JUDGMENT : DR. A.K.RATH, J. 1. This is a plaintiff’s appeal against the judgment and decree dated 18.4.1988 & 25.4.1988 respectively passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Gunupur in T.A.No.4 of 1986 confirming the judgment and decree dated 25.10.1984 and 2.11.1984 respectively passed by learned Munsif, Gunupur in Title Suit No.1 of 1981. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit land, which is locally known as Banki Polam Istuawas, originally belonged to Jeypore Estate. The ex-ruler of Jeypore gifted the said property in favour of one Bankoi Das. In due course of time, Gopinath Pujari and Balaram Pujari became the owner of the land by means of partition. The same was assessed to total land revenue of Rs.8/-with cess. Gopinath got the land bearing cist of Rs.3-8-0 and Balaram got the land bearing cist of Rs.4-8-0. On 25.3.1929 the legal heirs and successors of Balaram sold the land bearing cist of Rs.4-8-0 to Sammatla Jaggaraidu for a consideration of Rs.4,000/-. Thereafter on 3.3.1930, Gopinath and his sons sold their share bearing cist of Rs.3-8-0 to the said Sammatla Jaggaraidu. Thus Sammatla Jaggaraidu became the absolute owner of the entire land. Since the Registration Act was not in force, the sale deed was executed on stamp papers and attested as per law. While the matter stood thus, Sammatla Jaggraidu sold the entire land with the cist of Rs.8/-to Dinabandhu Sahu by means of a registered sale deed no.122 of 1942 and thereafter delivered possession. Thereafter Dinabandhu Sahu sold the said land to Neelamani Panigrahi, the father of the plaintiff, by means of a registered sale deed no.127 of 1948. Since then the father of the plaintiff was in peaceful possession of the suit land. Thereafter the plaintiff is in possession. The father of the plaintiff used to pay cist to the ex-Estate of Jeypore and thereafter to the State Government till the year 1965. The R.O.R. was published in the year 1964. Since he was a minor, he could not take any steps during settlement operation. The R.O.R. was issued in favour of his father in respect of khata no.5 for an area of Ac.66-66 cents. Though his father was the owner of an area Ac.105.90 cents, but an area Ac.35.82 cents was wrongly recorded in the name of State Government in respect of khata no.6 of plot no.51. The R.O.R. was issued in favour of his father in respect of khata no.5 for an area of Ac.66-66 cents. Though his father was the owner of an area Ac.105.90 cents, but an area Ac.35.82 cents was wrongly recorded in the name of State Government in respect of khata no.6 of plot no.51. While the matter stood thus, in the year 1964, the Tahasildar, Gunupur, defendant no.2 initiated encroachment case against him. The Tahasil Amin had submitted the report in his favour. In spite of the same, the order of eviction was passed on 18.6.1979. Thereafter he filed appeal before the S.D.O., Gunupur against the said order. Before delivery of the order, the suit records were washed away in the flood of 17.9.1980. To accommodate the flood victims, the defendants along with the Chairman, N.A.C., Gunupur made attempt to demarcate the disputed plot to grant lease. The same was stopped due to protest. Again in the last week of December 1980 and 1st week of January 1981, the defendants attempted to assign a part of the disputed plot to the R.E.O. and some flood victims. Though he protested but the defendants maintained a stony like silence. Since the defendants threatened to invade the right, title and interest and enjoyment to the property, he instituted the suit for permanent injunction. 3. Pursuant to issuance of summons, the defendants entered appearance and filed a comprehensive written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. The defendants denied the alleged gift deed and successive alienations. According to the defendants, father of the plaintiff was a Manager of Jeypore Estate. The land, which was in possession of the plaintiff, had been duly recorded in the name of his father in the last settlement. The plaintiff is the adjacent owner of plot no.51. Purimamidi alias Katwalaguda was an intermediary estate. The intermediary interest of Jeypore Estate vested in the State of Orissa. The land, which was in khas possession of the intermediary, was settled under Section 7 of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act. In the said proceeding, an area of 63.14 was settled on 27.1.1998. The family of the plaintiff had not made any claim over plot no.51. The defendant no.2 initiated encroachment proceeding against the plaintiff in respect of a portion of plot no.51 in the year 1974. The order of eviction was passed on 18.6.1979. In the said proceeding, an area of 63.14 was settled on 27.1.1998. The family of the plaintiff had not made any claim over plot no.51. The defendant no.2 initiated encroachment proceeding against the plaintiff in respect of a portion of plot no.51 in the year 1974. The order of eviction was passed on 18.6.1979. Against the said order, the plaintiff filed O.P.L.E. Appeal No.8/79 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Gunupur. Though the original records were sent to the appellate authority, but the same had been washed away in the flood of Banasdhara river in September 1980, which caused severe damage the house and residential office of defendant no.1. In view of the high flood, schemes had been formulated for rehabilitating the Government Officers and public from the low land areas of the town to higher places in the larger interest of the State. Neither the father nor the plaintiff was the recorded owner of the suit land nor they were in possession of the same. The plaintiff has no semblance of right, title and interest over the suit land. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court struck nine issues, out of which, issue no.(ii) is pivotal. The same is:- “(ii) Whether the plaintiff has right, title or possession over the suit lands?” 5. To substantiate the case, the plaintiff had examined two witnesses and on his behalf seven documents had been exhibited. The defendants had also examined seven witnesses and on their behalf seventeen documents had been exhibited. The learned trial court came to hold that the suit land is a Government land, several encroachment cases were initiated against the plaintiff, the order of eviction was passed, finally the plaintiff had been evicted and answered issue no.2 in negative. The trial court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff had unsuccessfully challenged the same in the court of the learned Sub-ordinate Judge, Gunupur in Title Appeal No.4 of 1986, which was eventually dismissed. 6. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos. 1 and 5. “1. For that Exts.1 to 4 having been accepted as genuine and in view of the evidence of D.W.6 that Ext. D and Ext. 6. The second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law enumerated in ground nos. 1 and 5. “1. For that Exts.1 to 4 having been accepted as genuine and in view of the evidence of D.W.6 that Ext. D and Ext. E are entries in Kattubadi Register relating to the lands covered under Exts.1 to 4, if the courts below have committed serious illegality in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove his title over the suit land? 5. For that if the lower appellate court acted illegally and failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not permitting the plaintiff to withdraw the suit under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C.” 7. Mr. Das, learned Advocate for the appellant, submitted that the father of the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value. His father was the absolute owner in possession of the suit land. Thereafter, the plaintiff is in possession. The father of the plaintiff used to pay cist to the ex-ruler of Jeypore Estate and thereafter to the State Government till the year 1965. He was paying rent to the ex-ruler. Thereafter the plaintiff was also paying rent to the State. Since the plaintiff was a minor, he could take any step during settlement operation for which the land was recorded in the name of State Government. In the encroachment proceeding, the R.I. has submitted a report in favour of the plaintiff. The same is a document of thirty years old and presumed to be correct. Placing reliance on Exts. 1, 2 and 4 and the entries made in the Kottubadi registrar vide Exts. D and E, he further submitted that the courts below have committed manifest illegality in holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove the title. He further submitted that during pendency of the appeal, the appellant filed an application under Order 23 Rule 1 C.P.C. for withdrawal of the appeal. The learned appellate court committed a patent error in dismissing the same. 8. Per contra, Mr.Panda, learned Additional Government Advocate supported the judgments of the courts below. He submitted that originally the land belonged to ex-ruler of Jeypore. The land vested in the State after coming into force of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act. The plaintiff has no semblance of right, title and interest over the same. Further simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. 9. He submitted that originally the land belonged to ex-ruler of Jeypore. The land vested in the State after coming into force of the Orissa Estate Abolition Act. The plaintiff has no semblance of right, title and interest over the same. Further simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. 9. Admittedly, the suit schedule land belonged to ex-ruler of Jeypore. The plaintiff asserts that the ex-ruler had gifted the said property in favour of Bankoi Das. Thereafter Balaram and Gopinath became the owner in possession of the said land by means partition. There is no evidence on record that the ex-ruler had gifted the property in favour of Bankoi Das. There is neither any pleading nor evidence with regard to the relationship of Bankoi Das with Balaram and Gopinath. Thus any successive alienation is void. Furthermore, the land was alienated by Gourmani and others in favour of S.Jaggaraidu on 25.3.1929, vide Ext.1 by means of an unregistered sale deed. Similarly Gopinath alienated the land by means of an unregistered sale deed in favour of said S.Jaggaraidu on 2.3.1930, vide Ext.2. There is no description of property in the unregistered sale deeds executed vide Exts.1 & 2. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the father of the plaintiff was the owner of the suit property. 10. The intermediary estate vested in the State free from all encumbrance of the suit land. Thus State is the paramount owner of the suit land. Reliance placed on R.I. report is totally misplaced. In Ramkrushna Mohapatra & others vs. Gangadhar Mohapatra & others , AIR 1958 Orissa 26, this court held that presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act relates to the execution of document, that is, signature, attestation of the document and to its genuineness, but not to the truth of its contents . Further the presumption can be raised only with reference to original documents & can not be availed of in case of certified copy as by this court in Subudhi pradhan vs. Raghu Bhuban, AIR 1962 Ori 40 . Otherwise also the report of the R.I. in the proceeding under O.P.L.E. Act does not confer any title. 