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2017 DIGILAW 296 (JK)

Sukhjit Singh Rana v. Union of India

2017-07-05

JANAK RAJ KOTWAL

body2017
JUDGMENT : Janak Raj Kotwal, J. 1. This writ petition filed by the petitioners, who are holding the rank of Commandant in the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), involves a dispute relating to fixation of the inter se seniority of the petitioners vis-a-vis the private respondents, who also hold the same rank in the same Force. 2. Factual matrix of the case is not disputed. Petitioners 1 to 10 and respondents 4 to 12 (private respondents) are Directly Appointed Gazetted Officers (DAGOs) in the CRPF. They were selected for the post of Assistant Commandant in the same selection process through SSB (CPOs), Examination, 1991-1992 held in the year 1992 pursuant to Notification No. 31 issued in the year 1991. After their selection, the petitioners 1 to 10 were appointed as Assistant Commandant on 30.06.1993 and were sent for the DAGOs' basic training in the 24th batch that commenced on 30.06.1993 and ended on 27.07.1994. The private respondents on the other hand were appointed on 01.12.1994 and were sent for the basic training in the 25th batch that commenced on 01.12.1994 and ended on 31.01.1996. Petitioner No. 11 is not a DAGO. He joined the CRPF in the year 1987 and was promoted to the rank of the Assistant Commandant on 30.11.1993. With the passage of time the petitioners as well as the private respondents got successive promotions to the rank of Deputy Commandant, Second-in-Command and finally to the rank of Commandant. 3. The inter se seniority of the DAGOs of the 24th batch and the 25th batch was fixed and the seniority list was issued by the Director General, CRPF, herein respondent No. 2, vide Office Order No. A.VI.1/97-KW-Estt.1, dated 22.01.1998. In this list the petitioners 1 to 10 as well as the private respondents were shown and reflected in the seniority list of the DAGOs of the 24th batch. The petitioners 1 to 10 respectively figure at serial Nos. 50, 21, 101, 46, 19, 43, 108, 76, 30 and 23 and the private respondents respectively figure at serial Nos. 5, 10, 22, 33, 44, 45, 51, 55 and 86. The seniority position of the petitioners 1 to 10 and the private respondents was similarly followed in their subsequent promotions and the Gradation Lists till issuance of the latest Gradation List of the Commandants as on 01.01.2016 (corrected up to 31.05.2016). 5, 10, 22, 33, 44, 45, 51, 55 and 86. The seniority position of the petitioners 1 to 10 and the private respondents was similarly followed in their subsequent promotions and the Gradation Lists till issuance of the latest Gradation List of the Commandants as on 01.01.2016 (corrected up to 31.05.2016). In this list the petitioners respectively figure at serial Nos. 77, 50, 118, 74, 49, 71, 123, 97, 59, 52 and 137 and the private respondents respectively figure at serial Nos. 36, 41, 51, 62, 72, 73, 78, 80 and 105. Vide Order No. I-45027/3/2016-Pers-II, dated 15.09.2016, the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs has accorded approval to empanelment of the Commandants, including respondents 4, 5 and 6, for their eventual promotion to the rank of Deputy Inspector General in CRPF and vide Order No. P.VII-3/2016-PERS-DA-I of the even date respondent No. 4 amongst others have been promoted to the rank of Deputy Inspector General. The petitioners feel aggrieved by combining the private respondents with them for fixation of their inter se seniority and in the process showing one or the other petitioner junior to one or the other respondent. 4. This writ petition was initially filed by the petitioners prior to the issuance of aforementioned orders dated 15.09.2016. Petitioners, however, with the permission of this Court, filed amended petition after these two orders were issued. Following relief are sought by the petitioners in the amended writ petition: (i) "Pass appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the Gradation list of May 2016 in so far as it pertains to private respondents who have been appointed as Assistant Commandant in CRPF after the petitioners and even then they have been shown senior to the petitioners and placed over and above their head. (ii) Pass appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the official respondents to re-fix the inter-se seniority of the petitioners who belong to 24th DAGO Batch and also petitioner No. 11 whose date of appointment as Assistant Commandant is dated 03.11.1993 in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) of CRPF Rules, 1955 read with Standing Order 01/2009 and in compliance to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Rohitash Kumar & Ors. v. Om Parkash Sharma & Ors. v. Om Parkash Sharma & Ors. and in accordance with their birth in service of the Force vis-a-vis the private respondents and place them over and above the private respondents who belong to 25th DAGO Batch. (iii) Pass appropriate writ, order or direction to the official respondents to forward the case of the petitioners to the DPC for according consideration to them for their promotion to the next higher rank of DIGP as they except petitioner No. 11, belong to 24th DAGO Batch (their date of appointment is from 30.06.1993 onwards, its specifically stated that petitioner No. 11 was appointed as Assistant Commandant on 03.11.1993 prior to the appointment of private respondents), over and above the private respondents, who belong to 25th DAGO Batch (their date of appointment as Assistant Commandant is 01.12.1994 to 26.12.1994). (iv) Pass appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the official respondents to issue appropriate orders for grant of all consequential benefits in favour of the petitioners retrospectively from the date of their birth in the cadre in the Force under Rules. (v) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the DPC proceedings vis a vis the private respondents which have been held in violation of the Rule position and without re-fixation of seniority of the petitioners. (vi) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing the rejection of the representation of the petitioners in terms of Signal Order No. G.II.1/2012-GCP-EC.VIII, dated 08.02.2012 and Order No. G.II-2/2016-Pers, dated 08.06.2016. (vii) Pass appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Order No. 1-45027/3/2016-Pers-II, dated 15.09.2016 to the extent whereby empanelment of private respondents 4, 5 and 6 has been approved. (viii) Pass appropriate writ, order or direction quashing Order No. P.VII-3/2016-PERS-DA-I, dated 15.09.2016 to the extent whereby the private respondent No. 4 has been promoted. (ix) Issue appropriate directions to the competent authorities to initiate proceedings against the official respondents for giving false evidence during the course of judicial proceedings in the Hon'ble High Court of J & K in order to defeat the genuine claim of the petitioners and they be directed to be dealt with under law. (x) Any other order, which this Hon'ble court may deems fit and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case may also very kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners." 