JUDGMENT : 1. The present writ petition is directed against the judgment and the order No. 61, dated December 18, 2009 passed by the learned Judge of the First Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata in Case No. VIII-66 of 2005. 2. After the writ petition was filed in this Court, there was an effort for a conciliation between the parties as it was submitted that there was a possibility of settlement between them by which the petitioner company would pay an agreed amount in full and final settlement of the entire claim of the respondent No. 2. It appears from the successive orders passed that the matter was referred to Justice Prabir Kr. Samanta (Rtd.) for mediation but it failed as the parties could not arrive at a solution despite best efforts put in by the learned mediator. Even today before I had taken up the matter, I directed the parties to take instruction from the respective clients to find out if any settlement between them could be arrived at. Since they could not arrive at any agreed sum, the writ petition has been taken up for hearing. 3. I have heard Mr. Prosad, the learned advocate for the petitioners. I have not called on Mr. Chatterjee, the learned advocate for the respondent No. 2 to make any submission. 4. It is unfortunate that the matter has been pending for about seven years in this Court over a short issue involved in the writ petition, viz. the competence of the Government of West Bengal to refer the dispute to the Tribunal for adjudication. The petitioners raised a preliminary issue about entertaining the reference touching upon the jurisdiction of the Tribunal at the very first instance. By order No. 49 dated February 12, 2009, the Tribunal decided to dispose of the preliminary issue and had taken up the same for hearing. That preliminary issue was decided in favour of the reference by the order impugned in the present writ petition. 5. For a consideration of the validity of the order passed by the Tribunal below, a brief appreciation of the facts is necessary. 6. The workman, i.e. the respondent No. 2 herein was initially appointed as a steno typist in the Kolkata branch of a company whose head office was in Mumbai. 5. For a consideration of the validity of the order passed by the Tribunal below, a brief appreciation of the facts is necessary. 6. The workman, i.e. the respondent No. 2 herein was initially appointed as a steno typist in the Kolkata branch of a company whose head office was in Mumbai. On January 28, 2000, her service was transferred to the petitioner No. 1 company in terms of an order of amalgamation passed by the Bombay High Court. Subsequently, there was an agreement between the petitioner No. 1 company and M/s. Asian Paints Coatings Limited by which the business of manufacture and sale of power-coatings were sold to M/s Asian Paints by the petitioners. 7. The workman/respondent No. 2 herein was transferred to the Mumbai office on March 8, 2002. Initially she agreed to join and asked the company to consider paying her additional emoluments. The company declined to accede to her request. According to the company, the respondent No. 2 in total disregard and defiance of the order of transfer did not join the duties at Mumbai. As a result, the company issued a show cause notice which was followed by a domestic enquiry held at Mumbai. The workman wanted the enquiry to be held in Kolkata. This was not acceded to as, according to the petitioners, after the order of transfer, the place of work for the respondent No. 2 had been shifted from Kolkata to Mumbai which was the place of work for her. 8. In the enquiry the respondent No. 2 was found guilty and the company dismissed her from service by its letter dated November 22, 2002. 9. The workman raised an industrial dispute which was subsequently referred to the Tribunal below and in this Tribunal the preliminary objection regarding the validity of the reference was taken by the petitioners. 10. The learned Judge of the Tribunal after considering the evidence and the materials on record and the various cases placed before him held that the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government to refer the dispute and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to try the same for adjudicating the issues referred to it. That is the order impugned. 11. 10. The learned Judge of the Tribunal after considering the evidence and the materials on record and the various cases placed before him held that the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government to refer the dispute and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to try the same for adjudicating the issues referred to it. That is the order impugned. 11. The only point thus which calls for determination in the present writ petition is whether the Tribunal below had rightly approached the issue in determining the validity of the reference made by the Government of West Bengal. In other words, whether in the facts of the present case, the Government of West Bengal qualifies to be the appropriate Government within the meaning of Section 2(a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the Act, for short) and whether the reference by such Government under Section 10 of the Act is valid. 