JUDGMENT BISWAJIT MOHANTY, J. - The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 1.10.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput at Jeypore in Criminal Trial No. 416 of 2004 convicting the appellant under Sections-364A/302/201, I.P.C. Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 25,000/-, in default, further to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for two years under Section -302, I.P.C. No. separate sentence has been awarded for the offences under Sections- 364 A & 201, I.P.C. 2. The prosecution story in brief is that on 19.5.2004, P.W. 4, who happens to be the mother of the deceased, received a phone call at 9.30 A.M. to send someone to collect rice sample from the shop of P.W. 5. Accordingly, she sent her deceased son to the shop of P.W. 5 and the deceased, who is aged about 14 years, went to the shop of P.W.5 by his bicycle. When the deceased son did not return, P.W.4 rang to the shop of P.W. 5, who denied to have called over phone. Accordingly, P.W. 4 asked him to send her son back. At 12.00 Noon, another call was received by father of the deceased, namely, P.W. 6 and the caller disclosed himself to be one Mishra calling from Pottangi and demanded ransom of Rs. 5,00,000/- for release of the deceased son, otherwise he (deceased son) would be murdered. The caller instructed P.W. 6 to pay the aforesaid money to him in Semiliguda Engineering College premises. P.W.6 became extremely alarmed and started searching for his deceased son along with P.Ws. 1, 2 & 3. They went to the telephone exchange to ascertain the telephone number from which calls came to his residence. On enquiry, he came to know that the phone call came from Lucky Pay Phone Booth of Russian Market, Sunabeda. Accordingly, he went to the said telephone booth. There , one Prasanta Maharana (not examined), the owner of the telephone booth told him that the appellant booked a telephone call to his residence in the morning regarding the rice sample. On 20.05.2004, P.W.6 reported the fact before Sunabeda Police Station vide F.I.R. under Ext. 8. Accordingly, P.W. 11 (Investigating officer) registered a case, took up investigation and took the appellant into custody. While in custody, the statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ext. On 20.05.2004, P.W.6 reported the fact before Sunabeda Police Station vide F.I.R. under Ext. 8. Accordingly, P.W. 11 (Investigating officer) registered a case, took up investigation and took the appellant into custody. While in custody, the statement of the appellant was recorded vide Ext. 1 as per which he confessed to have conspired with late accused Simanchal Naik and accused Chandrasen Takri to kidnap the deceased for ransom. In the statement, the appellant gave out details of the plan and how the deceased was killed. Pursuant to the statement of disclosure, the appellant led P.W. 11 accompanied by P.Ws. 1, 2 3 & 6 and gave recovery of the dead body, the stone over dead body, wearing apparels of the deceased, a plastic rope (M.O. VIII) and a Hercules Bicycle. In course of investigation, seizures were made, inquest report was prepared, post mortem examination was held and witnesses were examined. On completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed. During course of trial, accused Simanchal Naik died and accordingly, the learned Sessions Judge on 31.8.2006, ordered that the case of the accused Simanchal Naik stood abated. 3. The prosecution in order to bring home charges, examined 12 witnesses including the Doctor, two I.Os. and exhibited 21 documents. From the side of the defence/appellant, none was examined. 4. P.W.6, who is the informant, is the father of the deceased, P.W. 4 is the mother of the deceased. P.Ws. 1 to 3 are co-employees and neighbours of P.W.6. P.W. 5 is the owner of grocery shop in the Russian market complex. P.W.7 is the telephone booth owner, whose telephone booth was styled as “OMM SHANTI”. P.W. 8 is the Doctor, who conducted autopsy. P.W. 9 is the Junior Telecom Officer, Telephone Exchange, Sunabeda, P.W. 10 is the lady, who was managing a shop on 19.5.2004. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are the Investigating Officers. 5. In the examination under Section 313, Cr.P.C., the appellant answered most of the questions saying that the evidence appearing against him is false, however, in reply to question no. 3 relating to he being taken into custody by the police, the appellant admitted the same to be true. With regard to question nos. 43,49,53 and 56, the appellant replied that he has no knowledge regarding the matters covered by these questions. The appellant also took plea of false implication. 6. Dr. 3 relating to he being taken into custody by the police, the appellant admitted the same to be true. With regard to question nos. 43,49,53 and 56, the appellant replied that he has no knowledge regarding the matters covered by these questions. The appellant also took plea of false implication. 6. Dr. Gangadhar Tripathy, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant submitted that there exists no eye-witness to the occurrence and thus, there is no direct evidence against the appellant. Hence, it is a case of circumstantial evidence and though the chain of circumstance is not complete, the learned trial Court has gone wrong in recording a judgment of conviction against the appellant which requires to be quashed. Secondly, he submitted that in a case of present nature, the principle of last seen theory has been wrongly pressed into service by the learned trial Court despite large time gap and there is no evidence worth the name to prove that the appellant made the call at 12 Noon on 19.5.2004 demanding ransom. In this context, he submitted that though it has come out in the evidence that such a call was made from Laxmi Pay Phone/Lucky pay Phone Booth, however, neither the owner nor the attendant nor anybody, who heard the conversation of the appellant making such call demanding