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. (x) Any other order, which this Hon'ble court may deems fit and appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case may also very kindly be passed in favour of the petitioners." 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 6. Rule 8 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 (for short the CRPF Rules) deals with the 'Seniority' of the Superior Officers in the CRPF. Rule 8(b) deals with the determination of the inter se seniority of the Superior Officers including the DAGOs. Rule 8(b)(ii) is relevant in this case and is extracted for ready reference: "[8(b)(ii) The inter-se seniority of direct recruits to the Central Reserve Police Force in the rank of Company Commander or Quarter Master or Assistant Principal, Central Training College, shall be determined in accordance with the aggregate marks obtained by them before the selection board and at the passing out examinations Conducted after their basic training at the Central Reserve Police Force, Internal Security Academy. An officer promoted locally in the Central Reserve Police Force or from a Subordinate Police Service in the State shall take rank immediately below the entire batch of direct recruits, any officer of which may have been appointed on the same date, the inter-se seniority between local promotes from the States shall be determined with reference to their dates of birth.]" 7. Indisputably, the dispute raised in this writ petition has its origin in the fixation of the seniority of the petitioners 1 to 10 and the private respondents vide Office Order No. A.VI.1/97-KW-Estt.1, dated 22.01.1998 (supra), whereby the private respondents, who were appointed much after the petitioners 1 to 10 and had undergone the basic training in the 25th batch, were equated and combined with the DAGOs of the 24th batch for the purpose of fixation of the inter se seniority. The fundamental ground of assail to fixation of the inter se seniority of the private respondents along with the petitioners 1 to 10 vide order dated 22.01.1998 is that the private respondents as they were appointed much after the appointment of the petitioners and were sent for basic training in the 25th batch of training could not have been equated with the officers who had undergone the basic training in the 24th batch for the purpose of fixing the inter se seniority. It is contended that as all the private respondents belong to 25th batch of DAGOs so in terms of the Rule position their seniority is to be fixed below the petitioners. It is contended also that as birth of the petitioners in the cadre of the Assistant Commandant was w.e.f. 01.12.1994 they cannot rank senior to the petitioners. It is alleged that 'the then official respondents misinterpreted the Rule position and exercised the power other than the purpose, for which power was conferred under Rule 8(b)(ii) of CRPF Rules'. It is contended in particular that in view of Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules, the correct course of action was that the petitioners should have been placed over and above the private respondents in the seniority list, as per their birth in the cadre in the CRPF. Reliance is placed on Standing Order No. 1/2009 issued by the Director General, CRPF, whereby the inter se seniority of the officers is to be fixed in accordance with the batch in which they had undergone the basic training and the Supreme Court judgment in Rohitash Kumar & Ors. v. Om Parkash & Ors., (2013) 11 SCC 451 : AIR 2013 SC 30 . 8. It is important to note at this stage that the petitioners, while primarily questioning the correctness of the fixation of the inter se seniority initially in the year 1998, have not sought quashing of the seniority list dated 22.01.1998 (supra) or the subsequent Gradation (seniority) Lists of the next two promotional cadres, that is, the Dy. Commandant and the Second-in-Command. In this petition, the relief sought primarily and inter alia is the quashing of the Gradation list of the Commandants issued in the year 2016 and refixation of seniority qua the petitioners and the private respondents. 9. The respondents have raised preliminary objections to the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. It is contended that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed because the petitioners did not challenge the promotion of the private respondents much prior to the promotions of the petitioners on the basis of the seniority fixed in the year 1998 and are estopped from challenging the seniority after having availed the benefit of promotion. It is contended further that since on the basis of seniority fixed in the year 1998, the petitioners have been promoted as Dy. It is contended further that since on the basis of seniority fixed in the year 1998, the petitioners have been promoted as Dy. Commandants in May, 1999, Second-in-Command in May, 2005 and freshly as Commandant in July, 2008 and the subsequent Gradation Lists were duly issued and circulated from time to time, that is, in the years 2001, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2014 so they cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate after eighteen years. On merits of the case the stand taken by the official respondents, which has been adopted by the private respondents too, is that the private respondents were selected along with the petitioners in the same selection process but the former could not be sent for training in the 24th batch purely due to administrative reasons. They were therefore, assigned inter se seniority in order of merit within the 24th batch of the DAGOs in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) considering the marks obtained by them in the qualifying examination and in the basic training, keeping in view also that they could not be held responsible for delay due to which they could not undergo training in the 24th batch. In regard to the Standing Order No. 01/2009 (supra) the stand of the respondents is that the said order was non-existent at the relevant time and the seniority of the petitioners and the private respondents was fixed in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii). In regard to the judgment in Rohitash Kumar's (supra) the stand of the official respondents is that the said judgment is based on interpretation of the proviso to Rule 3 of the BSF (Seniority, Promotion and Superannuation of Officers), Rules 1978 (for Short the BSF Rules) and does not apply to the officers of the CRPF. 10. The emphasis in the submissions of Mr. B.S. Salathia, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, was that seniority of a Government servant cannot be fixed from a date when he was not even born on the cadre of the Service. Learned Senior Advocate urged that commencement of training of a DAGO in the