12. Since in the process of coming to the conclusion about the validity of the reference made the Tribunal had very heavily relied upon the judgment in the case of Bikash Bhusan Ghosh v. Ms. Novaraties India Limited, reported in 2007(113) FLR 1183, the principal point of attack by Mr. Prasad has been directed against the applicability of the judgment to the facts of this particular case. 13. In order to distinguish the judgment, Mr. Prasad has elaborately, probably more than what was necessary, taken me through the facts to establish that the situs of employment of the respondent No. 2 had shifted to Mumbai and, therefore, the appropriate Government would have been the State of Maharashtra and not this Government. According to Mr. Prasad when the order of transfer was issued upon the respondent No. 2, she had agreed to accept the same, made communication with the management authorities, asked for an enhanced remuneration and also asked for arranging an accommodation for her in Mumbai. All these go to show that the respondent No. 2 had agreed to move to the place of posting. As a matter of fact, she had even purchased ticket for proceeding to Mumbai but for some reasons, the ticket was cancelled. Subsequently, when she was asked to move to Mumbai by the Mumbai office, she did not join and therefore, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her. 14. This immediate background of the case must have been momentarily lost from Mr. Subsequently, when she was asked to move to Mumbai by the Mumbai office, she did not join and therefore, the disciplinary proceeding was initiated against her. 14. This immediate background of the case must have been momentarily lost from Mr. Prasad's frame of mind in his effort to bring this case out of the scope of the operation of the case of Bikash Bhusan Ghosh (supra). In order to establish how the workman favorably responded to the order of transfer Mr. Prasad submitted a rather queer thing. Mr. Prasad threw a big question which was clearly against the case of the petitioners that there was nothing more for her to join the company in Mumbai. Maybe, the workman had not physically joined the company but she had otherwise joined the Mumbai office. 15. The Court had to take the trouble of reminding Mr. Prasad that in making the tall claim, he was going against the case of the petitioners themselves. 16. Mr. Prasad submitted that the judgment in Bikash Bhusan Ghosh (supra) is not applicable to the case and the learned Judge of the Tribunal improperly relied on it without appreciating the fundamental difference in the facts between the two cases. Mr. Prasad reminded the Court of a very well settled principle of applying the ratio of a particular case that a judgment per se cannot be and should not applied to the facts of other case sans the factual context. 17. Mr. Prasad submitted that in the case of Bikash Bhusan Ghosh (supra) the workmen were transferred to different places in the U.P. and Assam. They contended that the orders of transfer were violative of the memorandum of undertaking and were issued with ill motive of victimising them for their trade union activities. As despite requests the orders of transfer were not revoked they sought intervention of the Labour Commissioner, West Bengal. During the conciliation proceeding their services were terminated. They raised an industrial dispute and the State of West Bengal in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 10(1)(c) read with Section 2A of the Act referred the dispute for adjudication to the concerned Industrial Tribunal. Before the Tribunal a similar contention as that taken by the present petitioner was raised about the jurisdiction of the State of West Bengal to make reference. 18. Mr. Before the Tribunal a similar contention as that taken by the present petitioner was raised about the jurisdiction of the State of West Bengal to make reference. 18. Mr. Prasad vehemently submitted that the facts mentioned above made Bikash Bhusan's (supra) case inapplicable to the present case. In the reported judgment the workmen were not satisfied with the orders of transfer. They had raised loud objections to it being violative of the memorandum of undertaking and result in victimisation process. Here the workman concerned had agreed to move to Mumbai and complied with the order of transfer. Therefore, the difference between the two cases was far too obvious to be ignored. While in the first case the order of transfer was challenged the workman here had initially agreed to move the place of posting. 19. On the contrary Mr. Prasad had laid great stress on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case Indian Express Newspaper (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Others, reported in 2005 (106) FLR 467 for a proposition that even if the order of termination is served upon the workman in Calcutta that does not vest the State Government in West Bengal to make a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. At the time of termination of the employee the Calcutta office had no control over her. 20. The service of Mr. Sampat, the workman concerned in the reported judgment relied upon by the petitioners, was transferred to Bombay and it was the Bombay office which had the control over his service. The Division Bench held that the situs of employment being Bombay, he ought to have raised an industrial dispute relating to the termination of services in Bombay and the Government of Maharashtra would have been the appropriate Government to make a reference under Section 10 of the said Act. 21. Mr. Prasad submitted that even if the Supreme Court has taken a slightly contrary view, since that judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case and since the Supreme Court has not upset any of the tests laid down by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, the judgment in Indian Express Newspaper (Supra) holds the field. 