to pay a court-fee based on the value of the item in respect of which he was appealing; while, if his case had not been heard at all, and the question was about the maintainability of the suit, in order to come up to this court to ask that the case should be heard, he would have to pay a court-fee equal to what he would have had to pay if he had lost the whole of the suit and had desired to appeal in respect of the whole. It is almost inconceivable to my mind that the legislature could have intended such a result, and, unless one is driven to the conclusion by very clear words that was the intention of the taxing statute, it would be, in my judgment, impossible so to hold. I find no clear words in this Article to drive me to that conclusion. I think that the subject-matter in dispute, meaning subject-matter in dispute in appeal, has the simple meaning applicable to those case namely the amount of stamp in dispute between the parties. I find no clear words in this Article to drive me to that conclusion. I think that the subject-matter in dispute, meaning subject-matter in dispute in appeal, has the simple meaning applicable to those case namely the amount of stamp in dispute between the parties. There is authority in support of this view in Durga Prasad V. Raghubar Dial, (1882) 2 All. W, N.244, where a bench arrived at the same conclusion, after arguments but without expressing its reasons. There is authority apparently against this view in the case of Surendra Narain Sinha V. Hafigue Rahaman, 30 I.C. 378. In that case the point argued before me was not raised, the decision as to it was not necessary for the decision of the case and no reasons were given for the decision; and I venture to disagree with that part of that decision. Other authorities there are none, though there have been cases in which it would appear that fees have been paid not on the scale which I am now holding is applicable but on some higher scale, but I can find no case where the point has been taken and argued and decided. 16. The above observations of the Division Bench, make it very clear that the subject matter of the dispute in an appeal against an order rejecting the plaint is not the same as the subject matter of the dispute, if the appeal had been filed against a contested decree in the same suit. This pronouncement of the Division Bench of this Court was followed by a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sri Maharaj Kumarika Subarna Rekha Mani Devi and others v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo and others reported in AIR 1968 Andhra pradesh 239. 17. Though there was a difference in opinion on a point between the three Judges on the question of valuation of an appeal and applicability of Article 1 of Schedule I the opinion was unanimous. The Full Bench, after referring the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, cited supra, had observed as follows : "49. It follows from the above discussion that Article 3 of Schedule II to the Act has no application to appeals against orders of rejection of plaints which are “decrees” within the meaning of section 2(2), Civil Procedure Code. The Full Bench, after referring the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court, cited supra, had observed as follows : "49. It follows from the above discussion that Article 3 of Schedule II to the Act has no application to appeals against orders of rejection of plaints which are “decrees” within the meaning of section 2(2), Civil Procedure Code. The said provision is intended only to orders and does not cover “decrees” within the meaning of the said section excepting such of those as have been included under orders by specific reference thereto in that provision. Even in cases of orders such of them as have been provided for specifically in any other provision in the Act are out of the purview of that Article. Thus all, the appeals in question being appeals from orders of rejection of plaints they are in no way for purposes of Court-fee governed by that Article. 50. There is no specific provision for appeals against orders of rejection of plaints as such so that all the appeals of that nature may be governed by that provision alone. The grounds of rejection of plaints may be many. Order 7, Rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, refers to such grounds in clauses (a), (b), (c), and (d). These grounds are of different nature. They may not be exhaustive of cases of rejection of plaints. So then no single provision of universal application can possibly be made applicable to all such cases against orders of rejection of plaints. 