JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. Since common questions of law and fact arise for consideration in these petitions, therefore, they were taken up together for hearing and are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. All the petitioners are office bearers of the Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association (for short ‘HPCA’ i.e. Petitioner No. 1 in Cr.MMO No. 285 of 2015) and have sought quashing of FIR No. 14 of 2013, dated 3.10.2013, registered under Sections 447, 201, 120-B IPC and Section 3 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act (for short ‘PDPP Act’) and Section 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act (for short ‘PC Act’), wherein, HPCA alongwith other co-accused including the petitioners herein have been accused of illegally encroaching upon the land comprising Khasra No. 3673/3547/3335, measuring 720 sq. mtrs. situated in Mohal Civil Station, Dharamshala (hereinafter referred to as ‘land in question’). 3. In addition thereto, they have also sought quashing of charge-sheet filed in the aforesaid case, which has now been registered as Case No. 14 of 2014 and is pending in the Court of learned Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 4. The aforesaid FIR emanates from a complaint made by District Youth Services and Sports Officer, Dharamshala that HPCA has illegally encroached upon the land in question. During inquiry, documents i.e. fard Jamabandi, tatima and demarcation etc. were taken in the earlier FIR No. 12/13, dated 1.8.2013, under Sections 420/406/120B/201 IPC and 13(2) of the PC Act, which revealed that a residential hostel/ accommodation comprising four sets existing on the above Khasra numbers was found to have been demolished by HPCA officials (the Petitioners herein) in connivance with the government officials. The demolished material was also alleged to have been disposed of without it even being accounted for. The Inquiry Officer recommended registration of the case under the aforesaid sections. 5(a). It is the allegation of the prosecution that a meeting was held on 14-03-2008 by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala with the government officials and one representative of the HPCA i.e. Sanjay Sharma (petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 355 of 2015). The meeting is alleged to have been held without any written request or reference from any quarter. The proceedings of the meeting read thus:- “Proceedings of the meeting held on 4.4.2008 at 4 pm under the chairmanship of Sh. The meeting is alleged to have been held without any written request or reference from any quarter. The proceedings of the meeting read thus:- “Proceedings of the meeting held on 4.4.2008 at 4 pm under the chairmanship of Sh. K.K. Pant, I.A.S., Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala regarding reallocation of government accommodation opposite cricket stadium at Dharamshala. The following were present: 1. Sub. Divisional Magistrate, Dharamshala; 2. Executive Engineer (PWD), Dharamshala; 3. Assistant Engineer (PWD), Dharamshala; 4. Principal Government College, Dharamshala; 5. Sanjay Sharma for HPCA. The meting was called in connection with the re-allocation of the Type-IV accommodation of Government College, Dharamshala, situated opposite the Cricket Stadium, Dharamshala. It was discussed that the accommodation situated there are in very dilapidated condition besides these accommodation also pose security threat to the cricketers playing inside the cricket stadium. After detail discussion the following decisions were taken:- 1. The Principal, Government College, Dharamshala will move an application to the Executive Engineer, PWD, Dharamshala for assessing durability of the building. 2. The Principal, Government College, Dharamshala with the help of Tehsildar, Dharamshala will identify a suitable land where quarters for government college can be constructed. 3. It was further decided that he will also move a case to the Secretary, Education for allocating of funds for construction of new residential accommodation. The Chairman assured the Principal, Government College that he will extend cooperation to the college to get the funds allocated for the new residential accommodation. 4. It was decided that existing occupants of the houses should apply for allotment of accommodation to the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala and it was assured that they would be allotted accommodation in general pool on priority basis. 5. It was also decided that HPCA should also extend financial assistance to the college authorities for the construction of accommodation elsewhere. The meeting ended with the vote of thanks to the chair. (Letter endst. No. 264652/MA, dated 14/3/08)”. 5(b). Further in the aforesaid meeting there was neither any application/request from the two lecturers residing in the Type-IV accommodation that the said building was in dilapidated condition, nor had the HPCA ever reported that the said accommodation was a security threat to the players inside the cricket stadium. (Letter endst. No. 264652/MA, dated 14/3/08)”. 5(b). Further in the aforesaid meeting there was neither any application/request from the two lecturers residing in the Type-IV accommodation that the said building was in dilapidated condition, nor had the HPCA ever reported that the said accommodation was a security threat to the players inside the cricket stadium. The interested party in the matter was HPCA representative Shri Sanjay Sharma, who later on was one of the promoter/Director of the so-called Company registered in the name and style “Himalayan Players Cricket Association”, which was later on renamed as “Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association” with its headquarter at Dharamshala, District Kangra and eventually got all the assets and liabilities of the HPCA (Society) transferred to the above-mentioned HPCA under Section 25 of the Companies Act. 5(c). The building in question was adjacent to the cricket stadium main gate and in possession of Education department. The area of 49118.25 sq. mtrs. was initially transferred to the Department of Youth Services & Sports and later on leased out to HPCA on 29.07.2002. The Revenue department marked the land under this building with new Khasra No. 3547/3335/2/1. 5(d). The sole object of this meeting held on 14.3.2008 was to remove government building from the premises of the cricket stadium for which all the accused persons conspired with one another as the then Deputy Commissioner Shri K.K. Pant (Chairman of the meeting) neither gave any reference nor any noting sheet was got prepared for holding such a meeting. That apart, the HPCA till date had not even submitted transfer/lease of this portion of land. 5(e). As per record procured from Superintending Engineer, 5th Circle, H.P.P.W.D., Palampur, the construction work of the building had started in the year 1979-80 and after completion of the building, the same was handed over to the Principal, Government College, Dharamshala in the year, 1986. This building had been constructed out of the funds of University Grants Commission (for short ‘UGC Grants’) and also from the contribution of the State Government. The cost of its construction at that time was approximately Rs.3,38,600.68/-. 5(f). This building had been constructed out of the funds of University Grants Commission (for short ‘UGC Grants’) and also from the contribution of the State Government. The cost of its construction at that time was approximately Rs.3,38,600.68/-. 5(f). In pursuance of the meeting held on 14.3.2008, in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala, the Assistant Engineer, P.W.D. No.1, Dharamshala, Shri Mahinder Chand Katoch, without following the proper procedure, on the very next day sent a letter to the XEN, H.P.P.W.D., Dharamshala, wherein, it was stated that “It is submitted that Type-IV quarter constructed opposite cricket stadium at Dharamshala are in very dilapidated condition and are beyond economical repair”. On 20.03.2008, the Principal, Government College, Dharamshala wrote a letter No. EDN-GCD/ UGCFlats/2008/2012, dated 20.03.2008 to the Director of Higher Education, H.P., Shimla, stating that “A meeting was held in the D.C. office and the proceedings sent herewith for your kind information and necessary action please.” The Principal thereafter on 10.04.2008 wrote to the Executive Engineer, H.P.P.W.D., Dharamshala, asking him to depute his official and make available a report on assessment and the safety status of the teachers’ flats though there was no complaint by the lecturers residing in the building. Though this letter was written after 25 days of the assessment of the status whereas the S.D.O., P.W.D., had already given the status report of this building on the very next date of the meeting without there being any request made by the Principal. The report did not contain any technical reason under which the building could have been declared ‘unsafe’. The Principal of the Government College thereafter vide his letter dated 19.04.2008 requested the Director, Higher Education for providing funds/budget for construction of new accommodation. 