CRPF corresponds with the date of his appointment and the seniority of an officer is to be reckoned from the date of his appointment. This legal position has been clarified by the respondents in the Standing Order No. 1/2009 and is clearly stated in Rohitash Kumar's judgment supra. Mr. This legal position has been clarified by the respondents in the Standing Order No. 1/2009 and is clearly stated in Rohitash Kumar's judgment supra. Mr. Salathia urged that the official respondents by combining the private respondents, who got their basic training in the 25th batch, with the DAGOs of the 24th and fixing the inter se seniority accordingly have given the private respondents seniority with effect from a date when they were not born on the cadre of the CRPF. In regard to the objection relating to delay in filing this petition, Mr. Salathia argued that one or the other aggrieved person had been making representations from time to time but justice was never done to them and it was not expected of all the petitioners to make representations or approach the court as they all along had been busy in performing their onerous duty of maintaining the internal security of the Country. Learned Senior Advocate argued also that in an appropriate case, as the one on hand, delay in approaching the court should not come in the way of doing justice if claim of the petitioners is legally sustainable. Learned counsel relied upon State of Jammu and Kashmir v. R.K. Zalpuri, AIR 2016 SC 3006 . In any case, urged Mr. Salathia, a new cause of action has accrued to the petitioners firstly with the issuance of Standing Order No. 1/2009 and the Supreme Court Judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case (supra). 11. Per contra, Ms. Sindhu Sharma, learned ASGI and Mr. M.S. Latief, learned counsel appearing for the private respondents submitted that as per Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules, seniority of the DAGOs is to be fixed in reference to the marks obtained by them before the Selection Board and at the time of passing out examination conducted after the basic training, so the inter se seniority used to be fixed in the same batch even if the candidates selected in that batch were split into two batches of basic trainings. Dilating the point, learned ASGI submitted that due to administrative reasons candidates selected in one batch are sent for basic training with the subsequent batch but the date of selection used to be reckoned for fixation of inter se seniority of all the candidates selected in that batch. Dilating the point, learned ASGI submitted that due to administrative reasons candidates selected in one batch are sent for basic training with the subsequent batch but the date of selection used to be reckoned for fixation of inter se seniority of all the candidates selected in that batch. This practice continued till the issuance of the Standing Order No. 1/2009 whereby it was clarified that the seniority shall be reckoned from the date of appointment, irrespective of the batch in which they were sent for training. Learned ASGI urged that the interpretation to Rule 8(b)(ii) and fixation of inter se seniority by the competent authority had never been questioned by the petitioners at the relevant time so the writ petition filed 18 years after initial fixation of seniority in the year 1998 is hit by the doctrine of delay and laches and is not maintainable. Reliance has been placed on K.R. Mudhgal v. R.P. Singh, AIR 1986 SC 2086 and a DB Judgment of this Court in 1Harjeet Singh & Ors. v. Union of India, 2016 (1) SLJ 21. 12. Given that this writ petition has been filed eighteen years after the initial fixation of the inter se seniority of the petitioners 1 to 10 and private respondents vide order dated 22.01.1998 (supra), which lies at the root of the controversy, the preliminary objection relating to delay and laches in filing this writ petition has vital importance and is required to be addressed first. I may, however, say also that reference to and comment on the merits of the Case would be unavoidable even in deciding the question of the delay. 13. It hardly needs to be stated that belated writ petitions cannot be "entertained and granted unless delay is satisfactorily explained and a case for condoning the delay is made out. The general rule is that if there has been unreasonable delay, the writ petition should not be entertained (See [State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhailal Bhai] Bhailal Bhai's case, AIR 1964 SC 1006 ). Nonetheless, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches and delay should be condoned if claim made by the petitioner is legally sustainable. (See R.K. Zalpuri's case (supra). Nonetheless, no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches and delay should be condoned if claim made by the petitioner is legally sustainable. (See R.K. Zalpuri's case (supra). Delay in service matters relating to seniority is required to be addressed even more seriously as entertaining the belated petitions disputing long standing seniority may have the consequence of causing administrative difficulties and deprivation of duly accrued rights to the persons who had been placed at a particular position in fixation of seniority at the relevant time. (See Shiba Shankra Mohapatra & Ors. v. State of Orissa & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 747). 14. It is not denied that the petitioners or anyone of them neither had raised any objection before the competent authority against the fixation of the inter se seniority initially in the year 1998 vide order dated 22.01.1998 (supra) nor they ever challenged the same before a court of law. It is not denied also that the petitioners or anyone of them did not raise any objection or approach the court when further promotions to the petitioners and the private respondents were given in accordance with the inter se seniority fixed in the year 1998 or the seniority was fixed in the cadres of the Deputy Commandant and the Second-in-Command. This position is evident from the petition itself. It is stated in this regard that after issuance of the seniority list in the year 1998, an officer of the 24th batch, who was similarly situated as the petitioners were, had made a representation to the competent authority challenging the seniority of the 25th batch, which, however, was rejected vide letter No. G.II.1/98-86-CB, dated 16.09.1998. It is stated further that the said officer had then again approached the Director General, CRPF for re-fixation of his seniority in view of Order No. A.VII-1/2008-Pers(AC), dated 08.04.2008 and 09.08.2008, whereby, according to the petitioners, seniority of 33rd 34th and 35th DAGO batch was correctly fixed but he was deprived of the benefit. It is stated further that the said officer had then again approached the Director General, CRPF for re-fixation of his seniority in view of Order No. A.VII-1/2008-Pers(AC), dated 08.04.2008 and 09.08.2008, whereby, according to the petitioners, seniority of 33rd 34th and 35th DAGO batch was correctly fixed but he was deprived of the benefit. It is stated further that the said officer had then filed a writ petition in this Court in SWP No. 886/2006 in which this Court vide order dated 08.06.2008 had issued a direction to the respondents therein to decide his representation within three weeks but the respondents vide their order dated 10.07.2008 had rejected the representation and the writ petition ultimately was dismissed in default. The copies of the letter dated 16.09.1998 and the order dated 10.07.2008 are produced by the petitioners as annexures B and D respectively. 