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Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 3024 (ALL)

Satyendra v. State Of U. P.

2017-12-21

HARSH KUMAR

body2017
JUDGMENT : 1. All the above bail applications and criminal appeal (defective) relate to the offences under various sections of I.P.C. read with offences under various sections of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes Prevention of Atrocities Act 1989 (hereinafter referred as “S.C./S.T. Act”) having been moved/filed upon rejection of bail applications by the Special Courts under (S.C./S.T. Act). Undisputedly, by Amendment Act No.1 of 2016, provisions of Sections 14-A and 15-A etc. were added/inserted in the S.C./S.T Act which came into force w.e.f. 26.01.2016, which provide that against every order passed by the Special Judge under S.C./S.T. Act granting or refusing bail, an appeal shall lie before this Court. 2. Before coming to the main question under consideration. The brief facts of the four cases mentioned above are necessary to be mentioned as follows. (i) Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.38755 of 2017 relates to an incident dated 22.1.2016 regarding which F.I.R. was lodged on 24.1.2016 for the offences under sections 376(d) 504, 506 IPC and 3 (2) (v) S.C./S.T. Act, wherein bail application of applicants was rejected vide order dated 14.7.2017 and the accused persons/applicants, feeling aggrieved filed Criminal Appeal No.4173 of 2017 under section 14 A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act in August, 2017. The Single Judge Bench of this Court, considering the fact that incident has taken place on 22.1.2016, prior to enforcement of newly inserted provisions of appeal under section 14 A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act, vide its order dated 22.9.2017, held the appeal not maintainable and in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. ordered to treat it as bail application under section 439 Cr.P.C., in view of judgment passed by it on 25.8.2017 in the case of Janardan Pandey Vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017. (ii) Criminal Misc. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017. (ii) Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.38324 of 2017 relates to an offence dated 11.6.2016 in which F.I.R. was lodged on 14.6.2016 for the offences under sections 363, 366, 506 and 376 IPC, ¾ POCSO Act and 3 (2) (v) S.C./S.T. Act and the bail application of accused was rejected by court below on 8.11.2016, feeling aggrieved with which, the accused moved a bail application no.44061 of 2016 before this Court, which was dismissed on 6.9.2017 as not pressed, to seek appropriate remedy and after rejection of first bail application as not pressed, the accused instead of filing appeal under section 14-A(2) again moved this application for bail on 14.9.2017, in view of the judgment of a Single Judge Bench of this Court passed on 29.8.2017 in 2017(101) ACC 242 Rohit Vs. State of U.P., wherein it was held that after expiry of 180 days from the date of order rejecting bail, the appeal under section 14 A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act may not be entertained and the accused shall acquire a right to file bail application under general provisions of section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (iii) Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.38812 of 2017 relates to the incident dated 15.8.2015 regarding which F.I.R. was lodged on 10.9.2015 under sections 363, 376, 506 IPC, ¾ POCSO Act and 3 (2) (v) S.C./S.T. Act and bail application was rejected by Court below vide order dated 1.9.2017 feeling aggrieved with which the accused applicant filed present bail application on 4.10.2017, within the period of 180 days in view of the judgment of this Court dated 25.8.2017 passed in the case of Janardan Pandey Vs. State of U.P. in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017 as the offence has been committed prior to enforcement of Amending Act. (iv) Criminal Appeal Defective No.785 of 2017 relates to the incident dated 29.2.2016 regarding which F.I.R. was lodged on 14.6.2016 for the offences under sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 504 IPC and 3(2)(v) S.C./S.T. Act bail application was rejected by Court below on 20.9.2016 and the appeal was filed on 14.11.2017, after 330 days from the order of rejection of bail, with an application for condonation of delay. 3. 3. Whenever some new enactment comes into force or some new provisions are added in existing enactments, some confusions may arise in the minds of litigants or the persons concerned. To do away alleged non-existing confusions and provide clarity with regard to implementation of procedure mentioned in newly added provisions of sections 14-A, 15-A etc. of S.C./S.T. Act, a Single Judge Bench of this Court delivered two judgments, (i) on 25.8.2017 in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017 Janardan Pandey vs. State of U.P. and (ii) on 29.8.2017 in Criminal Appeal Defective No.523 of 2017 Rohit vs. State of U.P. also reported in 2017 (101) SCC 242. 4. During arguments by the respective counsel for the parties seeking bail for the accused through bail applications or through appeals, as well as the counsel appearing on behalf of first informant/respondent opposing the prayer of bail so made in bail applications or appeals, expressed their concern contending that in the judgments in the cases of Janardan Pandey (supra) and Rohit (supra), the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has failed to take a correct view and on account of unnecessary and unwarranted interpretation to the newly added/inserted provisions of section 14-A S.C./S.T. Act given in above judgments and classification of cases on the basis of committal of offences, which have occurred prior to 26.1.2016 (on the ground of the provisions having not been given retrospective effect), a new controversy has been created for day-to-day filing of bail applications and appeals. Similar arguments were advanced by parties counsel in above four matters and so they were heard together and common order is being passed in all above matters. 5. Considering the day-to-day difficulty of Bar in the matters of filing of bail applications/appeals, and objections which are reportedly being raised by the Registry of this Court in accepting the same (finding themselves bound by judgments in cases of Janardan Pandey and Rohit (supra) as well as the objections being raised at the time of disposal of such bail applications/appeals, all these matters were listed on one and the same day and the able assistance of Senior Advocate Sri G.S. Chaturvedi was sought, who very humbly agreed to provide the required assistance. 6. In above case of Janardan Pandey, a Single Judge Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 25.8.2017 passed in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017 in the case of Janardan Pandey Vs. 6. In above case of Janardan Pandey, a Single Judge Bench of this Court in its judgment dated 25.8.2017 passed in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017 in the case of Janardan Pandey Vs. State of U.P. relying on the law laid down by Apex Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry and others AIR 1957 SC 540 , held that since the newly added provisions of S.C./S.T. Act brought through Amendment Act 1 of 2016 have not been given retrospective effect, the Criminal Appeal which relates to the incident of offence dated 24.11.2000 (prior to enforcement of Act), is not maintainable and on rejection of his bail application by court below, the proper remedy available for the accused-appellant was, to move an application for bail under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. (as earlier) and consequently, to secure the ends of justice, in exercise of powers under section 482 Cr.P.C., the appeal was converted into an application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., and upon considering merits, the appeal upon being treated as bail application was rejected, refusing bail to accused/appellant. 