5(g). On June 8, 2008, the Principal Secretary (YSS) addressed a letter to the Principal Secretary (Education) to the Government of H.P. regarding lease of land for HPCA on the ground that the Association intended to get the land in question leased out in their favour. It was further intimated that the land in question was government land and was still in the possession of the Education department. It was further pointed out that this piece of land could not be transferred to the department due to the reason that the structure belonging to the Education department existed over it, however, still the YSS asked for N.O.C. 5(h). It was further pointed out that this piece of land could not be transferred to the department due to the reason that the structure belonging to the Education department existed over it, however, still the YSS asked for N.O.C. 5(h). The N.O.C. issued by the Secretary, Higher Education, allowing transfer of land to the YSS department, which was ultimately leased out to the HPCA for the construction of the cricket stadium had imposed the following conditions:- (a) Sufficient land should be spared in the vicinity of land of the present UGC accommodation for future construction of staff quarters. (b) College should have free and unconditional access for the use of Cricket Stadium for College students. (c) The Stadium should have independent approach so that during college hours there is no disturbance to the normal instructional work and study of students etc. 5(i). Eventually the government of Himachal Pradesh granted N.O.C. for the transfer of the land in question subject to the following conditions:- (a) Suitable land is allotted by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala for construction of staff quarters. (b) Alternate accommodation is provided to the allottee who is staying in the residential quarters. 5(j). The NOC was approved from the Education Minister on 19.11.2008. The land in question was transferred in the name of the YSS from the Education Department vide mutation No. 1469. On 25.11.2008, the Sub Divisional Magistrate intimated that the Education department had been provided with alternate land in lieu of 720 sq. mtrs. transferred to the YSS. On 20.5.2009, the then Principal, Government College, Dharamshala, asked the Electricity department to disconnect the energy meters installed in the building, which by now had been vacated by the two lecturers. 5(k). In the year 2009-10, the HPCA engaged two companies, namely, Ria Constructions Ltd. and A.N.S. Ltd. for the construction work of indoor stadium and that of area between main gate and the practice area. Since, the land in question was between indoor stadium and the main stadium, therefore, HPCA had illegally trespassed over the said land. The photographs from official record of Ria Construction Ltd. showed that the building existed during that period and the area on which the demolished building existed was now in possession of the HPCA and situated quite adjacent to the main inner gate of the cricket stadium. 5(l). The photographs from official record of Ria Construction Ltd. showed that the building existed during that period and the area on which the demolished building existed was now in possession of the HPCA and situated quite adjacent to the main inner gate of the cricket stadium. 5(l). The land occupied by HPCA was got demarcated from the Revenue department on the basis of which it was established that government land measuring 3073.16 sq. mtrs including 720 sq. mtrs upon which the demolished building existed had been encroached by the HPCA in connivance with each other and with the government officials. 6. As observed earlier, on completion of the investigation the prosecution has already presented the charge-sheet in the Court of Special Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. 7. Shri P.S. Patwalia, Senior Advocate, duly assisted by S/Shri Abhinav Mukerji, Parshotam Chaudhary, Vikrant Thakur and Amit Kumar Dhumal, Advocates, sought quashing of the FIR on the following grounds:- A. That there is no proof of the HPCA being a trespasser as the demarcation conducted in this case has already been held to be illegal by Coordinate Bench of this Court (Justice Rajiv Sharma, J.) in Cr.MMO No. 37 of 2016, titled Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association & another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 02.08.2016. B. The building over the land in question had not been demolished but had only been re-allocated. C. The decisions taken by the competent authorities had been taken in accordance with the Rules of Business and any irregularity in such decisions could at best be termed to be an administrative lapse for which the petitioners could not be criminally prosecuted. D. No criminal offence is made out against the petitioner as the land has not been given to any individual but has been given to the Company that too on lease. E. Prosecution sanction against some of the officers had already been refused by the Central Government and in case of certain individuals, the State Government itself had not granted the prosecution sanction and that apart some of the officers who are the blue eyed boys of the government have been intentionally left out and not arraigned as an accused, therefore, the prosecution proceedings cannot continue and deserve to be quashed. F. Since, the petitioner No. 1 is a Company, therefore, the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act are not applicable. F. Since, the petitioner No. 1 is a Company, therefore, the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act are not applicable. G. No criminal allegations have individually been attributed to any of the petitioners. H. The instant case being an outcome of political vendetta cannot be permitted to continue. 8. On the other hand, Shri Sharwan Dogra, Advocate General, duly assisted by Ms. Meenakshi Sharma, Mr. Rupinder Singh, Additional Advocate Generals, Mr. Kush Sharma, Deputy Advocate General and Mr. J.S. Guleria, Assistant Advocate General, for respondent No. 1, would vehemently argue that once the trial Court has already taken the cognizance of the case on filing of the charge-sheet, the present petition is not maintainable as the petitioners have right to address the learned trial Court on the factum of consideration of charges. He further contended that the procedure prescribed under Criminal Procedure Code (for short ‘Code’) cannot be allowed to be circumvented by allowing the petitioners to approach this Court by invoking provision under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is further argued that this Court, at this stage, would not appreciate the evidence and go into the nitty-gritty of the case, especially once it is prima facie established that the petitioners have encroached upon the government land and the role of the each of the accused have been properly investigated and lawful evidence has been collected and thereafter the entire report placed before the competent Court for taking cognizance of the offence. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the material placed on record. 9. The parameters for quashing proceedings in criminal complaint or FIR are well known. If there are triable issues, the Court is not expected to go into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the face of it, the criminal proceedings are abuse of Court’s process, quashing jurisdiction can be exercised. 10. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 , Hon’ble Supreme Court culled out the following principles for exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code:- “(1) To give effect to an order under the Code. (2) To prevent abuse of the process of court. (3) To otherwise secure the ends of justice. (4) Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. (2) To prevent abuse of the process of court. (3) To otherwise secure the ends of justice. (4) Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. (5) Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself. (6) It would be an abuse of process of court to allow any action which would result in injustice. (7) In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts t abuse of the process of court. (8) When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. (9) When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it acquisition would not be sustained-That is the function of the trial Judge. (10) Section 482 is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. (11) It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. (12) If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same. (13) When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance-It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused person-The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot be itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.” 11. In Amit Kapoor versus Ramesh Chander and another (2012) 9 SCC 460 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly with regard to quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 and same are summarized as follows:- “1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 8. 6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 14. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ]; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors. [ AIR 1988 SC 709 ]; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors. [ AIR 1993 SC 892 ]; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors. [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 754 ]; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P. [ AIR 2003 SC 1069 ]; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors. [AIR 1988 SC 128]; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [ (1996) 7 SCC 705 ]; Ganesh Narayan Hegde vs. Bangarappa & Ors. [ (1995) 4 SCC 41 ]; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors. [ AIR 2005 SC 9 ]; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors. [ AIR 2000 SC 1869 ]; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr. [ (2009) 14 SCC 466 ]; V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ]; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. [ (2009) 7 SCC 234 ]; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr. [ (2009) 11 SCC 203 ]; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ AIR 1987 SC 877 ]; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr. [ AIR 1991 SC 1260 ]; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors. [ (2001) 2 SCC 17 ]; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr. [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 ]; Savita v. State of Rajasthan [ (2005) 12 SCC 338 ]; and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr. [ (2001) 7 SCC 659 ]}. 