15. Perusal of letter dated 16.09.1998 (supra) would show that representation of the officer, namely, Sudhanshu Singh, against another officer, namely, Mohsin Shahadi, who seems to be the respondent No. 4 in this writ petition, was rejected by the competent authority taking the view that the latter could not join the basic training in the 24th batch because of the delay in medical review board and there was no fault on his part for delayed joining the training. Likewise order dated 10.07.2008 (supra) would show that the same officer had filed representation raising an issue similar to that raised in this writ petition against eight officers, who are the private respondents in this writ petition. This representation was decided by the competent authority pursuant to and in compliance with the interim direction issued by this Court in SWP No. 836/2006 on 16.06.2008. The view taken by the competent authority again was that the said "officers were assigned at appropriate place along with their batch mates, i.e. 24th batch though they had undergone training with the 25th batch as they could not join training in their batch for administrative reasons that were beyond their control. They have been assigned inter-se-seniority in order of merit within their batch (i.e. 24 batch) in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 considering their marks of the selection and at passing out examination at the Academy". They have been assigned inter-se-seniority in order of merit within their batch (i.e. 24 batch) in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules, 1955 considering their marks of the selection and at passing out examination at the Academy". The competent authority had also refused to reopen the seniority fixed in the year 1998 even on the analogy of the order dated 08.04.2008 (supra), whereby seniority of 33rd, 34th and 35th batch of DAGOs was fixed taking the view that "the officers have gained two promotions till date as per inter-se-seniority already determined and therefore, are estopped from wracking up this issue at this belated stage." 16. What is, thus, clear too is that to the information of the petitioners the consistent view taken by the official respondents (competent authority) all along was that the private respondents and the similar other officers, who were selected along with the petitioners but were appointed at a later stage and were sent for basic training in the 25th batch, were to be treated at par with the officers of the 24th batch for the purpose of fixation of their inter se seniority for the reason that all of them are selected in the same selection process though the former could not join training in the 24th batch for administrative reasons, which were beyond their control. The view so taken was accepted by the petitioners inasmuch as they never raised any objection against or challenged the same at any stage, particularly immediately after fixation of the inter se seniority initially in the year 1998 or even after passing of orders dated 08.04.2008 and 09.04.2008, whereby, according to them, seniority of 33rd, 34th and 35th batches of DAGOs was correctly fixed. In the meantime all of them got two promotions on the basis of the seniority fixed in the year 1998 and the subsequent Gradation Lists were issued accordingly from time to time. 17. The petitioners, having accepted their seniority position vis-a-vis the private respondents initially for ten long years without raising any dispute and even after passing of the orders dated 08.04.2008 and 09.04.2008 (supra), cannot be heard assailing the seniority of the private respondents and seeking refixation of inter se seniority now after seventeen years. 17. The petitioners, having accepted their seniority position vis-a-vis the private respondents initially for ten long years without raising any dispute and even after passing of the orders dated 08.04.2008 and 09.04.2008 (supra), cannot be heard assailing the seniority of the private respondents and seeking refixation of inter se seniority now after seventeen years. As said hereinabove also, delay and laches in service matters assumes even more importance when the matter relates to fixation of seniority and the relief sought by the petitioners is sure to disturb long standing seniority of the respondents. Legal position in this regard is clearly stated in the Supreme Court judgment in K.R. Mudhgal's case (supra). In that case writ petition for the first time was filed in the High Court in the year 1976 nearly 18 years after the first draft seniority list was published in the year 1958. Learned Single Bench of the High Court of Delhi dismissed the writ petition, which, however, was allowed in the Letters Patent Appeal filed before the Division Bench. The respondents in the writ petition had raised a preliminary objection to the writ petition stating that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches. As the learned Single Bench and the learned Division Bench of the High Court had not disposed of the writ petition on the ground of delay, Hon'ble Supreme Court felt that in the circumstances of the case the writ petition should have been rejected on the ground of delay alone. Supreme Court in this case, while holding that 'the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches', referred with approval to two earlier decisions of the Court as follows: "7.......The facts of this case are more or less similar to the facts in R.S. Makashi & Ors. v. I.M. Menon & Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 69. v. I.M. Menon & Ors., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 69. In the said decision this Court observed at page 100 thus: "In these circumstances, we consider that the High Court was wrong in over-ruling the preliminary objection raised by the respondents before it, that the writ petition should be dismissed on the preliminary ground of delay and laches, inasmuch as it seeks to disrupt the vested rights regarding the seniority, rank and promotions which had accrued to a large number of respondents during the period of eight years that had intervened between the passing of the impugned Resolution and the institution of the writ petition. We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of March 22, ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition in so far as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government Resolution should have been dismissed." 