JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar Srivastava-II, J.—Heard Shri Apoorva Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Ratnesh Chandra, learned counsel for the opposite parties No. 1, 2 and 3 and Shri C.B. Pandey, learned counsel for the opposite party No. 6. 2. Petitioner has filed the writ petition for the following relief. (a) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the orders dated 20.10.2014, 7.10.2015 and revised marksheet dated 13/14.7.2015. (b) To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 to issue letter of intent in favour of the petitioner for setting up Kisan Seva Kendra at Karnaipur, Tehsil Bighapur, District-Unnao. (c) To issue such other orders, which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in favour of the petitioner; and (d) allow the writ petition with costs. 3. Petitioner has challenged the order dated 20.10.2014 passed by respondent No. 2 whereby a fresh evaluation of the site in respect of the allocation of Kisan Sewa Kendra at Karnaipur, Tehsil Bighapur, District Unnao and for preparation of fresh marksheets on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner while he was ranked at first position in the marksheet after the interview held on 17.8.2012. 4. Representation of the petitioner was rejected by the respondent No. 3 on 7.10.2015. Further a revised marksheet dated 13/14.7.2015 was published wherein the petitioner was placed at serial No. 2 while respondent No. 6 was placed at serial No. 1. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that a policy dated 28.7.2011 was published by the opposite party No. 1 for selection of dealers for petrol/diesel retail outlet to be referred as Kisan Seva Kendra. This document was self contained. Present dispute relates to location at serial No. 242 of the list, i.e., Karnaipur, Tehsil Bighapur, District Unnao. Petitioner was fully complying the requirements of the advertisement. Petitioner applied for the grant of dealership. Different marks were allocated for different parameters in the policy. Proposed sites of the applicants was to be scrutinized by the land evaluation committee and the report was to be prepared as per the criteria fixed in the policy. Petitioner was fully complying the requirements of the advertisement. Petitioner applied for the grant of dealership. Different marks were allocated for different parameters in the policy. Proposed sites of the applicants was to be scrutinized by the land evaluation committee and the report was to be prepared as per the criteria fixed in the policy. It was further provided in the policy that at the time of the interview site selection report of the site proposed by the applicant would be shown to him and his signatures would be obtained as acknowledgement thereof. Site of the petitioner was inspected by the land evaluation committee while the site of opposite party No. 6 was also inspected. After concluding the exercise including interview of the eligible candidates list was published wherein petitioner was placed at No. 1 with 87.57 marks while the respondent No. 6got 87.29 marks. Petitioner was entitled for letter of intent. 6. According to clause 18 of the policy a complaint can be made by any aggrieved person within 30 days of the publication of the result. Thereafter an inquiry shall be held after affording an opportunity of hearing to the complainant as well as the affected person. 7. It is further contended that some complaints were made by one Smt. Santosh Singh and respondent No. 6 Vinay Kumar Dixit which were wrongly evaluated by the land evaluation committee ordering for preparation of revised marksheet. It is submitted that the order dated 20.10.2014 was passed in utter disregard to the policy wherein no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner. 8. It is further submitted that the complaint of Vinay Kumar Dixit respondent No. 6 dated 15.1.2013 and 29.1.2013 were moved beyond the period of thirty days from the date of declaration of result and was against clause 18 of the policy. 9. It is further submitted that the Land Evaluation Committee has changed the evaluation criteria arbitrarily as initially land was evaluated after measuring 70 feet as road width from the centre of the road while respondent No. 2 has directed for fresh evaluation by taking 50 feet as road width from the centre of the road. It is further argued that a revised criteria has been fixed which is not permissible under the law. Petitioner appeared before the respondent on 14.8.2015 and submitted his representation which was rejected by the respondent No. 3 on 14.8.2015. 