22. After this much of the order I dictated in open Court Mr. 22. After this much of the order I dictated in open Court Mr. Prasad stood up to claim that this was not his submission that the Indian Express Newspaper (supra) still holds the field. The Court had to take the pains to remind him that he did specifically submit the same. The submission still rings in my ears. Then Mr. Prasad took an unusual plea that he had forgotten what he submitted. Such oblivion in a span of less than 60 minutes on the part of a lawyer is startling. But in view of his very specific submission I record both the submission originally made by him as well as his retracting from it in less than an hour's time. 23. Coming first to admitted points of law taken by Mr. Prasad, the difference sought to be made between the facts of Bikash Bhusan (supra) and the present case is more illusory than real. It matters little whether the workmen in the reported judgment expressed their displeasure or not in respect of the orders of transfer. After all, if one applies commonsense logic, it was not the order of transfer that was the bone of contention which was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The immediate occasion of the dispute was the termination of employment for not complying with the orders of transfer. It is immaterial whether the workmen expressed their dissatisfaction or raised any dispute or had accepted the order, to quote Mr. Prasad, "gladly". The perception of an individual workman is not determining factor. The consequence of noncompliance of the order of the management which had resulted in dismissal of the workman led the concerned Government to make reference to the Tribunal. 24. The distinction sought to be made by Mr. Prasad in his effort to take this case out of the principles of law decided by the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhusan (supra) is an unreal one. I cannot call it even an academic one. If at all it is a distinction without a difference. Some inconsequential part of the judgment was highlighted as if causing a departure from the facts of the present case. After all, as has been decided long ago no two cases match with each other in a tailor made manner. There must be some difference here and there in factual details. Some inconsequential part of the judgment was highlighted as if causing a departure from the facts of the present case. After all, as has been decided long ago no two cases match with each other in a tailor made manner. There must be some difference here and there in factual details. The question to be explored is whether taking into cognizance those fringes of factual differences the ratio of one case applies to the facts of another. 25. The distinction sought to be made by Mr. Prasad is reminiscent of R.W.M. Dias' classic example of modern trend and effort reflected in some cases to come out of the scope of a judgment and the ratio decided therein. Referring to the classic cases on tortious liability in Donghue v. Stevenson where a man while drinking a glass of ginger beer in a pub had fallen ill noticing a dead snail at the bottom of the glass. Professor Dias had occasion to observe in his classic text book Jurisprudence (1964) (London p.58) that it is theoretically possible to confine the authority in Donghue's case to the manufacture of ginger beer and to distinguish it from a case which concerns the manufacture of lemonade. Fortunately this Court is not ready to be swayed by such illusory distinction. 26. It is again entirely incorrect that the judgment in Bikash Bhusan (supra) is silent about the principles of law decided in the case of Indian Express Newspaper (supra). The Supreme Court did certainly make reference to Indian Express Newspaper (supra) and observed: "with respect to the Division Bench, we do not think that it has posed unto itself a correct question of law. It is not in dispute that the appellants did not join their duties at the transferred places. ... The assertion of the respondent that the appellant[s] were relieved from job was unilateral. If the orders of transfer were to be set aside, they would be deemed to be continuing to be posted in Calcutta." 27. Since in the case of Indian Express Newspaper (supra) a good deal of exercise was directed to find out where the cause of action had arisen and what was really meant by that expression it is necessary to consider what the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhusan's case had observed about the originating locus of the cause of action. Since in the case of Indian Express Newspaper (supra) a good deal of exercise was directed to find out where the cause of action had arisen and what was really meant by that expression it is necessary to consider what the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhusan's case had observed about the originating locus of the cause of action. The Supreme Court observed that the expression is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in Court or Tribunal. A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing, a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in a Court from another person. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had also relied on Stroud's Words and Phrases which says that in common legal parlance cause of action is existence of those facts which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. 28. Relying on the same the Supreme Court in Bikash Bhusan's (supra) case held that judged in that context a part of cause of action arose in Calcutta in respect whereof the State of West Bengal was the appropriate Government. In a given case two states may have the requisite jurisdiction in terms of Section 10(1)(c) of the Act. Assuming that other State Government had also jurisdiction it would not mean that although a part of the cause of action arose within the territory of the State of West Bengal it would have no jurisdiction to make the reference. 