JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar Srivastava-II, J.—The instant Special Appeal has arisen against the judgment and order dated 20.5.2016 whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed Review Petition No. 151 (D) of 2013, Lallu Prasad Singh and others v. State of U.P. and others, which arose out of Writ Petition No. 4712 (S/S) of 2004, Ram Sumer Yadav v. State of U.P. and others, decided on 17.2.2010. 2. We have heard Shri K.D. Nag, learned counsel for the appellants-petitioners, Shri Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Advocate for respondent No. 5, Ram Sumer Yadav, learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and perused the record. 3. In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel for the parties, it would be necessary to give a brief history of the litigation between the parties as it is a case of prolonged litigation. 4. Opposite party No. 5, Ram Sumer Yadav (hereinafter referred to as opposite party No. 5) was appointed as Junior Clerk/Typist for a fixed period up to February, 1991 in the Office of Transport Commissioner U.P. vide Order No. 5523 E/90-43E/87 dated 8.8.1990. This order was cancelled vide Office Order No. 5566 E/90-43E/87 dated 13.8.1990. A Writ Petition No. 2615 of 1991[S/S] (Ram Sumer Yadav v. State of U.P. and others) was filed by opposite party No. 5 wherein the following order was passed on 25.4.1991 : It appears that the petitioner was appointed by order dated 8.8.90 and on 9.8.90 he submitted his joining report. By the impugned order contained in Annexure 4, the appointment of the petitioner has been cancelled. If it were merely an order terminating the services of the petitioner the matter could have been different but by the impugned order, the appointment of the petitioner has been cancelled without giving him any opportunity of hearing. Since the order of cancellation was passed in August, 1990 it would not be possible to direct his reinstatement. But the opposite parties may consider him in any other available vacancy if they in the meantime propose to make fresh appointment.” 5. Thereafter on 20.4.1992, the following order was passed in the matter: “Before the order could be signed the petitioner’s counsel appeared and was heard on the interim relief application dated 1.4.1992. No Standing Counsel is present in the Court to reply. Thereafter on 20.4.1992, the following order was passed in the matter: “Before the order could be signed the petitioner’s counsel appeared and was heard on the interim relief application dated 1.4.1992. No Standing Counsel is present in the Court to reply. By order dated 25.4.1991, this Court had specifically directed that since the order of cancellation was passed some time in the month of August 1990 it would not be possible to direct his reinstatement, but the opposite parties may consider him in any other available vacancy, if they in the meantime prepare to make fresh appointments. In the affidavit attached with the application the petitioner in para 7 has stated on oath that even when the opposite parties had knowledge of the order dated 25.1.1991 they in a most illegal and contemptuous manner proceeded to appoint the persons named in the said paragraph. They give of the above averment, in the affidavit this is ordered that the opposite parties will within two weeks appoint the petitioner also in case they wish to deny the appointments contained in paragraph 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the application they may do so within two weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is given to him, otherwise the officer who has made the appointment of persons named in para 7 of the affidavit will present himself in the Court on 12.5.1992.” 6. In compliance of the orders dated 20.4.1992, appointment letter was issued in favour of opposite party No. 5 by the Office of Transport Commissioner, U.P. by Additional Transport Commissioner U.P. on 25.7.1992. Opposite party No. 5 was appointed on a vacant post of Class-III (Group-C) Junior Clerk on contractual basis for a fixed period till 30.6.1993. 7. Another Writ Petition No. 9160(S/S) of 1993 [Ram Sumer Yadav v. State of U.P. and others] was filed by opposite party No. 5 submitting that opposite party No. 5 is working on a Class III post from the year 1992. Several persons junior to him, who were similarly appointed, have been considered for regular appointment but the case of opposite party No. 5 was not being considered. On 19.7.2000, a direction was issued by this Court that case of the petitioner be also considered for regular appointment. 8. Several persons junior to him, who were similarly appointed, have been considered for regular appointment but the case of opposite party No. 5 was not being considered. On 19.7.2000, a direction was issued by this Court that case of the petitioner be also considered for regular appointment. 