ORDER : D.K. Upadhyay, J. 1. Heard Sri R.S. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2. This petition has arisen out of the proceedings drawn by the consolidation authorities in respect of dispute between the parties relating to land of khata No. 10, situate in village Pure Ram Sahai, Pargana Patti, Tehsil Raniganj, District Pratapgarh. The petitioner has challenged the validity of the orders dated 25.02.2015 and 03.07.2013 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh whereby the orders dated 12.06.2013 and 07.03.2011 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation and Consolidation Officer, respectively have been set-aside and an order has been passed to maintain the basic year entry in the revenue records. 3. The basic year entry in respect of the land in dispute was in the names of Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal, both sons of Rangayee. At the time of verification of khatauni, one Smt. Dhiraji claimed her possession over the land in dispute and accordingly she filed objection under Section 9-A (2) of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act') stating therein that the land in dispute devolved on her on the basis of sale deed and that she is bhumidhar of the land in question. It was further stated by Dhiraji in her objection that in the month of December, 1967, she was hospitalized for an eye operation in a nursing home at Allahabad wherefrom she was discharged on 09.01.1968 and during the period she was admitted in hospital at Allahabad i.e. between 26.12.1967 to 09.01.1968, Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal had obtained her thumb impression on plain paper on the pretext that certain levy has been imposed by the Tahsildar and for getting the said levy of food grains removed, she needed to give papers with her thumb impression. 4. The case put forth by Dhiraji was that Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal got a sale deed executed on 06.01.1968 on the said papers through their mother, who impersonated Dhiraji and that no sale consideration was paid to her in respect of the transaction which was the subject matter of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968. 5. 4. The case put forth by Dhiraji was that Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal got a sale deed executed on 06.01.1968 on the said papers through their mother, who impersonated Dhiraji and that no sale consideration was paid to her in respect of the transaction which was the subject matter of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968. 5. Smt. Dhiraji accordingly filed Regular Suit No. 255 of 1969 for cancellation of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968, which was abated on account of the village, in which the land in question is situated, having brought under consolidation operations on issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, which was issued on 06.12.1970. Objection under Section 9-A(2) of the Act was filed by Dhiraji before the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer allowed the objection filed by Dhiraji vide his order dated 03.10.1971 and ordered that her name be recorded. Against the order dated 03.10.1971 passed by the Consolidation Officer, an appeal was preferred by Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, which was allowed and the matter was remanded by him vide judgment and order dated 04.12.1971 to the Consolidation Officer concerned for decision of the issue afresh after providing opportunity of adducing evidence. On remand, Dhiraji moved an application before the Consolidation Officer for getting her thumb impression examined through an expert and accordingly report of the expert was filed in the court of Consolidation Officer, however the Consolidation Officer rejected the claim of Dhiraji and ordered for maintenance of basic year entry in the revenue records. Smt. Dhiraji, in the meantime, executed an adoption deed on 26.11.1978 whereby she adopted the petitioner and got the adoption deed registered on 27.01.1979. Against the order of Consolidation Officer dated 06.10.1978 whereby claim of Dhiraji was not conceded to, an appeal was filed by her before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, which too was dismissed on 09.05.1979. Thereafter challenging the said order passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, a revision petition was filed by Dhiraji before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who vide his order dated 17.05.1989 remanded the matter again to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the issues afresh. 6. Thereafter challenging the said order passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation, a revision petition was filed by Dhiraji before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, who vide his order dated 17.05.1989 remanded the matter again to the Consolidation Officer for deciding the issues afresh. 6. It may be noticed that during pendency of the revision petition before the Deputy Director of Consolidation concerned, Dhiraji died and accordingly the Deputy Director of Consolidation while remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer vide his judgment and order dated 17.05.1989 also directed to decide the substitution matter as well. On remand, the Consolidation Officer allowed the petitioner to be substituted in place of Dhiraji. Against this order whereby the substitution of the petitioner was allowed, a revision petition was preferred before the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was dismissed on 28.02.2011. The Consolidation Officer ultimately allowed the objection filed by Dhiraji vide his order dated 07.03.2011 which order was appealed against by Chhedi Lal by filing an appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Pratapgarh. The said appeal filed before the Settlement Officer Consolidation was dismissed on 12.06.2013, against which a revision petition was filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad. Against the order dated 12.06.2013, Chhedi Lal also filed revision petition before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh, in which stay order was passed on 19.06.2013. In the meantime, Chhedi Lal made an application before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad for dismissing the revision petition as not pressed preferred by him against the order dated 12.06.2013. 