16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance of the requirements of the offence.” 12. In C.P. Subhash vs. Inspector of Police Chennai and others (2013) 11 SCC 599, it was once again reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that where complaint prima facie makes out commission of offence, High Court in ordinary course should not invoke its powers to quash such proceedings, except in rare and compelling circumstances and it was observed as under:- “[7] The legal position regarding the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court in relation to pending criminal proceedings including FIRs under investigation is fairly well settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. Suffice it to say that in cases where the complaint lodged by the complainant whether before a Court or before the jurisdictional police station makes out the commission of an offence, the High Court would not in the ordinary course invoke its powers to quash such proceedings except in rare and compelling circumstances enumerated in the decision of this Court in State of Haryana and Ors. v Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp1 SCC 335. 8. v Ch. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp1 SCC 335. 8. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State, NCT of Delhi, 1999 3 SCC 259 where this Court observed: "...If factual foundation for the offence has been laid down in the complaint the Court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence." 9. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, 2004 1 SCC 691 where this Court said: “11...The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code" 10. Decisions of this Court in V.Y. Jose and Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., 2009 3 SCC 78 and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley etc., 2011 3 SCC 351 reiterate the above legal position.” 13. Thus, what can be considered to be settled on the basis of the exposition of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, High Court has to be both cautious as also circumspect. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint/FIR/charge-sheet etc. discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. A. That there is no proof of the HPCA being a trespasser as the demarcation conducted in this case has already been held to be illegal by Coordinate Bench of this Court (Justice Rajiv Sharma, J.) in Cr.MMO No. 37 of 2016, titled Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association & another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 02.08.2016. 14. Elaborating on the first submission, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would argue that the entire case of the prosecution accusing the petitioners to be encroachers over the land in question is solely based upon and rests upon the report of the Local Commissioner. However, the said report has already been set aside by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No. 37 of 2016 and, therefore, once the very foundation on which the edifice of the FIR is built collapses then with it falls the entire edifices. 15. However, the said report has already been set aside by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No. 37 of 2016 and, therefore, once the very foundation on which the edifice of the FIR is built collapses then with it falls the entire edifices. 15. Before appreciating this contention, it is necessary to bear in mind that Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. It is more than settled that observations of Court are neither to be read as Elucide’s Theorms nor as a provision of a statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context only as they appear to have been stated and judgments of Court are not to be construed as statute. It is equally settled that judgment of the Court is only authority to what it actually decides and not what logically follows from it. 16. Having stated the legal position I may now advert to the relevant observations as made in the judgment of Cr.MMO No. 37 of 2016, upon which heavy reliance is placed by the petitioners and the same reads thus: 4. The basis of registration of FIR No. 57/2014 dated 8.4.2014 is the demarcation report dated 14.11.2013 carried out by Shiv Dev Singh, Tehsildar at page 389 of the paper book. According to the report, the HPCA has encroached upon Kh. Nos. 3620/2826/1 measuring 216.26 sq. meter, 3618/2826/1 measuring 756.28 sq. meter and 3675/3547/3335 min/1 measuring 966.56 sq. meter. However, as noticed hereinabove, Shiv Dev Singh, Tehsildar has admitted that the correct Kh. No. was 3628/2838/1 instead of 3620/2826/1. The fact of the matter is that this mistake has not been rectified by the Tehsildar. The statement made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is not signed. Similarly, in his report dated 14.11.2013, he has mentioned that HPCA has encroached upon Kh. No. 460/307 but he has not mentioned that land is owned by Gurmeet s/o Gurpreet Singh. The basis for registration of the FIR is the demarcation report dated 14.11.2013. 5. The Addl. Chief Secretary (Home), to the Government of Himachal Pradesh has filed the reply to the petition. The reply filed is vague and sketchy. The averments made in the petition have not been specifically denied. The basis for registration of the FIR is the demarcation report dated 14.11.2013. 5. The Addl. Chief Secretary (Home), to the Government of Himachal Pradesh has filed the reply to the petition. The reply filed is vague and sketchy. The averments made in the petition have not been specifically denied. The gist of the reply filed is that the police has registered the case and the investigation has been carried out and the challan has been put up in the Court. The State should have filed the comprehensive reply traversing all the grounds mentioned in the petition. The reply has been filed by a responsible officer but the same is not in conformity with Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. Section 107 of H.P. Land Revenue Act reads as follows: "(1) A Revenue Officer may, for the purpose of framing any record or making any assessment under this Act or on the application of any person interested, define the limits of any estate, or of any holding, field or other portion of an estate, and may, for the purpose of indicating those limits, require survey marks to be erected or repaired. (2) In defining the limits of any land under sub-section (1) the Revenue Officer may, cause survey marks to be erected on any boundary already determined by, or by order of any court, Revenue Officer or Forest Settlement Officer, or restore any survey marks already set up by, or by order or any court of any such officer." 7. The Financial Commissioner has issued detailed instructions for the demarcation under Chapter 10 of the H.P. Land Record Manual, 1992. The notification dated 16.7.2012 has substituted Chapter 10 of the H.P. Land Records Manual, 1992, notified on 3.12.1992. Para 10.1 of Chapter 10 provides that any co-sharer or a person having a legally established title of ownership or possession in a land may submit an application for demarcation to Assistant Collector of either grade with the court fee prescribed in the H.P. Court Fee Act, 1968 accompanied with a copy of latest Jamabandi, a copy of mutation sheet relating to which the application for demarcation has been filed if Khasra number has been subdivided, current settlement map (Musavi) of the land also showing adjoining khasra numbers or sub-divided khasra number, if any and process fee as prescribed under the rules. The Revenue Officer, before whom, an application for demarcation is preferred is required to register the application in the proper register, cause a note of the pending application is required to be entered in remarks column of the jamabandi. On conclusion of the demarcation proceedings, a note to this effect is to be recorded against the Khasra No./land which has been demarcated alongwith name of the applicant. 8. Para 10.2 specifically lays down that the applicant shall implead all persons who are co-sharers with him in the land of which demarcation is being sought. Besides, owners of land who are in possession of the adjoining plots of land are to be impleaded as necessary parties to the demarcation. Para 10.3 prescribes the authority competent to demarcate the land. Para 14.4 provides that if the boundary is in dispute, the person carrying out the demarcation should measure it from the Village map (musavi) prepared during the last settlement or revision as the case may be. The map so prepared shall include maps prepared by electronic methods e.g. GPS, ETS etc. In case of a map prepared on triangulation system of measurement following the conventional method of survey, he should demarcate the land in dispute with reference to three fixed points. Such fixed points will be the reference points (chandas) which were the basis of measurement of the land during the previous settlement and will therefore be depicted on the musavi. These points should be such that have remained undisturbed since the last settlement. Statements of parties accepting such points as basis for the demarcation should be recorded before starting measurement work. It is further provided in para 14.4 that if the parties do not agree on any such fixed recognizable points, then the person demarcating the land will find such points on his own with the help of the map (musavi). Thereafter, the person demarcating the land will measure these points and compare the result with the distance given on the map. If the distances when thus compared are agreed in all cases, he can then proceed to demarcate the land with reference to these points. It is further laid down in the instructions that if three fixed points are not available and only two fixed recognizable points are available, a third point may be found with the help of these two points so as to form a triangle. 