11. The title of the plaintiff is on the cloud suspicion. Thus, a simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. In Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. Otherwise also the report of the R.I. in the proceeding under O.P.L.E. Act does not confer any title. 11. The title of the plaintiff is on the cloud suspicion. Thus, a simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. In Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 2008 SC 2033 , the apex Court held that where a cloud raised over plaintiff’s title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. 12. With regard to withdrawal of the suit at the appellate stage, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 23 Rule 1 (3) C.P.C. on the ground that he will institute fresh suit seeking correction of the record of rights which stood recorded in the name of State and to implead the State. But the learned appellate court rejected the same. 13. The Apex Court in the case of V. Rajendran and another v. Annasamy Pandian (D) Thr. LRs. Karthyayani Natchiar, AIR 2017 SC 685 held thus :- “9. Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) CPC lays down following grounds on which a Court may allow withdrawal of suit. It reads as under: R.1. Withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of claim.- (3) Whether the Court is satisfied. (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit or such part of the claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of such suit or such part of the claim. As per Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) CPC, suit may only be withdrawn with permission to bring a fresh suit when the Court is satisfied that the suit must fail for reason of some formal defect or that there are other sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. The power to allow withdrawal of a suit is discretionary. In the application, the plaintiff must make out a case in terms of Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) (a) or (b) CPC and must ask for leave. The power to allow withdrawal of a suit is discretionary. In the application, the plaintiff must make out a case in terms of Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) (a) or (b) CPC and must ask for leave. The Court can allow the application filed under Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) CPC for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit only if the condition in either of the clause (a) or (b) that is, existence of a “formal defect” or “sufficient grounds”. The principle under Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) CPC is founded on public policy to prevent institution of suit again and again on the same cause of action. 10. In K.S. Bhoopathy and Ors. v. Kokila and Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 458 : ( AIR 2000 SC 2132 ), it has been held that it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied about the existence of “formal defect” or “sufficient grounds” before granting permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit under the same cause of action. Though, liberty may lie with the plaintiff in a suit to withdraw the suit at any time after the institution of suit on establishing the “formal defect” or “sufficient grounds”, such right cannot be considered to be so absolute as to permit or encourage abuse of process of Court. The fact that the plaintiff is entitled to abandon or withdraw the suit or part of the claim by itself, is no licence to the plaintiff to claim or to do so to the detriment of legitimate right of the defendant. When an application is filed under Order XXIII Rule 1 (3) CPC, the Court must be satisfied about the “formal defect” or “sufficient grounds”. “Formal defect” is a defect of form prescribed by the Rules of procedure such as, want of notice under Section 80 CPC, improper valuation of the suit, insufficient court fee, confusion regarding identification of the suit property, mis-joinder of parties, failure to disclose a cause of action etc. “Formal defect” must be given a liberal meaning which connotes various kinds of defects not affecting the merits of the plea raised by either of the parties. 11. “Formal defect” must be given a liberal meaning which connotes various kinds of defects not affecting the merits of the plea raised by either of the parties. 11. In terms of Order XXIII Rule (3) (b) where the court is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit, the Court may permit the plaintiff to withdraw the suit. In interpretation of the word “Sufficient grounds”, there are two views: One view is that these grounds in clause (b) must be “ejusdem generis” with those in clause (a), that is, it must be of the same nature as the ground in clause (a) that is formal defect or at least analogous to them; and the other view was that the words “other sufficient grounds” in clause (b) should be read independent of the words a ‘formal defect’ and clause (a). Court has been given a wider discretion to allow withdrawal from suit in the interest of justice in cases where such a prayer is not covered by clause (a). Since in the present case, we are only concerned with “formal defect” envisaged under clause (a) of Rule (1) sub-rule (3), we choose not to elaborate any further on the ground contemplated under clause (b) that is “sufficient grounds”.” 14. The defect as stated in the application is a defect of substance. It not only affects the merits of the case but also it strikes at the root of the plaintiff’s case. In view of the same, the learned appellate court has rightly rejected the application for withdrawal of suit. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 15. In the result, the appeal, being devoid of any merit, fails and is dismissed. No costs.