ORDER : S. Vimala, J. Writ Petition (MD) Nos. 11 and 80 of 2015 have been filed by the Management/Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Madurai) Limited, as against the awards, dated 27.03.2014, passed in I.D. Nos. 56 and 57 of 2011, wherein the Management was directed to reinstate the second respondent herein/workmen/as casual worker, on daily wage basis, on the same conditions, as it existed before, within two months from the date of receipt of the copy of that award, with continuity of service, but without back wages and attendant benefits. 2. Since the awards, issues raised and parties are inter-linked, both the writ petitions are taken up together and a common order is passed. 3. For the sake of clarity, the parties are referred to not as petitioners and respondents, but as Transport Corporation/Management and workmen. Brief facts:- 4. The workmen were employed as conductors and drivers respectively between the years 2001 and 2006. During this period, the Government of Tamil Nadu imposed a ban on recruitment in all the departments, including the Transport Corporation. The workmen had completed 240 days of service within a period of 12 months. 4.1. The Trade Union of the workmen made a demand for regularization of the services of the workmen on completion of 240 days of service, in terms of 12 (3) settlement, dated 25.09.1986. But the said demand was not fulfilled by the Transport Corporation. Therefore, a notice was issued, in terms of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), calling for a strike. In pursuance of the same, conciliation proceedings were initiated by the Labour Department of Government of Tamil Nadu, on 09.07.2007. Pending conciliation, the services of the workmen were terminated, without following the procedures contemplated under Section 25 (F) of the Act and without seeking permission from the Conciliation Officer, as required under Section 33(1) (a) of the Act. 4.2. The workmen raised Industrial Disputes, individually, before the Labour Court, Madurai. The Labour court, on a perusal of the materials available on record and after recording detailed reasons, set aside the termination and directed the Transport Corporation to reinstate the workmen as casual employees and ordered to give preference while making regular appointment. 4.3. Aggrieved over the award in entirety, the Transport Corporation has filed Writ Petition Nos. 11 and 80 of 2015. 5. 4.3. Aggrieved over the award in entirety, the Transport Corporation has filed Writ Petition Nos. 11 and 80 of 2015. 5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the Workmen, in both the writ petitions, submitted that the workmen have passed SSLC and they are in possession of licence issued by the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, fit enough to work as conductors and drivers and they were recruited during the ban period and their services were terminated, after 240 days of service, without according permanency and without following mandatory requirements under Section 25 (F) and 33 (1) (a), which mandates that one month's notice or wages, in lieu of notice should be given prior to retrenchment and when there is a conciliation proceeding, the workmen concerned should not be dismissed without seeking permission; in other words, the learned counsel contended that no permission was sought for before termination, when conciliation proceedings were pending, hence, the termination is non-est in the eye of law. 6.1. In support of this contention, the learned counsel appearing for the workmen relied upon the decision reported in (2001) 9 SCC 99 (T.N.State Transport Corporation v. Neethivilangan, Kumbakonam). 6.2. The learned counsel further submitted that the Labour Court, having held that the method of recruitment of the workmen to the post of Conductor/Driver is irrelevant and their termination is nothing but retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act and that mandatory requirements of Section 25 (F) of the Act was not followed, the Labour Court, while setting aside the termination did not direct the Transport Corporation to accord permanency to them and instead directed the Transport Corporation to keep the names of the workmen in the seniority list of casual workers and give preference to them at the time of appointment of regular workers. 6.3. 6.3. The learned counsel further submitted that, once the termination of workmen from service is held to be in violation of Section 25 (F) of the Act, they are entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages; the Labour Court, having held that they completed 240 days of service, failed to issue direction to the respondents to accord permanency to them from the date of completion of 240 days of service, in the light of 12 (3) settlement dated 25.09.1986, which is still in force; the said settlement mandates that services of drivers/conductors, after satisfactory completion of 240 days of actual worker in a continuous period of one year, ought to be regularized. 6.4. Contending that, retrenchment without following Section 25 (F) of the Act is illegal and the method of recruitment was not relevant for deciding whether a person was or was not a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act, the learned counsel appearing for the workmen relied upon the decisions reported in 2011-III-LLJ-1 (SC) (Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur), 2015 (6) SCC 321 (Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corporation) and 2009 (8) SCC 556 (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmchari Sanghatana). The important observations, made in the later cited judgments, read thus:- “- The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a beneficial legislation enacted with an object for settlement of industrial disputes and for a certain other purpose. If any part of the provisions of Section 25F is violated and the employer thereby, resorts to unfair trade practice with the object to deprive the workman with the privilege as provided under the Act, the employer cannot justify such an action by taking a plea that the initial appointment of the employee was in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. We have noticed that Industrial Disputes Act is made for settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes as mentioned therein. It prohibits unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as casual or temporary employees for a long period without giving them the status and privileges of permanent