9. It is further laid down in the instructions that if three fixed points are not available and only two fixed recognizable points are available, a third point may be found with the help of these two points so as to form a triangle. 9. It is evident from these instructions that all the persons who are co-sharers with him in the land of which demarcation is being sought, besides that person, the owners of land who are in possession of the adjoining plots of land will be impleaded as necessary parties to the demarcation. The statements of the parties is to be recorded before starting measurement. In the instant case, the demarcation has been undertaken without informing the HPCA and its office bearers. The notice was required to be issued to the office bearers to be present at the time of carrying out the demarcation. Their statement was to be recorded at the time of fixing three pucca points. It is also provided in para 10.5. that after demarcation, a statement of the parties present is to be recorded and placed on the file alongwith a detailed demarcation report. The office bearers were neither impleaded as per para 10.2 nor they were notified of the date of demarcation i.e. 14.11.2013. Their statements were also not recorded after the demarcation. The report is required to clearly mention all the persons who were present or absent from the impleaded parties. The demarcation report is required to explain, as per para 10.5 in detail, as to how the measurement was undertaken and it should also mention as to what method was adopted and the manner in which the starting points and the fields were measured. The statements of the interested parties are required to be recorded and the objections regarding demarcation are also to be noted. In the instant case, since the office bearers have neither been impleaded nor heard at the time of fixing pucca points after preparing the demarcation report, they have been deprived the right to file even objections regarding demarcation. 10. Para 10.7 provides that on receipt of the report, the Revenue Officer shall summon all the interested parties and record their statements. In case one of the parties objects to the demarcation report and he finds the objections to be sustainable, the Revenue Officer shall get the land redemarcated and thereafter decide the objections by a reasoned order. 10. Para 10.7 provides that on receipt of the report, the Revenue Officer shall summon all the interested parties and record their statements. In case one of the parties objects to the demarcation report and he finds the objections to be sustainable, the Revenue Officer shall get the land redemarcated and thereafter decide the objections by a reasoned order. In the instant case, the Revenue Officer has neither summoned the office bearers of the Association nor recorded their statements. 11. Para 10.8 of the newly substituted Chapter 10 provides that the demarcation proceedings being quasi judicial in nature, unless an order accepting a report of demarcation passed by a Revenue Officer is set aside in appeal or revision by an authority of higher competent jurisdiction, a fresh demarcation of the boundaries of land demarcated shall not be given. Hence, whenever an application for demarcation is received, a Revenue Officer must ensure that all adjoining landowners are impleaded as parties and the applicant is made to fence his boundary at the time of demarcation in the presence of the adjoining land owners so that the demarcation involves all the necessary parties to avoid further applications for demarcation of the same boundary. It would be apt at this stage to mention that it is not that the office bearers have not been summoned but the land owners of the adjoining land were also not impleaded as parties. 17. A perusal of the aforesaid observations, makes it evidently clear that what in fact weighed with the Court in setting aside the demarcation so far as it pertained to the land involved therein was that all the co-sharers besides certain owners of adjacent land, had also not been associated in the demarcation and therefore the same was held to be in contravention of Chapter 10 of the H.P. Records Manual whereunder it was incumbent upon the revenue officer to associate all the co-sharers besides the owner of the adjacent property, and only thereafter could the demarcation have been conducted. However, this is not the fact situation obtaining in the instant case. 18. The precise case set-up by the petitioners themselves before this Court is that the HPCA was leased out government land measuring 49118.25 sq. mtrs., whereas its possession on the spot was over approximately 46000 sq. mtrs which includes 720 sq. mtrs. However, this is not the fact situation obtaining in the instant case. 18. The precise case set-up by the petitioners themselves before this Court is that the HPCA was leased out government land measuring 49118.25 sq. mtrs., whereas its possession on the spot was over approximately 46000 sq. mtrs which includes 720 sq. mtrs. of land i.e. the ‘land in question’ and such averments have been specifically set out in para 57 of the petition, and reads thus:- “57. On 3.10.2013, FIR No. 14 was caused to be registered by Mr. Virbhadra Singh against the petitioners alleging commission of offences under Section 447 read with 120 B of the Indian Penal code, Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. However, it would not be out of place to mention here that the lease deed was executed by the State Government with the petitioners in respect of the government land measuring 49118 sq. mtrs whereas, the possession of the petitioners on the spot of the leased land is approximately 46000 sq. mtrs including 720 sq. mtrs of land which is in dispute in FIR No. 14 of 2013. Thus, the 720 sq. mtrs of land is very much within the area leased to the petitioners. Further, before lodging FIR the respondents got demarcated the leased land from the revenue authorities but neither the petitioners nor its authorised representatives were associated in the demarcation. So, the allegation regarding encroachment of 720 sq. mtrs of land is a concocted story to harass the petitioners.” 19. Therefore, once it is the specific case of the petitioner No. 1 that it is in possession of not only the ‘land in question’ but the entire land in and around it, it essentially means that there is neither any co-sharer nor any owner of the adjacent land because even as per the spot map furnished to the Court, it is admitted that the land in question is situate in the middle of the stadium between main gate and the practice area. Therefore, in such circumstances, there was no requirement or even the necessity of giving notice to any one including the petitioners as no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to them. Therefore, in such circumstances, there was no requirement or even the necessity of giving notice to any one including the petitioners as no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to them. Rather, the demarcation report has only strengthened their plea and vindicated their stand that the petitioner No. 1 is in possession of the land in question. 20. Now, the further question as to what is the nature of the possession of petitioner No. 1 i.e. whether as a lessee or a trespasser or in any other capacity would essentially be a question to be determined during the course of the trial. This Court would otherwise not un-necessarily like to embark upon the controversy and render findings at this stage as the same is not only likely but is bound to adversely affect the case of either of the parties. B. The building over the land in question had not been demolished but had only been re-allocated. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would then argue that the petitioners have un-necessarily been arraigned as accused and would now be compelled to undergo the agony of trial for having allegedly demolished the building standing over the land in question whereas the fact of the matter is that this building was only re-allocated that too after the competent authorities had found it to be in a dilapidated condition. 22. Notably, even the petitioners do not dispute that there was a building standing over the land in question which now has been demolished and new building to accommodate the teachers has been constructed at a different place. It is the specific case of the prosecution that the buildings existing over the land in question belonged to the Education Department and had been constructed out of the grants made available by the UGC and the State Government. It is also the specific case of the prosecution that the buildings have been demolished in violation of CPWD Manual and even the debris had not been accounted for. Therefore, in such circumstances, the complicity of the petitioners that too for the offences leveled against them would again essentially be a matter of trial as for now their innocence cannot be readily inferred from the material available on record. 