50-A. The question whether a memorandum of appeal for purposes of Court-fee is governed by one provision or the other must turn on the scope of the appeal and substance of the reliefs claimed therein. The general principle as laid down in section 49 is that the fee payable in appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of appeal. The subject-matter of appeal may not necessarily cover the entire subject-matter of the suit as it depends upon the way in which the suit is disposed of in the Court of first instance. If the relief or reliefs prayed for are the same, no difficulty would arise. The Court-fee as paid in the Court of first instance shall be the fee in appeal. If the relief or reliefs prayed for are the same, no difficulty would arise. The Court-fee as paid in the Court of first instance shall be the fee in appeal. If only some of the reliefs and not all are prayed for in appeal, the Court-fee will be paid according to the value of those reliefs in the suit. If the relief prayed for is different from that prayed for or refused in the Court of first instance the fee payable shall be the fee that would have been payable in the Court of first instance on the relif prayed for in the appeal. The fee payable may be ad valorum or fixed. In view of these various qualifications each case must necessarily turn on its own facts and circumstances. So far as appeals against orders of rejection of plaints on grounds mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of Order 7, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, are concerned if the relief is limited to that matter and not to the merits of the suit itself the Court-fee payable on the memorandum of appeal, as a rule, is under Article 1(c) of Schedule I to Act and the subject-matter in dispute would be the value representing the difference between the Court fee demanded and that paid. The appeals from rejection of plaints under clauses (a) and (d) of Order 7, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, stand on a different footing and may not, however, fall under the said Article, if they are confined to the to that relief of setting aside the order of rejection of plaint alone and do not further. As already said it must all turn on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The scope of the appeal and the relief claimed would determine the issue and in the cases before us so far as S.R. No. 37685 of 1965 is concerned. I am of opinion that as the trial Court has not gone into the merits of the suit but simply rejected the plaint on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of Order 7, rule 11, Civil Procedure Code, and the appeal is confined to that relief alone and as the relief claimed is incapable of valuation and the Court-fee is not provided for otherwise than under sec. 47 read with sec. 49 having regard to the value of the suit itself, i.e., Rs. 47 read with sec. 49 having regard to the value of the suit itself, i.e., Rs. 6,000 shown in the memorandum of appeal, the Court fee required for the said appeal would be Rs. 200. The same cannot be said of A.A. Os. Nos. 176 to 179 of 1965 for the appeal are not limited to the question of setting aside the order of rejection of plaints. In them the reliefs claimed go beyond and contain a prayer that the suits should be decreed. The memoranda of the appeals, therefore cannot come under section 47 as the reliefs prayed for are capable of valuation and the appeals are governed by Article 1(c) of Schedule I. The Court-fee has to be paid ad valorem and would be the same as in the suits themselves. 51. It is urged that though it is stated in the memoranda of appeals that the appellants are entitled to decrees, and on the findings reached by the trial Court, the trial Court should have decreed the suits, the relief prayed for nevertheless was in substance and in essence confined to the rejection of plaints. It is difficult to accept this contention having regard to the scope of the memoranda of appeals filed. As I have already noticed, the ordinary rule is that Court-fee payable in appeal shall be the same payable in the Court of first instance. The subject-matter of appeals being the entire relief including the setting aside of rejection of plaints, the cases would fall under Article 1(c), of Schedule I and Court-fee should be paid accordingly. 18. The dictum of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has been followed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sehgal Industrial Works v. Tru-Temp Industries and Others reported in (1986) 11 DRJ 71 , wherein the Division Bench had concluded that no Court Fee is payable in an appeal filed against an Order rejecting a plaint under Clauses a and d of Rule 11 of Order 7 of the Civil Procedure Code. Subsequently, another Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court itself in Nagabhairava Medhini Devi and others v. Perumalla Kasi Rao and Another, reported in 2013 (4) ALD 720 has followed the Judgment of the Full Bench reported in AIR 1968 Andhra pradesh 239, cited supra, after quoting the judgment of this Court in SR No.1923 of 1923, refer to supra. In paragraph 10 of the said judgment it is observed as follows :- 10. The Full Bench of this Court in Kumarika Subarna Rekha Mani Devi's case (supra), dealt with this very aspect. It was held that the subject-matter of an appeal filed against an order of rejection of plaint has no value in terms of money at all. An elaborate discussion was undertaken by referring to the judgments rendered by various Courts. An instructive and educative passage from an unreported judgment of the Madras High Court, rendered in the year 1923, was quoted extensively. In that judgment, Schwabe, C.J., observed, It is agreed that the subject-matter