8. We are in respectful agreement with the above observation. 9. We may also refer here to the weighty observations made by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Maloon Lawrence Cecil D'Souza v. Union of India & Ors., [1975] Supp. S.C.R. 409 at page 413-414 which are as follows: "Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult to doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects. It should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of sometime." 10. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of sometime." 10. We feel that in the circumstances of this case, we should not embark upon on and enquiry into the merits of the case and that the writ petition should be dismissed on the ground of laches alone. 18. The question relating to the delay in filing writ petitions involving fixation of seniority has been recently considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Harjeet Singh's case (supra). Learned Division Bench in para 3 of the reporting has observed that 'it is well settled proposition of law that seniority once fixed cannot be questioned belatedly as it will upset and unsettle the seniority and consequential promotions.' The Division Bench in this case has relied upon Supreme Court judgment in Shiba Shankra Mohapatra & Ors. v. State of Orissa (supra) and also to Rohitash Kumar's case (supra). The Division Bench in addition has relied upon S. Sumnyan & Ors. v. Limi Niri & Ors., (2010) 6 SCC 791 where Supreme Court has held that 'if seniority has been fixed ten years ago, which was acted upon by giving promotions if challenged, the same cannot be entertained on the ground of delay and laches'. 19. In the case on hand, it may be stated at the cost of repetition, the petitioners did not raise any objection nor did they challenge the inter se seniority of the petitioners and the private respondents fixed in the year 1998 initially for ten years. They did not raise any point even after the seniority of 33rd, 34th and 35th batches of DAGOs was fixed in the year 2008, which, accordingly to them was correctly fixed. It took them another eight years after 2008 to approach this Court through the medium of this writ petition in the year 2016. They accepted their promotions and that of the private respondents to next three cadres in the intervening period on the basis of the seniority so fixed. No satisfactory explanation justifying filing of this writ petition at this belated stage is available from the record. They accepted their promotions and that of the private respondents to next three cadres in the intervening period on the basis of the seniority so fixed. No satisfactory explanation justifying filing of this writ petition at this belated stage is available from the record. Reference to the two representations made by one of their colleagues, namely, Sudhanshu Singh, who is not party to this petition, does not support the case of the petitioners to come out of the barrier of delay and laches coming in their way of filing this writ petition at this stage and rather confirms their acceptance of the view taken by the respondents (competent authority) at the relevant time. To seek reopening of the seniority after eighteen years and three promotions in the intervening period, will have unspeakable affect as, if allowed, it will upset entire fabric involving not only the petitioners and the private respondents but the entire cadre(s) and will create a cloud around the settled position which respondents are enjoying for such a long period to their disappointment. 20. The petition would have been dismissed on the basis of delay and laches as discussed above alone and the matter would have ended here only. However, some important developments those have taken place after the year 2008, which have been relied upon by the petitioners for filing this writ petition at this stage, are required to be addressed to before arriving at the final conclusion. 21. It is contended that a new ray of hope has came to the petitioners with the issuance of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 by respondent No. 2, whereby seniority of the officers is to be fixed in accordance with the batch in which they have undergone the basic training. It is contended further that the 'petitioners' made a representation in light of the said Standing Order but the representation of respondent No. 1 was rejected by Signal Order No. G.II.1/2012-GCP, dated 08.02.2012. The copies of representation and the order dated 08.02.2012 are produced as annexure-F and annexure-G to the writ petition. 22. The Standing Order No. 01/2009 issued by the respondent No. 2 in January, 2009 issues clarifications (guidelines) in regard to fixation of inter se seniority under Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules. Clause 02 and Clause 03(i) to (iii) of this Order are relevant for this case and are culled out for ready reference: "02. 22. The Standing Order No. 01/2009 issued by the respondent No. 2 in January, 2009 issues clarifications (guidelines) in regard to fixation of inter se seniority under Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules. Clause 02 and Clause 03(i) to (iii) of this Order are relevant for this case and are culled out for ready reference: "02. Rule 8(b)(ii) of "CRPF Rules, 1955" provides that the interne seniority of directly recruited AC shall be determined in accordance with the aggregate marks obtained by them before the selection board and at the passing out examination conducted after their basic training at the CRPF Academy. 03. There remains some grey areas which needs to be clarified to regulate the seniority of Assistant Commandants. Accordingly, following guidelines are issued with immediate effect:- (i) Seniority of directly appointed Gazetted Officers through UPSC and direct entry Gazetted Officers (LDCE quota) shall be reckoned with reference to their batch of Training from the date of appointment, irrespective of the batch in which they were selected. Date of appointment in respect of Directly Appointed Gazetted officers through UPSC shall ordinarily mean the date of commencement of training, unless the candidate had reported late but within 30 days of commencement of training. (ii) Within a batch of training, whether directly appointed or through LDCE, the inter-se-seniority shall be determined as per Rule 8(b)(ii) of "CRPF Rules, 1955" in the order of merit. Merit shall mean the aggregate of marks obtained at the time of selection and the marks obtained at the time of passing out examination at CRPF Academy. (iii) Notwithstanding anything contained in paras i) and ii) above, within a Batch of training, a person selected earlier but who could not join the training with his batch due to administrative reasons e.g. delay in verification of character and antecedents, shall be senior to a person selected in a subsequent selection process. Inter se seniority among officers of each year of selection will be decided in the order of merit