7. An objection was raised by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh about maintainability of the revision before him on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, which has not been sustained and the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh has ultimately allowed the revision petition filed by Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal vide judgment and order dated 25.02.2015, which is under challenge in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. The revision petition preferred by Chhedi Lal against the order dated 12.06.2013 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation was dismissed as not pressed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Allahabad vide order dated 19.07.2013. The petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition before this Court, namely, Writ Petition No. 317 of 2015 (Consolidation) which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file fresh petition. 9. The petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition before this Court, namely, Writ Petition No. 317 of 2015 (Consolidation) which was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to the petitioner to file fresh petition. 9. It is in aforesaid background facts that the instant petition has been filed challenging the orders dated 25.02.2015 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and also challenging the order dated 03.07.2013 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh whereby the revision petition preferred by Chhedi Lal was held to be maintainable. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing the impugned order has wrongly and erroneously held that the sale deed executed by impersonation and by playing fraud is a voidable document and in fact such a document is void. It has also been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation has completely erred while holding that mutation order passed under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act is binding on consolidation courts for the reason that the legal position is otherwise as the orders passed in mutation proceedings do not decide the right or title for such proceedings are summary in nature. It has also been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition against the order passed in appeal by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Allahabad and hence, the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction. 11. Opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel representing the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and that considering the fact that appeal by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Allahabad was decided which had arisen against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer, Pratapgarh, as such the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. He has further stated that it was only on account of an order passed by the Consolidation Commissioner for transferring the appeal before the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Allahabad that appeal was decided by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Allahabad on 12.06.2013 but since the subject matter of appeal i.e. land in question situates in District Pratapgarh, as such the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh has not committed any error in deciding the revision petition preferred before him against the order dated 12.06.2013 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. Sri Anurag Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 has stated that in fact, the consolidation courts lack the jurisdiction of trying an issue relating to any document said to have been obtained by impersonation and the appropriate course before the party concerned is to invoke the jurisdiction of civil court seeking cancellation of such document, which in this case is the sale deed dated 06.01.1968. He has, thus, submitted that in the instant case, the validity of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968 executed by Dhiraji in favour of Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal, sons of Rangayee could not be seen by the consolidation courts for the reason that the sale deed has yet not been cancelled by the appropriate court of competent jurisdiction i.e. civil court. 12. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has based the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 on two counts. He has stated that since on the basis of sale deed dated 06.01.1968, names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were recorded in the revenue records in mutation proceedings as such the same could not have been unsettled by the consolidation courts in the proceedings which are initiated once a notification under Section 4 of the Act is issued. He has also opined that in case there was any allegation of fraud or impersonation in execution of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968, the affected or aggrieved party ought to have challenged the same by filing a suit with the prayer of cancellation of the said sale deed in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. 13. He has also opined that in case there was any allegation of fraud or impersonation in execution of the sale deed dated 06.01.1968, the affected or aggrieved party ought to have challenged the same by filing a suit with the prayer of cancellation of the said sale deed in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. 13. So far as the reason indicated by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh in the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 that the mutation orders passed by the revenue authorities under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue Act cannot be upset in the proceedings under Section 9-A(2) of the Act is concerned, I am unable to persuade myself to be in agreement with the said reason. 