in dispute means the subject-matter in dispute on appeal, and it would indeed be strange if the position were this; that if the whole case had been heard and there had been a decision of one point upon which the plaintiff wished to appeal, he would in coming up to this Court only have to pay court-fee based on the value of the item in respect of which he was appealing; while if his case had not been heard at all, and the question was about the maintainability of the suit; in order to come upto this Court to ask that the case should be heard, he would have to pay a court-fee equal to what he would have had to pay if he had lost the whole of the suit and had desired to appeal in respect of the whole. It is almost inconceivable to my mind that the Legislature could have intended such a result, and, unless one is driven to the conclusion by very clear words that that was the intention of the taxing statute, it would, be in my judgment, impossible so to hold, I find no clear words in this Article to drive me to that conclusion I think that the subject matter in appeal, has the simple meaning applicable to those cases namely the amount of stamp in dispute between the parties. ...then I think it would be a subject-matter which is incapable of valuation. The question whether this case has to be heard or not and I confess that I have had very correct to say (sic) that the real subject matter is whether the case is to be heard or not and not what fee is to be paid... 19. The learned Additional Advocate General would however, invite my attention to the decision of a Division bench Judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of M.G. Tipnis v. The Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Union of India, New Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1970 MP 5 , wherein the Division Bench has disagreed with the Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court and chose to follow the Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in the case of Apparao Sheshrao Deshmukh v. Mt.Bhagubai and others reported in AIR (36) 1949 Nagpur 1. I must immediately point out that AIR (36) 1949 Nagpur 1, in fact dissented from the view of this Court in Kalliappa Goundan v. Kandaswami Goundan reported in AIR 1938 Madras 498. The Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sehgal Industrial Works v. Tru-Temp Industries and others reported in (1986) 11 DRJ 71 , has referred to M.G. Tipnis v. The Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, Union of India, New Delhi and others, reported in AIR 1970 MP 5 , as well as the Full Bench of Judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Sri Maharaj Kumarika Subarna Rekha Mani Devi and others v. Sri Ramakrishna Deo and others reported in AIR 1968 Andhra pradesh 239, but chose to follow the Full Bench Judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court, in preference to that of the Division Bench Judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. One another reason impels me to desist from following the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh is that it dissents from a Division Bench of this Court which is binding on me. 20. Insofar as the other decisions refers to by Mr. V. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General, I do not think that they have a bearing on the issue that has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. 20. Insofar as the other decisions refers to by Mr. V. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General, I do not think that they have a bearing on the issue that has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the judgment of this Court in S. Marimuthu v. G. Kumaraswamy and others reported in 1997 (1) LW 76 , the question involved was when the subject matter of an appeal is different from the Subject matter of the suit, what would be the Court Fee payable?. The Division Bench held that the Court Fee payable would be on the value of the subject matter in dispute as shown in the Memorandum of grounds of appeal. On the facts of said case a suit filed by the plaintiff falls for declaration of title for a particular property and also for a direction to execute and registered a rectification deed. The Trial Court while decreeing the suit directed the plaintiff to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the 1st defendant as compensation for the illegal acts committed by him. The plaintiff had challenged the said portion of the decree directing him to pay Rs.50,000/- as compensation for the illegal acts allegedly committed by him. While considering the question of Court Fee, the Division Bench held that the appellant should have paid Court Fee for a sum of Rs.50,000/- granted as compensation. Lesser Court Fee paid on the valuation of the suit was not accepted. In my considered opinion this Judgment of the Division Bench, supports the case of the appellant. Yet another provision that should be taken note of, in my opinion, is explanation 4 to Section 52 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. Section 52 provides that the Fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the Fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject matter of the appeal. Explanation 4 to Section 52 reads as follows :- Explanation (4). -- "Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the Court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal." 21. -- "Where the relief prayed for in the appeal is different from the relief prayed for or refused in the Court of first instance, the fee payable in the appeal shall be the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal." 21. The explanation reproduced above would show that the legislature had in fact contemplated that in an appeal against a decree where the relief prayed for is different from the relief that was prayed for in the suit, then the Court Fee payable in such cases is the Court Fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the relief prayed for in the appeal. In a case of rejection of plaint falling under Clause a or d of Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, the relief prayed for in the appeal is to set aside the order of rejection and for rehearing the suit. Then the Court Fee payable as per the Explanation 4 would be the Court Fee that was payable for seeking rejection of the plaint and nothing more. 22. Of Course Mr. V. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General would attempt to rope in Section 6 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 and contend that the rejection of the plaint being an ancillary relief, the Court Fee is payable on the main relief that is the relief for specific performance. Drawing my attention to the proviso to Sub Section 1 of Section 6, the learned Additional Advocate General would submit that the rejection of a plaint being an ancillary relief the Court Fee should be paid on the main relief. I do not think the above submission of the learned Additional Advocate General could be countenanced. What is contemplated under Section 6 is, there are several reliefs prayed for in a suit and some of the reliefs which are ancillary to the main relief, the suitor is given the benefit to pay Court Fee on the main relief only and is exempt from valuing each one of the ancillary reliefs and paying Court Fee separately. What is contemplated under Section 6 is, there are several reliefs prayed for in a suit and some of the reliefs which are ancillary to the main relief, the suitor is given the benefit to pay Court Fee on the main relief only and is exempt from valuing each one of the ancillary reliefs and paying Court Fee separately. For example if in a suit for specific performance the plaintiff seeks an ancillary relief of delivery of possession or partition, he could seeks those reliefs without paying Court Fee either Under Section 30 or under Section 37 as the case may be. Similarly when a plaintiff seeks an alternative relief of refund of advance in a suit for specific performance, he need not pay separate Court Fee for the said relief. Therefore, the proviso to Section 6(1) and Section 6(2) are intended for the benefit of the suitor and the same cannot be interpreted in a manner suggested by the learned Additional Advocate General so as to include a relief of rejection of plaint as an ancillary relief and thereby make them to pay the Court Fee payable in the suit in an appeal against an order rejecting a plaint. 23. Fundamentally, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Additional Advocate General that the rejection of the plaint would be an ancillary relief in the suit. Once the plaint is rejected, there is no question of a main relief being granted or an ancillary relief being rejected. 24. In find the objections raised by the Registry regarding the Court Fee payable could be answered as follows : (1) It is Article 1 Schedule I that would apply for deciding the Court Fee payable in an appeal against an order rejecting a plaint. (2) The Subject matter of the appeal filed against an order rejecting the plaint is not the same as the subject matter in the main suit (3) The subject matter in the appeal against an order rejecting the plaint is only if the right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit and nothing more. (4) Such a right to maintain a suit being incapable of valuation the Court Fee that is payable would be the minimum Court Fee that is paid on the application for rejection of plaint before the Trial Court. (4) Such a right to maintain a suit being incapable of valuation the Court Fee that is payable would be the minimum Court Fee that is paid on the application for rejection of plaint before the Trial Court. (5) The fact that an appeal against an order rejecting the plaint is numbered as regular appeal cannot be a deciding factor for the purposes of Court Fee payable in such appeals. 25. In fine the office objections are overruled and Court Fee of Rs.5/- paid by the appellant along with Memorandum of Appeal is held to be sufficient Court Fee, since the subject matter of the appeal is incapable of valuation. The Registry is directed to number the appeal. 26. Before parting with, this Court wishes to place on record its sincere gratitude and appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. V. Ayyadurai, learned Additional Advocate General at the instance of this Court.