ransom to P.W.6, has been examined. In such background, he submitted that once there is no evidence to prove that the call at 12 Noon on 19.5.2004 demanding ransom has been made by the appellant, then no motive can be attributed to the appellant in the matter. Thirdly, he submitted that so far as leading to discovery is concerned, nothing much turns on that as admittedly, the dead body of the deceased and the rope under M.O. VIII were recovered from an open place as has been admitted by P.Ws. 2 and 11. He further submitted that a reading of the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 makes it clear that confessional statement of the appellant under Ext. 1 was recorded only after return from the place of occurrence. Fourthly, he submitted that the rope that was recovered (M.O.VII) never sent to the Doctor (P.W.8), who conducted the autopsy to connect the same with mark of strangulation. This has been admitted by P.W.8 himself. 2 and 3 makes it clear that confessional statement of the appellant under Ext. 1 was recorded only after return from the place of occurrence. Fourthly, he submitted that the rope that was recovered (M.O.VII) never sent to the Doctor (P.W.8), who conducted the autopsy to connect the same with mark of strangulation. This has been admitted by P.W.8 himself. Thus, accordingly to him, the chain of circumstance in this case is not complete to warrant a conviction of the appellant. Fifthly, he submitted that with regard to answer-statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C. apart from the fact that such statements are no evidence, even otherwise the appellant is protected under Sub-Section 3 of Section 313 of Cr.P.C. Lastly, he submitted that the appellant is in custody for more than 12 years. 7. Ms. S. Pattnaik, learned Additional Government Advocate defended the judgment of the learned trial Court ;and submitted that the appellant has been rightly convicted under Sections- 364A/302/201, I.P.C. Further, according to her, the last seen theory has been rightly pressed into service by the learned trial Court as the appellant and the deceased were last seen together at 11.00 A.M. on 19.5.2004. Further, the appellant himself led to the discovery of dead body, blood stained earth and blood stained wearing apparels of the deceased, which have been marked as M.Os. III, IV & V. Further, the appellant has also given recovery of the plastic rope under M.O. VII. According to her, P.W.8 had clearly opined that the case was one of homicide and besides this, there is ample material on record to show that it was the appellant and appellant alone, who had given the phone call demanding ransom. This coupled with the fact that the appellant had given false answers to the questions put to him under Section 313, Cr.P.C., this is a case where chain of circumstance is complete and accordingly, the impugned judgment does not require interference of this Court. 8. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 9. Perused the LCR and the impugned judgment. 10. In order to appreciate the contentions of both the parties, we have to scan the evidence. The Doctor, who conducted Post mortem Examination, has been examined as P.W.8. 8. Heard learned counsel for the respective parties. 9. Perused the LCR and the impugned judgment. 10. In order to appreciate the contentions of both the parties, we have to scan the evidence. The Doctor, who conducted Post mortem Examination, has been examined as P.W.8. In his evidence, he clearly stated that all the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased were ante-mortem in nature, cause of death was due to asphyxia and venous congestion, which was due to manual strangulation by means of a rope. This coupled with the inquest repot would clearly show that in the present case, death was homicidal in nature and the appellant had not disputed the same. Though the rope seized by the police i.e. M.O. VII was confronted to P.W.8 during trial and though he said that the strangulation can be caused by the said rope however during cross examination, he stated that I.O. had never sent any rope to him for his examination. He further made it clear that from the dimension of the ligature mark, the size of rope applied for causing that ligature mark can be determined. All these clearly mean that there exists no evidence worth the name to connect M.O. VII with the ligature mark. P.W. 1 is a colleague of P.W.6, who is the father of the deceased. In his examination –in-chief, P.W. 1 stated that when the was in his quarters, P.W.6 came to him and informed that he got a telephone message that his son has been kidnapped by somebody and the culprits were demanding Rs. 5,00,000/- as ransom to be paid to them in the Engineering College premises failing which his son would be murdered. P.W.6 further told him that his son has gone to Russian market to collect rice sample and therefrom he has been kidnapped. After hearing this, they went to the Telephone Exchange and ascertained therefrom that the telephone call was made from Laxmi Pay Phone, which has been described by P.W. 6 as Lucky Pay Phone Booth. Thereafter, he along with others went to the telephone booth and ascertained that the appellant had booked that telephone call. Accordingly, they searched the nearby area, but could not trace out the deceased son. So, they proceeded to the Police Station and P.W. 6 reported the matter before the Sunabeda Police Station. Thereafter, he along with others went to the telephone booth and ascertained that the appellant had booked that telephone call. Accordingly, they searched the nearby area, but could not trace out the deceased son. So, they proceeded to the Police Station and P.W. 6 reported the matter before the Sunabeda Police Station. Further according to P.W. 1, after registration of F.I.R., the appellant was brought to the Police Station and they were informed. Accordingly, they went to the Police Station and saw the appellant in custody. P.Ws. 