10. It is further argued that a revised criteria has been fixed which is not permissible under the law. Petitioner appeared before the respondent on 14.8.2015 and submitted his representation which was rejected by the respondent No. 3 on 14.8.2015. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly pressed his argument on the point that the Land Evaluation Committee has initially evaluated the site uniformly as 70 feet from the centre of the road while in the changed criteria it has fixed it as 50 feet from the centre of the road. Learned counsel further submits that according to the policy document land evaluation committee could not change the criteria for assessment. It is further contended that in clause 13.1.1 policy document criteria for awarding the marks have been fixed which could not be changed subsequently. According to this clause it is mentioned that the land evaluation committee shall evaluate the site on the basis of pre-determined criteria which shall be uniform to all the eligible candidates. 11. Shri C.B. Pandey learned counsel for the opposite party No. 6 argued that the land evaluation committee has not changed the criteria as fixed in the policy document. Land evaluation committee has determined the distance from the centre point of the road in accordance with the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. It is further contended that at the initial stage provisions of the Act were misinterpreted which were subsequently corrected and orders were passed. It is further contended that it is the decision making process of the opposite party No. 1 to 3 wherein no element of mala fide was there. It was an exercise done to correct the mistake which was committed on account of misinterpretation of U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. 12. Shri Ratnesh Chandra learned counsel for opposite party No. 1 to 3 submits that the advertisement itself it is mentioned that: ^^fdlku lsok dsUnz dh LFkkiuk ds fy;s Hkw[k.M dk U;wure vkdkj 20 eh0 xq.kk 20 eh0 ¼yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx dh Hkwfe dks NksMdj½ gksuk pkfg,A ds0,l0ds0 dh LFkkiuk ds fy;s izLrkfor Hkwfe jk"Vªh;@jktekxZ@jkT; jktekxZ esa ugha gksuh pkfg;s vkSj ;s Hkwfe yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx ds fu;e rFkk mifu;eksa rFkk lHkh lkafof/kd vko';drkvksa ds vuq:i gksuh pkfg;sA** 13. It is submitted that it was the prerogative of the Land Evaluation Committee to fix the standard for the land. It is submitted that it was the prerogative of the Land Evaluation Committee to fix the standard for the land. Land Evaluation Committee has fixed the standards in accordance with the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. Although at the initial stage it should have been seen by the Land Evaluation Committee but subsequently this mistake was rectified by the Land Evaluation Committee. 14. Land Evaluation Committee was constituted to fix the standard for assessment and finalization of the site of eligible candidates. Scope of Land Evaluation Committee is to be seen as to whether Land Evaluation Committee was competent to initially fix a standard and subsequently can change the same? In order to find out the scope of the Land Evaluation Committee we have to see the advertisement as well as the document dated 28.7.2011 wherein all the necessary information was mentioned for the candidates. In the advertisement dated 12.10.2011 published in Daily Dainik Jagran newspaper Kanpur it is mentioned that: ^^fdlku lsok dsUnz dh LFkkiuk ds fy;s Hkw[k.M dk U;wure vkdkj 20 eh0 xq.kk 20 eh0 ¼yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx dh Hkwfe dks NksMdj½ gksuk pkfg,A ds0,l0ds0 dh LFkkiuk ds fy;s izLrkfor Hkwfe jk"Vªh;@jktekxZ@jkT; jktekxZ esa ugha gksuh pkfg;s vkSj ;s Hkwfe yksd fuekZ.k foHkkx ds fu;e rFkk mifu;eksa rFkk lHkh lkafof/kd vko';drkvksa ds vuq:i gksuh pkfg;sA** 15. In the policy document dated 28.7.2011 essential qualifications, reservation and all other conditions for grant of KSK are mentioned. In the policy document dated 28.7.2011 essential qualifications, reservation and all other conditions for grant of KSK are mentioned. In clause 13.1.1 it is mentioned that: 13-1-1 vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ewY;kadu gsrq ekun.M 1- ;ksX; vkosndksa dk ewY;kadu dqy 100 vadksa esa izkIrkad ds vk/kkj ij fuEu 3 pj.kksa esa fd;k tk;sxkA izLrkfor Hkwfe dk ewY;kadu ^^Hkwfe ewY;kadu lfefr** }kjk iwoZ fu/kkZfjr ekin.M ds vk/kkj ij fd;k tk;sxkA blds }kjk baQkLVDpj@lqfo/kk,a iznku djus dh {kerk ekin.M ds izkIrkad dk fu.kZ; gksxkA ftlds vf/kdre vad 35 gksaxsA ^^Lrj & 1 lfefr** leLr vfHkys[kksa dk fujh{k.k djsxh ,oa vfHkys[k vk/kkfjr ekin.Mksa ds vk/kkj ij vad iznku djsxhA vf/kdre vad oS;fDrd vkosnu gsrq 56 vad ,oa xSj oS;fDrd gsrq 45 gksaxsA ^^lk{kkRdkj lfefr** leLr