29. There is yet another reason on which the question of jurisdiction was held to be not a relevant question to be decided as a preliminary point. Relying on the case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan & Others, reported in AIR 1954 SC 340 , it was held in Bikash Bhusan's (supra) case that if the provisions contained in the Court of Civil Procedure are given effect to, even if the concerned Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction, in view of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, unless respondent suffered any prejudice, they could not have questioned jurisdiction of the Court. 30. Bikash Bhusan (supra) further held that if the appellants were workmen their services were protected in terms of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. An order of termination was required to be communicated. 30. Bikash Bhusan (supra) further held that if the appellants were workmen their services were protected in terms of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. An order of termination was required to be communicated. Communication of an order of termination itself may give rise to a cause of action. 31. It may be mentioned that Bikash Bhusan (supra) travelled to Supreme Court from this Court and in deciding the question of jurisdiction the Division Bench of our High Court had relied on the case of Indian Express Newspaper (supra). Ultimately when the impugned judgment of this Court in Bikash Bhusan (supra) is set aside and the appeal is allowed the judgment on the basis of which the Division Bench had delivered the judgment is equally said to be not a good law. It is a settled position of law that if X judgment is based on Y judgment and the judgment X is held to be wrong, the basis of the judgment, i.e. Y judgment is also impliedly held to be a bad law. This is an unavoidable conclusive process of reasoning. It is not necessary to go too far to search a logical process of ratio cination. In the present case the Indian Express Newspaper (supra) held to be based on wrong issues addressing to itself by the Division Bench of our Court. 32. I have considered the submission of Mr. Prasad and have read the award carefully. I find nothing wrong with the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge of the Tribunal. The petitioners' preference for Indian Express Newspaper (supra) may be the result of an order going in their favour. It need not be repeated that the substratum of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court have been held to be not sustainable in law. Even otherwise, i.e. even if Bikash Bhusan (supra) had not referred to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, once a contrary view is expressed by the superior Court that is the view which is required to be followed. Once a superior Court expresses any view, even if does not refer to the contrary view expressed by a Court of inferior jurisdiction, the latter judgment loses its binding nature as an authoritative precedent. 33. And this is precisely what the learned Judge of the Tribunal has done. Once a superior Court expresses any view, even if does not refer to the contrary view expressed by a Court of inferior jurisdiction, the latter judgment loses its binding nature as an authoritative precedent. 33. And this is precisely what the learned Judge of the Tribunal has done. He has discussed different issues including all the judgments placed before him and found the judgment delivered in Bikash Bhusan(supra) to be squarely applying and rightly held that the Industrial Tribunal had the jurisdiction to hear the matter as the State of West Bengal was the appropriate authority to refer the dispute. 34. I also concur with the view and much assertion to the contrary, I hold that Bikash Bhusan(supra) certainly holds the field. 35. I find absolutely no merit in the writ petition and I regret to hold that on the point of jurisdiction a writ petition has been lying in this Court for well nigh seven years. In the process the workman has lost so many years from getting her grievance redressed by an appropriate forum. 36. From the tenor of the submissions as recorded it also did not suggest that the petitioner had a very serious, if at all any, point of law to agitate or the case could be regarded one such calling for any detailed exercise of judicial duty. The writ petition is dismissed. 37. I consider this to be a case which should not only be dismissed but dismissed with costs. I direct the petitioner-company to pay Rs. 10000/- (rupees ten thousand) to the respondent no. 2 within a period of three weeks from date. In default, the respondent no. 2 shall be entitled to recover the sum from the petitioner in accordance with law. 38. Before I part with, it is necessary to record that since the dispute was referred by the State Government more than twelve years ago and since the matter still lies at the stage of deciding the jurisdiction, the Court would direct the First Tribunal to expedite the process of hearing as early as possible, but positively within a period of six months from the date of communication of the order. The learned Judge of the Tribunal shall try to minimise the number of adjournment to the extent possible and shall not grant any adjournment unless absolutely necessary. The learned Judge of the Tribunal shall try to minimise the number of adjournment to the extent possible and shall not grant any adjournment unless absolutely necessary. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis. Petition dismissed.