7. In this case of Janardan Pandey (supra), a Single Judge Bench of this Court held that since the provisions of section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act have not been given retrospective effect, in matters relating to offences committed prior to 26.1.2016, appeal would not be maintainable and an application for bail under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. shall be competent as earlier. 8. The learned Senior Advocate Sri G.S. Chaturvedi submitted that the interpretation made by the Court in the case of Janardan Pandey in view of the law laid down in the case of Garikapati Veeraya Vs. N. Subbiah Choudhry and others, AIR 1957 SC 540 is absolutely wrong and totally unwarranted, because the above case law relates to substantive civil law in respect of the vested substantive right of appeal and may not be made applicable in this matter relating to amendment of the procedural law where no substantive rights of accused are involved. N. Subbiah Choudhry and others, AIR 1957 SC 540 is absolutely wrong and totally unwarranted, because the above case law relates to substantive civil law in respect of the vested substantive right of appeal and may not be made applicable in this matter relating to amendment of the procedural law where no substantive rights of accused are involved. He pointed out that in the case of Garikapati Veeraya (supra) at the time of institution of civil suit in 1949, the parties had acquired a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court and since Federal Court was replaced by Supreme Court, it was held that parties may not be deprived of their substantive right to appeal before the Apex Court due to closer of Federal Court and its replacement by Supreme Court. 9. Upon hearing learned counsel and perusal of record, I find that in the case of Garikapati Veeraya (supra) the question of enforcement of procedural law was not at all involved rather it was a case of vested substantive right of the appellant therein. In above case relating to civil suit instituted on 22.4.1949 and dismissed by trial court on 14.11.1950, against the judgment passed in appeal by Andhra Pradesh High Court on 10.2.1955, an application for Special Leave to Appeal was moved and the contention of petitioner that since from the date of institution of suit, he had acquired a vested right of appeal to the Federal Court, which has since been replaced by the Supreme Court, was accepted and considering that he may not be deprived of his vested right of appeal, the appeal before Supreme Court was held maintainable. In view of above case law it may not be correct to say that since the provisions of section 14-A (2) have no retrospective effect in cases of offences committed prior to 26.1.2016, the right to seek bail by moving application for bail under general provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C. shall remain intact. 10. In view of above case law it may not be correct to say that since the provisions of section 14-A (2) have no retrospective effect in cases of offences committed prior to 26.1.2016, the right to seek bail by moving application for bail under general provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C. shall remain intact. 10. In the case of Rohit (supra), the Single Judge Bench of this court held that “insertion/addition of section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act is a legislative device to bye-pass the remedy of moving bail application under section 439 Cr.P.C. before this Court and in view of provisions of section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act against order granting or refusing bail by Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, the remedy of appeal has been provided for a limited period of 180 days and in view of section 5 of the Cr.P.C., after expiry of 180 days from the date of order, the provisions of section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act shall remain no longer, law for the time being enforce and as soon as the bar created by section 5 of Cr.P.C. goes, the accused-appellant would be entitled to invoke general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. as for him this legal remedy revives as soon as his right to file appeal stands extinguished by limitation. It further held that the general remedy of moving bail application under section 439 Cr.P.C. was substituted by Amending Act 1 of 16 providing an accused a short term special remedy of filing appeal within 180 days, under the Special Act after expiry of which period of 180 days the accused would not be denuded of his right to approach this Court under the general law i.e. section 439 Cr.P.C. as Act 1 of 2016 does not expressly or by necessarily implication repeal provisions contained in section 439 Cr.P.C. rather simply provides a special remedy of appeal for limited period and till the special remedy of appeal remains available to him, he would have no right to seek remedy under general law but as soon as the special remedy ceases to exist for him, he can very well avail ordinary remedy provided by general law. 11. In above judgment dated 29.8.2017 in the case of Rohit Vs. 11. In above judgment dated 29.8.2017 in the case of Rohit Vs. State of U.P. 2017 (101) ACC 242, where the appeal filed under section 14A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act was reported by the Office of Stamp Reporter to have been filed beyond 357 days from its prescribed period of limitation, the Single Judge Bench of this Court held that since after the expiry of 180 days no appeal shall be entertainable in view of the proviso to section 14A (3) of S.C./S.T. Act, so the general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. will revive and will be applicable on account of which, the accused, shall acquire and be entitled to move application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., before this Court under general provisions of bail in Code of Criminal Procedure and consequently, the Criminal Appeal Defective No.523 of 2017 filed by the accused Rohit was directed to be converted into bail application. 12. It is also pertinent to mention that in the case of Rohit (supra), F.I.R. was lodged on 2.5.2016 (after enforcement of newly added provisions of section 14-A, 15-A etc.) for the offences under sections 363, 366, 376 IPC, section 4 POCSO Act and section 3 (2)(v) S.C./S.T. Act and bail application was rejected by court below vide order dated 25.6.2016, upon which accused filed criminal misc. bail application before this Court and upon preliminary objections raised by learned AGA regarding maintainability of bail application, in view of specific alternate remedy of appeal provided under amended provisions of Section 14-A(2), S.C./S.T. Act, this Court rejected his bail application as not maintainable vide order dated 3.8.2017, with liberty to the applicant to file appeal, as provided under amended provisions of S.C./S.T. Act and the appeal so filed with a delay of 357 days was very strongly again ordered to be converted into bail application, which itself does not sound good. 13. It has been reported that in furtherance of above order dated 29.8.2017 of Single Judge Bench of this Court, the Criminal Appeal Defective No.523 of 2017, numbered as Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.35025 of 2017 and was decided on 7.10.2017 by another Bench granting bail to accused, without affording opportunity of hearing to victim or first informant, against the spirit and objects of the provisions of Section 14-A(2) of S.C./S.T. Act. 14. Bail Application No.35025 of 2017 and was decided on 7.10.2017 by another Bench granting bail to accused, without