Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 2988 (MAD)

Tamilnadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer

2017-09-01

M.SUNDAR

body2017
ORDER : M. Sundar, J. When the matter was called in the forenoon, there was no representation for the writ petitioner. The second respondent (a private respondent) has been duly served, a counsel has entered appearance on 12.04.2005 and the name of the counsel is also duly shown in the cause list today. There is no representation for the writ petitioner and the second respondent. Given the nature of the matter and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that adjourning a matter of this nature, which is more than 12 years old, merely for non-appearance of counsel, only contributes to avoidable delay in disposal of other cases, besides adding to arrears in this Court. Such addition is also avoidable. However, with the objective of giving one more opportunity to the writ petitioner, the matter was passed over and called again in the afternoon session. Afternoon session also, there was no representation for the writ petitioner and the second respondent. In other words, there was no representation for the writ petitioner and the second respondent in the second call also. Therefore, I proceed to examine the matter on the available records and I shall be disposing of this matter on merits. 2. Subject matter of the instant writ petition arises under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'I.D. Act', for the sake of brevity). 3. The writ petitioner before me, i.e. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Salem) Ltd., rep. by its Managing Director, 12, Ramakrishna Road, Salem 636 007, is hereinafter referred to as 'Management Corporation', Respondent No. 1 before me, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Salem, is referred to as 'said Labour Court' and Respondent No. 2 before me, M. Rajendran (S/o. Narayanan), is hereinafter referred to as ' said workman', all for the sake of brevity, clarity and convenience. 4. The entire matter is on the basis of an unfortunate road accident that occurred on 07.10.1995. Workman was employed as a driver with the Management Corporation. On 07.10.1995, when the workman was behind the wheel on duty driving a public transport bus bearing registration No. TN 37 M 0556 plying between Salem and Erode, a young boy was hit by the bus. Workman was employed as a driver with the Management Corporation. On 07.10.1995, when the workman was behind the wheel on duty driving a public transport bus bearing registration No. TN 37 M 0556 plying between Salem and Erode, a young boy was hit by the bus. Unfortunately, he died instantaneously, where after a criminal case was launched against the workman for rash and negligent driving inter alia under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code in the jurisdictional Court. Departmental enquiry was also initiated by the said Management Corporation against the workman. In the departmental enquiry, the charge against the workman was that he was careless and he was driving in a rash and negligent manner resulting in instantaneous death of a young boy. 5. I am not setting out the facts in great detail, as the matter turns on a very narrow compass. 6. The departmental enquiry returned a finding that the workman was negligent and on that basis, the Management Corporation dismissed the said workman from service on 22.06.1996. 7. Complaining that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with fair principles of law and that the said workman was not afforded adequate and fair opportunity, the said workman raised an Industrial Dispute under Section 2-A(2) of the I.D. Act, which culminated in I.D. No. 657 of 2001. 8. In and by a detailed award dated 10.11.2003, the said Labour Court modified the punishment of dismissal inflicted on the workman and held that the workman should be reinstated in service with continuity of service, but without back-wages and other benefits. Axiomatically, the said Labour Court held that denial of back-wages and other benefits is sufficient to meet the ends of justice. This was done by the said Labour Court in exercise of its powers inter alia under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act, wherein and whereby said Labour Court held that punishment imposed on the said workman is not justified/disproportionate. This opinion of the said Labour Court was, in turn, based on the finding it returned with regard to the charge of negligence on the part of the said workman. The said Labour Court returned a finding that the charge of negligence of the said workman has not been fully proved. 9. This opinion of the said Labour Court was, in turn, based on the finding it returned with regard to the charge of negligence on the part of the said workman. The said Labour Court returned a finding that the charge of negligence of the said workman has not been fully proved. 9. Complaining that the award has not considered the Industrial Dispute in it's proper perspective, the Management Corporation has laid the instant writ petition assailing the above said award dated 10.11.2003 made in I.D. No. 627 of 2001, which is hereinafter referred to as 'impugned award'. 10. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that though no oral evidence was let in by both sides, two documents were marked as Exs.P.1 and P.2 on the side of the workman and as many as 14 documents were marked as Exs.R.1 to R.14 on the side of the Management Corporation. 11. A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the said Labour Court has critically analysed the domestic enquiry, the evidence let in therein and the conclusions that have been arrived at. After careful and critical analysis, the said Labour Court has returned a finding that the enquiry officer, in the domestic enquiry itself, has stated that the accident happened when the boy was crossing the road from right hand side to left hand side. On this basis and on the basis of buttressing material, the said Labour Court came to the conclusion that it cannot be held that the workman was only negligent and as stated supra, applying the exercise contemplated under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act referred to supra, the said Labour Court came to the conclusion that the punishment is incommensurate or in other words, disproportionate. 