2 & 6 were there along with others in the Police Station along with P.W.1 On interrogation by the police, the appellant confessed to the crime in details, led them and the police to Landa Hill area, showed them the dead body of the deceased son of P.W. 6 and gave recovery of wearing apparels of the deceased from a concealed place. Police scribed the confessional statement (Ext. 1) of the appellant and made seizure list in presence of P.W. 1 and others. The police also seized the rope, blood stained earth, as per the seizure list. The dead body was lying with face downwards and there was rope binding sign on the neck of the dead body. Later on, inquest report was prepared. P.W. 1 proved seized shirt and pant of the appellant indentified as M.Os. I & II and Chadi, T Shirt & black colour full pant of the deceased identified as M.Os. III, IV & V. He also proved the white colour plastic rope seized as M.O.VII. In his cross-examination, P.W.1 stated that the confessional statement of the appellant was recorded by the police at 9 A.M. to 10 A.M. Further, in his cross-examination, P.W. 1 stated that as the hill top was without any trees or plants and that is why it was called as ‘Landa Pahad’, but there were grass and small bushes. The back side of the deceased excepting the portion of neck, was visible to outside. Thus, P.W.1 is mainly a witness leading to discovery of various things. However, his statement that confessional statement was recorded at 9 A.M. to 10 A.M. cannot be accepted as in the present case, F.I.R. was lodged at 11.15 A.M. P.W. 2 like P.W. 1 is also a witness to the leading to discovery. Thus, P.W.1 is mainly a witness leading to discovery of various things. However, his statement that confessional statement was recorded at 9 A.M. to 10 A.M. cannot be accepted as in the present case, F.I.R. was lodged at 11.15 A.M. P.W. 2 like P.W. 1 is also a witness to the leading to discovery. In addition, in his evidence he has stated that on 19.5.2004, P.W. 6 informed him that his son had been kidnapped by somebody and in spite of search, he could not be traced out. On 20.5.2004 morning, when he was starting for his duty, he got information from P.W. 6 that the appellant is in police custody in connection with kidnapping of his son. On his call, P.W. 2 went to Sunabeda Police Station along with P.W.1. There, upon interrogation, the appellant confessed his crime, led to Landa Pahad, showed the dead body and gave recovery of wearing apparels of the deceased, rope & blood stained earth. In his cross-examination, P.W. 2 stated that on 19.5.2004 he had also searched for the deceased. Like P.W. 1, he has stated that while the wearing apparels of the deceased were not visible, the dead body was visible to outside. He also stated that the father of the appellant was an employee of H.A.L., who was dead. There was no ill-feeling between him and the family of the appellant. He denied a suggestion about the existence of ill-feeling of the appellant between him and the appellant. P.W.3 is also a witness to the leading to discovery. According to him on 20.5.2004, he heard the appellant has been caught by the police and accordingly, he went to the Police Station. P.Ws. 1, 2 & 6 were present in the Police Station. On interrogation, the appellant confessed to have committed the murder of the deceased, led them and the police to Landa Pahad, showed the dead body and gave recovery of wearing apparels of the deceased. In his cross-examination, P.W.3 stated that it is only after return from the place of occurrence shown by the appellant, the confessional statement was recorded so also the seizure list prepared. In his cross-examination, he further stated that in the Landa Pahad, the dead body was there in an open condition and visible to outside. P.W. 4 is the mother of the deceased. In his cross-examination, he further stated that in the Landa Pahad, the dead body was there in an open condition and visible to outside. P.W. 4 is the mother of the deceased. In her deposition, she stated that the deceased was aged about 14 years and on 19.5.2004 at about 9.30. A.M., someone telephoned from the shop of P.W. 5 to send somebody to take rice sample. Again for the second time, alike telephone call came and by that time, the deceased was at home. Accordingly, P.W. 4 sent the deceased to the shop of P.W. 5 and the deceased went in his bicycle. Thereafter, she got a third telephone call from P.W. 5 that he had not called the deceased over phone. So, P.W. 4 told him over telephone to send back the deceased. But the deceased did not return home. P.W. 6, husband of P.W. 4 returned from duty at 12.00 Noon and she disclosed the above facts to him (P.W.6) and at this time a telephone call came, which was attended by P.W. 6. The caller disclosed himself to be one Mishra from Pottangi and demanded Rs. 5,00,000/- ransom in order to hand over the deceased son. She stated that her son was wearing M.Os. III, IV & V. Though on that day and night, search for the missing son was launched, however the same proved to be the futile. On the next day morning, it was informed that the appellant was caught by the police and had confessed about murdering her son. In her cross-examination, P.W. 4 stated that on 19.5.2004, her husband-P.W.6 had not informed the police station regarding the missing son and Police had not examined her in connection with the occurrence and that she was deposing before the Court for the first time. P.W. 5 is the owner of the grocery shop, who in his evidence, made it clear that on 19.5.2004, he was present in his shop. At about 10.00 A.M. the deceased came to his shop and told that he had come to take rice sample pursuant to his telephone to his residence. But he denied to have made such a telephone call. The deceased telephoned to his mother and intimated the said fact and then he handed over the telephone to P.W. 5 P.W. 4 told P.W.5 to direct his son to return to home. But he denied to have made such a telephone call. The deceased telephoned to his mother and intimated the said fact and then he handed over the telephone to P.W. 5 P.W. 4 told P.W.5 to direct his son to return to home. Accordingly, P.W. 5 asked the deceased to return back home. On the next day, he came to know that the appellant committed the murder of the deceased after demanding a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- as ransom from P.W.6. In his cross-examination, P.W. 5 stated that the O.I.C. has examined him in connection with the case and that P.W. 6 happens to be a permanent customer of his shop. He denied a suggestion that he is deposing false because of his good relationship with P.W.6. P.W. 6 is the informant and father of the deceased. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that the deceased was his only son and on 19.5.2004 at 12.00 Noon after returning from duty, his wife P.W. 4 informed him that in the morning at about 9.00 A.M. after getting a call from Kumuti shop, she sent the deceased to bring rice sample but when his son reached there, Kumuti-P.W.5 denied making telephone call to their house. Accordingly, P.W. 4 asked the deceased to return back home, but he has not returned yet. At about 12.00 Noon, P.W.6 received a phone call from one Mishra of Pottangi demanding ransom of Rs. 5,00,000/- for releasing his son otherwise he would face dire consequence. The person telephoning him (P.W.6) further instructed him to pay the aforesaid money to him in Semiliguda Engineering College premises and threatened him not to inform the matter either to the police or anybody else. However, P.W. 6 expressed his inability to pay Rs. 5,00,000/- and asked to have grace on him. Being extremely alarmed, he disclosed the fact to his friends and neighbours and went to the telephone exchange to ascertain the telephone number from which the telephone had come to his residence. P.W. 1 was there with him. He ascertained that the call was booked from Lucky Pay Phone Booth of Russian Market of Sunabeda to his residence. Accordingly, he went to the said telephone booth and there one Prasanta Maharana (not examined) the owner of the telephone booth, told him that the appellant had booked a telephone call therefrom to his residence in the morning regarding rice sample. Accordingly, he went to the said telephone booth and there one Prasanta Maharana (not examined) the owner of the telephone booth, told him that the appellant had booked a telephone call therefrom to his residence in the morning regarding rice sample. Further, P.W. 6 in his examination-in-chief stated about lodging of F.I.R. under Ext. 8, confession made by the appellant in the Police Station, the appellant leading to the spot of occurrence and showing them the dead body and giving recovery of wearing apparels of the deceased and seizure of wearing apparels along with blood stained earth and stone. He also stated that M.Os. II, III & IV are the wearing apparels of his deceased son. In his cross-examination, P.W. 6 stated that the appellant had good acquaintance with him as a neighbor and he had never misbehaved with him previously. From the telephone call received at 12.05 P.M., he guessed that it was by the appellant. However, he admitted that on 19.5.2004, he had not intimated this fact to the Police Station. He further has not stated that the police examined him in connection the case after recovery of the articles. In his cross-examination, P.W. 6 also stated that the dead body was visible to outside and hill top but not from the foot of the hill. P.W.7 is the owner of the telephone booth, i.e., “OMM SANTI”. In his examination-in –chief, he stated that the appellant had booked a telephone call from his shop on 19.5.2004 morning and he also identified the appellant. He also stated that the appellant had asked for a rope for binding bag of rice and on his request, he had given the rope by cutting a portion. The balance portion of the rope has been seized by the police from the secret telephone booth. In his cross-examination, P.W. 7 stated that he had no earlier acquaintance with the appellant as he did not have any business dealing with him. On 19.5.2004, the appellant came to his telephone booth for the first time and for the second time, he saw him when police brought him to his shop. He further deposed that the police had not asked him to produce computerized bill nor also the police enquired from him as to the telephone number to which the appellant booked a call from his booth. He further deposed that the police had not asked him to produce computerized bill nor also the police enquired from him as to the telephone number to which the appellant booked a call from his booth. However, he also stated that it is a fact that the cut portion of the rope seized by the police (M.O. VII) is the same rope which he used to sell in his grocery shop. He further stated that the two pieces of rope identified by him had no special identification mark on them to know that these were the same rope which he had given to the appellant and which the police seized from his shop (M.O.XI). P.W. 9, who is the J.T.O. Sunabeda, in his examination in chief, stated that on 19.5.2004, on the request made by one of his subordinate Prasant Nayak, a related brother of P.W.6, he had supplied the relevant numbers from where the phone calls were coming to the residence of P.W.6. Further in his cross-examination, he stated that the above noted things were not supplied in a properly certified manner and the police has not examined him in connection with this matter. P.W. 10, who was managing the shop and selling Cigarettes, sachets of Khaini, Chocolates, Cold Drinks, etc., in her examination- in-chief, stated that on 19.5.2004 at about 11.30 A.M., a boy of about 14 years along with another young man of 21 years came to her shop and purchased a bottle of cold drink, four sachets of Gutka and four chocolates and both of them shared the bottle of cold drink in front of her shop. The elder one amongst them paid the money and she identified the elder one. She identified the present appellant as the elder on. Two days thereafter, she came to know that the appellant has killed the young boy, who had been to the shop with him. In her cross-examination, P.W. 10 admitted that she saw the appellant to whom she identified in the Court on 24.11.2006 for the first time in her shop on 19.5.2004. She did not remember the exact colour of their wearing apparels. She also admitted that she had never seen both of them which include the appellant thereafter till 24. 