JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. D.R. Choudhury, Ms. S. Deb Gupta, and Mr. D. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. D.C. Nath, and Mr. Samarjit Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. Both these appeals being RSA No.68 of 2013 [Jahangir Hossein vs. Tripura State Electricity Corporation and Others] and RSA No.69 of 2013 [Smt. Sandhya Deb vs. Tripura State Electricity Corporation Limited and Others] are clustered for disposal by a common judgment as these appeals are structured on identical substantial question of law. In RSA No.68 of 2013, the judgment dated 27.08.2013 delivered in Money Appeal No.07 of 2011 and in RSA No.69 of 2013, the judgment dated 21.09.2013 delivered in Money Appeal No.08 of 2011 are under challenge. 3. In RSA No.68 of 2013, the following substantial question of law was framed for hearing the appeal by the order dated 25.07.2014: “Whether the first appellate court was correct in holding that filing of the subsequent suit was barred by limitation as Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not have any manner of application as regards the time consumed in the court of the District Judge in prosecuting bona fide the previous suit being TS(FA) No.09 of 2003 on the face that the District Judge had no jurisdiction in trying the said suit and consequent thereupon the District Judge returned the plaint for filing before the court of the competent jurisdiction when the previous suit was instituted within the period of two years?” 4. In RSA No.69 of 2013 the following substantial question of law was framed for hearing of the appeal by the order dated 18.09.2014: “Whether the first appellate court is correct in interpreting the provision of Section 14 of the Limitation Act for discounting the period from 12.12.1996 to 21.03.2007?” 5. The judgment dated 27.08.2013 which is under challenge in RSA No.68 of 2013 has culminated from the judgment dated 05.04.2011 delivered in Money Suit No.44 of 2008 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala, whereby the said court has awarded a compensation of Rs.1,04,500/- with interest @ 6% p.a. on the premises that the negligent management of the live electric wire by the respondents has resulted in the death of one Bir Kumar Debbarma on 02.09.2001 at about 12.00 hrs. 6. 6. In RSA No.69 of 2013, the judgment dated 21.09.2013 has culminated from the judgment dated 13.04.2011 delivered in Money Suit No.28 of 08 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala, whereby a compensation to the extent of Rs.1,74,500/- with interest @ 6% p.a. was awarded in favour of the appellants as the fatal accident which occurred for negligent management of the live electrical wire on 02.10.1996 at about 09.00 p.m. has resulted in the death of Sri Ranjit Deb, only son of the appellant got being electrocuted. 7. Initially in the money suits, both the appellants filed their claim in the court of the District Judge for realising damage for death by electrocution. The appellant in RSA No.68 of 2013 filed the application for compensation being T.S.(FA) 09 of 2003 in the court of the District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala on 27.08.2003 when the cause of action by way of death arose on 02.09.2001 and as such the said application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation i.e. 2(two) years in terms of Article 82 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. In terms of the order of the Gauhati High Court dated 31.07.2007 delivered in LPA 08 of 2001 and LPA 09 of 2001, whereby it was held that the suits under Section 1A of the Fatal Accident Act shall only be entertained by the civil court of competent jurisdiction and the District Court does not have the jurisdiction and accordingly the said application was returned on 26.02.2007 for filing in the civil court the competent jurisdiction. Finally, the suit being M.S. 44 of 2008 was filed on 04.07.2007 along with an application for treating the said suit as the suit filed by an indigent person. It is apparent on the face of the record that the said suit was filed after 120 days from the date of return i.e after more than 4(four) months. 8. The appellant in RSA 69 of 2013 filed a claim application in the court of the District Judge being T.S. (FA) 03 of 1996 on 12.12.1996 for death of one Ranjit Deb in the fatal accident. In view of the said order of the Gauhati High Court, the said application was returned by the District Judge on 26.02.2007 though erroneously it was written in the order that the petition was returned on 21.03.2007. In view of the said order of the Gauhati High Court, the said application was returned by the District Judge on 26.02.2007 though erroneously it was written in the order that the petition was returned on 21.03.2007. Subsequently, that error was corrected. The appellant has contended that he had no information of the said correction. However, after the said return, a fresh Money Suit being M.S. 28 of 2008 was filed on 20.06.2008. The said money suit was decreed and having been challenged in MA 08 of 2011, the same was reversed by the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2013. The cause of action for filing the money suit being Money Suit No.28 of 2008 arose on 02.10.1996, but the claim application before the District Judge was filed on 12.12.1996. The common question that has been projected in both the appeals is that whether the appellate court while reversing the judgment passed by the trial court has interpreted Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 correctly or not. For purpose of reference, Section 14 of the Limitation Act is reproduced hereunder: “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be executed, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.