14. As a matter of fact, mutation order passed under Section 34/35 of U.P. Land Revenue Act does not create any right or title. The purpose of mutation order and corresponding revenue entries are to ascertain as to from whom the land revenue is to be realized. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sawarni (Smt) vs. Inder Kaur (Smt) and others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 223 that mutation in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title; rather it only enables the person in whose favour mutation order is passed to pay the land revenue. Para 7 of the said judgment is relevant, which is quoted herein below:- "7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having scrutinised the judgment of the trial Judge as well as that of the lower appellate court, we find sufficient force in all the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. At the outset, it may be noticed that the plaintiff had filed the suit claiming half interest for herself and claiming half interest in favour of the husband and sons of Roori and, therefore, the learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error to hold that the plaintiff could not have filed the suit in question. In view of the rival stand of the parties the main question that arose for consideration was whether Roori was the daughter of Gurbax Singh or Inder Kaur, defendant 5 was the daughter of the same Gurbax Singh? In view of the rival stand of the parties the main question that arose for consideration was whether Roori was the daughter of Gurbax Singh or Inder Kaur, defendant 5 was the daughter of the same Gurbax Singh? The learned trial Judge after elaborate discussion of the evidence on record both oral and documentary came to the positive conclusion that it was Roori who was the daughter of Gurbax Singh as alleged by the plaintiff and not Inder Kaur. The lower appellate Court without focusing its attention on the weighty reasons advanced by the trial court and without examining the materials on record in that respect even did not set aside the said finding of the trial Judge and yet reversed the decree of the trial Judge. We have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the said judgment of the Additional District Judge is wholly unsustainable in law. The crucial point being as to who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh, namely Roori or Inder Kaur, and the trial Judge having come to the positive conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh, the lower appellate Court was not justified in not considering the material evidence as well as the reasons advanced by the trial Judge and merely coming to the conclusion that the evidence on the file dose not prove Roori to be the daughter of Gurbax Singh. Further, the lower appellate Court has not come to any positive finding that Inder Kaur was the daughter of Gurbax Singh. He has been swayed away by the so called mutation in the revenue record in favour of Inder Kaur. Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment. That apart, as it would be seen, the learned trial Judge had considered the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the parties to establish the respective stand as to who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh and on perusal of the same came to the conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh. The Additional District Judge has not even discussed anything about the said oral evidence and the reasonings advanced by learned trial Judge in coming to the conclusion that it was Roori who was the second daughter of Gurbax Singh. Non consideration of the oral evidence adduced by the parties, by the lower appellate Court vitiates the ultimate conclusion on the question whether Roori was the daughter of Gurbax Singh or not. It is further seen that Gurdip Kaur, widow of Gurbax Singh had executed a Will in respect of the entire estate in favour of the plaintiff and Roori and after the death of Gurdip Kaur a succession certificate had been issued by the civil court under the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in favour of the plaintiff and the said Roori. The said succession certificate and rights flowing therefrom cannot be ignored. Admittedly no attempt has been made by defendants 1 to 4 to annul the succession certificate on the grounds available under the Succession Act. The Additional District Judge committed serious error of law in not considering the said Will and the succession certificate in question which unequivocally clinches the matter and thereby the ultimate judgment of the Additional District Judge is vitiated. The High Court also was in error in not examining these questions and dismissing the Second Appeal in limine." 15. In respect of mutation entries, Hon'ble Supreme Court yet in another judgment in the case of Sankalchan Jaychandbhai Patel and others vs. Vithalbhai Jaychanbhai Patel and others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 433 has held that mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues and the right, title and interest should be established dehors the entries. In respect of mutation entries, Hon'ble Supreme Court yet in another judgment in the case of Sankalchan Jaychandbhai Patel and others vs. Vithalbhai Jaychanbhai Patel and others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 433 has held that mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues and the right, title and interest should be established dehors the entries. Para 7 of the said judgment is also relevant, which is extracted herein:- "7. It is settled law that mutation entries are only to enable the State to collect revenues from the persons in possession and enjoyment of the property and that the right, title and interest as to the property should be established dehors the entries. Entries are only one of the modes of proof of the enjoyment of the property. Mutation entries do not create any title or interest therein. Therefore, the view taken by the learned Single Judge, with due respect, is not correct in law. The civil suit is clearly maintainable. The High Court rightly granted injunction restraining the appellants from alienating the land. Even otherwise, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 lis pendens always stands in the way of the purchaser of the land subject to the result in revision." 