affording opportunity of hearing to victim or first informant, against the spirit and objects of the provisions of Section 14-A(2) of S.C./S.T. Act. 14. Learned Senior Advocate Sri G.S. Chaturvedi submitted that the provisions of special Act override the provisions of general law and so the provisions of appeal under section 14-A (2) brought through Amendment No.1 of 2016 override the general provisions of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. He submitted that when any jurisdiction of the High Court is withdrawn by any enactment of a special law, it cannot be re-conferred on the Court by implicating general law. He submitted that the provisions of section 14-A are not in contravention with the provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. and it will be absolutely wrong and incorrect to say that by placing a cap of limitation of maximum period of 180 days for filing appeal and making it not entertainable beyond such period, the enactment has gifted a special remedy of appeal which only temporarily suspends the right to move application for bail before the High Court under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. for a limited period of 180 days, and after expiry of period of 180 days, the right of seeking bail under general provisions of law by moving an application under section 439 Cr.P.C. gets revived and the accused-appellant is relieved from the liability to follow the procedure of newly inserted provisions of appeal under section 14-A(2), for all times to come. 15. Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Advocate referred to the instance of replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred as “Old Cr.P.C.”) by the present Code Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as “New Cr.P.C.”) w.e.f. 1.1.1974 and submitted that under the old Cr.P.C. there was very lengthy and time taking procedure with regard to committal of cases by the Magistrate to the Court of Sessions, while under new Cr.P.C. the above provisions were substituted with new provisions which provides that in a case if any of the alleged offences is triable by the Court of Sessions, the Magistrate shall forthwith commit it to the Court of Sessions, after taking cognizance and need not to record statement of witnesses, as was required earlier. He further submitted that after enforcement of new Cr.P.C. w.e.f. 1.4.1974 which has also not been given retrospective effect, all the Courts rightly followed the new procedure of committal as per provisions of New Cr.P.C. not only in matters of the offences committed after 1.4.1974 but also in the pending cases where offences were committed before 1.4.1974 i.e. before enforcement of new Cr.P.C. as they were not required to follow old procedure in the cases relating to offences committed before 1.4.1974 and for making the procedure applicable to all pending matters, the provisions of New Cr.P.C. were not required to be given retrospective effect and for not giving retrospective effect to the provisions of New Cr.P.C., no Court could dare to take absurd view of non applicability of provisions to pending cases where undisputedly criminal incident did take place prior to 1.1.1974. 16. He further referred to the instances of various Amendments in Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, with regard to pecuniary jurisdiction of subordinate courts, enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the courts of Civil Judge (Junior Division) from time to time as well as enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judges to hear and decide the 1st appeals under section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure or revisions under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He submitted that by U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1991 and U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 2015 whenever the pecuniary jurisdiction of subordinate courts was enhanced several 1st appeals under section 96 of Civil Procedure Code, earlier pending before this High Court beyond the then prevailing pecuniary limits of District Judges were sent back to District Courts for disposal by the District Judges, in view of enhancement of pecuniary limits, in-spite of the fact that above amendments were not given any retrospective effect and the only affect of the amendment not having been given retrospective effect, was that after enforcement of the amendment enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of District Judges, to decide appeals upto the valuation of Rs.25 lacs, any appeal under section 96 of Cr.P.C. against the judgment and decree passed in a suit having valuation below Rs.25 lacs, even if was passed much prior enforcement of U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 2015 enhancing the pecuniary limits, not remained entertainable by the High Court on ground of provisions being not retrospective. 17. 17. Learned AGA submitted that it will not be correct to say that for the offences in which offence was committed prior to enforcement of Amendment Act No.1 of 2016, the provisions of Section 14-A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act would not be applicable and similarly it will also not be correct that after the expiry of 180 days from the order of rejection of bail by Special Court below, the right of accused to file appeal will be fortified and right to move bail application under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. would revive and it will also not be correct to say after such period of 180, the provisions of Section 14-A(2) shall become obsolete or redundant. 18. The learned counsel for applicants and appellant in above cases did not put any argument to the contrary. 19. Despite equity and equality before law, guaranteed under our constitution, in 40th year after independence, it was felt that still various incidents of commission of offences of atrocities take place against the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in day to day life and so, with an object to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, to provide Special Courts for the trial of such offences, for providing relief and rehabilitation to the victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto, The Scheduled Castes and The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted with following Statement of Objects and Reasons:- “Statement of Objects and Reasons:-Despite various measures to improve the socio economic conditions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, they remain vulnerable. They are denied number of civil rights. They are subjected to various offences, indignities, humiliations and harassment. They have in several brutal incident, been deprived of their life and property. Serious crimes are committed against them for various historical, social and economic reasons. 2. Because of the awareness created amongst the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes through spread of education, etc. they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and resist practices of un-touch-ability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. they are trying to assert their rights and this is not being taken very kindly by the others. When they assert their rights and resist practices of un-touch-ability against them or demand statutory minimum wages or refuse to do any bonded and forced labour, the vested interests try to cow them down and terrorise them. When the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes try to preserve their self-respect or honour of their women, they become irritants for the dominant and the mighty. Occupation and cultivation of even the Government allotted land by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes is resented and more often these people become victims of attacks by the vested interests. Of late, there has been an increase in the disturbing trend of commission of certain atrocities like making the Scheduled Castes persons eat inedible substances like human excreta and attacks on and mass killings of helpless Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and rape of women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Under the circumstances, the existing law like the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 and the normal provisions of the Indian Penal Code have been found to be inadequate to check these crimes. A special legislation to check and deter crimes against them committed by non-Scheduled Castes and non-Scheduled Tribes has, therefore, become necessary. 