23. Therefore, in such circumstances, the complicity of the petitioners that too for the offences leveled against them would again essentially be a matter of trial as for now their innocence cannot be readily inferred from the material available on record. 23. It is settled proposition that while considering the case for quashing of the criminal proceedings the Court should not “kill a still-born child” and appropriate prosecution should not be stifled unless there are compelling circumstances and reasons to do so. 24. In exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., it is not permissible for the High Court to appreciate the evidence as it can only evaluate material documents on record to the extent of its prima facie satisfaction about the existence of sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused and the Court cannot look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. Any document filed alongwith the petition labeled as evidence without being tested and proved cannot be examined. 25. This Court has no jurisdiction or authority to go into the material or examine the correctness of allegations unless allegations are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach to such a conclusion and there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused but the Court, at this stage, cannot go into the truth or falsity of the allegations, as it cannot undertake meticulous examination of evidence for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not, at this stage. The probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analyzed at this stage and likewise the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. C. The decisions taken by the competent authorities had been taken in accordance with the Rules of Business and any irregularity in such decisions could at best be termed to be an administrative lapse for which the petitioners could not be criminally prosecuted. 26. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would then contend that going by the material placed on record it can at best be said to be a case of administrative lapse, for which the petitioners cannot be criminally prosecuted. Strong reliance in support of this contention is placed upon the following observation made by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO NO. Strong reliance in support of this contention is placed upon the following observation made by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO NO. 134 of 2015, titled Prem Kumar Dhumal vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2015 6 ILR (HP) 670, which reads thus: 22. The application has been processed in accordance with Rules governing the issue of submission of application for seeking voluntary retirement and its withdrawal. The order made by the Chief Minister on 03.01.2008 and the notings made by Principal Secretary (Home) and the Chief Secretary will not amount to criminal misconduct. It was purely an administrative decision. Merely that Shri A.N. Sharma has superannuated on 30.11.2011 instead of 21.11.2007, will not render it an illegal act. There was no dishonest intention or guilty mind involved in the decision making process. Even as per the language employed by the then Chief Minister, the observation made is that the withdrawal which appears to be in order, may be accepted. The words “appears and may be accepted” are not couched in mandatory and imperative language. It was for the officers concerned to deal with the matter in accordance with law which in fact they have done so by taking into consideration the Rules, decisions and the statements of the Constables who have diarized the application submitted by Shri A.N. Sharma seeking withdrawal of application for voluntary retirement. [25] While taking the administrative decision, the principles of Evidence Act would not apply. The case was decided as per the conditions of service governing the case of Shri A.N. Sharma. Shri A.N. Sharma was also given personal hearing on 24.01.2008. Thus, it cannot be said that Dr. P.C. Kapoor has followed any illegal dictate of the then Chief Minister. [26] Now as far as Shri Ravi Dhingra is concerned, he has approved the file submitted by the Principal Secretary (Home) and has submitted to Hon'ble the Chief Minister. This exercise does not have any trappings of criminal misconduct or dishonest intention. It is purely administrative decision based on the orders passed by the Principal Secretary (Home). 30. The case of the prosecution is that the then Chief Minister exercised the power with mala fide intention. What malice is, has been explained in Corpus Juris Secundum to signify either general malignity or ill-will toward another or simply an intent to commit a wrongful act. 30. The case of the prosecution is that the then Chief Minister exercised the power with mala fide intention. What malice is, has been explained in Corpus Juris Secundum to signify either general malignity or ill-will toward another or simply an intent to commit a wrongful act. In criminal law, the term is not generally used in the former sense, but only in the latter as synonymous with “criminal intention” and as applied to the state of mind of a person who does a wrongful act intentionally or willfully, and without legal justification of excuse. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. Without guilty knowledge, criminal intent cannot exist. It cannot be said, in the present case, that the then Chief Minister has acted knowingly to do a criminal act. The act of the then Chief Minister and petitioners cannot be termed as willful. The willful act sometimes is held to be equivalent to “intentional” or “designed”, and not to require a wrongful intention or malice. The act of the then Chief Minister and other petitioners cannot be held to be a criminal act. They have neither any motive nor malice to do any criminal act or designed. It was purely an administrative decision. 31. The administrative action has been defined in Volume-2 of Corpus Juris Secundum to mean as under”- “Administrative action includes not only merely ministerial acts, but many decisions by responsible public officers involving judgment and discretion, and administrative officers, in arriving at decisions, may be free to investigate and determine proper methods and procedures, although their final decision is ex parte in nature, as distinguished from decisions based upon evidence which the parties at interest have an absolute right to present and insist upon. Administrative acts. Acts which are to be deemed as acts of administration, and classed among those governmental powers properly assigned to the executive department, are those which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared by the legislative body, or such as are devolved upon it by the organic law of its existence. They are commonly called “administrative acts”. “Administrative acts” have been compared with or distinguished from “judicial acts,” and “legislative acts”. They are commonly called “administrative acts”. “Administrative acts” have been compared with or distinguished from “judicial acts,” and “legislative acts”. [67] The allegations contained in the FIR No. 6 of 2014 dated 17.6.2014 and accusations made in the final report even if taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, neither constitute criminal misconduct nor discloses guilty mind or dishonest intention. It is reiterated that it was purely an administrative decision taken strictly as per the laid down procedure. 27. I have deeply considered this contention and have also minutely gone through the observations as extracted above and find that these observations are practically of no assistance to the case of the petitioners and otherwise inapplicable to the facts of the instant case. 28. Admittedly, in the aforesaid case, it was the government officials who have approached this Court and sought quashing of the FIR on the ground that the allegations made against them even if taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety neither constitute criminal misconduct nor discloses guilty mind or dishonest intention and at best these were administrative decisions taken strictly as per the laid down procedure. 29. Whereas, in the instant case, firstly the petitioners are not government officials who are governed by the rules of business, conduct rules etc. and even otherwise those of the government officials who took the decisions are not before the Court and secondly this is too premature a stage to conclude that the instant is only a case of an administrative lapse, particularly when the prosecution has placed on record material to show that there was a building standing over the land in question, which as observed earlier is stated to have been demolished that too allegedly in violation of CPWD Manual and its debris was not accounted for. In such scenario, it cannot be said that no case against the petitioners at this stage is made out. The commission of offence cannot be decided on affidavit evidence. This Court cannot adopt a short course of annihilating the still born prosecution by going into the plea of proof of prima facie case and give findings on merits. D. No criminal offence is made out against the petitioner as the land has not been given to any individual but has been given to the Company that too on lease. 30. D. No criminal offence is made out against the petitioner as the land has not been given to any individual but has been given to the Company that too on lease. 