vkosndksa dk lk{kkRdkj fu"ikfnr djsxh ,oa vf/kdre vad 12 oS;fDrd vkosnu gsrq@20 ¼xSj oS;fDrd gsrq½ esa ls vad iznku dj p;u izfdz;k dks iwjk djsxhA mijksDr lfefr;ksa dk xBu ,oa muds }kjk ewY;kadu dkiksZjs'ku dh rkRdkfyd izHkkoh uhfr ds vuq:i fd;k tk;sxkA 2- ;ksX; vkosndksa dk ewY;kadu fuEu ekin.Mksa ds vk/kkj ij fd;k tk;sxk %& dz0 la0 iSjkehVj vf/kdre vad oS;fDrd izR;k'kh@ lk>snkjh izR;k'kh ¼vf/kdre vad½ xSj oS;fDrd 1 Hkwfe vkSj baQkLVDpj@ lqfo/kk,a miyC/k djkus dh {kerk 35 vad 35 vad 2 foRr miyC/k djkus dh {kerk 25 vad 25 vad 3 'kS{kf.kd ;ksX;rk,a 15 vad 0 vad 4 O;kikj c<+kus dh {kerk 10 vad 25 vad 5 vk;q 4 vad 4 vad 6 vuqHko 4 vad 4 vad 7 O;kikj {kerk@dkS'ky 5 vad 7 vad 8 O;fDrRo 2 vad 0 vad dqy vad 100 vad 100 vad mu Jsf.k;ksa@fLFkfr;ksa esa ykxw ugha tgka dkiksZjs'ku bu lqfo/kkvksa dks miyC/k djkus dh vis{kk ugha djrk gSA 16. It is specifically provided that the Land Evaluation Committee shall evaluate proposed site on the basis of pre-determined standards. In order reference UPSO-I/KNP/KSK/Karnaipur/780 dated 20.10.2014 order passed by U.P. Singh General Manager Indian Oil Corporation at page 5 following finding has been given : “Investigation further reveals that LEC has awarded ‘’0' marks out of 11 marks under the parameter proximity to culvert. The policy states that if the culvert is within 30 mtrs. From the plot, ‘’0' marks is to be awarded and if culvert is beyond 30 mtrs. From plot, full marks is to be awarded. Investigation reveals that LEC has measured plot after leaving 70 ft. ROW from the center of the road. The policy states that if the culvert is within 30 mtrs. From the plot, ‘’0' marks is to be awarded and if culvert is beyond 30 mtrs. From plot, full marks is to be awarded. Investigation reveals that LEC has measured plot after leaving 70 ft. ROW from the center of the road. IO has carefully examined UP Road Side Control Act according to which 50 ft. is to be the ROW from the center of the PWD road on ODR. Thuis, this plot should have been evaluated after 50 ft. ROW and accordingly the distance of the culvert from the plot should have been measured. It has been established on investigation and the measurement of the land that the plot of 20 x 20 m. is available and culvert is beyond 30 mtrs. The complaint is substantiated and Sh. Vinay Kumar Dixit should have been awarded marks on parameters of land evaluation i.e. distance from culvert and no trees on the plot. Therefore, re-LEC will be in order.” 17. It has been vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the opposite party No. 6 as well as opposite party No. 1 to 3 that the Land Evaluation Committee has wrongly fixed a criteria and measured plot after leaving 70 feet ROW from the centre of the road while according to the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act, 50 feet should be the ROW from the centre of the PWD road on ODR. When the Land Evaluation Committee found this mistake on the basis of complaint made at opposite party No. 6 then it has rectified its mistake. 18. Per contra learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Land Evaluation Committee has no jurisdiction to change the criteria already fixed by it. In the policy document in clause 13.1.1 it is provided that the assessment shall be made on the basis of the pre-determined standards fixed by the Land Evaluation Committee. It is further submitted that in the policy document it is mentioned that the rules and bye-laws of the PWD shall be followed. Land Evaluation Committee has fixed the criteria of 70 feet ROW from the centre of the road which is in excess of the distance as provided under the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. It is further submitted that in the policy document it is mentioned that the rules and bye-laws of the PWD shall be followed. Land Evaluation Committee has fixed the criteria of 70 feet ROW from the centre of the road which is in excess of the distance as provided under the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act. If Land Evaluation Committee had fixed standard less than 50 feet from the centre of the road then it could have been said that the Land Evaluation Committee has performed its functions against the provisions of the law but the distance as fixed in the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act is 50 feet which had a purpose but the Land Evaluation Committee has even fixed the distance as 70 feet which cannot and should not be held as against the law. 19. We find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the policy document it is provided that the rules bye laws of the PWD has to be followed by the Land Evaluation Committee. Even if it might not have been mentioned even