3. The term “atrocity” has not been defined so far. It is considered necessary that not only the term “atrocity” should be defined but stringent measures should be introduced to provide for higher punishments for committing such atrocities. It is also proposed to enjoining on the States and the Union territories to take specific preventive and punitive measures to protect the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes from being victimized and where atrocities are committed, to provide adequate relief and assistance to rehabilitate them.” 20. In the 65th year after independence and after another period of over 25 years of enactment of S.C./S.T. Act 1989, it was further realized by the legislature that despite the deterrent provisions made in the Special Act, offences of atrocities against the members of S.C./S.T. continued at a disturbing level and adequate justice also remained difficult for majority of the victims and witnesses, as they faces hurdles virtually at every stage of the legal process and so with a view to provide them real and effective justice. Various amendments were made in S.C./S.T. Act 1989 by S.C./S.T. Act (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015 (1 of 2016) with effect from 26.1.2016 with following Statement of Objects and Reasons:- “Statement of Objects and Reasons:-The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 was enacted with a view to prevent the commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and to establish Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for providing relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences. 2. Despite the deterrent provisions made in the Act, atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes continue at a disturbing level. Adequate justice also remains difficult for a majority of the victims and the witnesses, as they face hurdles virtually at every stage of the legal process. The implementation of the Act suffers due to (a) procedural hurdles such as non-registration of case;(b) procedural delays in investigation, arrests and filing of charge sheets; and (c) delays in trial and low conviction rate. 3. It is also observed that certain forms of atrocities, known to be occurring in recent years, are not covered by the Act. Several offences under the Indian Penal Code, other than those already covered under section 3(2)(v) of the Act, are also committed frequently against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes on the ground that the victim was a member of a Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. It is also felt that the public accountability provisions under the Act need to be outlined in greater detail and strengthened. 4. In view of the above, it became necessary to make a comprehensive review of the relevant provisions of the Act after due consultation with the State Governments, Union territory Administrations, concerned Central Ministries, National Commission for the Scheduled Castes, National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes, certain Non-Governmental Organizations and Activists. 5. 4. In view of the above, it became necessary to make a comprehensive review of the relevant provisions of the Act after due consultation with the State Governments, Union territory Administrations, concerned Central Ministries, National Commission for the Scheduled Castes, National Commission for the Scheduled Tribes, certain Non-Governmental Organizations and Activists. 5. It is, therefore, proposed to amend the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 by the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Bill, 2014 which, inter alia, provides the following, namely:- (a) to amend the long title of the Act so as to provide for the establishment of the “Exclusive Special Courts” in addition to the Special Courts for the trial of the offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes; (b) to amend section 2 of the Act and insert certain new definitions like “economic boycott”, “Exclusive Special Court”, “forest rights”, “manual scavenger”, “public servant”, “social boycott”, “victim and witness”; (c) to amend section 3 of the Act relating to “Punishments for Offences of Atrocities” so as to provide some more categories of atrocities in the said section for which the same punishment as provided in the said section may be imposed; (d) to substitute section 4 of the Act relating to “Punishment for neglect of duties” so as to impose certain duties upon the public servant and to provide punishment for neglect of the duties specified in the said section; (e) to amend section 8 of the Act relating to “Presumption as to offences” and to provide that if the accused was acquainted with the victim or his family, the Court shall presume that the accused was aware of the caste or tribal identify of the victim unless proved otherwise; (f) to substitute section 14 of the Act relating to “Special Court” so as to provide that the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more districts to try the offences under the Act; (g) to amend section 15 of the Act relating to “Special Public Prosecutor” so as to insert a new sub-section requiring the State Government to specify an Exclusive Public Prosecutor or appoint an advocate as an Exclusive Special Public Prosecutor for the purpose of conducting cases in Exclusive Special Court; and (h) to insert a new Chapter IVA relating to “Rights of Victims and Witnesses” to impose certain duties and responsibilities upon the State for making necessary arrangements for protection of victims, their dependents and witnesses against any kind of intimidation, coercion or inducement or violence or threats of violence.” 21. It is pertinent to mention that by S.C./S.T. Amendment Act No.1 of 2016 drastic amendments were brought and enforced w.e.f. 26.1.2016, for ensuring effective justice for the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, by substitution, addition as well as insertion of various new provisions and by way of substitution of new sections 14 and 15 in place of existing, for providing speedy and effective justice, provisions for establishing Exclusive Special Courts in addition to Special Courts and for appointment of Exclusive Public Prosecutors in addition to Special Public Prosecutors were made and at the same time provisions for appeal under section 14-A were added/inserted, apart from adding various definitions in section 2 and inserting various new categories of offences, by substitution of new section 3 in place of existing. The Provisions of Sections 14-A, 15-A (1)(2)(3) and Section 20 of Scheduled Castes And The Scheduled Tribes (Prevention Of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are being reproduced as under:- "14-A. Appeals.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (2 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of ninety days: Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one hundred and eighty days. (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal." 15-A. Rights of victims and witnesses.