JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners seek quashment of order dated 17th April 2017 passed by Principal Sessions Judge, Srinagar, (for brevity “Revisional Court”) and order of cognisance dated 29th June 2016, passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (2nd Additional Munsiff) Srinagar, (for short “Trial Magistrate”) on grounds set out therein. 2. Heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 3. Learned counsel for petitioners states that no specific allegation is vituperated against petitioners for commission of offence punishable under Section 406 RPC, nor police report specifically reflects petitioners committed any offence and entire material before learned Trial Magistrate is bereft of any such allegation that constitute an offence punishable under Section 406 RPC. Despite the same, learned Trial Magistrate is said to have issued summons to petitioners, which, according to counsel, is an attack to their right to liberty and that order has been passed in casual and mechanical manner and cannot sustain in eyes of law. Learned counsel contends that provisions of Section 177 Cr.P.C. provide that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried by a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed, which makes no option for the court but to deal with only those matters, which have been committed or taken place within territorial jurisdiction of the court and therefore, order dated 13th December 2016 is in tune with procedural law and order of Revisional Court dated 17th April 2017 is bad in law, especially when Trial Magistrate has made it clear that the offence alleged had been committed in a different district and not at District Srinagar. 4. Learned counsel for petitioners also argues that the issue of territorial jurisdiction in the complaint-matters can be taken even after cognisance by Magistrate for the reason that it is only the prima facie existence of commission of offence, which forms opinion for Trial Magistrate to take cognisance but as far as territorial jurisdiction to try offences are concerned, that goes to the root of the matter and trying an offence without jurisdiction, is nothing but abuse of process of law, which seems to have been done by Revisional Court while passing order impugned dated 17.04.2017. His further contention is that mandate of judgment passed by Apex Court in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal (2004) 7 SCC 338 , has been wrongly applied to the instant matter by Revisional Court, which deals with power to recall the order by learned Judicial Magistrate, once cognisance is taken, but instant case is all about territorial jurisdiction, which is otherwise statutory bar under the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure to enquire or try the matters when the finding of Magistrate over territorial jurisdiction has already been announced vide order dated 13th December 2016. Learned Revisional Court, according to counsel, is not empowered to confer jurisdiction over learned Judicial Magistrate, who has already decided the issue of territorial jurisdiction in negative. To cement his arguments, learned counsel for petitioners refers to Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. 2004 (8) SCC 100 ; Neelu Chopra & Anr. v. Bharti 2009 (10) SCC 184 ; 2009 (11) SCC 286 ; Chandralekha & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2013 Cr.LJ (SC) 3644; Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee & Anr. 2014 (10) SCC 708 ; judgement dated 23rd August 2016 passed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal no.775 of 2013 titled Manoj Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr.; Feroz Hassan Khan & Ors. v. Ather Shaheen 2010 (2) JKJ 584 ; and Kirandeep Electronics & Anr. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. 2010 (2) JKJ 241 ; 5. Countering learned counsel for petitioners’ submission, learned counsel for respondent avers that learned Trial Magistrate vide order dated 17.12.2016 returned the complaint to respondent to be presented before court of competent jurisdiction. Thereagainst respondent filed revision petition and learned Revisional Court passed a detailed and well-reasoned order, which, according to learned counsel for respondent, deals with all facets of the matter raised by petitioners. He argues that learned Trial Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the complaint as the offence was continuing one as one part of offence had been committed at Srinagar and another at Pampore and cause of action for filing complaint arose at Srinagar. He argues that learned Trial Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the complaint as the offence was continuing one as one part of offence had been committed at Srinagar and another at Pampore and cause of action for filing complaint arose at Srinagar. Learned counsel avers that if complaint does not disclose jurisdiction or from the content of complaint, jurisdiction is uncertain, still Trial Magistrate has jurisdiction to try the complaint and in this regard he refers to Chapter XV of Code of Criminal procedure that deals with jurisdiction of criminal courts in inquiries and trials. Learned counsel further states that it is not permissible for the Magistrate to review his decision of issuing process as there is no such specific provision available to recall such order. To strengthen his argument, learned counsel has placed reliance to S.S. Khanna v. Chief Secretary, Patna AIR 1983 SC 595 ; Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar & Anr. (1985) 2 SCC 370 ; Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1216 ; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru (2004) 13 SCC 269 ; and Bhaskar Lal Sharma & Anr. v. Monica & Ors. (2014) 3 SCC 383 . 