employees-” 7. We have noticed that Industrial Disputes Act is made for settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes as mentioned therein. It prohibits unfair labour practice on the part of the employer in engaging employees as casual or temporary employees for a long period without giving them the status and privileges of permanent employees-” 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Transport Corporation, apart from reiterating the contentions raised before the Labour Court, submitted that the Labour Court did not properly appreciate the evidence of the Management and finally passed the awards in favour of the workmen, directing the Transport Corporation to reinstate the workmen as casual workers on daily wage basis, on the same condition as it existed before, i.e., within two months, with continuity of service, but without back wages and other attendant benefits. The learned counsel further submitted that the Labour Court ought to have seen that if the original appointment was made by not following due process of selection, as envisaged by the relevant rules, it is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of the temporary employees, whose period of engagement has come to an end or of ad-hoc employees, who, by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. 7.1. Contending that a person appointed on a daily wage basis was not an “appointee to a post” in accordance with the Rules and on his termination, the project employing him coming to an end, the Court could not issue a direction to re-engage him in any other work or to direct appointment against existing vacancies, the learned counsel appearing for the Transport Corporation relied upon the decisions reported in 1996 (1) LLN 299 (Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma and others) and 2004 (4) LLN 8 (A.Umarani v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies and others). 7.2. These decisions would not apply to the facts of the case on hand, as the engagement of the workmen was not on a project based engagement. The appointment is, in fact, in a public utility service, which should be continued so long as the mankind exists. 8. 7.2. These decisions would not apply to the facts of the case on hand, as the engagement of the workmen was not on a project based engagement. The appointment is, in fact, in a public utility service, which should be continued so long as the mankind exists. 8. It is appropriate to quote the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2011 (3) LLJ (SC) 1 (Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sananur) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that “the source of employment, the method of recruitment, the terms and conditions of the employment/contract of service, quantum of wage/pay and the mode of payment are not at all relevant for deciding, whether or not a person is a workman within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act'. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the Transport Corporation would contend that the question of getting permission under Section 33 (1) of the Act would not arise, since the strike notice issued by the Trade Union is not a valid strike notice and the decision to go on strike was not taken in the General Body of the Union and that apart, six weeks' notice period was not given to the Transport corporation, as per Section 22 of the Trade Union Act. The learned counsel further submitted that there is no necessity to comply with Sections 25-F or 25-N of the Act, since the workmen has not continuously worked for 240 days in the calender year and the engagement of the second respondent was not continuous, but intermittent. 10. The undisputed fact is that there was a settlement under 12 (3) entered between the Trade Unions and the Transport Corporation, which mandates that the services of the drivers/conductors, after satisfactory completion of 240 days of actual work in a continuous period of one year has to be regularized. 11. After entering into 12 (3) settlement and in the light of the statutory provisions under Section 25-F and 33 (1) (a) of the Act, whether the termination can be justified, is the issue to be considered. 12. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer to Sections 25 (F) and 33 (1) (a) of the Act, which reads thus:- “25F. 12. At this juncture, it will be useful to refer to Sections 25 (F) and 33 (1) (a) of the Act, which reads thus:- “25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” “33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.- (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before an arbitrator or a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall- (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding-” 13. Section 25F of the Act mandates that one month's notice or wages, in lieu of notice shall be given prior to retrenchment and Section 33 (1) (a) of the Act mandates that when there is a conciliation proceedings pending before the conciliation officer, the workmen concerned shall not be dismissed without seeking prior permission. A perusal of the materials available on record and the reasonings rendered by the Labour Court would go to show that, both the provisions, i.e., Sections 25-F and 33 (1) (a) of the Act were not followed by the Transport Corporation, while effecting termination of the workmen. 14. A perusal of the materials available on record and the reasonings rendered by the Labour Court would go to show that, both the provisions, i.e., Sections 25-F and 33 (1) (a) of the Act were not followed by the Transport Corporation, while effecting termination of the workmen. 14. It is always open to the Transport Corporation to issue an order of “retrenchment” on the ground that the initial appointment of the workman was not in conformity with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India or in accordance with rules. Even for retrenchment on such ground, unfair labour practice cannot be resorted to and thereby the workmen cannot be retrenched on such ground without notice, pay and other benefits, in terms of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, if the workmen had continued the work for more than 240 days in a calendar year. 14.1. It is, within the personal knowledge of the Transport Corporation, to say from when the workmen had been employed and how many days they had been employed. The Transport Corporation is in possession of the best evidence. When the best evidence available has not been produced by the Transport Corporation, the inference is that, if those documents are produced showing the relevant details regarding the facts of the case, the production of documents would be detrimental to the case of the Transport Corporation. Therefore, this Court can draw adverse inference for non-production of relevant documents relating to the employment of workmen, in these cases. Permanency not given. 