—(1) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the State to make arrangements for the protection of victims, their dependents, and witnesses against any kind of intimidation or coercion or inducement or violence or threats of violence. (2) A victim shall be treated with fairness, respect and dignity and with due regard to any special need that arises because of the victim‘s age or gender or educational disadvantage or poverty. (3) A victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any Court proceeding including any bail proceeding and the Special Public Prosecutor or the State Government shall inform the victim about any proceedings under this Act. 20. Act to override other laws.-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 22. The provisions of above mentioned newly inserted/added section 14-A (2) provide that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against each and every order of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, granting or refusing bail, within a period of 90 days from the date of order appealed from, provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of 90 days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of 90 days and further provides that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of 180 days. Meaning thereby that against an order passed by Special Court or Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail, the only remedy provided under the act, is by way of filing an appeal under section 14-A(2) which has to be filed within 90 days from order or within a maximum period of 180 days from the date of order and the High Court may condone a maximum delay of 90 days, after the expiry of prescribed 90 days period of limitation and may not entertain an appeal preferred beyond the total period of 180 days from the date of order, on any ground whatsoever. From the above provisions it is also clear that a maximum delay for the period of 90 days can be condoned by the High Court and the above provisions may not be construed to empower the High Court to condone the delay of a period of 180 days, after the prescribed period of 90 days enabling it to entertain appeal upto 270 days from the date of order. 23. Upon cumulative reading the newly added provisions of Sections 14-A and 15-A of S.C./S.T. Act, I find that the legislature brought these provisions of appeal with further provisions to serve the victim or his/her dependent with notice of such appeal only with an intention to provide him an opportunity to oppose the plea of bail of real culprit, before this Court in place of the general provisions of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. 24. In my view, the provisions of newly inserted/added section 14A of the S.C./S.T. Act are unambiguous and crystal clear and do not require any interpretation or clarification. The provisions have neither been brought only for offences occurring after 26.1.2016 nor the provisions of appeal are for a short term of 180 days, suspending right of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. for such short period and its revival after lapse of such period. 25. It is settled principle of law, as has also been held by the Apex Court in AIR 2010 SC 671 in the case of Sri Jai Ram Educational Trust Vs. 25. It is settled principle of law, as has also been held by the Apex Court in AIR 2010 SC 671 in the case of Sri Jai Ram Educational Trust Vs. AG Syed Mohideen that “purpose of interpretation is not to make a provision what the Judge thinks it should be – but to make it what the legislature intended it to be” and so the intentions of legislature is to be gathered from the words used in the newly inserted/added provisions and intention of Judge (as given in the cases of Janardan Pandey and Rohit supra) need not be given effect. 26. In 2002 (6) SCC 678 in the case of Nilesh Nand Kumar Shah Vs. Sikandar Aziz Patel, the Apex Court held that “Statutes or provisions – rent control statute – provisions of, in case of conflict, held, override the general legislation – the purpose of rent control legislation, is to protect the tenants from unjust evictions at the hands of greedy and unscrupulous land lords – in case of doubt, provisions of rent control Act should be interpreted in favour of tenant.” and similarly the provisions of Special Statute of S.C./S.T. Act are required to be interpreted in favour of the victims, the persons belonging to Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes, for whose welfare and protection from atrocities, the enactment was brought. 27. In AIR 2000 SC 109 in the case of Mathuram Agrawal Vs. State of M.P., the Five Judges Bench of Apex Court in dealing with the matter of taxing statute held that “intention of legislature to be gathered from words used and not from the economic results sought to be obtained.” 28. In the cases of Janardan Pandey (supra) and Rohit (supra), it has been held by the learned Single Judge that the provisions of appeal under section 14-A (2) S.C./S.T. Act would not be applicable to (i) the cases where offences were committed prior to 26.1.2016 as well as (ii) to the cases, where more than 180 days have elapsed from the date of order refusing or allowing the bail. 29. “A new law is bound to be prospective”. 30. 29. “A new law is bound to be prospective”. 30. As per basic principle of law (i) only substantive laws or amendments therein can be given retrospective effect while procedural laws or amendments therein may not be generally given retrospective effect, (ii) even in substantive laws only civil laws or amendments therein may be given retrospective effect and substantive criminal laws and amendments therein may not be given retrospective effect and (iii) all laws and amendments therein are ordinarily be only prospective, unless made retrospective by specific provisions or necessary implication. 31. The legislature has power to make laws with prospective or retrospective effect, but Article 20 of our Constitution provides certain safeguards to the persons accused of crime and so Art. 20 (1) imposes a limitation on the law making power of the legislature. It prohibits the legislature to make retrospective criminal laws, however it does not prohibit a civil liability retrospectively i.e. with effect from past date. So a tax can be imposed retrospectively. Under Chapter III of “Fundamental Rights” in the constitution, clause (1) of Article 20 guarantees right against ex-post facto laws. It provides that, “no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force, at the time of commission of the offence.” 32. As a rule every new law is bound to be prospective until and unless it has been given retrospective effect by the legislature. Further all procedural laws are bound to be prospective and the legislature never gives retrospective effect to any procedural law, because in case of giving retrospective effect to any procedural law various complications may arise. 