11. 2006, i.e, the date on which she was deposing as a witness. She did not remember the exact colour of their wearing apparels. She also admitted that she had never seen both of them which include the appellant thereafter till 24. 11. 2006, i.e, the date on which she was deposing as a witness. She could not say definitely as to whether the appellant had killed the deceased. Two days after 19.5.2004, the police examined her and she never stated before the police during such examination that she could identify those persons if they were shown to her. P.W.11 is the I.O. In his examination-in-chief he mainly stated about the course of investigation and also proved the F.I.R. vide Ext. 8 and confessional statement under Ext. 1. In his examination-in-chief, he stated how the appellant led him and other witnesses to the top of Landa Pahad, showed dead body and gave recovery of concealed wearing apparels of the deceased. He further stated that during course of investigation, he found ligature mark on the neck of the deceased and blood to have been oozed out from the nostril, eyes and mouth. Thereafter, he prepared dead body challan and dispatched the dead body to the District Headquarters Hospital, Koraput for Post mortem examination. He also stated about the seizure of stone, which was put on the neck of the deceased, some sample earth, some blood stained earth from near the spot. He also proved the seizure list like Exts. 2 to 5. He also seized plastic rope from the shop of P.W. 7 as the same was said to be a part of the rope seized from the ground of Board High School and prepared seizure list vide Ext. 10. He also spoke regarding arrest of the appellant along with other accused persons. He also sought opinion of the Doctor as to whether ligature mark found on the neck of the deceased was possible by a rope and whether such ligature injury contributed to the death of the deceased. He also proved materials objects. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he did not visit the spot wherefrom the deceased was said to have been kidnapped. He apprehended the appellant from the Timber depot of OSIC, Sunabeda. He further stated that in the Case Diary, he mentioned about recording of disclosure statement of the appellant after his apprehension. But he had not mentioned time of recording of such statement. He apprehended the appellant from the Timber depot of OSIC, Sunabeda. He further stated that in the Case Diary, he mentioned about recording of disclosure statement of the appellant after his apprehension. But he had not mentioned time of recording of such statement. With regard to recovery of the dead body, he stated that the dead body was visible to the naked eye and it was not kept concealed. He also admitted that he had not tried to ascertain the telephone from which the incoming calls were given to the telephone of the deceased immediately past to the date of kidnapping of the deceased. He also stated that it is a fact that while making the enquiry, he has not mentioned the thickness of the rope seized in his query to the Doctor seeking his opinion with regard to the ligature injury found on the neck of the deceased. He also admitted that the seized bicycle was lying in an open place, which was accessible and visible to all and that long rope, which was seized from the ground was also lying in an open and accessible place. In his cross-examination, he further stated that his investigation revealed that the appellant had made telephone call to the house of the deceased but he had not collected any computerized bill from the STD both from where the telephone call was made evidencing the same. He also admitted that he had not collected details with regard to telephone calls made to the house of the deceased on the date of kidnapping from the telephone exchange during investigation of the case. P.W.12, who is the other I.O., in his examination-in-chief, has stated that after taking charge of investigation, he tested all the witnesses examined by P.W. 11 and also examined P.W.10. He received Post mortem examination report and then made a prayer to the learned S.D.J.M, Koraput to send the seized exhibits to R.F.S.L., Berhampur for chemical examination. Ext. 19 in three sheets contains the Chemical Examination Report. During course of investigation, he gave requisition to the J.T.O., Sunabeda on 4.9.2004 to give call details of telephone No. 222828 of P.W. 6 for the date 19.5.2004. Ext. 20 is the carbon copy of the requisition. Ext. 21 is the report of the J.T.O. received on the said requisition. A perusal of Ext. During course of investigation, he gave requisition to the J.T.O., Sunabeda on 4.9.2004 to give call details of telephone No. 222828 of P.W. 6 for the date 19.5.2004. Ext. 20 is the carbon copy of the requisition. Ext. 21 is the report of the J.T.O. received on the said requisition. A perusal of Ext. 21 dated 11.9.2004 shows that the J.T.O. intimated that there existed no provision of automatic recording of incoming calls of a particular telephone number. Moreover, the details of calls of telephones are available only for two months. So the details of the telephone no. 222828 for the date mentioned were no more available in the exchange. In his cross-examination, P.W. 12 stated that P.W. 10 was not examined by P.W.11. The house of P.W. 10 is nearer to the spot and by the time he examined P.W. 10, the appellant was in custody. It is a fact that P.W.10 had not named the appellant in her statement. He denied the suggestion that in order to implicate the appellant, P.W. 10 set her as a witness of circumstances against the appellant. 