15. 12 (3) settlement, dated 25.09.1986, mandates that services of drivers/conductors after satisfactory completion of 240 days of actual work in a continuous period of one year ought to be regularized. 16. It is the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the workmen that the Labour Court ought to have awarded the status of permanency to the workmen, in the light of 12 (3) settlement and the awards passed by the Labour Court directing the Transport Corporation to consider the appointment of the workmen, whenever vacancy arises on a priority basis, is without basis and therefore, it is liable to be set aside. 17. It is necessary to point out that the existence of the 12 (3) settlement and its continuance and applicability are not disputed by the Transport Corporation. 17. It is necessary to point out that the existence of the 12 (3) settlement and its continuance and applicability are not disputed by the Transport Corporation. Therefore, it is imperative that the Transport corporation should have given life to 12 (3) settlement and consequently to the workmen also. Binding nature of settlement : 18. In the case of Renganathan v. The General Manager, Personal, decided on 6 July, 2007, this Court has held as follows:- “A settlement entered into between the parties after the negotiation and deliberation cannot, at any stretch of imagination, be unreasonable unfair and discriminatory. What is good for the majority is the good for the minority. That is the rule of democracy-. The question of binding nature of the settlement reached and the right of an individual to question the same either in his representative capacity as one belonging to a minority. Union not governed under the settlement proceedings or in his individual capacity came up for consideration in the decision Hebertsons Ltd. v. Workers. The Apex Court held that in the case of a settlement reached, the same would be binding on all workers, even if a small number of members were not members of the majority union. The Apex Court held that when a recognised Union negotiates with the employer, the workers as individuals do not come into the picture. It is not necessary that each individual worker should know the implications of the settlement, since a recognised union which is expected to protect the legitimate interests of the labour, enters into a settlement in the best interests of the labour. The Apex Court held that this would be the normal rule; however, there may be allegations of mala fides or fraud and other inducements. Until any of these facts are shown, prima facie, a settlement arrived at in the course of collective bargaining is entitled to due weight and consideration. The Apex Court further held that the settlement has to be taken as a package deal and a settlement cannot be judged by the yardstick normally adopted in scrutinising an award in adjudication, and a settlement cannot be scanned in bits and pieces, but has to be accepted or rejected as a whole. The Apex Court further held that the settlement has to be taken as a package deal and a settlement cannot be judged by the yardstick normally adopted in scrutinising an award in adjudication, and a settlement cannot be scanned in bits and pieces, but has to be accepted or rejected as a whole. In view of the inherent complexities involved in arriving at a settlement, considering the diverse situations and other contingencies, a settlement arrived at through a process of conciliation, hence, is given a great weightage. Except in the case of mala fides shown or a patent unfairness in the terms of settlement or attribution of an oblique motive based on definite materials, a settlement reached is prima facie considered to be in the interest of the employees.” 18.1. Further, in the case of Natarajan R. and Ors. v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, reported in (1966) ILLJ 310 AP decided on 16 April, 1965, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held as follows:- “The first question argued by the learned Counsel for the appellants before us is that, so long as the settlements dated 1 July 1961 and 10 December 1962 were in force, there could not arise any dispute about the retrenchment of workers and that such a dispute can be raised by the company only after those settlements were put an end to in accordance with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 2(k) defines “industrial dispute” as any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. Section 2(p) as amended by Act 36 of 1956 defines “settlement” as follows: 'Settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and includes written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the appropriate Government and the conciliation officer; Prior to the amendment introduced by Act 36 of 1956, this definition did not include “agreements” arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings. Section 18 specifies the persons on whom settlements and awards are binding. Section 18 specifies the persons on whom settlements and awards are binding. Sub-section (1) of that section states that a settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workmen otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. 18.2. If the afore stated two decisions are applied to the facts of the case, it is crystal clear that the impugned awards passed by the Labour Court, in so far as not directing the Transport Corporation to reinstate the Workmen in service in permanent post from the date of completion of 240 days of service is unsustainable. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned awards, passed by the Labour Court (in so far as not directing the Transport Corporation to reinstate the workmen in service in permanent post from the date of completion of 240 days of service) are set-aside. Both the writ petitions filed by the Transport Corporation are dismissed. 19.1. The Transport Corporation is directed to accord permanency to the workmen from the date of completion of 240 days of their service, in the light of 12 (3) settlement, dated 25.09.1986. No costs. Consequently, the connected MPs are closed.