ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the Union of India being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1575 of 2005 dated 29th April, 2010, whereby the petition preferred by the respondent was allowed by interfering with, the Inquiry Officer’s report and it has been held by the learned Single Judge, by sitting in appeal, upon the decision of the Inquiry Officer's report that charges levelled against the respondent are not proved on the basis of the detailed analysis of the evidence on record. The petition was allowed hence, original respondents have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this respondent (original petitioner) was working as an Inspector in Central Industrial Security Force and charges were levelled against him as per Annexure1 dated 15th May, 2002. The charges were to the effect that he had allowed 16 coal loaded trucks to lift the coal though these truck-owners were prohibited. This work was done by this petitioner alongwith other co-security personnels who were posted at Karo Check Post of Kargali, unit of Central Coalfields Limited situated at District, Bokaro. The trucks were allowed to go out of the gate unauthorizedly. The charges levelled against this respondent were serious in nature. 3. It further appears from the facts of the case that the Inquiry Officer was appointed and adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the respondent (original petitioner). Evidences have also been taken by the Inquiry Officer during course of the inquiry and on the basis of the inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer and on the basis of the documentary evidences on record, it has been held by the Inquiry Officer that the charges levelled against, the respondent-delinquent have been proved. Looking to the evidences on record it cannot be said that Inquiry Officer's report was based upon no evidence at all. Departmental appeal was also preferred by the delinquent which was dismissed by the Departmental Appellate Authority. Looking to the inquiry, it appears that adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the delinquent. There is no procedural lacuna in holding inquiry. Inquiry has been held by the competent authority. Departmental appeal was also preferred by the delinquent which was dismissed by the Departmental Appellate Authority. Looking to the inquiry, it appears that adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the delinquent. There is no procedural lacuna in holding inquiry. Inquiry has been held by the competent authority. Looking to the evidences and report of Inquiry Officer, it cannot be said that the report of the Inquiry Officer is based upon no evidence. 4. It ought to be kept in mind that we are not sitting in appeal against the Inquiry Officer’s report. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. Sree Rama Rao as reported in AIR1963 SC 1723 especially paragraph no.7 thereof as under: “7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 5. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and others versus Chitra Venkata Rao, as reported in (1975) 2 SCC 557 especially paragraph nos. 21, 22, 23 & 24 thereof as under: “21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226. 22. Again, this Court in Railway Board, representing the Union of India, New Delhi v. Niranjan Singh said that the High Court does not interfere with the conclusion of the disciplinary authority unless the finding is not supported by any evidence or it can be said that no reasonable person could have reached such a finding. In Niranjan Singh's case (supra) this Court held that the High Court exceeded its powers in interfering with the findings of the disciplinary authority on the charge that the respondent was instrumental in compelling the shutdown of an air compressor at about 8.15 a.m. on May 31, 1956. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. This Court said that the Enquiry Committee felt that the evidence of two persons that the respondent led a group of strikers and compelled them to close down their compressor could not be accepted at its face value. The General Manager did not agree with the Enquiry Committee on that point. The General Manager accepted the evidence. This Court said that it was open to the General Manager to do so and he was not bound by the conclusion reached by the committee. This Court held that the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority should prevail and the High Court should not have interfered with the conclusion. 23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction. The Court exercises it not as an appellate court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 24. The High Court in the present case assessed the entire evidence and came to its own conclusion. The High Court was not justified to do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court does not correct a finding of fact on the ground that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the evidence in the present case which was considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by the High Court to justify the conclusion that there is no evidence which would justify the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court to say that no reasonable person could have arrived at these conclusions. The High Court reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence and then rejected the evidence as no evidence. That is precisely what the High Court in exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari should not do. (Emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi Versus Union of India and others as reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 especially paragraph nos.12 and 13 thereof as under: “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to re-appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. (Emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur versus Nemi Chand Nalwaya, as reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 especially paragraph nos.7 & 9 thereof as under: “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.) 