11. In such background, we have to see whether the appellant was the author of crime as has been held by the learned trial Court. before beginning out analysis, we think it proper to refer to the principles relating to appreciation of circumstantial evidence as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra as reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 in the following manner: It has been made clear by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established on circumstantial evidence; “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047]” “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused in guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 12. From a scanning of evidence, it is clear that most of the links are missing here to complete the chain of circumstantial evidence. This would be clear from the following analysis of evidence. 13. Here P.W. 4 speaks about four telephone calls on 19.5.2004. The last telephone call which came around 12.00 Noon, which was attended by her husband P.W. 6, indicated that the caller was one Mishra from Pottangi, who demanded Rs. 5,00,000/- ransom to hand over the deceased son. Though P.W. 6 in his cross-examination stated that from the tone of the person, he could guess that it was the appellant’s call, however, there remains no legal evidence to connect the appellant with the said call. It is well settled that suspicion however strong cannot take the place of evidence. Rather P.W. 6 in his cross-examination has stated that appellant had good acquitance with him as neighbor and has never misbehaved with him previously. Further, the evidence of P.Ws. It is well settled that suspicion however strong cannot take the place of evidence. Rather P.W. 6 in his cross-examination has stated that appellant had good acquitance with him as neighbor and has never misbehaved with him previously. Further, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 & 6 show that after the said call, on enquiry, they ascertained that it came from Laxmi Pay Phone Booth (according to P.W.1) and Lucky Pay Phone Booth (according to P.W.6). However, not a single person-neither the owner nor attendant of the owner nor anybody else who has heard the conversation while such a call was made to the house of P.W. 6 has been examined to prove that it was the appellant and the appellant alone, who made the call demanding ransom giving out a threat that in case of non-payment, the consequence would be dire. Though P.W.6 spoke about meeting the owner of the said pay phone booth, namely, Prasanta Maharana, however, said Prasanta Maharana has not been examined by the prosecution. Even otherwise, as per the evidence of P.W.6, said prasanta Maharana only told to P.W6 that the appellant had booked a telephone call therefrom to his residence in the morning regarding rice sample. A perusal of evidence of P.W 4 would show that such call relating to rice sample came at around 9.30 A.M. in the morning. No doubt, that may be a false call, but with regard to the relevant call, which came at 12.00 Noon, the details of the same have not been proved so as to connect the appellant with that call. As indicated earlier, P.W11 has also admitted in his cross-examination that he had not collected any computerized bill from the STD booth from where the telephone call was made evidencing the same and that he has also not collected the details with regard to telephone calls made to the house of P.W6 on the date of kidnapping of his son from telephone exchange during investigation of this case. Only an attempt was made by P.W.12 for getting the details but vide Ext. 21, it was made clear to the investigating authority that such details are no more available in the exchange as in the meantime, more than two months have elapsed. Only an attempt was made by P.W.12 for getting the details but vide Ext. 21, it was made clear to the investigating authority that such details are no more available in the exchange as in the meantime, more than two months have elapsed. In any case as indicated earlier none has been examined to prove about involvement of the appellant in making a call at 12.00 Noon demanding ransom for releasing of son of P.W.6 from the Laxmi Pay Phone Booth/Lucky Pay Phone Booth. Once the involvement of appellant is not proved in making this call at 12.00 Noon demanding ransom, consequently there remains no evidence worth the name with regard to motive of the appellant in committing the crime. The evidence of P.W.7 with regard to telephone call also nowhere helps the prosecution as he spoke about a telephone call being made by the appellant in the morning of 19.5.2004. Here, we are mainly concerned with the telephone call made at 12.00 Noon. P.W.7 is also silent on the subject matter of such telephone call. Even with regard to morning phone call, P.W.7 has not given any details of the conversation made by the appellant. he also does not prove that such phone call was made by appellant to the residence of P.W.6 with the help of computer machine paper roll. So far as leading to discovery is concerned let us first refer to the leading decision on the subject i.e. Pulukuri Kottaya and others V Emperor (AIR 1947 P.C.67). After quoting Section-27 of the Evidence Act, it lays down as follows:- “X X X X Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed by the preceding Section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition necessary to bring the Section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The condition necessary to bring the Section into operation is that discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of a Police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The Section seems to be based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence but clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally the Section is brought into operation when a person in police custody produces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a weapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown, has argued that in such a case the “fact discovered” is the physical object produced, and that any information which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon this view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a person murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in the commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a dacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of Section 27, little substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding Sections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police custody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But is all that is required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object subsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive powers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that is practice the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their Lordships’ think that the proviso to S. 26, added by S. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the Section. On normal principles of construction their Lordships’ think that the proviso to S. 26, added by S. 27, should not be held to nullify the substance of the Section. In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the Section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife, knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed I the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered in very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed A” these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant. (emphasis supplied) X X X X “ 14. In the present case with regard to dead body, P.Ws. 2 and 3 have stated that they found the dead body to be visible from outside. P.W.3 in his cross-examination specifically admitted that the dead body was found in an open condition. P.W.11 in his cross-examination has admitted that the dead body was not concealed but was visible to naked eye. With regard to the rope (M.O.VIII) seized from the ground of Board High School, he stated that the same was also lying in an open and accessible place. With regard to seizure of bicycle, he stated that it was also lying in an open space, which was visible and accessible to all. P.W.2 in his cross-examination admitted that such type of cycle and rope are commonly available in the market. Since the above noted recoveries are not from some place of concealment, such recoveries are of little use and cannot be utilized against the appellant except the recoveries relating to wearing apparels of deceased discovered from a concealed place. P.W.2 in his cross-examination admitted that such type of cycle and rope are commonly available in the market. Since the above noted recoveries are not from some place of concealment, such recoveries are of little use and cannot be utilized against the appellant except the recoveries relating to wearing apparels of deceased discovered from a concealed place. It may be noted that recovery of any article cannot be described as discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, where it is not recovered from a hidden/concealed place and which could have been found out in normal course of investigation. It settled that if the place of recovery is easily accessible to all and sundry then no reliance should be placed on such recovery. In such background, all the above noted recoveries except wearing apparels of deceased cannot be utilized against the appellant. Secondly, besides the above there also exists serious contradiction relating to time/stage of recording of disclosure statement of the appellant under Ext. 1 leading to discovery. P.W.1 says that after lodging of F.I.R., police called the appellant and on their interrogation, the appellant confessed and led to recovery. However, in cross-examination he says that confessional statement of the appellant was recorded at about 9 A.M. to 10 A.M. Here it is important to note that the F.I.R. was registered at 11.15 A.M. under Ext. 8. P.W. 3 in his cross-examination states that after their arrival the appellant was interrogated. On his reply to the interrogation, he was taken to show the occurrence spot soon after without recording his confessional statement. It is only after return from the place of occurrence shown by the appellant, the confessional statement was recorded. Similarly, P.W.6 in his cross-examination states that he does not remember perfectly where the police scribed the confessional statement of the appellant-in the police station or in the hill top. He has also stated that he was examined by the police after recovery of the articles. P.W.11 in his examination-in-chief says he apprehended the appellant at 11.30 and during course of investigation he gave the information relating to dead body, rope, bi-cycle and concealed wearing apparels of deceased. Accordingly, he recorded the statement under Ext. 1 and thereafter the appellant led to recovery. In his cross-examination he has admitted that he has not mentioned about the time of recording of disclosure statement. Accordingly, he recorded the statement under Ext. 1 and thereafter the appellant led to recovery. In his cross-examination he has admitted that he has not mentioned about the time of recording of disclosure statement. All these thrown a doubt about the timing of information received from the appellant and as to whether such information preceded the discovery. 