12. This had impelled the Labour Court to modify the punishment. A perusal of the award also reveals that the findings returned, conclusions arrived at and the modifications are based on clear and cogent reasons, besides careful analysis of the documentary evidence placed before the said Labour Court. 13. Now, turning to the affidavit filed by the Management Corporation, to my mind, no convincing or compelling reason or ground has been set out or raised, which is so compelling that the impugned award should be interfered with. 13. Now, turning to the affidavit filed by the Management Corporation, to my mind, no convincing or compelling reason or ground has been set out or raised, which is so compelling that the impugned award should be interfered with. Besides reiterating the stand of the said Management Corporation before the domestic enquiry officer as well as before the said Labour Court that the accident was attributable solely due to the negligent of the said workman, Management Corporation has also raised two other points in the writ petition. One point is that there was a delay of about six years on the part of the said workman in raising the Industrial Dispute. The second point is that the previous conduct of the workman has not been taken into account by the said Labour Court. 14. These two points are articulated in grounds (d) and (g) of the writ affidavit, which read as follows: “d. The 1st respondent ought to have dismissed the industrial dispute on the ground of delay. .. g. The 1st respondent erred in not taking into account the past record of service of the 2nd respondent.” 15. I find from the impugned award that both these aspects have also been dealt with by the said Labour Court. With regard to the delay of six years, the said Labour Court has clearly held that there is no limitation under the I.D. Act and therefore, this cannot be put against the said workman. With regard to past service record of the said workman, no material has been placed either before the said Labour Court (or before me for that matter) by the Management Corporation. It has been merely stated before the said Labour Court that the said workman has committed several misconducts in previous occasions and was awarded minor punishments for the previous misconducts, but, no details whatsoever about what the grievous misconducts are and what are the minor punishments have been set out. Most importantly, even in the affidavit filed in support of the instant writ petition before me, no such details have been given. The only reference in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition before me is ground (g), which has been extracted supra. Ground (g) is absolutely cryptic and no details or particulars have been given therein. 16. Most importantly, even in the affidavit filed in support of the instant writ petition before me, no such details have been given. The only reference in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition before me is ground (g), which has been extracted supra. Ground (g) is absolutely cryptic and no details or particulars have been given therein. 16. Therefore, the two aspects of delay and past service record that have been canvassed, albeit faintly, by the Management Corporation in the instant writ petition also fail. 17. Owing to all that have been stated supra, I find no ground whatsoever, much less compelling ground to interfere with the impugned award. Owing to the other reasons set out supra, I am also convinced that this writ petition is bereft of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. However, I am passing a slightly different order that is set out in the paragraphs infra. 18. Before I conclude, it has to be noticed that the writ petition is of the year 2005. An interim order has also been granted by this Court on 11.03.2005. The interim order is to the effect that the last drawn wages should be continued to be paid to the said workman. At this distant point of time, it is not clear if this has been complied with. It is also not clear as to whether the writ petitioner would have crossed the age qua reinstatement. Therefore, I make it clear that reinstatement will be subject to the workman satisfying all conditions necessary for discharging duties as a driver of a public passenger vehicle. I say this keeping in mind the fact that the writ petitioner was employed as a driver of a public passenger vehicle. 19. As far as interim order of this Court is concerned, the same reads as follows: “Interim stay on the following conditions: (i) The petitioner shall pay the last drawn wages from the date of award till date directly to the second respondent within eight weeks from today; (ii) The petitioner shall continue to pay the last drawn wage on or before 5th of every month to the second respondent, provided the second respondent files an affidavit of non-employment before this Court. In default of either of above conditions, the interim stay granted shall stand vacated automatically. Notice.” 20. In default of either of above conditions, the interim stay granted shall stand vacated automatically. Notice.” 20. Though I am inclined to dismiss the writ petition, instead of ordering reinstatement, based on the interim order dated 11.03.2005, I am of the view that it will suffice if there is a direction that the Management Corporation (writ petitioner) shall pay as stated supra in (i) and (ii) of the interim order, from the date of the interim order to the date on which the writ petitioner would have attained superannuation. Though obvious, it is made clear that all retirement benefits on superannuation should also be disbursed to the said workman. 21. With the above directions, the writ petition stands disposed of. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.