33. As a rule only substantive laws may be given retrospective effect and that too only applies in respect of civil laws and not to criminal laws. For example, a tax can be imposed w.e.f. a past date, but at the same time an action which was, earlier not termed an offence, may neither be treated a punishable offence w.e.f. a previous date nor the punishment for any offence may be enhanced w.e.f. a previous date. 34. For example, a tax can be imposed w.e.f. a past date, but at the same time an action which was, earlier not termed an offence, may neither be treated a punishable offence w.e.f. a previous date nor the punishment for any offence may be enhanced w.e.f. a previous date. 34. Undisputedly the Amendment Act 1 of 2016 has come into force w.e.f. 26.1.2016 and the amended provisions have not been given retrospective effect from any date in past. Hence, the clear and simple meaning of the provisions of Act as well as newly inserted Section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act is that (i) against the orders refusing bail by Special Court if the accused has approached this Court through an application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., prior to enforcement of amendment i.e. prior to 26.1.2016, the same shall be competent and unaffected by amendment, irrespective of the fact that it comes up for hearing on or after 26.1.2016, and shall not be thrown out on the ground of maintainability, in view of newly added provisions of appeal against such orders, under section 14-A S.C./S.T. Act. (ii) Similarly in the matters of bail granted by Special Court, if the first informant/victim has moved an application for cancellation of bail prior to 26.1.2016 this Court shall have to dispose it of on its merits and the same may not be rejected on the ground of maintainability of appeal against such orders, under section 14-A (3) S.C./S.T. Act. Need not to say that in every such case, where application for bail or for cancellation of bail filed before this Court prior to 26.1.2016, the offence would certainly have committed prior to 26.1.2016 and under any imagination there can not be any case of offence having been committed after 26.1.2016 and order having been passed prior to 26.1.2016. (iii) On or after 26.1.2016, against every order granting or refusing bail by the Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, passed before or after 26.1.2016, in respect of offences committed prior or subsequent to 26.1.2016, an appeal would be the only remedy available to the aggrieved party and an application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. shall not be entertainable/maintainable on ground of lapse of more than 180 days from the date of impugned order or on any other ground whatsoever. 35. 35. For the sake of convenience and clarity, there can be following categories of cases viz. (i) cases where offence was committed prior to 26.1.2016, bail application was disposed of by Special Judge prior to 26.1.2016 and application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. or for cancellation of bail moved before the High Court prior to 26.1.2016 but comes up for hearing after 26.1.2016. (ii) cases where offence was committed prior to 26.1.2016, bail application was disposed of by Special Court prior to 26.1.2016 but application before this Court could not be moved prior to 26.1.2016. (iii) cases where offence itself was committed subsequent to 26.1.2016 and consequences are bound to take place after 26.1.2016. (iv) cases under any of the above categories (ii) and (iii) where appeal could not be filed within the prescribed period of 90 days, but filed within next 90 days. (v) cases under IVth category where appeal could not be filed within 180 days from order and has been filed beyond 180 days with an application for condonation of delay. 36. Out of above categories of cases, cases of category (i) will not be covered by the newly added provisions of S.C./S.T. Act (as provisions have not given retrospective effect) but the cases under rest four categories will be governed by such newly added provisions of Sections 14-A, 15-A etc. and in cases under category (ii) and (iii) an appeal under section 14-A would be the remedy available to the aggrieved person, in cases under category (iv) appeal may be filed with application for condonation of delay and in cases under category (v) the appeal shall not be entertainable by the High Court, being barred by time. 37. So the only effect of provisions not being made retrospective will be that in the cases where bail application was disposed of by the Special Court and application for bail or for cancellation of bail was moved before High Court prior to 26.1.2016, the same shall be competent and shall not be rejected on the ground of maintainability, as the provisions of section 14-A S.C./S.T. Act will not be applicable to above applications. The above provisions of appeal relate to the procedural law and do not relate to substantive law, so the date of committal of offence or of lodging of F.I.R. or of taking of cognizance by the Court upon submission of charge sheet shall not be relevant or significant factor with regard to the enforcement of provisions of section 14-A S.C./S.T. Act irrespective of the fact of provisions being prospective or having not given retrospective effect. 38. After enforcement of provisions of section 14-A S.C./S.T. Act, against every order passed prior to or subsequent to 26.1.2016 only appeal shall be the remedy available to the aggrieved person under above provisions and no application for bail or for cancellation of bail would be maintainable or entertainable on the ground of offence having been committed prior to 26.1.2016 or otherwise. 39. It is pertinent to mention that the main object of Amending Act 1 of 2016 behind the insertion/addition of provisions of appeal under section 14-A(2) S.C./S.T. Act against an order granting or refusing bail by the Special Court is, to provide an opportunity of hearing to the first informant/victim or his dependent, at the time of disposal on the plea of bail of accused before this Court, so as to provide effective justice to the persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, as section 15-A (3) S.C./S.T. Act specifically contemplates that a victim or his dependent shall have the right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any Court proceedings including any bail proceedings and the Special Public Prosecutor or the State Government shall inform the victim about any proceedings under this Act. In view of the provisions of section 15-A (3) S.C./S.T. Act which requires notice to victims, no accused may be permitted to seek bail by moving an application under section 439 Cr.P.C., instead of filing appeal under section 14-A (2) S.C./S.T. Act, on the ground of offence having been committed prior to 26.1.2016, and provisions having not been given retrospective effect, or on the ground of lapse of more than 180 days from the impugned order, and by doing so he may not be permitted to contravene the provisions of law so as to deprive the victim or his dependent from an opportunity of opposing his bail, which statutory opportunity has been provided to the victim by the enactment, by inserting and adding the provisions of appeal to protect his rights. 40. As far as the revival of right of accused to seek bail under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. after expiry of 180 days from the date of rejection of his bail by court below as held in the case of Rohit (supra) is concerned, I find no justification for giving such a vague interpretation which is absolutely against the intentions, objects and spirit of the enactment as well as the provisions of section 14-A and 15-A of S.C./S.T. Act. In the case of Rohit (supra), the Single Judge Bench of this Court has held that newly added provisions of section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act simply provides a special remedy of appeal from the date of order and suspends his right of seeking bail through an application under section 439 Cr.P.C. for such limited period, which right of accused revives on the expiry of period of 180 days. 41. The above interpretation is absolutely vague. By providing the remedy of appeal in any manner, the enactment has not facilitated the accused, rather it has taxed the accused with burden of adopting procedure of appeal for seeking bail, instead of general procedure of application under section 439 Cr.P.C. and has also burdened him with liability to wait for hearing till service of notices on victim or his dependent. It will not be correct to say that the remedy of appeal has been provided to accused as a 'Gift' which stands forfeited after a period of 180 days. It will not be correct to say that the remedy of appeal has been provided to accused as a 'Gift' which stands forfeited after a period of 180 days. Since the opportunity of hearing to victim has been provided by above provisions, he may not be deprived of his right of hearing, on account of delay/fault by the accused. It will be absolutely wrong and incorrect to say that the provisions of sections 14-A/15-A of S.C./S.T. Act provides any short term special Gift to accused and suspends his right to seek bail through application under section 439 Cr.P.C. remains in abeyance for a period of 180 days (within which time appeal may be filed) and revives on 181st day. I find that the entire marathon exercise done by the learned Single Judge Bench of this Court in making these interpretation was totally unwarranted and unjust. 