15. Further, with regard to the rope, i.e., M.O. VII, which was seized from an open and accessible place of Board High School ground, though the said rope was confronted to P.W. 8, however, the said rope was not sent to P.W 8 while sending query for its examination. As admitted by P.W.11 in his cross-examination, while sending query, he has also not mentioned about the thickness of rope for seeking opinion of the doctor with regard to injury on the neck. P.W. 8 in his cross examination, admitted that he could not determine the size of the rope applied to the injury in the present case. The dimension of the ligature mark is dependant upon the size of the rope applied for causing that ligature mark. In other words, since the said rope was not supplied to him, though he stated while being confronted that strangulation can be caused by this rope, however, there is no evidence to show that it is the said rope under M.O. VII, which was used to cause the ligature mark on the body of the deceased. In such background, the deposition of P.W. 7 connecting the rope seized under M.O. VII with the rope seized under M.O. XI and so also the S.F.S.L. report dated 21.8.2004 under Ext. 19 connecting both the seized ropes are of little value. 16. Now coming to the last seen theory, it is the evidence of P.W.10 that she saw the appellant along with a young boy of 14 years of age on 19.5.2004 at 11.30 A.M. in her shop for the first time. In the present case, the dead body of the deceased was located around 12.00 Noon of 20.5.2004. This would be clear from the evidence of P.W. 2 and the inquest report under Ext. 6. It may further be noted in the present case that F.I.R. was lodged at 11.1 A.M. of 20.5.2004. Thus, there exists a long gap between the time, the appellant was last seen with the deceased and the recovery of dead body. This would be clear from the evidence of P.W. 2 and the inquest report under Ext. 6. It may further be noted in the present case that F.I.R. was lodged at 11.1 A.M. of 20.5.2004. Thus, there exists a long gap between the time, the appellant was last seen with the deceased and the recovery of dead body. It is well settled that when the time gap is long, it would be dangerous to come to a conclusion about the culpability of the accused as the possibility of others intervening cannot be ruled out. Here as indicated earlier, other necessary corroborative pieces of evidence are also absent. Even otherwise, the evidence of P.W. 10 is not free from doubt. She had identified the appellant for the first time in the Court on 24.11.2006 after a gap of 2 ½ years, it may be noted here that as per her evidence, she saw the appellant for the first time on 19.5.2004 in her shop. In her cross-examination she admitted that she has never seen appellant after 19.5.2004 till 24.11.2006. There is nothing to show that she had previous acquaintance with the appellant or knew him otherwise. Rather in her cross-examination she has stated that she never told the police during investigation that she could identify the appellant. Probably for this reason T.I. parade has not been conducted in the present case. In such background, keeping in mind limitation of human memory and the fact that on a particular day a shop is visited by so many customers, the identification of appellant by P.W. 10 in the Court for the first time after a gap of 2 ½ years creates a doubt about such identification. 17. In such background, we have no hesitation in accepting the contention of Mr. G.D. Tripathy, learned Senior Advocate for the appellant that chain of circumstance in the present case is incomplete and thus, the case against the appellant has not been proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court has given unnecessary emphasis on the morning call ignoring that there exists no evidence worth the name for proving the conversation made during the said call. He has also missed the fact that there exists no evidence to prove the call detail made at around 12 Noon demanding money and holding out threat. The learned trial Court has given unnecessary emphasis on the morning call ignoring that there exists no evidence worth the name for proving the conversation made during the said call. He has also missed the fact that there exists no evidence to prove the call detail made at around 12 Noon demanding money and holding out threat. With regard to seizure of plastic rope, i.e., M.O. VII, the learned trial Court has glossed over the fact that the said rope was recovered from an open place which was accessible to all and there exists no evidence as discussed earlier connecting the said rope with the strangulation/ligature mark. With regard to last seen theory relied upon by the learned trial Court, we have already indicated on account of large time gap, I the present case, the said theory cannot be relied upon. 18. Submissions of Ms. Pattnaik, learned Additional Government Advocate on last seen theory, leading to discovery of various thinks have already been taken care above and the same requires no repetition. Only on the basis discovery of blood stained apparels of deceased at the behest of appellant and some incorrect answers to questions under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in absence of any other circumstantial evidence against the appellant, we do not think it would be proper to uphold the conviction of the appellant keeping in mind the ratio of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). In any case falsity of answers under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot take place of the proof of facts, which the prosecution is bound to establish in order to succeed. 19. For all these reasons, we grant the benefit of doubt to the appellant and acquit him of the charge under Sections -364A/302/201, I.P.C. Accordingly, the order of conviction and sentence dated 1.10.2007 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Koraput at Jeypore in Criminal Trial no. 416 of 2004 is set aside. The appellant-Swadesh Ranjan Swain be set at liberty forthwith, if his detention in jail custody is not required in connection with any other criminal case. The Criminal Appeal is allowed. I. MAHANTY, J. I agree. Appeal allowed.