- For the purpose of this section,- (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of cause of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.” 9. There cannot be any amount of confusion that the civil court does have jurisdiction to discount the period from the date when the action was instituted till the day, when the action was discharged for defect of the jurisdiction, under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, but the civil court even of the competent jurisdiction does not have any authority to exclude any further period. 10. There is no dispute that the limitation for instituting the fatal accident suits is two years. In the Money Suit 44 of 2008 [related to RSA 68 of 2013], cause of action arose on 02.09.2001. The claim application was erroneously filed before the District Judge on 27.08.2003 and the said application was returned on 26.02.2007. In terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period starting from 27.08.2003 to 26.02.2007 [both days are inclusive] can be discounted from the total period consumed for filing the Money Suit No.44 of 2008. 11. Since the cause of action arose from the death of Sahin Hossain, son of the appellant, the suit ought to have been filed within two years therefrom i.e. 01.09.2003. It is an admitted position that the suit was filed on 04.07.2007 and the suit was registered on 04.09.2008 in terms of the order dated 03.09.2008. The claim-application was filed before the District Judge on 27.08.2003 and it was returned on 26.02.2007. Apparent it is, that the said application was filed after one year eleven months and twenty five days. It is an admitted position that the suit was filed on 04.07.2007 and the suit was registered on 04.09.2008 in terms of the order dated 03.09.2008. The claim-application was filed before the District Judge on 27.08.2003 and it was returned on 26.02.2007. Apparent it is, that the said application was filed after one year eleven months and twenty five days. After return of the petition on 26.02.2007, the suit was filed on 04.07.2007. After return, the appellant had consumed 127 days in filing the suit whereas the suit is bound to be filed within two years from the date of death. Even after discount the suit was filed after 122 days beyond the period of limitation and hence, the suit was not maintainable. Thus, there is no infirmity in the finding of the first appellate court, which passed the judgment dated 28.07.2013 in Money Appeal No.07 of 2011, which is under challenge in the appeal being RSA No.68 of 2013. Though this court does not approve the analogy of the first appellate court, but since the conclusion remains the same, this court is not inclined to interfere with the said judgment. 12. In the result, the appeal, being RSA 68 of 2013 is dismissed. 13. So far the institution of the money suit, being Money Suit No.28 of 2008 is concerned, this court has reappraised the record to find out whether that suit was filed within the period of limitation of two years for claiming damages for the said fatal accident. By the judgment dated 21.09.2013 delivered in Money Appeal No.08 of 2011, the said suit has been dismissed as barred by limitation and hence by filing this appeal, being RSA 69 of 2013, the said judgment dated 21.09.2013 has been challenged by the plaintiff-appellant.. The death occurred admittedly on 02.10.1996 when the only son of the plaintiff-appellant, namely Ranjit Deb died of electrocution for the negligent management of the electric wire. For claiming damage, a claim application was filed before the learned District Judge on 12.12.1996 and the same was returned by the District Judge for defect of jurisdiction on 26.02.2007. The fresh suit being M.S. 28 of 2008 was instituted on 20.06.2008. In terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period from 26.02.2007 to 20.06.2008 [both days are inclusive] are liable to be discounted and added with the prescribed period of limitation. The fresh suit being M.S. 28 of 2008 was instituted on 20.06.2008. In terms of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the period from 26.02.2007 to 20.06.2008 [both days are inclusive] are liable to be discounted and added with the prescribed period of limitation. The claim petition which was erroneously filed before the District Judge, was filed after 60 days of death of Ranjit Deb, son of the plaintiff-appellant. and after return of the petition the suit was filed after 113 days. Thus the suit after discount, was filed within 173 days, meaning on discount as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the suit was instituted within two years and as such the suit, being Title Suit No.28 of 2008, was instituted within the period of limitation. As a result, the impugned judgment dated 21.09.2013 delivered in Money Appeal No. 08 of 2011 is set aside. 14. Since the plaintiff-appellant did not prefer any appeal to question the judgment dated 21.09.2013 as delivered in Money Appeal (Cross Objection) 09 of 2011 by the Additional District Judge, Court No.3, West Tripura, Agartala so as to the challenge the quantum of compensation as determined by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, West Tripura, Agartala, by his judgment and decree dated 13.03.2011 delivered in Money Suit 28 of 2008, the determination of quantum has reached its finality. The appellant cannot challenge the same by filing a common appeal neither the plaintiff-appellant did insist this court to frame any substantial question on that aspect of the matter. 15. Having observed thus, the judgment and decree dated 13.04.2011 delivered in Money Suit 28 of 2008 by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala, is restored. 16. In the result, the appeal being RSA 69 of 2013 is allowed. Prepare the decree accordingly. Send down the LCRs thereafter.