and placed accordingly en bloc at the top of the batch in which such candidates undergo training." (underlining by me) 23. Inter se seniority among officers of each year of selection will be decided in the order of merit and placed accordingly en bloc at the top of the batch in which such candidates undergo training." (underlining by me) 23. It is not denied that with the issuance of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 the seniority or the DAGOs is to be reckoned from the date of appointment, which will correspond with the date of commencement of the basic training, irrespective of the batch in which they were selected. The natural corollary therefore, would be, which is not denied too, that had the Standing Order No. 01/2009 been in existence at the time of the selection of the petitioners 1 to 10 and the private respondents or at the time of the initial fixation of their inter se seniority, the former would have been considered senior to the latter, having regard to the batch in which they had undergone the basic training/date of their appointment, notwithstanding that both were selected in the same batch. 24. The stand of the respondents in regard to the Standing Order No. 01/2009 is that the same did not exist at the time when inter se seniority of the petitioners and the private respondents was fixed in terms of Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules in the year 1998 and the Standing Order does not have retrospective effect. Contextually, the Signal Order dated 08.02.2012 (annexure-G supra), whereby petitioner No. 1 was informed about the rejection of his representation (annexure F supra) would show that the clarifications (guidelines) issued vide Standing Order No. 01/2009 were given effect while fixing inter se seniority of 32nd batch of the DAGOs and onwards. 25. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Salathia, submitted that not only discrimination was done with the petitioners and similar other officers but their fundamental right of equality has been violated by restricting the benefit of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 to 32nd batch and onwards and refusing the same to the officers of 24th batch. Dilating his point, Mr. 25. Learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Salathia, submitted that not only discrimination was done with the petitioners and similar other officers but their fundamental right of equality has been violated by restricting the benefit of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 to 32nd batch and onwards and refusing the same to the officers of 24th batch. Dilating his point, Mr. Salathia referred to the list of 22nd to 40th Batch of DAGOs given in para 6 of the rejoinder filed on behalf of the petitioners on 27.10.2016 and pointed out that the 32nd batch had commenced on 25.02.2000 so if the Standing Order was given retrospective effect from the 32nd batch of 2000 such benefit could not have been denied to the Batches prior thereto. Learned Senior Advocate urged that Standing Order No. 01/2009 is clarificatory in nature and issues guidelines for applying Rule 8(b)(ii) so its benefit cannot be denied to the officers whose seniority has been fixed prior to the said order. Mr. Salathia submitted further that stand taken by the official respondents in regard to the Standing Order No. 01/2009 is contrary to their stand earlier taken before the High Court of Manipur in writ petition (C) No. 322 of 2013, titled, Shri S.A. Rojan Zimik v. Union of India & Ors. that seniority cannot be assigned from the date when the incumbent was not in service. Referring to the copies of the pleadings of the parties in that writ petition and the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Manipur in that case dated 21.04.2016 (annexures P, Q and R). Mr. Salathia sought to point out that in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the official respondents in that case dated 12.08.2013 the clear stand taken was that there was no question of seniority from a date on which an individual has not joined the service, whereas the stand taken in this writ petition is that the seniority is to be reckoned from the date of recruitment, ignoring the date of appointment/commencement of basic training. 26. Per contra, learned ASGI Ms. Sharma submitted that neither any discrimination has been done to the petitioners nor any contrary stand was taken by the official respondents in S.A. Rojan Zimik's case before the High Court of Manipur. 26. Per contra, learned ASGI Ms. Sharma submitted that neither any discrimination has been done to the petitioners nor any contrary stand was taken by the official respondents in S.A. Rojan Zimik's case before the High Court of Manipur. Dilating the point, the ASGI submitted that seniority of the DAGOs of 32nd batch onwards was fixed in accordance with the Standing Order No. 01/2009 whereas that of the batches prior thereto including 24th and 25th batch had already been fixed in accordance with earlier, practice under Rule 8(b)(ii) as the said Standing Order did not exist at that time. The said Standing Order could not have been used retrospectively in a manner so as to reopen the seniority of the officers fixed at a time when this order did not exist. In support of her submission, learned ASGI, cited a Division Bench judgment dated 06.01.2016 of Delhi High Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 4940/2011. In regard to the stand taken in S.A. Rojan Zimik (supra), it was submitted that the seniority of the petitioner in that case was fixed along with the officers of the 34th batch as he had undergone basic training in that batch and similar stand was taken by the official respondents in the writ petition filed by him. 27. It is evident and is not denied that prior to the issuance of the Standing Order No. 01/2009, the seniority of DAGOs used to be reckoned on the basis of the batch for which they were selected and recruited and not in reference to the date of appointment/the batch in which they had undergone the basic training. In that, if some of the officers selected for a particular batch were sent for training along with the officers of a subsequent batch, due to administrative reasons, they used to be equated and combined with the officers of the batch for which the selection was made for the purpose of fixing their inter se seniority. The view taken by the respondents (competent authority) at that time was that the reasons for which officers selected for a particular batch were sent for the basic training along with a subsequent batch were beyond their control. This position is evident from the letter order dated 16.09.1998 (annexure B supra), whereby the representation of Sh. Sudhanshu Singh against respondent No. 4 (Sh. This position is evident from the letter order dated 16.09.1998 (annexure B supra), whereby the representation of Sh. Sudhanshu Singh against respondent No. 4 (Sh. Mohsin Shahde) was rejected as also from order dated 10.07.2008 (annexure D supra), whereby representation of said Sudhanshu Singh against all the private respondents was rejected. It was in this view of the matter that the petitioners 1 to 10 and the private respondents, who were selected in the same batch, were equated for the purpose of fixing their inter se seniority, notwithstanding that the private respondents were appointed much after petitioners 1 to 10 and had undergone basic training with a subsequent batch. This position seems to have continued up to fixation of the seniority of 31st batch of DAGOs. 28. The Standing Order No. 01/2009 in its Clause 3 by using the term 'with immediate effect' makes it clear that the same was to be given effect from the date it was issued. Neither clearly nor by implication the said order provides for giving retrospective effect so as to reopen the seniority fixed prior to the Said order. The learned Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Krishna Kumar Singh's case (supra) has held in para 10 of the judgment that: "10. As far as reliance on Standing Order No. 01/2009 goes, here again, the petitioner cannot argue of unjustified treatment clearly, those are executive instructions, they cannot be read so as to supplant prevailing statutory rules. They contain no indication (nor indeed can they contain such indication) that they are retrospective in character. Therefore, the assignment of seniority in the list dated 01.01.2007 could not have been affected by the Standing Order even if it were to be made applicable until there was an explicit intendment to do so, validly...." 29. It is, however, admitted that the guidelines issued under the Standing Order No. 01/2009 were followed in fixing the seniority of the officers selected for 32nd batch and onwards (refer annexure-G supra) and contextually, it is stated in para 16 of the objections to the amended writ petition that after issuance of the said Standing Order, the inter se seniority of the DAGOs was fixed in accordance with Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules read with the Standing Order No. 01/2009. 30. 30. It is thus clear that even though the Standing Order No. 01/2009 did not have retrospective effect, it was followed in fixing the inter se seniority under Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules of all those DAGOs whose seniority was fixed after issuance of this order and in that the seniority of officers in 32nd batch and onwards was fixed accordingly, notwithstanding that the basic training of 32nd batch had commenced in the year 2000. It being so, the official respondents cannot be said to have taken contrary stand before the High Court of Manipur in Shri S.A. Rojan Zimik's case supra. In that case the petitioner therein was a part of 29th batch of DAGO of the year 1997 but he was appointed on 16.10.2001 and was sent for the basic training along with 34th batch of the DAGOs. His seniority was fixed along with the officers of 34th batch. He sought fixation of his seniority along with the officers of 29th batch under Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules. The official respondents in that case had relied upon Standing Order No. 01/2009 and had taken a stand that there was no question of seniority from a date on which the individual had not joined service and it was argued on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner can be deemed to be a member of service only after he undertakes basic training course, which he completed in the year 2001. The plea taken by the petitioner, however, was rejected by the High Court holding that fixation of seniority is in conformity with guidelines mentioned in Standing Order No. 01/2009 and there was no arbitrariness in fixing his seniority. Given that the writ petition in Shri S.A. Rojan Zimik's case was filed in the year 2013, that is, after issuance of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 and fixation of seniority related to 34th batch, which was fixed in accordance with the said Standing Order, official respondents cannot be said to have taken a contrary stand in that case. 31. The official respondents cannot be said to have committed any illegality, much less a patent illegality, by following the guidelines issued under the Standing Order No. 01/2009 in fixing seniority of the DAGOs, whose seniority was not fixed prior to the issuance of the said order as the order was clarificatory in nature. 31. The official respondents cannot be said to have committed any illegality, much less a patent illegality, by following the guidelines issued under the Standing Order No. 01/2009 in fixing seniority of the DAGOs, whose seniority was not fixed prior to the issuance of the said order as the order was clarificatory in nature. Likewise, the official respondents cannot be said to have committed any illegality, much less a patent illegality by not reopening the seniority of the officers fixed prior to the said order as the said order neither clearly nor by implication was meant to reopen the already settled seniority matters. 32. Whether benefit of guidelines issued under the Standing Order No. 01/2009 should have been made available even to those eligible officers whose seniority was fixed prior to this order by reopening their seniority fixed initially and in promotion cadres, is a question which could have been raised immediately after issuance of the said order. It, however, took petitioner No. 1 three years to make a representation dated 24.01.2012 seeking refixation of his seniority in terms of the said Standing Order. This representation, however, was promptly rejected by the competent authority and the petitioner No. 1 was informed vide Signal dated 08.02.2012. It is not stated nor it was explained at Bar as to why the petitioner No. 1 did not challenge the rejection of his representation. There is, however, no material to show that the other petitioners too had sought benefit of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 at any stage. The failure of petitioner No. 1 to challenge the rejection of his representation and the other petitioners having not sought any benefit under the said Standing Order indicates that the petitioners had no grievance in applying the said Standing Order in fixing seniority of officers whose seniority was not fixed by the time of this order. Petitioners now cannot be heard seeking benefit of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 seven years after passing of the said order and four years after the rejection of the representation of the petitioner No. 1 and on that score also this writ petition is hit by the doctrine of the delay and laches. 33. Petitioners now cannot be heard seeking benefit of the Standing Order No. 01/2009 seven years after passing of the said order and four years after the rejection of the representation of the petitioner No. 1 and on that score also this writ petition is hit by the doctrine of the delay and laches. 