6. In the present case, a complaint respondent lodged before learned Trial Magistrate on 3rd February 2016. Investigating the matter by SHO concerned under Section 202 Cr.P.C., instead of issuing process, was directed. Report was received. Cognisance was taken. Process under Section 406 RPC, accordingly, issued on 29th June 2016. Summons served upon accused/petitioners. Learned Trial Magistrate, however, vide order dated 13th December 2016, returned complaint to respondent to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction. 7. Respondent here preferred a Criminal Revision against order dated 13th December 2016 before learned Principal Sessions Judge, Srinagar. Revision has been allowed and Trial Magistrate order set-aside. 8. The onset argument learned counsel for parties have taken, is that already a petition under Section 561-A no.43/2017 had been filed by present petitioners, which had been, vide order dated 26th April 2017, allowed and complaint pending before court of 3rd Additional Munsiff (Judicial Magistrate), Srinagar, quashed and order dated 10th December 2013 passed thereon by said Judicial Magistrate, set-aside. The onset argument learned counsel for parties have taken, is that already a petition under Section 561-A no.43/2017 had been filed by present petitioners, which had been, vide order dated 26th April 2017, allowed and complaint pending before court of 3rd Additional Munsiff (Judicial Magistrate), Srinagar, quashed and order dated 10th December 2013 passed thereon by said Judicial Magistrate, set-aside. However, learned counsel for respondent vehemently and painstakingly has invited attention of this Court to the observation in order dated 26th April 2017 in 561-A no.43/2017, by which this Court has made it clear upon Trial Court that whatever mentioned in the said order, will not come in the way of Trial Court in deciding the pending complaint, after the same has been restored by Principal Sessions Judge vide order dated 17th April 2017 (impugned in this petition). Learned counsel for respondent, and rightly so, has strenuously averred that an order of dismissal of complaint is no bar to entertainment of second complaint on the same facts. 9. It is well settled that a second complaint can lie on fresh facts or even on the previous facts if a special case is made out inasmuch as there is no statutory bar in filing a second complaint on the same facts, as observed by the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. Kali Singh (1977) 1 SCC 57 and Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy (2003) 1 SCC 734 . 10. A Full Bench in Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab Banerjee ILR (1901) 28 Cal 652, adopting and affirming the opinion of Macleam, C.J. in Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass ILR (1901) 28 Cal 211, has held that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or when fresh evidence is forthcoming. Thus, there is no bar to further proceedings under the law, and a Magistrate, to whom a complaint has been made under such circumstances, is bound to proceed in the manner set out in Section 200, that is, to examine the complaint and, unless he has reason to distrust the truth of complaint, or for some other reason expressly recognised by law, such as, if he finds that no offence had been committed, he is bound to take cognizance of the offence on a complaint and unless he has good reason to doubt the truth of complaint he is bound to do justice to the complainant, to summon his witnesses and to hear them in presence of accused. The same view was expressed by the Madras High Court in Malayil Kottayil Koyassan Kutty, In re AIR 1918 Mad 494, and it was observed that there was nothing in law against entertainment of a second complaint on same facts, on which a person had already been discharged. This view was reiterated in Kumariah Naicker v. Chinna Naicker AIR 1946 Mad 167 , where it was held that the fact that a previous complaint had been dismissed, there was no bar to entertainment of second complaint. The question was examined with reference to a large number of earlier decisions on the subject and it was held by the Supreme court in Poonam Chand Jain’s case (supra) that in a case where a previous complaint is dismissed, the Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence and issue process if there is sufficient ground for proceeding, but the second complaint on the same facts could be entertained only in exceptional circumstances where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous proceedings have been adduced and even the second complaint could be dismissed after a decision has been given against the complainant in previous matter upon a full consideration of his case. In that view of matter there is no bar in entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts in exceptional cases. 11. As regards jurisdictional point raised by learned counsel for petitioners, it would be apropos to see what Chapter XV of Code of Criminal Procedure envisages. Chapter XV relates to jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials. In Chapter XV, Section 177 is its first Section and it provides : “177. 11. As regards jurisdictional point raised by learned counsel for petitioners, it would be apropos to see what Chapter XV of Code of Criminal Procedure envisages. Chapter XV relates to jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials. In Chapter XV, Section 177 is its first Section and it provides : “177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.” 12. Section 177 ingeminates well established common law rule alluded to in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Vol. IX para 83) that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. “All crime is local, the jurisdiction over the crime belongs to the country where the crime is committed”, as observed by Blackstone. A significant word used in Section 177 of the Code is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. Exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offence by the same Court, as observed by the Supreme Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 ; L.N. Mukherjee v. State of Madras, AIR 1961 SC 1601 ; Banwarilal Jhunjhunwalla & Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 1620 ; and Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. 2001 (4) SCC 350 . 13. The above general rule has several exceptions and some of them are, qua present case, specified in Sections 179, 180, and 182 of the Code, which provide : “179. v. Union of India and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 1620 ; and Mohan Baitha & Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr. 2001 (4) SCC 350 . 13. The above general rule has several exceptions and some of them are, qua present case, specified in Sections 179, 180, and 182 of the Code, which provide : “179. Accused triable in district where act is done or where consequence ensues When a person is accused of the commission of any offence by reason of anything which has been done, and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any such thing has been done, or any such consequence has ensued Illustrations (a) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and dies within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court. The offence of the culpable homicide of A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Z. (b) A is wounded within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X and is, during ten days within the local limits of jurisdiction of Court Y, and during ten days more than within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Z, unable tin the local limits of the jurisdiction of either Court Y or Court Z, to follow his ordinary pursuits. The offence of causing grievous hurt to A may be inquired into or tried by X, Y or Z. (c) A is put in fear of injury within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court X, and is thereby induced, within the local limits of the jurisdiction of Court Y, to deliver property to the person who put him in fear. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y. (d) A is wounded in the State of Surashtra and dies of his wounds in Srinagar. The offence of causing A’s death may be inquired and tried in Srinagar. 180. The offence of extortion committed on A may be inquired into or tried either by X or Y. (d) A is wounded in the State of Surashtra and dies of his wounds in Srinagar. The offence of causing A’s death may be inquired and tried in Srinagar. 180. Place of trial where act is offence by reason of relation to other offence When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, a charge of the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction either act was done. Illustrations (a) A charge of a abetment may be inquired into or tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the abetment was committed, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the offence abetted was committed. (b) A charge of receiving or retaining stolen goods may be inquired into or tried either by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the goods were stolen, or by any Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any of them were at any time dishonestly received or retained. (c) A charge of wrongfully concealing a person known to have been kidnaped may be inquired into or tried by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the wrongful concealing, or by the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the kidnapping, took place. 182. Place of inquiry or trial where scene of offence is uncertain or not in one district only; or where offence is continuing, or consists of several acts When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another; or where an offence is continuing one; and continues to be committed in more local areas than one; or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas; it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 14. Section 179 of the Code envisages that when a person is accused of commission of offence by reason of anything, which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued, such offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such act has been done or any such consequence has ensued. Its Illustration as well envisions that if a person, injured in a particular area, dies in other area, either of the courts, where the person got injured or died, may try such case. Subsequent illustration also makes make more room. It envisages that if a person is wounded in a particular area say X, and during first ten days he remained in the area of Y and thereafter for further ten days he remained in the area of Z, but unable in both the areas of Y or Z, to follow his ordinary pursuits, the offence causing grievous hurt to A may be inquired into or tried by X, Y or Z. 15. Again Section 182 envisages that when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Thus it can be very well said that provisions of Sections 179, 180 and 182 are exceptions to the general rule laid down by Section 177 of the Code. 16. Continuing offence, as observed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi and Anr., AIR 1973 SC 908 , is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one, which is committed once and for all, that it is one of those offences which arises out of failure to obey or comply with the rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. A similar plea relating to continuance of offence was examined by the Supreme Court in Sujata Mukherjeet (Smt.) v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee 1997 (5) SCC 30 . The said case related to demand of dowry. It was noted therein that though dowry was demanded earlier, husband of complainant went to the place where complainant was residing and had assaulted her. The Supreme Court held Section 178 was attracted. Same is true about present case. 17. The essential question that arises is whether any part of cause of action arose within jurisdiction of concerned Court. In terms of Section 177 of the Code it is the place where offence was committed. In essence it is the cause of action for initiation of proceedings against accused. While in civil cases, normally expression “cause of action” is used, in criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction where offence is committed. These variations in etymological expression do not really make position different. The expression “cause of action” is therefore, not a stranger to criminal cases. It is well settled that cause of action consists of bundle of facts, giving rise to cause to enforce legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. in other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the allegedly affected party a right to claim relief against opponent. It must include some act done by the latter since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possible accrue or would arise. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of action means circumstances forming infraction of right or immediate occasion for the action. In wider sense, it means necessary conditions for maintenance of proceeding including not only alleged infraction, but also infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgement of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”. Compendiously, expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for complainant to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right or grievance to the judgement of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove such fact, comprises in “cause of action”. The expression cause of action has sometimes been employed to convey restricted idea of facts or circumstances, which constitute either infringement or the basis of right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts. Cause of action is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. “Cause of action”, according to Black’s Law Dictionary is entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. 18. In the present case only question that require to be decided is whether on the allegations made in the complaint filed by respondent, a prima facie case of commission of offences alleged in the complaint, is made out against petitioners. The accused no.1 in the complaint, namely, Imtiyaz Ahmad Bhat, has not come before this Court, who is said to have gone to Dubai. Having given my anxious consideration to the averments made in the complaint, I am of the view that the facts, as alleged in the complaint, will have to be proved, which can only be done in the course of a regular trial. It is wholly unnecessary to embark upon a discourse as regards the scope and ambit of the Court’s power to quash the impugned orders. The appreciation, even in summary manner, of the averments made in a complaint or FIR would not be permissible at the stage of quashing and the facts stated will have to be accepted as they appear on the very face of it. This is the core test that has to be applied before summoning the accused. The appreciation, even in summary manner, of the averments made in a complaint or FIR would not be permissible at the stage of quashing and the facts stated will have to be accepted as they appear on the very face of it. This is the core test that has to be applied before summoning the accused. Once the said stage is over, the facts alleged have to be proved by complainant on the edifice of legal evidence in order to establish penal liability of the person charged with the offence. 19. Now there remains the question as regards passing of the order of Revisional Court. The Revisional Court, while setting aside learned Trial Magistrate order, returning complaint after having taken cognisance and issuing process for appearance of the accused, has rightly opined that action on the part of Trial Magistrate is in breach of Section 369 of the Code as also against the principles of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Adalat Prasad’s case (supra) and held that recalling an order of issuing process runs counter to the scheme of the Code, which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. 20. It is pertinent to mention here that Section 200 contemplates a Magistrate to examine the complaint and examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any. If on such examination of the complaint and the witnesses, if any, the Magistrate, if he does not want to postpone issuance of process, has to dismiss complaint under Section 203, if he comes to conclusion that the complaint, statement of complainant and witnesses, has not made out sufficient ground for proceeding. Per contra, if he is satisfied that there is no need for further inquiry and complaint, evidence adduced at that stage, has material to proceed, he can proceed to issue process under Section 204 of the Code. Section 202 of the Code contemplates postponement of issue of process and provides that if the Magistrate on receipt of a complaint thinks fit to postpone issuance of process against accused and desires further inquiry into the case, either himself or directs an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may do so. In that process, if he thinks it fit, he may even take evidence of witnesses on oath, and after he finds no sufficient ground for proceeding, he can dismiss the complaint by recording briefly the reasons for so doing, as is contemplated under Section 203 of the Code. 21. An important aspect that needs to be taken into account by the Magistrate is that once cognisance of complaint is taken and complainant and witnesses examined, and Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground to proceed with complaint, he can issue process by way of summons under Section 204 of the Code. Therefore, what is necessary or a condition precedent for issuing process under Section 204 is satisfaction of the Magistrate either by examination of complainant and witnesses or by inquiry contemplated under Section 202 that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with complaint, hence issue the process under Section 204 of the Code. In none of these stages, the Code has provided for hearing the summoned accused, for obvious reasons that this is only a preliminary stage and the stage of hearing of accused would only arise at a subsequent stage provided for in latter provision in the Code. Before issuance of summons Magistrate should be satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the complaint but that satisfaction is to be arrived at by inquiry conducted by him as contemplated under Sections 200 and 202, and the only stage of dismissal of complaint arises under Section 203 of the Code, at which stage accused has no role to play and once process is issued under Section 204 of the Code, the stage of Section 203 is already over and reconsideration of the decision to issue process is impermissible in view of bar by Section 369 of the Code. Section 369 stipulates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same. At this juncture, it will be also necessary to take note of what the Supreme Court has said in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 13 SCC 324 . It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the said case that it is impermissible for the Magistrate to reconsider his decision to issue process in the absence of any specific provision to recall such order. 22. It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the said case that it is impermissible for the Magistrate to reconsider his decision to issue process in the absence of any specific provision to recall such order. 22. In Adalat Prasad’s case (supra), the Supreme Court has considered the view it had taken in K.M. Mathew v. State of Kerala (1992) 1 SCC 217 and held that issuance of process under Section 204 is a preliminary step in the stage of trial contemplated at Chapter XX of the Code. Such an order made at a preliminary stage being an interlocutory order, same cannot be reviewed or reconsidered by the Magistrate inasmuch as there being no provision under the Code for review of an order by the same Court. Hence it is impermissible for the Magistrate to reconsider his decision to issue process in absence of any specific provision to recall such order. In such circumstances, in the present case, impugned order of Revisional Court is well-reasoned and needs no interference. As a corollary petition on hand is devoid of any merit. 23. Learned counsel for petitioners has relied upon judgement dated 23rd August 2016 passed by the Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal no.775 of 2013 titled Manoj Kumar Sharma & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. Some attention-grabbing comments and remarks have been made by the Supreme Court in the said case and pointed out that Chapter XIII of the Central Code of Criminal Procedure provides for “jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials” and under the said Chapter there are various provisions which empower the court for inquiry and trial of a criminal case and that there is no absolute prohibition that the offence committed beyond the local territorial jurisdiction cannot be investigated, inquired or tried. 24. Whether an offence has been disclosed or not, must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If on consideration of the relevant materials, the Court is satisfied that an offence is disclosed, it will normally not interfere with the investigation into the offence and will generally allow the investigation into the offence to be completed in order to collect materials for proving the offence. 25. In the above backdrop, it is also very important to discuss the scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. In the above backdrop, it is also very important to discuss the scope of inherent power of the High Court under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This point has been more clarified in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein the Supreme Court also stated that though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined, sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae or to give exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein power under Section 561-A (pari material to Section 482 of the Central Code) for quashing FIR, should be exercised, there are circumstances where the Court may be justified in exercising such jurisdiction. These are, where FIR does not prima facie constitute any offence, does not disclose a cognisable offence, justifying investigation by police; where allegations are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against accused; where there is an expressed legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code; and where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Despite mentioning these grounds, the Supreme Court unambiguously uttered a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too, in the rarest of rare case. The Supreme Court also warned that the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in FIR or complaint and that extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims and caprice. 26. The Supreme Court in Padal Venkata Rama Reddy vs Kovvuri Satyanarayana Reddy, (2011) 12 SCC 437 , while relying on Bhajan Lal’s case (supra), has held : “31. ……When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. ……When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in detail in Bhajan Lal (supra). The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 are very wide and at the same time the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.” 27. The inherent power cannot naturally be invoked in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code. It is only where the High Court is satisfied either that an order passed under the Code would be rendered ineffective or that the process of any court would be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent powers under Section 561-A of the Code. This power can be invoked only in an event when the aggrieved party is being unnecessarily harassed and has no other remedy open to it. The power under Section 561-A Cr. P.C., is not intended to scuttle justice at the threshold but to secure justice. 28. In view of the above discussion and observations, the petitions on hand fail and are hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs. Interim directions shall stand vacated.