8. The U.P. Regularisation of the Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) (Third Amendment) Rules, 2001 came into force with effect from 20.12.2001 wherein rule 4 sub-rule (1) of U.P. Regularisation of the Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 was amended wherein the cut off date was 30.6.1998. The relevant portion reads as under : “(1) Any person who- (i) was directly appointed on Ad hoc basis on or before June 30, 1998 and is continuing in service as such on the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Third Amendment) Rules, 2001. (ii) possessed requisite qualifications prescribed for regular appointment at the time of such ad hoc appointment; and (iii) has completed or as the case may be, after he has completed three years service shall be considered for regular appointment in permanent or temporary vacancy, as may be available, on the basis of his record and suitability before any regular appointment is made in such vacancy in accordance with the relevant rules orders.” 9. Opposite Party No. 5 was regularized with effect from 25.7.1992 vide order No. 1036 E/2002-43E/87-99 dated 18.4.2002. 10. Opposite party No. 5 preferred another Writ Petition No. 7332(S/S) of 2003 wherein on 20.11.2003 it was ordered that the opposite parties shall consider the petitioner’s representation regarding his regularisation and grant of seniority with effect from the date he was appointed. The fact that some employees, as recited in the Office Notification of May 31, 2003 (Annexure-12) and notification dated 3.5.2003 (Annexure-14) working in similar circumstances were regularised with retrospective effect from the date indicated against their names but, as contended by the petitioners, they have been discriminated against, may also be taken into consideration. 11. Thereafter, representation of opposite party No. 5 was considered by the Additional Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. The representation of opposite party No. 5 was rejected. It was held that he has been regularised vide order dated 18.4.2002. 11. Thereafter, representation of opposite party No. 5 was considered by the Additional Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. The representation of opposite party No. 5 was rejected. It was held that he has been regularised vide order dated 18.4.2002. The request for consideration of regularisation and seniority with effect from 25.7.1992 was refused. 12. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, opposite party No. 5 filed yet another Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 [Ram Sumer Yadav v. State of U.P. through Secretary, Transport Department, Government of U.P.; Transport Commissioner U.P. Lucknow and Additional Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P., Lucknow]. In the said petition, a prayer was made to quash the order dated 20.1.2004 passed by opposite party No. 3 and further to regularise the services of the petitioner Ram Sumer Yadav with effect from 8.8.1990 and further to issue a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties not to make any promotion on the post of Senior Clerk till the services of opposite party No. 5 are regularised. In this petition, counter-affidavit was filed by opposite party No. 3 wherein, in para 17 it was mentioned that explanation has been called from R.T.O.s of various districts for negligence in regularising the services of the employees. Rejoinder-affidavit to the same was filed by opposite party No. 5 wherein the assertions made in paras 32 to 38 of writ petition were reiterated. No specific denial was made in the rejoinder-affidavit. 13. Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 was allowed by a learned Single Judge vide order dated 17.2.2010 wherein a direction was issued that the opposite parties shall reconsider the case of the petitioner for regularisation from the date of his appointment after ignoring the order dated 20.1.2004 (Annexure-1) and also after taking into consideration the seniority list issued by Head Office on 20.6.2003 as well as the order dated 19.1.2009. 14. The appellant submitted his representations dated 8.3.2010 and 27.8.2010. On 4.4.2011, the order was issued by the Additional Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. wherein it was mentioned that the employees junior to opposite party No. 5 have been regularised with effect from the date of their appointment. Consequently, opposite party No. 5 is also regularised with effect from 25.7.1992. 15. The appellants were adversely affected by the impugned order and they have not been heard prior to passing of the order. Consequently, opposite party No. 5 is also regularised with effect from 25.7.1992. 15. The appellants were adversely affected by the impugned order and they have not been heard prior to passing of the order. As such, Writ Petition No. 2365(S/S) of 2011 was preferred by the appellants which was dismissed on 29.4.2011. Special Appeal No. 393 of 2011 was preferred wherein the order dated 4.4.2011 issued by the Additional Transport Commissioner (Administration) U.P. and the judgment and order dated 29.4.2011 passed by this Court were challenged. In another Special Appeal (Defective) No. 196 of 2012, the order dated 17.2.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 was challenged. Both the Special Appeals were disposed of by a common order dated 28.2.2013. The appellants were relegated to learned Single Judge for filing Review with application for permission to file review. Thereafter, the appellants filed a review petition which was decided by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 20.5.2016 wherein it was held that opposite party No. 5 was given appointment against a regular vacancy and in the year 1993 when regular appointments were being considered, one regular post was kept reserved for him. It was further held that the department has allowed the benefit of past services to other similarly placed incumbents, hence, the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was neither under stopgap arrangement nor fortuitous. Consequently, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Review Petition. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was made under the orders of this Court. It is further submitted that when the regular appointments were being considered, he was not permitted to participate in the process and one post was kept reserved for him. It is further contended that opposite party No. 5 has not challenged his regularisation with effect from 18.4.2002. It was further contended that appointment of opposite party No. 5 was not regular appointment, rather, it was on the basis of orders of this Court. It is also contended that the appellants were not afforded any opportunity of hearing in Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 as they had not been impleaded as opposite party. They are being adversely affected by the impugned order. The orders were passed behind their back in the writ petition as well as in the Department. Hence, the impugned order is bad in law. They are being adversely affected by the impugned order. The orders were passed behind their back in the writ petition as well as in the Department. Hence, the impugned order is bad in law. It was to be decided as to whether the ad hoc appointment is a stopgap or fortuitous as against being to an existing vacancy? Whether the appointment was made after due selection without violating the rules, if any? Learned counsel submits that the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was on contractual basis. It was not made following the due process as provided under the Rules. Hence, opposite party No. 5 cannot be given seniority with effect from 25.7.1992. 17. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for opposite party No. 5 submits that appointment of opposite party No. 5 was made after adopting the due process of law. He was not even permitted to participate in the process for regular recruitment in the year 1993 and one post was kept vacant and reserved for him. Although Writ Petition No. 2615 of 1991 has been dismissed as infructuous with lapse of time on 9.2.2015 but it should not affect the rights of opposite party No. 5. Opposite party No. 5 is continuously working since the date of his initial appointment. It is further submitted that in Writ Petition No. 4712(s/S) of 2004, the appellants were neither necessary nor proper parties, hence, they were not impleaded as party. Opposite party No. 5 was claiming his rights. Hence, it cannot be said that any order has been passed on the back of appellants. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge has, rightly, dismissed the review petition. 18. In Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department and others v. Narendra Kumar Tripathi, (2015) 11 SCC 80, in para 13.3, Rudra Kumar Sain v. Union of India, (2000) 8 SCC 25 , has been referred, which reads as under : 13.3 In Rudra Kumar Sain and others v. Union of India, it was observed : “15. So far as the terminology used in Singla case namely ‘’ad hoc’, ‘’fortuitous’ and ‘’stopgap’, the same is quite familiar in the service jurisprudence. Mr Rao, appearing for the High Court of Delhi however contended before us that the said terminology should be given the same meaning, as was given in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India. So far as the terminology used in Singla case namely ‘’ad hoc’, ‘’fortuitous’ and ‘’stopgap’, the same is quite familiar in the service jurisprudence. Mr Rao, appearing for the High Court of Delhi however contended before us that the said terminology should be given the same meaning, as was given in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India. In Dhingra case the Court was examining whether removal of an employee can be held to be penal and whether Article 311(2) of the Constitution can at all be attracted and the Court also observed that certain amount of confusion arises because of the indiscriminate use of the words ‘’provisional’, ‘’officiating’ and ‘’on probation’. We do not think that the concept or meaning given to those terminology in Dhingra case will have any application to the case in hand, where the Court is trying to work-out an equitable remedy in a manner which will not disentitle an appointee, the benefit of his fairly long period of service for the purpose of seniority, even though he possesses the requisite qualification and even though his appointment has been made after due consultation and/or approval of the High Court. 16. The three terms ‘’ad hoc’, ‘’stopgap’ and ‘’fortuitous’ are in frequent use in service jurisprudence. In the absence of definition of these terms in the Rules in question we have to look to the dictionary meaning of the words and the meaning commonly assigned to them in service matters. The meaning given to the expression ‘’fortuitous’ in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary is ‘’accident or fortuitous casualty’. This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation and such appointment obviously would not continue for a fairly long period. But an appointment made either under Rule 16 or 17 of the Recruitment Rules, after due consultation with the High Court and the appointee possesses the prescribed qualification for such appointment provided in Rule 7 and continues as such for a fairly long period, then the same cannot be held to be ‘’fortuitous’. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the expression ‘’fortuitous’ means ‘’occurring by chance’, ‘’a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate’. It thus, indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. The expression ‘’ad hoc’ in Black’s Law Dictionary, means ‘’something which is formed for a particular purpose’. In Black’s Law Dictionary, the expression ‘’fortuitous’ means ‘’occurring by chance’, ‘’a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate’. It thus, indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. The expression ‘’ad hoc’ in Black’s Law Dictionary, means ‘’something which is formed for a particular purpose’. The expression ‘’stopgap’ as per Oxford Dictionary, means ‘’a temporary way of dealing with a problem or satisfying a need’. 17. In Oxford Dictionary, the word ‘’ad hoc’ means for a particular purpose; specially. In the same dictionary, the word ‘’fortuitous’ means happening by accident or chance rather than design. 18. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (2nd Edn.) the word ‘’ad hoc’ is described as: ‘’For particular purpose. Made, established, acting or concerned with a particular (sic) and or purpose.’ The meaning of word ‘’fortuitous event’ is given as ‘’an event which happens by a cause which we cannot resist; one which is unforeseen and caused by superior force, which it is impossible to resist; a term synonymous with Act of God”. 19. The meaning to be assigned to these terms while interpreting provisions of a service rule will depend on the provisions of that rule and the context in and the purpose for which the expressions are used. The meaning of any of these terms in the context of computation of inter se seniority of officers holding cadre post will depend on the facts and circumstances in which the appointment came to be made. For that purpose it will be necessary to look into the purpose for which the post was created and the nature of the appointment of the officer as stated in the appointment order. If the appointment order itself indicates that the post is created to meet a particular temporary contingency and for a period specified in the order, then the appointment to such a post can be aptly described as ‘’ad hoc’ or ‘’stopgap’. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as “fortuitous” in nature. If a post is created to meet a situation which has suddenly arisen on account of happening of some event of a temporary nature then the appointment of such a post can aptly be described as “fortuitous” in nature. If an appointment is made to meet the contingency arising on account of delay in completing the process of regular recruitment to the post due to any reason and it is not possible to leave the post vacant till then, and to meet this contingency an appointment is made then it can appropriately be called [pic]as a ‘’stopgap’ arrangement and appointment in the post as ‘’ad hoc’ appointment. It is not possible to lay down any strait-jacket formula nor give an exhaustive list of circumstances and situation in which such an appointment (ad hoc, fortuitous or stopgap) can be made. As such, this discussion is not intended to enumerate the circumstances or situations in which appointments of officers can be said to come within the scope of any of these terms. It is only to indicate how the matter should be approached while dealing with the questions of inter se seniority of officers in the cadre. 20. In service jurisprudence, a person who possesses the requisite qualification for being appointed to a particular post and then he is appointed with the approval and consultation of the appropriate authority and continues in the post for a fairly long period, then such an appointment cannot be held to be ‘’stopgap or fortuitous or purely ad hoc’. In this view of the matter, the reasoning and basis on which the appointment of the promotees in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service in the case in hand was held by the High Court to be “fortuitous/ad hoc/stopgap are wholly erroneous and, therefore, exclusion of those appointees to have their continuous length of service for seniority is erroneous.” 19. In Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department and others (Supra), the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis. The letter of appointment, inter alia, provided that the appointment was purely on ad hoc basis and his services could be terminated by notice or on availability of candidates duly selected through Public Service Commission and the appointee had no claim for regular appointment. 20. The letter of appointment, inter alia, provided that the appointment was purely on ad hoc basis and his services could be terminated by notice or on availability of candidates duly selected through Public Service Commission and the appointee had no claim for regular appointment. 20. In the present case also, vide order dated 25.7.1992, opposite party No. 5 was appointed against a vacant Class III (Group C) Post of Junior Clerk on contractual basis till 30.6.1993. It was mentioned that his services can be terminated at any time. He was appointed on a fixed pay. His services were temporary in nature. 