33. No benefit under the Supreme Court judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case supra, which relates to fixation of inter se seniority of the Border Security Force (BSF) Officers, can be made available to the petitioners the reason not far to seek. The inter se seniority of the officers of the BSF including direct entrance is governed by Rule 3 of the BSF Rules. Sub-rule (3)(ii) of Rule 3 dealing with seniority of direct entrance is almost identical to Rule 8(b)(ii) of the CRPF Rules. The important distinguishing factor in the two Rules, however, is the existence of the proviso to Rule 3 of the BSF Rules and absence of such a proviso in the CRPF Rules. This proviso reads: "Provided that in case of direct entrant the date of appointment shall be the date of commencement of their training course at the Border Security Force Academy." 34. In that case the officers selected in the same selection process were sent for basic training in two separate batches. Batch No. 16 had joined training on 01.02.1993 and batch No. 17 had joined on 02.07.1993. In the writ petition filed by respondent, Om Parkash, before this Court, a learned Single Bench of this Court held that the Proviso to the Rule is clear. It is specifically mentioned that in the case of direct entrants, the date of appointment shall be the date of commencement of their training course at Border Security Force Academy. A learned Division Bench of this Court concurred with the said interpretation given by the learned Single Bench. The appeal filed before the Supreme Court was dismissed with an observation that "if the contention of appellants is accepted, it would amount to fixing their seniority from a date, prior to their birth in the cadre". It is this observation of the Supreme Court, the petitioners herein have based the entire edifice of their case on. It was vehemently submitted by learned Senior Advocate, Mr. It is this observation of the Supreme Court, the petitioners herein have based the entire edifice of their case on. It was vehemently submitted by learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Salathia, that by fixing the seniority of private respondents along with petitioners 1 to 10, the private respondents have been given benefit of the seniority even for the period when they were not even born in the cadre of the CRPF. 35. Paragraphs 27 and 28 of the judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case are important and are culled out as they are relevant for addressing the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners: "27. If we apply the settled legal propositions referred to hereinabove, no other interpretation is permissible. The language of the said rule is crystal clear. There is no ambiguity with respect to it. The validity of the rule is not under challenge. In such a fact-situation, it is not permissible for the court to interpret the rule otherwise. The said proviso will have application only in a case where officers who have been selected in pursuance of the same selection process are split into separate batches. Interpreting the rule otherwise, would amount to adding words to the proviso, which the law does not permit. 28. If the contention of the appellants is accepted, it would amount to fixing their seniority from a date prior, to their birth in the cadre. Admittedly, the appellants (17th batch), joined training on 02.07.1997 and their claim is to fix their seniority from the 1st of February, 1993 i.e. the date on which, the 16th batch joined training. Such a course is not permissible in law. The facts and circumstances of the case neither require any interpretation, nor reading down the rule". (underlining by me) 36. The view taken by the learned Single Bench of this Court, upheld by the learned Division Bench and the Supreme Court in Rohitash Kumar's case is based on the interpretation of Rule 3 of the BSF Rules in light of the proviso thereto and in that backdrop Supreme Court has observed that if the contention of appellants therein is accepted, it would amount to fixing their seniority from a date, prior to their birth in the cadre. No such proviso, however, exists in the CRPF Rules and the practice followed prior to issuance of Standing Order No. 01/2009 was that the seniority of the DAGOs was in reference to the year of recruitment even if officers of a particular recruitment year were splitted into two batches for the purpose of sending them for the basic training. The judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case, therefore, cannot be applied to the officers of the CRPF whose seniority has been fixed prior to coming into existence of the said Standing Order. Even otherwise, seeking benefit of the judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case reported in January, 2013, in the year 2016 in a seniority matter is also hit by the doctrine of delay and laches. 37. Another contention raised on behalf of the petitioners was that petitioners are primarily seeking quashing of the Gradation List of the Commandants issued in May, 2016 and re-fixation of the inter se seniority in the cadre of Commandants so the doctrine of delay and laches is not attracted. Contextually, it is contended that petitioners 1 and 2 had made representations in the month of March and April, 2016 respectively for implementation of the judgment in Rohitash Kumar's case in their favour too on the analogy of its implementation by the BSF authorities but the said representations were rejected without any lawful justification vide a communication dated 08.06.2016. It was contended that fresh cause of the action has arisen to the petitioners with the issuance of the Gradation List of the Commandants in which petitioners have been shown junior to the private respondents and by rejection of representations of petitioners. 38. Aforementioned contention does not deserve much discussion for the reason that issuance of Gradation List of the Commandants is based upon the initial fixation of the seniority in the year 1998 and its percolation to fixation of seniority in the subsequent promotion cadres including the cadre of Commandant. Issuance of Gradation List based upon fixation of the inter se seniority at the relevant time does not revive the cause of action nor filing of belated representation can revive a dead and stale cause of action. (See in State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors. 2013 (11) SCALE 56 ). 39. For all that said and discussed above, this writ petition has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. (See in State of Uttaranchal & Anr. v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari & Ors. 2013 (11) SCALE 56 ). 39. For all that said and discussed above, this writ petition has no merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. Contempt (SWP) No. 362/2016 Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed in the judgment in the main writ petition and the nature of the interim direction issued by this Court vide order dated 11.08.2016 read with order dated 20.09.2016, this contempt petition does not merit further consideration and is dismissed accordingly.