JUDGMENT By the Court.—We have heard Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri M.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 14. 2. By means of this writ petition, prayer has been made to issue writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 21.10.2011 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad in O.A No. 1492 of 2004 (H.L. Chhabra and others v. Union of Indian and others) by which the Tribunal has allowed the claim petition and set aside the order dated 26.9.2003 passed by petitioner No. 5 rejecting the claim of the respondents for grant of special pay of Rs. 35/- per month. 3. The facts of the case in brief, are that respondents 2 to 14 while working as Selection Grade Auditors have initially approached Central Administrative Tribunal in the year 1997 through O.A. Nos. 575 of 1997 and 1134 of 1997 for grant of special pay of Rs. 35/- per month w.e.f. 1.5.1986, since the day when their juniors were paid special pay. Prayer was made to pay all consequential benefits alongwith interest at the rate of 18%. At the time when application was moved. Most of all petitioners had already retired but since it was a common claim therefore the same had been taken up by the Tribunal for common adjudication. 4. The special pay was demanded under the Scheme of 1984, 1985 and 1986 before the Tribunal. After exchange of pleadings and after argument, the matter was finally concluded by the Tribunal through judgement and order dated 20.1.2003 with the following observations; “It is not known whether applicants belonged to any of the above two categories. In case they belonged to any of the two categories, they shall individually bring the fact to the notice of Respondent No. 4 by means of representation and the respondents shall consider their claims under the scheme applicable to those falling between Sl. No. 1 to 2040 for grant of special pay w.e.f. 10.7.1986. The respondents are directed to consider the claims of individual applicants filing their representation in accordance with the principles outlined above.” 5. No. 1 to 2040 for grant of special pay w.e.f. 10.7.1986. The respondents are directed to consider the claims of individual applicants filing their representation in accordance with the principles outlined above.” 5. The Tribunal has categorized the applicants and other similarly situated persons in two categories; (i) the applicants who had given their option for transfer in response to Memo dated 4.7.1986; (ii) applicants who were earlier not entitled to special pay but became eligible/entitled to special pay as on 10.7.1986 on account of order dated 20.10.1995. 6. After the judgement of Tribunal, the applicants have given their applications before competent authority and the competent authority has refused to grant special pay for two reasons; (i) the applicants had not specified the category to which he belongs as per judgement of Central Administrative Tribunal dated 20.1.2003; (ii) the applicant has refused to accept the benefit of special pay of Rs. 35/- per month for attending work of more important and complex nature due to involvement of his transfer. 7. The decision was taken by the authority concerned on 26.9.2003. The order dated 26.9.2003 was challenged by the respondents 2 to 14 through O.A. No. 1492 of 2004 on the ground that the respondents had already disclosed their position and details as required by the Tribunal before respondent No. 5 but the respondent No. 5 had erred in misinterpreting and misreading the same. Particular attention has been drawn towards para No. 4.21 of original application. 8. In the submission of learned counsel for the respondents, the authority concerned ought to have considered the averments made in paragraph 4.21 and the details given in the individual application filed by respondents 2 to 14. 9. To the original application, counter-affidavit was filed by the petitioners and after exchange of pleadings, the Tribunal has passed the order dated 21.10.2011 remitting the matter before authority concerned to consider the case of the applicants (respondents here) in the light of the orders passed by the Tribunal and also grant consequential relief within a period of six weeks. 10. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 21.10.2011 has been challenged by the petitioners before this Court only on the ground that every material which was essential for deciding the original application was available before the Tribunal itself therefore Tribunal has erred in remitting the matter for fresh decision. 10. The aforesaid order of the Tribunal dated 21.10.2011 has been challenged by the petitioners before this Court only on the ground that every material which was essential for deciding the original application was available before the Tribunal itself therefore Tribunal has erred in remitting the matter for fresh decision. This Court prima facie found substance in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners and issued notice to the respondents inviting counter-affidavit and as an interim measure has stayed the operation of the order dated 21.10.2011 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal till the next date of listing. 11. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 12. On being confronted as to whether the Tribunal this time has remitted the matter with the observation to consider any fresh (new) material or decision has to be taken on the basis of material available on record, learned counsel appearing for both parties have fairly conceded that the Tribunal this time has not directed the petitioners (respondents here) to consider any new material. The main observation of the Tribunal was that the controversy has set at rest pursuant to the earlier judgement of the Tribunal and this has not been considered by the authority in right perspective. 13. In Ashwin Kumar K. Patel v. Upendra J. Patel and others, AIR 1999 SC 1125 , the Apex Court has held that when the material was available before the High Court, it should have itself decided the appeal one way or other. It could have considered the various aspects of the case mentioned in the order of the trial Court and considered whether the order of the trial Court ought to be confirmed or reversed or modified. 14. In Pushpa Devi and another v. Binod Kumar Gupta and another, AIR 2004 SC 1239 , it was held, if the entire material is available and the parties have raised all issues before the Appellate Court, it should not remand the matter but decide on its own. 15. The Apex Court in Bachahan Devi and another v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur and another, (2008) 12 SCC 372 , has further observed as under : “The order of remand should not be passed as a matter of routine. 15. The Apex Court in Bachahan Devi and another v. Nagar Nigam, Gorakhpur and another, (2008) 12 SCC 372 , has further observed as under : “The order of remand should not be passed as a matter of routine. The first appellate Court which has the power to analyse the factual position can decide the issue and the additional issues. In order to bring in application of Order XLI Rule 25 the appellate Court must come to a conclusion that the lower Court has omitted to frame issues and/or has failed to determine any question of fact which in the opinion of the appellate Court are essential for the right decision of the suit on merits. Once the appellate Court comes to such a conclusion it may, if necessary, frame the issues and refer the same to the trial Court. In other words there is no compulsion on the part of the appellate Court to do so. This is clear from the use of the expression may.” 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the powers of the appellate Court in remanding the matter in Rajinder Sharma v. Arpana Sharma, (2011) 15 SCC 300 , found fault with the High Court in remitting the matter to the trial Court and directed the trial Court to allow the application of the respondent for adducing additional evidence by giving corresponding right to the appellant to rebut that evidence and also directed the trial Court to decide the matter afresh. The Hon’ble Supreme Court having observed the documents which are sought to be adduced by way of adducing evidence are on record is pleased to hold that the High Court being the first appellate Court, is a Court of both fact and law and the High Court in the interest of justice ought to have decided the controversy in accordance with law and the order to remit the matter to the trial Court is unwarranted and it will merely prolong the proceedings between the parties. 17. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is apparent that if the entire material is available before the Court for adjudication of the matter, in that eventuality instead of remitting the same, the case has to be decided by the Court itself on merit. 18. 17. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, it is apparent that if the entire material is available before the Court for adjudication of the matter, in that eventuality instead of remitting the same, the case has to be decided by the Court itself on merit. 18. Here in this case, the matter has only been remanded taking note of the earlier judgement of the Tribunal, which could easily be interpreted by the Tribunal itself instead of remitting the same before the authority. 19. In view of the discussions made, herein, above, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal has erred in remitting the matter for fresh decision before the authority. 20. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 21.10.2011 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad in O.A No. 1492 of 2004 (H.L. Chhabra and others v. Union of Indian and others) is hereby quashed with the request to the Tribunal to decide the case on merit afresh expeditiously, if possible within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. 21. The aforesaid observation has been made for the reasons that after 20 years, some of the applicants, who had already retired had approached the department for redressal of their grievance, most of them must have attained the age in between 80 to 90 years and are waiting to get the fruit of litigation, therefore, the Tribunal must consider this aspect of the matter while adjudicating the same on merit.