30. The petitioner would then contend that no criminal offence is made out against the petitioners, as the land has not been given to any particular individual but has been given to the company that too on lease. 31. I am afraid that even this contention cannot be accepted as the law as regards criminal intent and liability, really makes no distinction as to whether the land is given to an individual or a Company. Moreover, the entire case of the prosecution is based and founded upon the allegations that accused including the petitioners had connived with each other and illegally demolished the building standing over the land in question and thereafter illegally encroached upon the said land. Moreover, the prosecution does not admit the status of the petitioner No. 1 in Cr.MMO NO. 285 of 2015 to be that of a Company and this aspect of the matter is otherwise dealt with in the later part of the judgment. E. As prosecution sanction against some of the officers had already been refused by the Central Government and in case of certain individuals, the State Government itself had not granted the prosecution sanction and that apart some of the officers who are the blue eyed boys of the government have been intentionally left out and not arraigned as an accused, therefore, the prosecution proceedings cannot continue and deserve to be quashed. 32. The petitioner would then vehemently contend that Central Government, in case of some of the accused, has already refused prosecution sanction and in some cases even the State Government has itself not granted prosecution sanction, therefore, in such circumstances the petitioners alone cannot be made the scapegoats and compelled to stand trial. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further vehemently argue that some of the officers who are the ‘blue-eyed boys’ of the government have not even been prosecuted. 33. Suffice it to state that even this contention sans merit as all these questions can only be determined during the trial wherein the exact role and complicity of the petitioners vis-a-vis the so-called blue eyed boys or with those of the officials where prosecution sanction has been refused can be evaluated and considered. 33. Suffice it to state that even this contention sans merit as all these questions can only be determined during the trial wherein the exact role and complicity of the petitioners vis-a-vis the so-called blue eyed boys or with those of the officials where prosecution sanction has been refused can be evaluated and considered. Moreover, the mere fact that the Central Government has refused to accord sanction does not in any manner improve the case of the petitioners as they admittedly are not government servants and no prosecution sanction in their cases is otherwise required to be obtained. 34. That apart, many of the allegations against the petitioners are separate and distant from those leveled against the government servants and therefore even the principle of parity cannot be applied to their cases at this stage. Even otherwise the refusal of prosecution sanction to some of the government officials will not by itself be an indicator of the petitioners innocence at this stage. F. Since, the petitioner No. 1 is a Company, therefore, the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act are not applicable. 35. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners would then vehemently argue that as the petitioner No. 1 i.e. HPCA is a Company, therefore, the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act are not applicable to it and has placed strong reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Small Industries Corporation Limited vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and others (2009) 1 SCC 407 , the relevant portions reads as under:- 7. The second respondent next contended that if all the employees of a government company are public servants, the government company does not become a public servant, as it has an identity distinct from its employees. In support of the said contention, the second respondent relied upon the following observations in State Trading Corporation of India Ltd. v. Assistant Superintendent of Commercial Taxes ( AIR 1963 SC 1811 ) : (AIR p. 1822, para 29) "29. We are dealing here with an incorporated company. The nature of the personality of an incorporated company which arises from a fiction of law, must be clearly understood. Unlike an unincorporated company, which has no separate existence and which the law does not distinguish from its members, an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognizes it as a legal person separate and distinct from its members. Unlike an unincorporated company, which has no separate existence and which the law does not distinguish from its members, an incorporated company has a separate existence and the law recognizes it as a legal person separate and distinct from its members. This new legal personality emerges from the moment of incorporation and from that date the person subscribing to the memorandum of association and other persons joining as members are regarded as a body corporate or a corporation aggregate and the newperson begins to function as an entity. But the members who form the incorporated company do not pool their status or their personality. If all of them are citizens of India the company does not become a citizen of India any more than if all are married the company would be a married person. The personality of the members has little to do with the persona of the incorporated company. The persona that comes into being is not the aggregate of the personae either in law or in metaphor." (emphasis supplied) 11. The term "public servant" is not defined in the Code. However, section 2(y) of the Code provides that words and expressions used but not defined in the Code will have the meaning assigned to them under the Indian Penal Code. Section 21 IPC defines 'public servant', the relevant portion of which is extracted below : "21. 'Public servant'.- The words "pubic servant" denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following; namely: Twelfth - Every person - x x x x x (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956." Having regard to the aforesaid definition, it is clear that the appellant which is a government company is not a 'public servant', but every employee of the appellant is a 'public servant'. 36. On the same point heavy reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalco Engineering Private Limited vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhye and Others (2010) 4 SCC 378 , wherein it was held as under:- 12. Let us examine the meaning of the crucial word 'establishment' used in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the Act. 36. On the same point heavy reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dalco Engineering Private Limited vs. Satish Prabhakar Padhye and Others (2010) 4 SCC 378 , wherein it was held as under:- 12. Let us examine the meaning of the crucial word 'establishment' used in sub-section (1) of section 47 of the Act. The definition of the word 'establishment' in section 2(k), when analyzed, shows that it is an exhaustive definition, and covers the following categories of employers: (i) a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial, or State Act; (ii) an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government; (iii) a local authority; (iv) a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956; and (v) Departments of a Government. 13. It is not in dispute that the employers in these two cases are companies incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 which do not fall under categories (ii) to (v) specified in Section 2(k) of the Act. 14. The employee contends that a company incorporated under the Companies Act is a Corporation falling under the first category enumerated in section 2(k), that is 'Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act', on the following reasoning : that a corporation refers to a company; that Companies Act is a Central Act; and that therefore a company incorporated and registered under the Companies Act is a Corporation established under a Central Act. He contends that the use of the words "by or under" is crucial. According to him, 'a corporation established by an Act' would refer to a corporation brought into existence by an Act; and a 'corporation established under an Act' would refer to a company incorporated under the Companies Act. 15. On the other hand, the employer contends that the term 'Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' refers to a statutory Corporation which is brought into existence by a statute, or under a statute and does not include a company which is registered under the Companies Act. It is submitted that Companies Act merely facilitates and lays down the procedure for 8 incorporation of a company which, when incorporated, will be governed by the provisions of the said Act and therefore, a company registered under the Companies Act, is not a corporation established under an Act. It is submitted that Companies Act merely facilitates and lays down the procedure for 8 incorporation of a company which, when incorporated, will be governed by the provisions of the said Act and therefore, a company registered under the Companies Act, is not a corporation established under an Act. 16. The words "a Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" is a standard term used in several enactments to denote a statutory corporation established or brought into existence by or under statute. For example, it is used in sub-clause (b) of Clause Twelfth of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC' for short) and Section 2(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('PC Act' for short). Both these statutes provide that a person in the service of a 'Corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act' is a public servant. 31. We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that Courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal 19 statutes, and taxing statutes. But a caveat. The courts cannot obviously expand the application of a provision in a socio-economic legislation by judicial interpretation, to levels unintended by the legislature, or in a manner which militates against the provisions of the statute itself or against any constitutional limitations. In this case, there is a clear indication in the statute, that the benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular class of employees, that is employees of enumerated establishments (which fall within the scope of 'state' under Article 12). Express limitations placed by the socio-economic statute can not be ignored, so as to include in its application, those who are clearly excluded by such statute itself. 32. We should not lose sight of the fact that the words "corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act" is a term used in several enactments, intended to convey a standard meaning. It is not a term which has any special significance or meaning in the context of the Disabilities Act or any other socio-economic legislations. It is a term used in various enactments, to refer to statutory corporations as contrasted from non-statutory companies. It is not a term which has any special significance or meaning in the context of the Disabilities Act or any other socio-economic legislations. It is a term used in various enactments, to refer to statutory corporations as contrasted from non-statutory companies. Any interpretation of the said term, to include private sector, will not only amount to overruling the clear enunciation in Dhanoa which has held the field for nearly three decades, but more importantly lead to the erasure of the distinction maintained in the Constitution between statutory corporations which are 'state' and non-statutory bodies and corporations, for purposes of enforcement of fundamental rights. The interpretation put forth by the employee would make employees of all companies, public servants, amenable to punishment under the provisions of Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act; and would also result in all non-statutory companies and private sector companies being included in the definition of 'State' thereby requiring them to comply with the requirements of non-discrimination, equality in employment, reservations etc. 37. Obviously, there can be no quarrel with the propositions as expounded in the aforesaid judgment but the moot question as to whether the ratio laid down therein has any applicability to the facts of the instant case. 38. The issue at this stage is whether the petitioner No. 1 is a Company and is so admitted and accepted by the prosecution. The answer to this is obviously in negative as this very question is not only the subject matter of FIR No. 12/13 where this Court has refused to quash the proceedings arising out of this FIR and the matter is now admittedly sub judice before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. That apart, this very issue is pending adjudication before the learned Division Bench of this Court in CWP No. 8662 of 2013, titled Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association vs. State of Himachal Pradesh. Thus, in this factual background, the judgments relied upon by the petitioners are not at all applicable to the facts of the instant case. G. No criminal allegations have individually been attributed to any of the petitioners. 39. The petitioners would then contend that no specific criminal allegations have been attributed to any person, therefore, the proceedings based on vague and general allegations cannot be made the basis of the charge-sheet and this in turn cannot lead to their prosecution and therefore the same deserve to be quashed. 40. 39. The petitioners would then contend that no specific criminal allegations have been attributed to any person, therefore, the proceedings based on vague and general allegations cannot be made the basis of the charge-sheet and this in turn cannot lead to their prosecution and therefore the same deserve to be quashed. 40. I am afraid even such contention is without merit for the simple reason that the prosecution has set out specific allegations against each one of the petitioners. 41. As regards petitioner No. 2 in Cr.MMO No. 285 of 2015, the specific allegations against him read as under:- “SH. ANURAG THAKUR 1. Sh. Anurag Thakur is President of the HPCA since July, 2000. The building in question was demolished on his behest. As the President of the HPCA, he wrote a letter No. nil, dated 03/07/2008 (Annexure –N1 & N2, Page No. 510-514) to the Director YSS regarding lease of land comprising Khasra no. 3547/3335/2/1 measuring 720 sqr. Mtrs., situated in Mohal Civil Station Dharamshala, stating therein that the HPCA requires this portion of the land, since the said land is adjoining to the cricket stadium. 2. It is pertinent to mention here that Sh. Anurag Thakur, President of the HPCA is the elder son of Sh. Prem Kumar Dhumal, the then Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh. Sh. K.K. Pant, IAS, the then D.C. Kangra had admitted that the meeting for re-allocation of the government accommodation was convened on the directions of the then Chief Minister, Himachal Pradesh. 3. The meeting was held by the Deputy Commissioner, Kangra knowing very well that the relocation of the government accommodation was being done to benefit Sh. Anurag Thakur. Sh. Anurag Thakur was having knowledge that in the year 2002 the education department vide office letter no. EDN-A-JA (8)-5/2000 Dt. Sept., 2001 had issued N.O.C./Permission for transfer of college land to Youth Services and Sports Department with a condition that sufficient land should be spared in the vicinity of land for future construction of staff quarters and due to this very reason, this portion of land was not transferred to Y.S.S. at that time. This government building consisting of type-IV quarters was not only an eyesore to the HPCA but also a major obstruction in the way of construction of the cricket stadium. 4. Sh. This government building consisting of type-IV quarters was not only an eyesore to the HPCA but also a major obstruction in the way of construction of the cricket stadium. 4. Sh. Sanjay Sharma could not have attended the meeting at DC office on 14.03.2008, without the knowledge and instructions of HPCA President, moreover when the land under the said building had become a genuine requirement for construction of the cricket stadium. 5. Therefore, the government building existing on this piece of land was got demolished by the HPCA by involving contractors/construction companies, to pave way for the construction of the Cricket Stadium, by taking advantage of the influence of Sh. P.K. Dhumal, father of Sh. Anurag Thakur and the then Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh. 6. The investigating officer of this case had requested Sh. Anurag Thakur vide notice u/s 91 of Cr.PC, No.3436, dated 23/11/2013 (Annexure – KD1, Page No. 294), letter No. SPL/SV&ACB-10, dated 13/11/2013 (Annexure – KD2, Page No. 296) and letter No. 3637, dated 13/12/2013 (Annexure – KD3, Page No. 298), to supply the proceeding register of the HPCA and name & addresses of the contractors/construction companies engaged for the construction work of the stadium, particularly at the site where the building in question existed. But till date, he did not supply the required information on one pretext or the other. 7. Thus, Sh. Anurag Thakur, as President of the HPCA illegally encroached upon the land, got the building demolished and committed offences u/s 447, 201, 120B IPC and Section 3 of PDPP Act.” 42. As regards petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 355 of 2015, the specific allegations against him are as under:- “SANJAY SHARMA 1. Accused Sanjay Sharma attended the meeting on 14-03-2008 with other accused persons for the reallocation of Type-IV quarters in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala as representative of the HPCA. The rules and regulations of the HPCA, as ratified and confirmed on 20.01.2001 by the executive body of the HPCA, states in para 14 that the executive body of the HPCA shall comprise of 12 members, including Public Relations Officer (Para 14, serial No. (x). Thereafter, in the Annual General Meeting of the HPCA, dated 06.06.2010, the name of Sh. Sanjay Sharma is mentioned against the designation of PRO in the attendance roll (Serial No. 8). Thereafter, in the Annual General Meeting of the HPCA, dated 06.06.2010, the name of Sh. Sanjay Sharma is mentioned against the designation of PRO in the attendance roll (Serial No. 8). This fact has been corroborated from the record obtained from the Registrar of Societies, H.P., Shimla (Annexure – BR1, BR2, Page No. 367-454). 2. There is no document on record with Deputy Commissioner Office, Dharamshala that under whose direction he was called to attend this meeting which clearly shows that he was well aware of this meeting, being held in the interest of the HPCA cricket stadium? Being interested party in the meeting, Sh. Sanjay Sharma, according to witness Sh. Duni Chand (the then AC to DC) who was also present in the meeting stated that Sh. Sanjay Sharma stressed that the building in question was in dilapidated condition and security threat to the players inside the cricket stadium, whereas this building was in existence at the time of lease in the year 2002 and in respect of which the education department had imposed a condition for the transfer of land to the deptt. of YSS that, “sufficient Land should be spared in the vicinity of land for the present U.G.C. accommodation for future construction of staff quarters”. 