then any act done by any authority against the porvisions of law is illegal but when the Land Evaluation Committee has fixed a criteria of 70 feet from the centre of the road which is in excess of the distance already fixed by the U.P. Roadside Land Control Act which cannot be said to be against law. 20. We have to look into the powers of High Court for judicial review. It was held in Sterling Computer Limited v. M and N Publications Limited, (1993) 1 SCC 445 , in para 18 that : “18. While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the ‘’decision making process’. ....... the Courts can certainly examine whether ‘’decision making process’ was reasonable, rational, not arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.” 21. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , it was held that : “(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 , it was held that : “(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative action. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. .... (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 22. In Raunaq International Limited v. IVR Constructions Limited, (1999) 1 SCC 492 , in para 9, 10 and 11 it was held that : “9. The award of the contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision, considerations which are of paramount importance are commercial considerations. These would be: (1) The price at which the other side is willing to do the work; (2) Whether the goods or services offered are of the requisite specifications; (3) Whether the person tendering has the ability to deliver the goods or services as per specifications. These would be: (1) The price at which the other side is willing to do the work; (2) Whether the goods or services offered are of the requisite specifications; (3) Whether the person tendering has the ability to deliver the goods or services as per specifications. When large works contracts involving engagement of substantial manpower or requiring specific skills are to be offered, the financial ability of the tenderer to fulfil the requirements of the job is also important; (4) The ability of the tenderer to deliver goods or services or to do the work of the requisite standard and quality; (5) Past experience of the tenderer, and whether he has successfully completed similar work earlier; (6) Time which will be taken to deliver the goods or services; and often (7) The ability of the tenderer to take follow up action, rectify defects or to give post-contract services. Even when the State or a public body enters into a commercial transaction, considerations which would prevail in its decision to award the contract to a given party would be the same. However, because the State or a public body or an agency of the State enters into such a contract, there would be, in a given case, an element of public law or public interest involved even in such a commercial transaction. 10. What are these elements of public interest? (1) Public money would be expended for the purposes of the contract. (2) The goods or services which are being commissioned could be for a public purpose, such as, construction of roads, public buildings, power plants or other public utilities. (3) The public would be directly interested in the timely fulfilment of the contract so that the services become available to the public expeditiously. (4) The public would also be interested in the quality of work undertaken or goods supplied by the tenderer. Poor quality of work or goods can lead to tremendous public hardship and substantial financial outlay either in correcting mistakes or in rectifying defects or even at times in redoing the entire work - thus involving larger outlays of public money and delaying the availability of services, facilities or goods, e.g., a delay in commissioning a power project, as in the present case, could lead to power shortages, retardation of industrial development, hardship to the general public and substantial cost escalation. 11. 11. When a writ petition is filed in the High Court challenging the award of a contract by a public authority or the State the Court must be satisfied that there is some element of public interest involved in entertaining such a petition. If, for example, the dispute is purely between two tenderers, the Court must be very careful to see if there is any element of public interest involved in the litigation. A mere difference in the prices offered by the two tenderers may or may not be decisive in deciding whether any public interest is involved in intervening in such a commercial transaction. It is important to bear in mind that by Court intervention, the proposed project may be considerably delayed thus escalating the cost for more than any saving which the Court would ultimately effect in public money by deciding the dispute in favour of one tenderer or the other tenderer. Therefore, unless the Court is satisfied there is a substantial amount of interest, or the transaction is entered into mala fide, the Court should not intervene under Article 226 in disputes between two rival tenderers.” 23. In Air India Limited v. Cochin International Airport Limited, (2000) 2 SCC 617 , it was held that : “7. ... The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the Court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision making process the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The Court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the Court should intervene.” 24. In Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India, (2005) 1 SCC 679 , it was held that : “43..... Article 14 of the Constitution prohibits the Government from arbitrarily choosing a contractor at its will and pleasure. It has to act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract. At the same time, no person can claim a fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. All that he can claim is that in competing for the contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated to the detriment of public interest.” 25. IN BSN Joshi and sons Limited v. Nair Coal Services Limited, (2006) 11 SCC 548 , it was held that : “56. It may be true that a contract need not be given to the lowest tenderer but it is equally true that the employer is the best judge therefor; the same ordinarily being within its domain, Court’s interference in such matter should be minimal. The High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record.” 26. The High Court’s jurisdiction in such matters being limited in a case of this nature, the Court should normally exercise judicial restraint unless illegality or arbitrariness on the part of the employer is apparent on the face of the record.” 26. In State of Uttar Pradesh and another v. Manmohan Nath Sinha and another, (2009)8 SCC 310 , it was held that : “15. The legal position is well-settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision making process. The Court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a Court of appeal and reach its own conclusions.” 27. Initially, the petitioner was selected for the outlet to be known as Kisan Seva Kendra. He was fulfilling all the requirements as per the advertisement. Result of interview was declared wherein the petitioner got the highest marks 87.59 while respondent No. 6 got 87.29. Accordingly, the petitioner was rated at No. 1. Subsequently, on the basis of certain complaint Land Evaluation Committee re-assessed the matter and changed the evaluation criteria which was against the norms as mentioned in the advertisement. No doubt, criteria could be changed by the concerned authority but once a decision has been taken after following the due process then there cannot be any explanation for changing the criteria. Such exercise cannot said to be a bona fide exercise, rather it would be termed as mala fide exercise of power which is not permitted under the law. 28. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, Hon’ble the Apex Court has laid down the criteria for interference by the Court in the case of tender or contractual matters. 28. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, Hon’ble the Apex Court has laid down the criteria for interference by the Court in the case of tender or contractual matters. It was held that “ a Court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review should pose to itself the following questions; (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary, irrational that the Court can say; “The decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached.” (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in negative, there should be no interference under Article 226. 29. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal consequences on a tenderer/contractor or distribution of state largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealership and franchises) stand on a footing as they may require a higher degree of fairness in action. 30. It is a matter of allotment of site for Kisan Seva Kendra for selection of dealers for petrol/diesel retail outlet. Action of the authority requires a better deal of fairness in its actions. 31. In the counter-affidavit of Opposite party No. 1 to 3 it is stated that there were discrepancies in the award of marks on the basis of interview held on 17.8.2012 which came to the knowledge of answering opposite parties when the complaints were made, hence, the order dated 20.1.2014 was passed wherein fresh LEC and L-1 of all eligible candidates and preparation of revised marksheet was ordered. 32. Clause 18 of the advertisement reads as under: d- dksbZ Hkh ihfM+r O;fDr viuh f'kdk;r vkbZ vks lh ds xzkgd lsok dsUnz ds vius fudVre dk;kZy; esa Hkst ldrk gS] ftldh lwph vkbZ vks lh ds fjVsy vkmVysV ij iznf'kZr gSA vkbZ vks lh dh osclkbV ij Hkh f'kdk;rsa ntZ djkbZ tk ldrh gSA Mhyj ds p;u gsrq f'kdk;rsa fdlh Hkh ifjfLFkfr esa lk{kkRdkj dk ifj.kke ?kksf"kr gksus ds 30 fnukas ds mijkUr izkIr gksus ij Lohdkj ugha dh tk;sxhA 33. A complaint regarding petitioner was allegedly made by the opposite party No. 6 on 15.9.2012 wherein the main objection was regarding minority of Ram Ji Raghav. A complaint regarding petitioner was allegedly made by the opposite party No. 6 on 15.9.2012 wherein the main objection was regarding minority of Ram Ji Raghav. Further an objection was raised regarding competence of Smt. Uma Devi for executing the sale-deed in favour of Lalit Mohan Misra. No objection regarding distance from the centre of road was taken. This objection was taken in a subsequent reminder dated 29.1.2013 which is filed alongwith the counter-affidavit. In the impugned order dated 20.10.2014 it is mentioned in regard to the complaint of opposite party No. 6 regarding the petitioner that the complaint letter dated 15.1.2013 and 29.1.2013 of Vinay Kumar Dixit were considered by the competent authority which itself shows that the complaint dated 15.1.2013 and 29.1.2013 were made after the period of thirty days from the declaration of results. Further so far as competence of the petitioner regarding purchase of land from Uma Devi guardian of Ram Ji Raghav is concerned, complaint was not found substantiated. Hence, so far as complaint dated 15.9.2012 is concerned no allegations levelled in the complaint were found substantiated and complaint was found baseless but the competent authority took into consideration the plea raised in the complaint dated 29.1.2013 and following finding was recorded : “Investigation further reveals that LEC has awarded ‘’0' marks out of 11 marks under the parameter proximity to culvert. The policy states that if the culvert is within 30 mtrs. from the plot ‘’0' marks is to be awarded and if culvert is beyond 30 mtrs from plot, full marks is to be awarded. Investigation reveals that LEC has measured plot after leaving 70 ft. ROW from the centre of the road. IO has carefully examined U.P. Road Side Control Act according to which 50 ft. is to be the ROW from the centre of the PWD road or ODR thus this plot should have been evaluated after 50 feet ROW and accordingly the distance of the culvert from the plot should have been measured. It has been established on investigation and the measurement of the land that the plot of 20 x 20 m. is available and culvert beyond 30 mtrs. The complaint is substantiated and Sh. Vinay Kumar Dixit should have been awarded marks on parameters of Land Evaluation, i.e., distance from culvert and no trees on the plot. Therefore, re-LEC will be in order.” 34. The complaint is substantiated and Sh. Vinay Kumar Dixit should have been awarded marks on parameters of Land Evaluation, i.e., distance from culvert and no trees on the plot. Therefore, re-LEC will be in order.” 34. This finding has been given on the basis of a complaint which was moved after the period of thirty days which is prescribed in clause 18 of the advertisement. 35. Further when the Land Evaluation Committee has fixed a criteria initially which was not against the provisions of U.P. Roadside Land Control Act then it was not bona fide that the said criteria is changed. Any condition mentioned in the advertisement is binding upon the competent authority as well as the applicants. Once, it is mentioned that the assessment will be made on the basis of criteria fixed by the Land Evaluation Committee then the said criteria should not have been changed. When it is changed without any lawful excuse then it is a case of misuse of power by the Land Evaluation Committee with a purpose to extend favour to someone, i.e., opposite party No. 6. No responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could take such a decision. 36. Facts of the case are such which requires an interference by this Court because arbitrariness on the part of the concerned authority is apparent on the face of record. Power of decision making has been wrongly exercised by the concerned authority. 37. Consequently, we are of the considered view that the impugned order has been passed arbitrarily which is liable to be quashed. 38. Accordingly, petition is allowed and impugned order dated 20.10.2014, 7.10.2015 are quashed.