9. Several witnesses were examined to prove the charge. One of them was H.S. Sharma who conducted the preliminary enquiry and to whom the respondent had made a statement broadly admitting the facts which constituted the subject-matter of the second charge. I.M. Rawal, who was the cashier and I.C. Ojha, the officiating Branch Manager were also examined. Based upon their evidence, the enquiry officer found the respondent to be guilty of the second charge and that has been accepted by the disciplinary authority. The High Court has interfered with the said finding without expressly holding that the said finding of guilt was erroneous. The High Court has proceeded as if it was sitting in appeal over the departmental enquiry and interfered with the finding on a vague assumption that the respondent must have acted bona fide in an “increasing customer-friendly atmosphere”. There was no justification for the Division Bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others versus P. Gunasekaran, as reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 especially paragraph no.12 and 13 thereof as under: “12. There was no justification for the Division Bench to interfere with the finding of guilt.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others versus P. Gunasekaran, as reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 especially paragraph no.12 and 13 thereof as under: “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. (Emphasis supplied) 9. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience. (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and others v. Abrar Ali, as reported in AIR 2017 SUPREME COURT 200 especially paragraph no.8 thereof as under: “8. Contrary to finding of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India..................................................................................................... ...........................................................................................................” (Emphasis supplied) 10. Looking to the aforesaid decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court the High Court by exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not sitting in appeal against the order passed by the Inquiry Officer. What is to be verified by the High Court is the procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer. There is no procedural lacuna on the part of this appellant in holding the inquiry. Due notice was given as well as opportunity of being heard was also given to the delinquent, who is the respondent and on the basis of the oral and documentary evidences the Inquiry Officer has concluded that the charges levelled against this respondent-delinquent have been proved. The inquiry has been conducted absolutely in accordance with law as there is no procedural lacuna and as adequate opportunity of being heard was given to the respondent and as the report of the inquiry is based upon oral as well as documentary evidence. Learned Single Judge has appreciated the evidences on record and has failed to appreciate that High Court is not sitting in an appeal against the order passed by the Inquiry Officer. Learned Single Judge has appreciated the evidences on record and has failed to appreciate that High Court is not sitting in an appeal against the order passed by the Inquiry Officer. This is an error apparent on the face of the record while deciding W.P.(S) No. 1575 of 2005 judgment and order dated 29th April, 2010. Thread bare analysis of the evidence is not permissible in the writ petition. 11. Once the inquiry is held as legal and valid one the only question left out before this Court is to look at the proportionality of the quantum of punishment. Looking to the nature of the duty of the respondent-delinquent, who was Inspector at Central Industrial Security Force Unit, Kargali, District Bokaro, State of Jharkhand and as he has allowed as many as 16 coal loaded trucks to go out of the gate, unauthorizedly this is a grave misconduct. Being a member of the disciplinary force the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary department vide order dated 01.11.2002, who is Deputy Inspector General of Police of CISF Unit, Kargali, Bokaro, upon the respondent was dismissed from the services. 12. Nonetheless, in the departmental appeal of the Appellate Authority-Inspector General, CISF vide order dated 13th May, 2003 has reduced the quantum of punishment and from dismissal the respondent-delinquent is reduced in rank from the post of Inspector to the post of Sub Inspector and that too, only for three years. Thus, after three years again he will be on the post of Inspector and will also get the pay scale of the post of Inspector. This phenomena has already been completed after three years from the date of the order passed by the Appellate Authority on 13th May, 2003. 13. Thus, the quantum of punishment has been reduced by the Appellate Authority. Looking to the nature of misconduct of the delinquent it cannot said that punishment inflicted upon the delinquent is unreasonably excessive or shockingly disproportionate. 14. Thus, the aforesaid aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(S) No. 1575 of 2005 vide order dated 29th April, 2010. 15. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1575 of 2005 dated 29th April, 2010. 15. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, we hereby, quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No. 1575 of 2005 dated 29th April, 2010. This Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of.