3. It is evident that the building was an eyesore to the HPCA and the HPCA had wanted the removal of the same at any cost. Sh. Sanjay Sharma who had participated in the meeting and insisted upon the removal of the building is PRO of the “Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association”. As per demarcation report of Tehsildar, Dharamshala, the land in question on which the building existed is under the encroachment of the HPCA. Therefore, he has abetted offence u/s 120B IPC and of Section 3 PDPP Act.” 43. Finally, the allegations against petitioner in Cr.MMO No. 338 of 2015, reads as under:- “Gautam Thakur He was honorary Secretary of the HPCA w.e.f. 2005 to 2010, as per para 11 of the proceedings of the annual general meeting of HPCA, dated 06/06/2010 (Annexure – BR 2, Page No. 401) and charge handing over certificate of hony. Secretary HPCA, dated 25/06/2005 (Annexure – RR, Page No. 300). Secretary HPCA, dated 25/06/2005 (Annexure – RR, Page No. 300). Since the construction companies executed the work on behalf of the executive body of HPCA, he being general secretary of the association is liable for offences u/s 447, 201 IPC and Section 3 of PDPP Act.” 44. Likewise, specific allegations against the other co-accused, who are not before this Court have also been set out in the final report. Thus, the contention of the petitioners that there are no specific criminal allegations attributed to any of the accused is devoid of any merit and is accordingly rejected. H. The instant case being an outcome of political vendetta cannot be permitted to continue. 45. As a last ditch effort, the petitioners would contend that the instant is a case of political vendetta which has been registered at the behest of the ruling party, more particularly, its Chief Minister and owes its genesis to the “Congress Charge sheet” that had been prepared by the ruling party at the time when it was in opposition. It is vehemently argued that on the basis of the charge-sheet the incumbent Chief Minister is now pressurizing the authorities to register one case after the other against the petitioners and therefore the proceedings should be quashed. 46. Even this contention is without merit, as it is more than settled that the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance, after the information is lodged at the police station and offence is registered. 47. That apart, merely because prosecution has been initiated by the successor government, the same simply cannot be said to be an outcome of the political vendetta as there is nothing in law which can prevent the successor government in launching a prosecution provided there is justifiable and adequate evidence available for doing so. The prosecution then does not become vitiated on account of malafide or vendetta. This is so held by the Hon’ble Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sheonandan Paswan Vs. State of Bihar and others, (1987) 1 SCC 288, wherein it was held as under:- “16. It was then contended on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra that Sheonandan Paswan was a Minister in the cabinet of Karpoori Thakur and continued to be a member of the political party opposed to Dr. State of Bihar and others, (1987) 1 SCC 288, wherein it was held as under:- “16. It was then contended on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra that Sheonandan Paswan was a Minister in the cabinet of Karpoori Thakur and continued to be a member of the political party opposed to Dr. Jagannath Misra and he was therefore actuated by political motivation in opposing the withdrawal of prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and in preferring a revision application to the High Court and an appeal to this Court. This contention is also without substance and does not commend itself to us. We may concede for the purpose of argument that Sheonandan Paswan opposed the withdrawal of the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra because he had a political score to settle with Dr. Jagannath Misra and he was motivated by a political vendetta. But that is no reason why this Court should sustain an order made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate granting consent for withdrawal of the prosecution if otherwise the order appears to be improper and unjustified. The question is even if no one had opposed the withdrawal of the prosecution, would the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court have been justified in granting consent to the withdrawal of the prosecution and that would depend essentially on the facts and particulars of the case placed before the Court. The political motivation or vendetta of Sheonandan Paswan could not possibly be a valid ground for granting consent for withdrawal of the prosecution if otherwise on the facts and circumstances of the case it was improper and invalid. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or the Complainant. It was rightly observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 1 SCR 1071 at p. 1076 : ( AIR 1980 SC 319 at p. 321) : "If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalisation by malice is not legicidal". The same principle must obviously apply where a person is opposing withdrawal of prosecution against an accused. His political motivation or vendetta cannot justify grant of consent for withdrawal if otherwise it is not legitimate or justified. 17. The same principle must obviously apply where a person is opposing withdrawal of prosecution against an accused. His political motivation or vendetta cannot justify grant of consent for withdrawal if otherwise it is not legitimate or justified. 17. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra was initiated by the successor Government of Karpoori Thakur after Dr. Jagannath Misra went out of power. But that by itself cannot support the inference that the initiation of the prosecution was actuated by political vendetta or mala fides because it is quite possible that there might be material justifying the initiation of prosecution against Dr. Jagannath Misra and the successor Government might have legitimately felt that there was a case for initiation of prosecution and that is why the prosecution might have been initiated. There would be nothing wrong on the part of the successor Government in doing so and the prosecution cannot be said to be vitiated on that account. This is precisely what Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench pointed out in Krishna Ballabha Sahay v. Commission of Enquiry, (1969) 1 SCR 387 : ( AIR 1969 SC 258 ):- "The contention that the power cannot be exercised by the succeeding ministry has been answered already by this Court in two cases. The earlier of the two has been referred to by the High Court already. The more recent case is P.V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, (1968) 3 SCR 789 : ( AIR 1969 SC 215 ). It hardly needs any authority to state that the inquiry will be ordered not by the Minister against himself but by someone else. When a Ministry goes out of office, its successor may consider any glaring charges and may, if justified, order an inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will become a law unto itself and the corrupt conduct of its Ministers will remain beyond scrutiny." These observations afford a complete answer to the contention urged on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Misra that this Court should not interfere with the withdrawal of the prosecution because the successor Government of Karpoori Thakur or Sheonandan Paswan was actuated by political motivation or vendetta”. 48. Jagannath Misra that this Court should not interfere with the withdrawal of the prosecution because the successor Government of Karpoori Thakur or Sheonandan Paswan was actuated by political motivation or vendetta”. 48. In M. Narayandas v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 11 SCC 251 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected the contention that proceedings were liable to be quashed as the same stood initiated on account of personal vendetta observing that complaint has to be tested and weighed after the evidence is collected. 49. Thus, it can be taken to be settled that in case there is sufficient evidence against the accused which may establish the charge against them, even if the bias/malafide is established, the proceedings cannot be quashed. 50. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the inherent powers of this Court cannot be exercised rather should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution and as observed earlier, quashing the charge-sheet even before the cognizance is taken by the Court below, would in given facts and circumstances of the case amount to killing a still-born child. No other points were raised. 51. In view of the aforesaid discussion, no ground for quashing of FIR or the charge-sheet is made out. Accordingly, there is no merit in these petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. 52. Interim order dated 24.9.2015 is vacated. However before parting, it goes without saying that any observation touching upon the merits of the case is purely for the purpose of deciding the question of quashing of the FIR in the charge-sheet and shall, therefore, not be construed as an expression on final opinion in the main matter or any other proceedings.