42. Section 14-A (2) S.C./S.T. Act provides for the remedy of appeal against an order allowing or refusing bail, passed by Special Court or Exclusive Special Court and section 14-A (3) provides that such appeal shall be preferred within a period of 90 days from the date of order. There are two proviso to section 14-A (3), Ist of which provides that an appeal after the expiry of said period of 90 days will be entertained upon satisfaction of sufficient cause for the delay and IInd that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of 180 days. The main anxiety of this Court at the time of decision in the case of Rohit (supra) was that after expiry of 180 days, whether an accused under the Special Act would be denuded of his right to seek bail and considering that since on account of expiry of more than 180 days from the date of impugned order of rejection of his bail application, the accused may not be deprived of his opportunity of seeking bail/liberty for an indefinite period, it held that his right to seek bail under general law by moving application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. before this Court (which was impliedly suspended in view of provisions of section 14 A (2) and (3)), will revive for all future times. 43. 43. In view of discussions made above, I am of the considered view that proviso to section 14-A (3) making the appeal not entertainable after lapse of a maximum period of 180 days from the date of order, does neither render the accused or victim remediless nor deprives him of his right to seek bail for all times to come nor deprives the victim from seeking cancellation of bail granted to an accused by the Special or Exclusive Special Court as the case may be before this Court. Undisputedly, the principles of res-judicata, as applicable to the civil cases, are not applicable to the criminal cases and particularly to the miscellaneous matters of bails etc. An accused after rejection of his first bail application may move numberless applications for bail before the same court again and again seeking bail on the ground of change of circumstances or even on the ground of period of detention etc. and his subsequent bail applications may not be rejected on the ground of being barred by principle of res-judicata on account of rejection of his earlier bail application. Similarly, under general law, an accused upon rejection of his bail application may move numberless applications before this Court under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. Previously, despite there being no such provision, as a matter of practice upon rejection of application for bail by this Court under section 439 Cr.P.C., instead of moving second or subsequent bail application before this Court directly, the accused persons each time used to move fresh bail application before the court below, after rejection of which they used to come before this Court with second, third, fourth or subsequent applications for bail. 44. By inserting proviso and imposing a cap of maximum period of limitation of 180 days for filing appeal, the Special Act neither had any intention to deprive the accused from his right to seek liberty of bail for all times to come nor had any intention of making the provisions of appeal ineffective and inapplicable after such period so as to revive the general provisions of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. and depriving the right of hearing of victim. After the expiry of period of 180 days, the accused is not stopped from seeking bail and has every right to move fresh bail application before Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, upon rejection of which, he has statutory fresh and absolute right to file appeal under section 14 A (2) of S.C./S.T. Act within the prescribed period of 90/180 days from the date of subsequent order of refusal of bail and such appeal will be competent and may not be treated to be barred by principles of res-judicata on account of not challenging earlier order of refusal of bail by Special or Exclusive Special Court. 45. It is pertinent to mention that there can be no reason or justification with the legislation to bring and enforce the special provisions of appeal in place of general provisions of bail under section 439 Cr.P.C., and that too for a short period from 3 to 6 months only. The view taken by the Court in the case of Rohit (supra) is totally illogical and if prevails or allowed to stand, it will enable the litigants make abuse of process of Court as well as to flout the provisions of enactment, defeating the object of provisions brought through amendment and making the provisions of Act redundant. The view taken by the Court in the case of Rohit (supra) is totally illogical and if prevails or allowed to stand, it will enable the litigants make abuse of process of Court as well as to flout the provisions of enactment, defeating the object of provisions brought through amendment and making the provisions of Act redundant. For example upon disposal of bail application by the Special Judge or Exclusive Special Judge, in a cases where around 178 or 179 days have elapsed from the date of order and accused is required to file appeal under section 14-A (2) with application for condonation of delay under proviso to section 14-A (3) he will opt to cause further delay of 2-3 more days deliberately so as to get rid of the clutches of law and set himself free from the liability of following the provisions of appeal under section 14-A (2) upon which he will not be required to wait until delay is condoned, rather he will be at liberty to move simple application under section 439 Cr.P.C. directly before this Court and may seek bail without issuance of notice to victim (as mandatorily contemplated under section 15-A(3) in case of appeal) and without waiting till disposal of delay condonation application and without any probability of opposing of his bail plea by victim, against the aim, object and spirit of the enactment behind insertion/addition of the provisions of appeal and depriving the first informant/victim from an opportunity of hearing by this Court he will be able to seek bail more quickly and easily. This way mischievous and unscrupulous litigants will be able to surpass the provisions of enactment and render them redundant and obsolete by making abuse of process of law. Moreover if the Rohit's view prevails an unscrupulous accused if mischievously causes deliberate delay of 180 days from the date of order of rejection of his bail by Special Court and opts to wait for such period, he shall be relieved from the liability to follow the amended provisions of appeal and shall acquire a gift of revival of his right to seek bail under general provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C., depriving the victim from his statutory right of hearing and making the provisions of Amending Act obsolete and redundant. In this way, the accused shall be free from above provisions of section 14-A-2 for ever, and even in case of rejection of his bail application by this Court, he shall be having right to move IInd, IIIrd and subsequent bail applications before the Court without approaching the Special or Exclusive Special Court again and may get them disposed of without any opportunity of hearing to the victim. 