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2017 DIGILAW 293 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Kangasia Jayantibhai Somabhai

2017-02-06

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant - State feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of acquittal, dated 1.5.2006, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar in Sessions Case No. 9 of 2006, whereby the trial court was pleased to acquit the respondent accused from the charges for which he has been tried. 2. Brief facts of the prosecution case is that the complainant - Kamuben was residing with his father and brother at Gosaikunj society, Kalol, who was dealing in the business of cutlery items. She was married with one Bhikhabhai Kalubhai prior to two years as per their custom. The case of the prosecution further is that on 19.6.2005 at about 10.00 O'clock in the morning while she was going along with her uncle-in-law Virambhai at that time, accused Jayantibhai suddenly came in the rickshaw, snatched her and flew away from the spot in the said rickshaw. The complainant shouted but, she could not succeed and thereafter, as per the version of the complainant, accused told her uncle-in-law to go away from the spot as he would like to marry with her. Subsequently, they went to Modasa and thereafter at Shamlaji and then, to Bhilvad and stayed at various places and during this span, the accused committed forcibly sexual intercourse and this incident in question has resulted into filing of the complaint before the Kalol City Police Station which was registered as I-C.R. No. 75 of 2005. 2.1 This complaint was sent for investigation and the Investigating Officer has recorded the statements of witnesses. Later on, the prosecutrix was sent to municipal hospital, Kalol for taking the treatment. Thereafter, necessary panchnamas have been drawn and the material which was collected during the course of investigation has been sent to FSL for further examination and after completion of entire investigation, the Investigating Officer has filed the charge-sheet for the offence punishable under Sections 363, 366 and 376 of the IPC. 2.2 Since the offence was triable by the court of sessions, upon submission of the charge-sheet, the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kalol in exercise of powers under Section 209 of the Cr.P.C., was pleased to commit the case to the learned District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar for onward adjudication. The case being registered as Sessions Case No. 9 of 2006. The case being registered as Sessions Case No. 9 of 2006. 2.3 After committal of the case on 13.3.2006 a specific charge came to be framed and the statement of the respondent - accused came to be recorded. Since the accused denied the offence being committed, the case was then put up for trial. During the course of trial, the prosecution has led the evidence in the form of oral as well as documentary evidence which are as under:- Sr. No. PW No. Name Exh. 1 1 Navinchandra Mafatlal 7 2 2 Laxmiben Dhirubhai 9 3 3 Dineshkumar Amrutlal 11 4 4 Vijay Hasmukhray Vyas 12 5 5 Kalubhai Bhathibhai Thakor 15 6 6 Babu Ramji Gawariya 16 7 7 Chaturbhai Tapubhai 17 8 8 Bhimabhai Bhurabhai 18 9 9 Virambhai Khushalbhai 19 10 10 Kamuben @ Kamlaben Chaturbhai 21 11 11 Ramanbhai Bhalabhai 23 12 12 Manilal Magandas 24 13 13 Kalabhai Maganbhai 31 14 14 Dr. Jagdishbhai Nanjibhai 32 15 15 Dr. Pravinbhai Gandalal 35 Democracy evidence 1 Panchnama of place of incident 8 2 Panchnama of physical condition of the victim 10 3 Birth certificate of the victim 13 4 Xerox copy of registration of birth of the victim in the birth & death register 14 5 Complaint 22 6 Panchnama of physical condition of accused 25 7 Letter to sending muddamal to FSL 26 8 Receipt as to receiving of muddamal by FSL 27 9 Letter written by FSL to Kalol City police Station 28 10 Analysis report of muddamal 28 11 Report as to result of serological analysis of muddamal 29 12 Yadi in respect of physical examination of the accused sent by PSI, Kalol City  Police Station to the Medical Officer 33 13 Medical Certificate in respect of physical examination of the accused 34 14 Yadi in respect of physical examination of the victim sent by PSI, Kalol City Police Station to the Medical Officer 36 15 Certificate in respect of age of the victim given by Dr. J.K. Engineer, Radiologist of Rotary Club, Kalol Charitable Trust Municipal Hospital. 37 16 Medical certificate in respect of physical condition of the victim 38 2.4 Subsequently, after leading the evidence in the aforesaid manner, vide Exh. J.K. Engineer, Radiologist of Rotary Club, Kalol Charitable Trust Municipal Hospital. 37 16 Medical certificate in respect of physical condition of the victim 38 2.4 Subsequently, after leading the evidence in the aforesaid manner, vide Exh. 39 a closure pursis came to be given and thereafter, an opportunity was given to the respondent accused by recording further statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. The respondent accused having denied the offence being committed, the case was thereafter put up for final adjudication by framing the charge. The trial court, after considering the overall evidence on record and after assigning the reasons, on 1.5.2006, was pleased to acquit the respondent accused by giving benefit of doubt for the offence for which he was tried. It is this judgment and order which is made the subject matter of present criminal appeal. The present criminal appeal was admitted and now, taken up for final hearing. 