21. The learned Single Judge while disposing of Writ Petition No. 4712 (S/S) of 2004 vide order dated 17.2.2010 has issued a direction for reconsideration of the case of opposite party No. 5 for regularisation with effect from the date of his appointment, i.e. 25.7.1992. It was further directed that the order dated 20.1.2004 should be ignored. The seniority list issued by Head Office dated 20.6.2003 as well as order dated 19.1.2009 whereby the Junior Clerks/Assistant Accountants were regularised from the date of their initial appointment should be taken into consideration. 22. On the basis of this direction, the order of regularisation was passed. 23. Rule 4 of U.P. Regularisation of the Ad hoc Appointments (on posts outside the purview of the Public Service Commission) Rules, 1979 was amended with effect from 20.12.2001, relevant portion of which has been extracted herein above. 24. In the order dated 17.2.2010, the learned Single Judge has taken note of the fact that opposite party No. 5 was appointed on 25.7.1992 on a vacant post of Class III category on contractual basis for a period till 30.6.1993. Subsequently, opposite party No. 5 approached for regularisation of his services from the date of his initial appointment, which was not done. Then, he filed Writ Petition No. 7332(S/S) of 2003 challenging his regularisation from 18.4.2002, which was allowed on 20.11.2003 with a direction to reconsider the case of opposite party No. 5. The department rejected the representation of opposite party No. 5 on 20.1.2004. Then he filed Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 for quashing the order dated 20.1.2004 and for his regularisation with effect from 25.7.1992. The department rejected the representation of opposite party No. 5 on 20.1.2004. Then he filed Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 for quashing the order dated 20.1.2004 and for his regularisation with effect from 25.7.1992. It is to be noted that similarly placed employees, who are junior to opposite party No. 5, have been considered for regularisation and vide order dated 19.1.2009, they were regularised with effect from the date of their initial appointment, which order was not challenged. Seniority list was, subsequently, issued by the department on 20.6.2003. On these grounds a direction was issued to reconsider the case of opposite party No. 5 who was, subsequently, regularised with effect from 25.7.1992. 25. The point raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that opposite party No. 5 could not have been regularised with effect from 25.7.1992 as he was appointed temporarily on ad hoc basis. He was not appointed after adopting the due process of law. 26. In Secretary, Minor Irrigation Department and others (Supra), in para 14 of the report, it has been observed that the question to be decided is as to whether the ad hoc appointment was stopgap or fortuitous as against being to an existing vacancy which continued and initial appointment was made after due selection without violating the rules, if any. 27. In the present case also the regularisation rules were amended with effect from 20.12.2001 wherein cut off date was given as 30.6.1998. Opposite party No. 5 was given appointment on 25.7.1992 on ad hoc basis. Similarly placed Junior Clerks have been regularised by the Department. The Department has been making recruitment and by applying the rules which has been extended from time to time, services of the employees were regularised. Validity of the scheme of these recruitments is not under challenge. In such circumstances, when the rules provide that such ad hoc appointments have to be regularised and seniority to be counted from the date of appointment, opposite party No. 5 could not be deprived of the past services rendered by him. It is not a case where the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was made without vacancy or without the prescribed qualification, in violation of the Rules. Hence, it cannot be said that the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was illegal. He was appointed against a regular vacancy in the year 1993. It is not a case where the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was made without vacancy or without the prescribed qualification, in violation of the Rules. Hence, it cannot be said that the appointment of opposite party No. 5 was illegal. He was appointed against a regular vacancy in the year 1993. When regular recruitment process had begun, one post was kept reserved for him. Moreover, the department has extended the benefit of past services to other similarly placed candidates. The appointment of opposite party No. 5 could not be said to be stopgap or fortuitous. Hence, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge in his Judgment and order dated 17.2.2010 has rightly issued the directions which were considered and the order was passed on 4.4.2011 by the Department. 28. The impugned judgment and order dated 20.5.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in the Review Petition as well as the judgment and order dated 17.2.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 4712(S/S) of 2004 do not suffer from any material illegality or irregularity. We are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has rightly dismissed the Review Petition. 29. The appeal is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly.