JUDGMENT : U.C. Dhyani, J. 1. The applicant, by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeks to quash the impugned cognizance order dated 25.04.2015, passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Pauri Garhwal in criminal case no. 230 / 2015, State vs. Mool Chand and another (connected with case no. 445 / 2014, State vs. Rafi Saifi & others), under Sections 452, 365, 342, 504, 506, 323, 171F/34 IPC, P.S. Laxman Jhula, District Pauri Garhwal, as also the entire proceedings of aforesaid criminal case, pending in the court of learned C.J.M., Pauri Garhwal. 2. Complainant-informant-respondent no. 2 set the criminal law into motion by lodging FIR against some named and remaining 150 unknown accused persons on 18.02.2013, in relation to an incident, which allegedly occurred in the intervening night of 17/18.01.2013, for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 365, 342, 504, 506, 323, 171F/34 IPC, at P.S. Laxman Jhula, Sub District Kotdwar, District Pauri Garhwal, stating therein, that the accused persons, in furtherance of their common intention trespassed into hotel Shiva Resort, committed assault with informant’s father along with 28 other persons, abused them and abducted them to some unknown secluded place. 3. Brief facts of the case are that an FIR was registered on 18.01.2013, at about 2345 hours by one Rohit Kumar, wherein it has been alleged that the informant and other persons, including the accused, are residents of District Bijnaur, U.P. There were elections of local bodies. One of the candidates namely, Lavi w/o Chatar Singh took the members to a particular resort situated in Laxman Jhula. It was averred in the FIR that in order to avoid undue pressure exerted on the members, they willfully moved out from district Bijnaur and were staying at resort situated in Laxman Jhula. The FIR further alleged that certain persons named in the FIR as well as 150 unknown persons came to resort and forcefully abducted all the members staying there. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, FIR was registered at P.S. Laxman Jhula as case crime no. 2/2013, under Sections 452, 365, 342, 504, 507, 323/34 IPC. 4. The FIR further alleged that certain persons named in the FIR as well as 150 unknown persons came to resort and forcefully abducted all the members staying there. On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, FIR was registered at P.S. Laxman Jhula as case crime no. 2/2013, under Sections 452, 365, 342, 504, 507, 323/34 IPC. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that applicant was local MLA from Nageena constituency of District Bijnaur at the relevant point of time and was Minister of State in the State of U.P. Because of political rivalry, applicant has been implicated, though he has no concern with the elections of local bodies. The wife of present applicant, who is one of the members of the Zila Panchayat, however, was not contesting the elections of Chairman, Zila Panchayat. The applicant or his wife cannot be said to be interested in the election of Chairman of the Zila Panchayat. One of the important aspects of the matter is that though the allegations of abduction and kidnapping of members of Zila Panchayat are alleged, but all such members were very much present at the time of voting and participated in free and fair elections and cast their votes. There is no representation made by any of the members before any of the authorities conducting the elections or even before any of the authorities of the State of U.P. regarding allegations made in the FIR. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that after the investigation was carried out in the matter, a charge sheet was submitted on 26.05.2014 against 8 persons. The said charge sheet, which was submitted before the learned trial court clearly provides that the allegations made against 8 persons were found substantiated, while for the rest of the two persons, were exonerated. There was specific entry made in the said charge sheet that the applicant has not been charge sheeted. Said charge sheet nowhere suggests that further investigating is under progress in the matter or any issue of filing of supplementary charge sheet is under process. A perusal of such charge sheet clearly reveals that, for all purposes, final report of the investigation was submitted and nothing more was required to be done at the level of investigating officer. Said charge sheet nowhere suggests that further investigating is under progress in the matter or any issue of filing of supplementary charge sheet is under process. A perusal of such charge sheet clearly reveals that, for all purposes, final report of the investigation was submitted and nothing more was required to be done at the level of investigating officer. On the basis of said charge sheet, cognizance was taken by learned C.J.M., Pauri Garhwal on 07.06.2014, against 8 persons against whom charge sheet was submitted. The matter proceeded and summons were issued by the trial court. 6. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that without any orders of further investigation by the learned Magistrate and without any assertion that any new facts have came into the light after submission of charge sheet against eight accused persons, a supplementary charge sheet was submitted against the present applicant on 11.03.2015, which was submitted before the court and the learned trial court on 25.04.2015 has taken cognizance against the applicant also. After cognizance order was passed by the learned Magistrate, summon was issued to the applicant, a criminal revision was preferred before the Sessions Judge, Pauri Garhwal challenging the order dated 25.04.2015. The said criminal revision was registered as criminal revision no. 15 of 2015 before the Sessions Judge, Pauri Garhwal. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that the State Government has directed the prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution. That matter has reached the High Court and is pending adjudication before another Bench of this Hon’ble Court. 8. Section 173(8) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, reads as below: “173(8). Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed ; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub-section (2).” 9. Power of police to conduct further investigation is recognised under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The ‘police report’ is a conclusion that an Investigating Officer draws on the basis of materials collected during investigation and such conclusion can only form the basis of a competent court to take cognizance there upon under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code and to proceed with the case for trial. When a power under Sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. is exercised, the court ordinarily should not interfere with the statutory powers of the investigating agency. The court cannot issue directions to investigate the case from a particular angle. In the instant case, if the charge sheet was submitted against eight accused, the same is not the end of the story. It, therefore, cannot be argued that, if earlier, charge sheet was submitted against eight accused, the Investigating Officer is precluded from further investigation and submitting charge sheet against other accused persons. The principal plea of learned counsel for the accused-applicant is that when, in the first go, a charge sheet was submitted against eight accused persons, how can the charge sheet, subsequently be filed against present applicant? Such submission of learned counsel for the applicant is de hors the law. 10. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 986, has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Some of those principles, which are relevant in the context of present case, can be summarized as below: i. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. ii. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. iii. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. iii. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. iv. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. v. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. vi. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. vii. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. viii. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. ix. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. It may be purely a civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its original jurisdiction. x. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. xi. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. xii. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. xiii. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution. xiv. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. xv. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. xv. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. xvi. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours otherwise, it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. xvii. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration. 11. There appears to be no illegality in the cognizance and summoning order (order under challenge). No interference is called for in the same at this stage, as would also be evident from the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajiv Thapar and others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor (2013) 3 SCC 330 . Para 28 of the said ruling is reproduced herein below for convenience: “The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defence raised on behalf of the accused is. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so, because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed, by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed, by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position, that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held.” 12. The foundation of Criminal Offence is laid against the applicant in the instant case. Criminal proceeding pending against him therefore, should not be quashed. The jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be exercised to stifle or scuttle the legitimate prosecution. 13. Learned counsel for the applicant also submitted that that the summoning order is cryptic and has been passed without application of mind. It will be relevant to quote the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in Kanti Bhadra Shah vs. State of West Bengal, reported in 2000 AIR SCW 52, in reference to such submission of learned counsel for the applicant here-in-below: “12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work? The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to writ detailed orders at different stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial. It is a salutary guidelines that when orders rejecting or granting bail are passed, the Court should avoid expressing one way or other on contentious issues, except in cases such as those falling within Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.” 14. What is abuse of the process of the Court? Abuse of Process of the Court “33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is well-established and recognized doctrine both by the English courts and courts in India. There are some established principles of law which bar the trial when there appears to be abuse of process of court. 34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions, observed: (AC pp. 1301-02) “There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such jurisdiction… A court must enjoy such powers in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its process. The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction) to prevent abuses of its process and to control its own procedure must in a criminal court include a power to safeguard an accused person from oppression or prejudice.” In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same case observed that where particular criminal proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trail. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R v. R. (1992) 1 AC 34 , The Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. 35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R v. R. (1992) 1 AC 34 , The Privy Council defined the word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and wrong with the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other respects, a perfectly supportable case. 36. In the leading case of R. v. Horsferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Pennett, (19940 1 AC 42 on the application of abuse of process, the court confirms that an abuse of process justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the following circumstances: (i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a fair trial; or (ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of process because it offends the court’s sense of justice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in the circumstances of the particular case. 37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brookds 12 (1984) 80 CR App R 164 (DC), Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated: “It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the prosecution has manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection proved by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.” 38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beck for (Anthony) (1996) 1 CR App R 94, observed that: “The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many different circumstances. Nevertheless two main strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases where the court concludes that the defendant cannot receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.” What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to determine on the individual fats of each case. 39. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1997) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under Section 482 Cr.P.C entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it come to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Court observed in this case that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the legislature. It was held in this case; (SCC p. 703, para 7) “7. In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal mattes, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this Court and other courts. 40. 40. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant provisions of Cr.P.C under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C gave the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and to give an exhaustive list to myriad kinds of case wherein such power should be exercised: (SCC p. 379, para 102) “102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 41. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 , observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8) “8…. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offense is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.” 42. In India Oil Corpn. V. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 , this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. In India Oil Corpn. V. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 , this Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time-consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that: (SCC p. 749, para 13) “13… Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged.” 15. There appears to be no abuse of the process of the Court in the instant case. 16. It is also the settled law that the factual controversy need not be gone into by this Court in exercise of it’s inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself. The applicant, in the instant case, is unable to pass those tests. 17. This Court, therefore, is of the view that no interference is called for, in the proceedings of the Court below, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed on behalf of the applicant is therefore, dismissed at the threshold. 18. As prayed, liberty is granted to the applicant to take all the factual pleas before the Court below for securing his discharge/acquittal at an appropriate stage.