3. Ms. Hansa Punani, learned APP for the appellant - State has vehemently contended that the order of acquittal passed by the trial court is erroneous and not sustainable in the eye of law. It has also been contended by learned APP that the age of the prosecutrix was not certain. On the contrary, at the relevant point of time, when the offence said to have been committed, she was below the age of 16 and therefore, in any case the offence is made out and proved by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. Learned APP has further drawn the attention of the Court to the evidence of PW-4 - Vijaybhai Hasmukhray Vyas, who was examined at Exh. 12 and has tried to substantiate the case that this witness has proved the age by pointing out the entry form of Birth and Death Register maintained by the local body. Learned APP has further submitted that the PW-7 - Chaturbhai Tapubhai, who was examined at Exh. 17, has substantially supported the case of the prosecution. Learned APP has further drawn the attention to the medical evidence in the form of deposition of PW-15 - Dr. Pravinbhai Gandalal, who was examined at Exh. 35 and has contended that age of the prosecutrix is opined between 15 to 17 years and therefore, taking this evidence in mind also, the trial court ought not to have granted benefit of doubt to the respondent accused. Pravinbhai Gandalal, who was examined at Exh. 35 and has contended that age of the prosecutrix is opined between 15 to 17 years and therefore, taking this evidence in mind also, the trial court ought not to have granted benefit of doubt to the respondent accused. Even otherwise, as per the say of learned APP, there are sufficient and cogent judgments, which would not support the conclusion arrived at by the trial court and therefore, ultimately requested the Court to reverse the judgment and order of acquittal and inflict appropriate punishment upon the respondent accused. No other submissions advanced by learned APP. 4. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, learned counsel appearing for the respondent - accused has submitted that after considering the materials on record, it clearly appears that the case has not been proved by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt. The PW-4 - Vijay Hasmukhray Vyas, who was examined at Exh. 12, has not succinctly proved the age of the prosecutrix. On the contrary, on the basis of material on record, said witness has deposed before the trial court that the entry which has been made in the record of the Nagarpalika with respect to birth of the prosecutrix, there is no other material connecting and supporting the said entry. Said witness has also deposed that it is found by him that this entry appears to have been orally made and from the register record in the said entry, it appears that there is no name or address is reflecting and therefore, it appears that no substantial support is derived by the prosecution from the evidence of this witness. 5. Now, so far as the further deposition of father i.e. Chaturbhai Tapubhai (PW-7), who was examined at Exh. 17 has tried to support the case of the prosecution. But at the same time, he has admitted specifically that with respect to alleged incident which took place on 19.6.2005, he has not given immediately the police complaint. From the version of this witness, it is also emerging that there is some past animosity with Sultanbhai, Ravjibhai and Karshanbhai and therefore, evidence of this witness does not conspire any confidence as has been rightly found by the trial court. From the version of this witness, it is also emerging that there is some past animosity with Sultanbhai, Ravjibhai and Karshanbhai and therefore, evidence of this witness does not conspire any confidence as has been rightly found by the trial court. On the contrary, in the cross-examination of this witness, he has further admitted that he has not lodged any FIR nor has given any complaint before the police and on that day, Virambhai had also not given any information to the police. It is only thereafter on 15.7.2005, an application stated to have been given in the Kalol court and therefore, from the evidence of this witness, nothing turns out and in addition thereto, no specific version coming out from the evidence of this witness about exact date of birth or the age of the prosecutrix. 6. In furtherance of this, the medical evidence which is tried to be pressed into service by the prosecution in the form of deposition of PW-15 - Dr. Pravinbhai Gandabhai, who was examined at Exh. 35. In examination-in-chief, this medical officer has opined that looking to the report and radiological opinion given by Dr. Jay K. Engineer, it can be stated that the age of the prosecutrix might be between 15 to 17 years and for that purpose, he has relied upon the radiological report at Exh. 37. But if we look at the cross-examination of this witness, he has specifically admitted and opined that upon physical examination of the prosecutrix, the age can be said to be more than 16 years. Even on the basis of the radiological report also, this medical officer has opined specifically and admitted in cross-examination that age can be said to be of 17 years and has also further opined that there are no external or internal injuries which can substantiate the case of the prosecution and therefore, this opinion of medical officer has clearly dislodged the case of prosecution inasmuch as the age of the prosecutrix can be said to be more than 16 years and therefore, it appears from the reasons which are assigned by the trial court, the benefit of doubt has rightly been given to the respondent accused. 7. The incident in question is reported to have taken place on 19.6.2005 and prevailing definition of Section 375 of the IPC as it stood prior to 2013 reads as under: "375. Rape-. 7. The incident in question is reported to have taken place on 19.6.2005 and prevailing definition of Section 375 of the IPC as it stood prior to 2013 reads as under: "375. Rape-. A man is said to commit 'rape' who, except in the case hereinafter excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling under any of the six following descriptions:- First - Against her will. Secondly - Without her consent. Thirdly - With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. Fourthly - With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. Fifthly - With her consent, when, at the time of giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the administration by him personally or through another of any stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which she gives consent. Sixthly With or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age. Explanation.- Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse necessary to the offence of rape. Exception.- Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, is not rape." 7.1 In this Section 375 which is defined, the offence of rape has specifically provided in 6th Column "with or without her consent, when she is under sixteen years of age." 8. In the background of this fact, when the incident has occurred but, in the month of June, 2005, the relevant age to attract the offence of Section 375 must be below 16 years and therefore, in the background of this position, if the report of radiological officer as well as medical officer as stated above is seen, the age of the prosecutrix is conclusively held that of beyond 16 years and therefore, it appears that the trial court has rightly given the benefit of doubt looking to the other surrounding circumstances. From the evidence of prosecutrix as well as the deposition of the father, it has been revealed that at various places, accused and the prosecutrix went on and only thereafter, the complaint came to be filed and offence came to be registered and therefore, the trial court has rightly granted the benefit of doubt more particularly when the evidence as emerged the case of consent and when the prosecutrix is found to be beyond the age of 16 years, there appears to be no error committed by the trial court in passing the order of acquittal. 9. In addition to this, we are conscious about the fact that this appeal has arisen against the order of acquittal whereby, the benefit is extended to the accused person and therefore, looking to the peripheral scope of acquittal appeal, the Court finds no manifest error nor any perversity in coming to the conclusion by the trial court and upon independent examination of material on record also, there appears to be no case of taking a different view than what has been taken by the trial court and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that in the background of aforesaid set of circumstance, no case is made out by the State which would call for any interference. Relevant decisions on the issue of exercise of appellate jurisdiction are reproduced hereinafter. 9.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 9.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 9.3. The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 242, has held in Para 6, 7 and 8 as under: "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that;- "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 9.4 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 ,- "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 9.5 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it has observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should lead in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994." 10. In view of aforesaid proposition of law on exercise of jurisdiction while dealing with acquittal appeal, having gone through the proposition and co-related the same with the facts of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that the State has not made out any case which can permit us to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the trial court. 11. In view of the above, the present appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal, dated 1.5.2006, passed in Sessions Case No. 9 of 2006, by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Gandhinagar, is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand discharged. Record and Proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned, forthwith.