46. It is settled principle of law that no Court can confer a jurisdiction on itself, which has not been conferred on it by law i.e. by any statute. In the matters relating to partition of agricultural land which are triable by revenue courts, the civil court may not be competent to confer jurisdiction to try such suit on itself on any ground whatsoever. Similarly in the matters of offences where the court of Magistrate or Sessions Judge shall be having jurisdiction, the civil courts may not confer jurisdiction on itself on the ground of offence having been committed in respect of a property which is subject matter of civil suit, claiming jurisdiction to decide the same or vice versa. The judicial proprietary requires that no court is supposed to confer any jurisdiction on itself unless the same is vested in it by law. 47. In view of the discussions made above, I am of the considered view that (i) the jurisdiction to grant bail in the matters where bail has been refused by the Special Judge, or Exclusive Special Judge S.C./S.T. Act, upon an application for bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. as well as (ii) the jurisdiction to cancel the bail so granted by Special Judge or Exclusive Special Judge, upon an application for cancellation of bail, which is vested in High Court under general law of Cr.P.C., have been taken away by the Special Act, the S.C./S.T. Act by insertion/addition of provisions of section 14-A (2), 15-A etc. conferring appellate jurisdiction on it with an intention to afford additional opportunity of hearing to the first informant/victim or his dependent to oppose the bail of accused/appellant before the High Court and the jurisdiction so taken away may not be re-conferred on itself by the High Court either on the ground of offence having been committed prior to 26.1.2016 (the date of enforcement) or on the ground of revival of general rule of seeking bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. due to lapse of over 180 days from the date of order, so as to deprive the victim or his dependent of his valuable statutory right of hearing provided to him under law and also against the objects and spirit of the provisions of law. I am unable to agree with the views taken by learned Single Judge Bench of this Court in its decisions dated 25.8.2017 in the case of Janardan Pandey (supra) in Criminal Appeal No.2943 of 2017 and, dated 29.8.2017 in the case of Rohit (supra) in Criminal Appeal Defective No.523 of 2017. By above decisions, unnecessary controversy has been created due to which on one hand, the lawyers at Bar feel day-to-day problems in filing of appeals, because though appeal is proper remedy but Registry shows its inability to accept such appeals in matters of offences committed prior to 26.1.2016 as well as in cases where more than 180 days have elapsed from the date of impugned order and insists for moving of bail application under section 439 Cr.P.C. in view of the decisions of Single Judge Bench of this Court in cases of Janardan Pandey and Rohit (supra), while on the other hand, the poor litigants including accused persons, who claim to have been falsely implicated finds themselves adversely affected from unwarranted controversy created by above decisions for not being released for months together. Sometimes, when the bail application is moved by a person in view of the decisions in the case of Janardan Pandey (supra) due to offence having been committed prior to 26.1.2016 or in view of the decision in the case of Rohit (supra) on account of expiry of more than 180 days from the order, learned counsel for the applicants find themselves unable to support maintainability of their bail applications at the time of hearing, as the same happens to be barred by the provisions of special enactment. 48. 48. In view of discussions made above, I am of the considered view that the judgments delivered in the cases of Janardan Pandey in Criminal Appeal No2943 of 2017 and Rohit in Criminal Appeal Defective No.523 of 2017 (both supra) give wrong, incorrect and totally unwarranted interpretation of amended provisions which are in utter contradiction with clear and unambiguous newly inserted/added provisions of section 14-A and 15-A etc. of S.C./S.T. Act, which bars the maintainability of application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C./application for cancellation of bail against the orders granting or refusing bail. In my opinion, the above provisions of sections 14-A and 15-A etc. of S.C./S.T. Act creates/puts absolute bar on moving of an application for bail or for cancellation of bail against the orders granting or refusing bail by Special or Exclusive Special Courts, irrespective of the fact that the order passed relates to the offence committed prior to 26.1.20016 or more than 180 days have elapsed since passing of such order and finds that in the interests of justice following questions are required to be answered by a Larger Bench for putting controversy at rest and finishing the chaos created by the above mentioned two judgments. Thus, the following questions are being referred to be answered by the Larger Bench: (i) whether in matters of offences committed before 26.1.2016, from which date amending Act no.1 of 2016 inserting/adding provisions of appeal against orders allowing or refusing an application for bail by the Special or Exclusive Special Judge under S.C./S.T. Act has been enforced, the filing of appeal will be incompetent on the ground of offence having been committed prior to enforcement of above provisions of section 14-A and an application for bail under general provisions of law section 439 Cr.P.C. before this Court, would be competent as held in the case of Janardan Pandey (supra) (ii) whether the provisions of newly added section 14-A (3) and its proviso prescribing the limitation period of 90 days from the date of order, further providing for the condonation of delay by the High Court in appeals preferred beyond the period of 90 days and again providing a maximum period of 180 days, after which no appeal shall be entertained, puts absolute bar on the right of appeal and renders the aggrieved persons remediless or it only suspends the general provisions of seeking bail from the High Court under the provisions of section 439 Cr.P.C. for a limited period of 180 days after which the provisions of section 14-A becomes obsolete and ineffective for ever and the right to seek bail before the High Court under general provisions of law section 439 Cr.P.C. stands revived as held in the case of Rohit (supra) or the accused may move fresh application for bail before Special or Exclusive Special Court and in case of its rejection may have fresh right of appeal under section 14A of the Act. (iii) whether an appeal filed under section 14-A of S.C./S.T. Act may be converted into an application for bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in exercise of inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. on account of offence having been committed prior to 26.1.2016, the date of enforcement of Act No.1 of 2016 or on account of expiry of more than 180 days from the date of impugned order of Special or Exclusive Special Court. 49. Let the papers be placed before the Hon'ble The Chief Justice to consider constitution of a larger Bench to resolve the conflict in the decision of the Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction and for consideration of above question. 50. 49. Let the papers be placed before the Hon'ble The Chief Justice to consider constitution of a larger Bench to resolve the conflict in the decision of the Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction and for consideration of above question. 50. The Court is very thankful to the learned Senior Counsel Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, who provided his valuable time in assisting the Court on the question in controversy. 51. Let a copy of order be placed on record of connected cases.