16. Similar view has been expressed by this Court in the case of Radhey Shyam and others vs. State of U.P. through Secretary Ministry of Revenue, U.P., Lucknow and others, reported in 2013 (120) RD 423 and also in the case of Narendra Singh vs. Sardar Swarn Singh, reported in 2008 (104) RD 715. 17. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as also by this Court, it is difficult to agree with the reason given by the Deputy Director of Consolidation while passing the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 that the consolidation courts lack the jurisdiction to upset the mutation orders passed by the revenue courts. It is trite law that the mutation proceedings are summary in nature which do not decide right and title of the parties. The mutation proceedings are not regular proceedings and the orders passed therein do not have the effect of any declaratory decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. It is trite law that the mutation proceedings are summary in nature which do not decide right and title of the parties. The mutation proceedings are not regular proceedings and the orders passed therein do not have the effect of any declaratory decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. Any party even if not recorded in the revenue records on the basis of any mutation order, can always challenge such entry and put forth his/her claim once the consolidation operations start in the village by filing objections under Section 9-A(2) of the Act. 18. In the instant case, it is relevant to point out that Dhiraji had instituted Regular Suit No. 255 of 1969 seeking a prayer of cancellation of sale deed dated 06.01.1968, however the said suit was abated on account of village in which the land is situated having brought under the consolidation operations on issuance of a notification under Section 4 of the Act on 06.12.1970. The suit filed by Dhiraji for cancellation of sale deed was abated and accordingly if her objection filed under Section 9-A(2) of the Act also is not decided on the ground that names of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were mutated on the basis of sale deed dated 06.01.1968 on the strength of some mutation orders passed by the revenue courts, the same would result in serious prejudice. For this reason also, I am unable to persuade myself to be in agreement with the said reason given by the Deputy Director of Consolidation. 19. As regards the sale deed dated 06.01.1968 being void or voidable, it has been recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation that in case vendor asserts that he/she was duped and the sale deed has been executed by playing fraud and that no sale consideration was paid to him/her, then in such a situation, appropriate forum for getting such a sale deed declared void, will be civil court where suit ought to be instituted with appropriate prayers. 20. The law in this regard is also very well settled. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dularia Devi vs. Janardan Singh and others, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 216 has held that a sale deed found to have been executed by fraudulent misrepresentation as to its character and not merely as to its contents, will determine if such transaction will be void and not voidable. 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dularia Devi vs. Janardan Singh and others, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 216 has held that a sale deed found to have been executed by fraudulent misrepresentation as to its character and not merely as to its contents, will determine if such transaction will be void and not voidable. 21. Dealing with the facts of the said case, it was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that in case thumb impression on the sale deed was obtained from an illiterate lady on two documents, one for gift of her land to her daughter and another for sale of the land to some other person and such document was got registered on misrepresentation that it was executed only as gift deed, in such a situation inference would be that executant of the document was totally deceived as to character of the document. Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the said judgment are relevant to be reproduced which run as under:- "5. In Gorakh Nath Dube, this Court held that the object of the relevant provision of the Act was to remove from the jurisdiction of any civil court or revenue court all disputes which could be decided by the competent authority under the Act during the consolidation proceedings. Questions relating to the validity of a sale deed or a gift deed and the like had to be examined in proceedings before the statutory authorities. The Court, however, drew a distinction between void and voidable documents and said a voidable document was one which remained in force until set aside, and such a document could be set aside only by a competent civil court, and a suit for that purpose would, therefore, be maintainable. On the other hand, a claim that a transaction was void was a matter which could be adjudicated upon by the consolidation courts. This is what this Court stated: "We think that a distinction can be made between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be, to the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such a purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights or interests in land which are the subject matter of consolidation proceedings. The existence and quantum of rights claimed or denied will have to be declared by the consolidation authorities which would be deemed to be invested with jurisdiction, by the necessary implication of their statutory powers to adjudicate upon such rights and interests in land, to declare such documents effective or ineffective, but, where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it could be urged that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed, and, therefore, it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. In the case before us, the plaintiffs claim is that the sale of his half share by his uncle was invalid, inoperative, and void. Such a claim could be adjudicated upon by consolidation courts." (emphasis supplied) 6. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa, this Court referred to the well-established principle that a contract or other transaction induced or tendered by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the option of the party defrauded. The transaction remains valid until it was avoided. This Court then said: "The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable. In Foster v. Mackinon, [1869] 4 CP 704, the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In Foster v. Mackinon, [1869] 4 CP 704, the action was by the endorsee of a bill of exchange. The defendant pleaded that he endorsed the bill on a fraudulent representation by the acceptor that he was signing a guarantee. In holding that such a plea was admissible, the Court observed: It (signature) is invalid not merely on the ground of fraud, where fraud exists, but on the ground that the mind of the signer did not accompany the signature; in other words, that he never intended to sign, and therefore in contemplation of law never did sign, the contract to which his name is appended ..... The defendant never intended to sign that contract or any such contract. He never intended to put his name to any instrument that then was or thereafter might become negotiable. He was deceived, not merely as to the legal effect, but as to the 'actual contents' of the instrument." (emphasis supplied) 7. From the facts narrated above, about which, as stated earlier, there is no dispute, it is clear that this is a case where the plaintiff-appellant was totally ignorant of the mischief played upon her. She honestly believed that the instrument which she executed and got registered was a gift deed in favour of her daughter. She believed that the thumb impressions taken from her were in respect of that single document. She did not know that she executed two documents, one of which alone was the gift deed, but the other was a sale of the property in favour of all the defendants. This was, therefore, a case of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document executed by her and not merely as to its contents or as to its legal effect. The plaintiff-appellant never intended to sign what she did sign. She never intended to enter into the contract to which she unknowingly became a party. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. This is a case that falls within the principle enunciated in Ningawwa v. Byrappa and it was, therefore, a totally void transaction. Accordingly, as stated in Gorakh Nath Dube, the suit is not maintainable by reason of the bar contained in the Act." 22. Her mind did not accompany her thumb impressions. This is a case that falls within the principle enunciated in Ningawwa v. Byrappa and it was, therefore, a totally void transaction. Accordingly, as stated in Gorakh Nath Dube, the suit is not maintainable by reason of the bar contained in the Act." 22. In the instant case, the allegation of Dhiraji while filing objection under Section 9-A(2) of the Act was that during the period she was hospitalized for an eye operation at a nursing home at Allahabad between 26.12.1967 to 09.01.1968, Chhedi Lal and Jokhulal obtained her thumb impression on plain paper under the pretext that they will be getting levy of food grains imposed by Tehsildar removed. The allegation further was that no sale consideration had been paid to her. 23. Accordingly, it is clear that it is a case where Dhiraji was totally ignorant of mischief which was played against her. In good faith she put her thumb impression on the plain paper believing that the thumb impression taken from her on the plain paper was for the purposes of getting the levy of food grains imposed on her removed. It is a case of fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of document executed by Dhiraji and not merely as to its contents. Such a document would, therefore, has to be declared to be void and any transaction made through such sale deed will be completely a void transaction. 24. In the light of the discussions made above, it is difficult to agree with the reasons given by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by passing the order dated 25.02.2015 whereby he has set-aside the order passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation dated 12.06.2013 and the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 07.03.2011. 25. Since there are enough grounds available before this Court to allow the writ petition and quash the impugned order dated 25.02.2015 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh, the Court feels that it will be a futile exercise to advert to the third issue raised by learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. as to whether the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision petition filed before him against the order dated 12.06.2013 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, Allahabad. 26. 26. Resultantly, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 25.02.2015, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh in Revision Petition No. 1841; Chhedi Lal and others vs. Jokhulal, under Section 48 of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, pertaining to land situated at Pure Ram Sahai, Pargana Patti, Tehsil Raniganj, District Pratapgarh, is hereby quashed. Accordingly, the order dated 12.06.2013 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation, and the order dated 07.03.2011 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Sadar, Pratapgarh in this matter shall be given effect to. 27. There will be no order as to costs.