JUDGMENT & ORDER : In this criminal revision, the petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 28-1-2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Agartala, in S.T. No. 141 of 2012 framing the charges against the petitioner U/s 302/201/34 IPC by rejecting his prayer for discharge. 2. The facts giving rise to this criminal revision are that Bishalgrah P.S. Case No. 151/2012 U/s 304-A/201 of IPC and Section 135(1)(a) of the Electricity Act, 2003 was registered against, among others, the petitioner on the basis of the FIR dated 29-10-2011 lodged by the respondent No. 2. The allegation of the respondent No. 2 is that on 28-10-2011, she along with her husband (the deceased) had gone to orchestra event in their own locality, but she returned home leaving her husband behind and that on the following morning at 6.30 AM, she found her husband lying dead with electric burn injuries on his leg at the backyard of the house of the co-accused Suman Bhowmik. After investigation of the case, the police submitted the charge sheet against the petitioner, co-accused Suman Bhowmik and his wife, Rakhi Bhowmik U/s 302/201/34 IPC. On commitment, the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura transferred the case to the file of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 3, Agartala, who by the impugned order rejected the prayer of the petitioner for discharge from the case and proceeded to frame the charges against him U/s 302/201/34 IPC. 3. Assailing the impugned order, Mr. AK Bhowmik, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, the framing of the charge by the learned Additional Sessions Judge on the basis of the extra-judicial confession and last seen together was based on misconception of fact and of law inasmuch as the so-called confession was recorded by the police while he was in police custody, which is clearly inadmissible in law. Contending that there is absolutely no prima facie case to go for trial, the learned senior counsel strenuously urges this Court to set aside the impugned order and discharge the petitioner from the case. Per contra, Mr. R.C. Debnath, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, contends that the question to be determined in this case is not whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the petitioner as evidence are yet to be adduced, but whether there are sufficient materials to raise strong suspicion against him. Per contra, Mr. R.C. Debnath, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, contends that the question to be determined in this case is not whether there is sufficient evidence to convict the petitioner as evidence are yet to be adduced, but whether there are sufficient materials to raise strong suspicion against him. So judged, submits the learned State counsel, there are, based on last seen theory, adequate materials to raise strong suspicion against the petitioner. He, therefore, maintains that there is no merit in this revision petition, which is liable to be dismissed. 4. The provision for discharge of an accused is found at Section 227, Cr.P.C, which reads thus: “227. Discharge.— If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” 5. In exercise of the power conferred under Section 227, Cr.P.C, the High court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The scope of this salutary provision came up for consideration before the Apex Court recently in State of T.N. v. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 . After making comparative study of Sections 227, 239 and 245, Cr.P.C, the Apex Court held: “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476 , in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2008) 2 SCC 61: (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case (supra)) “15. ‘11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.?(Onkar Nath case) (supra))” (emphasis in original) 31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar, Sajan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 and Dilawar Balu Kurane, Dilawar Balu Karane v. State of Mahashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 , relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it “considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction”. 31.2. However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when “the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless”. The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, “the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction”. 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1986) 2 SCC 716 . The same reads as follows: “43. … Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of “prima facie” case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed.” 6. In the instant case, the statement of the wife of the deceased has, in my opinion, raised strong suspicion against the involvement of the petitioner in the crime. Whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed in convicting the petitioner after adducing all the evidence is entirely a different issue, which cannot be considered at the stage of framing of the charge; the glaring fact is that some witnesses have implicated the petitioner in the case. This cannot be brushed aside at the stage of framing of the charge. To discharge the petitioner at this stage, on the available materials on record, would amount to shutting the case of the prosecution, which is yet to examine its witnesses. This cannot be brushed aside at the stage of framing of the charge. To discharge the petitioner at this stage, on the available materials on record, would amount to shutting the case of the prosecution, which is yet to examine its witnesses. In my considered view, the trial court has correctly refused to discharge the petitioner, proceeded to frame the charge and commence the trial, which cannot be interfered with by this Court. 7. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this criminal revision, which is, accordingly, dismissed. The trial court shall now proceed with the trial of the case and attempt to complete the same without further delay. Nothing stated in the foregoing shall, however, be construed to be a final observation on the merit of the case, which is yet to be independently decided by the trial court after the trial is over. No cost. Transmit the LC record forthwith.