ORDER : B. Siva Sankara Rao, J. Among the petitioners 1 to 3, the petitioner No.3 Dr. Rev. K.V.K. Rao, arrayed individually is no other than the Chairman and Correspondent of two other petitioners viz; Joseph Sriharsha & Mary Indraja Educational Society, Hyderabad and St. Mary's Group of Institution, Guntur. The Respondents 1 to 7 are viz; Union of India, through Ministry of HRD-R.1, The Pharmacy Council of India-R.2 (for short, 'the PCI'), All India Council for Technical Education-R.3 (for short, 'the AICTE'), Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, Kakinada,R.4 (for short, 'JNTU'), Conveners CETs-AC SW III 2017-R.5 (for short 'CET-17), the A.P. State Council for Higher Education, Vijayavvada-R.6 (for short, 'APSCHE') and the State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by its Principal Secretary-R.7. 2. by its Principal Secretary-R.7. 2. The prayer in the Writ Petition reads as follows:- "To issue writ/order and direction more particularly in nature of writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the 4th respondent in granting affiliation to the 2nd petitioner for a limited intake of 100 seats in B. Pharmacy course, vide the impugned proceeding No. JNTUK/DAP/B 1/B.Tech/B. Pharmacy/2017-18, dated 09.06.2017 in respect of the 2nd petitioner, on the basis of the policy of the 2nd respondent ignoring the approval granted by the 3rd respondent for an intake of 180 seats as arbitrary and illegal, ultra-virus the JNTU Act, 2008 and Statutory Regulations and issue a further declaration that (a) the 3td respondent AICTE is the only competent authority to determine the adequacy of faculty and infrastructure for the purpose of granting approval for intake of students in all technical courses/programs including Pharmacy courses/programs; (b) the 2nd respondent Pharmacy Council of India is not competent to determine the number of students to be given admission as the same is beyond the scope of the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and further declare the letter issued by Pharmacy Council of India to the Petitioner's Institution bearing document No.32-887/2014/15681-87, dated 01.07.2016 and the decision taken by PCI in its 100th CC dated 14th and 15th November,2016 are illegal, ultra vires the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and AICTE Act, 1987 and arbitrary, irrational and unreasonable and violative of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution with a further direction to the 2nd respondent and its affiliates to register such Pharmacists under the Pharmacists Act, 1948 and pass such further order or orders as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case." 3. The averments in the writ petition supporting affidavit of the 3rd Petitioner are that the 2nd petitioner institutions that is established by the 1st petitioner, is approved by the PCI-R.2 and AICTE-R.3, affiliated to JNTU-R.4 is also recognized by National Commission for Minority institutions, as a Christian Minority institution since May, 2009 and of which the PCI is established under the Pharmacy Act, 1948 to regulate the education and practice of provision of Pharmacy, the AICTE-R.3 is established under the AICTE Act, 1987 which authorized to grant approval for establishing and operating institutions to impart technical education and JNTU-R.4 is established under JNTU Act, 2008 (State Act) in exercising functions granting affiliation to colleges within its territorial jurisdiction. 4. The JNTU-R.4 granted affiliation to the 2nd petitioner for the academic 2007-08 for the intake as approved by the AICTE-R.2, however for the academic year 2016-17 though initially granted affiliation for full intake of 180 seats, subsequently reduced to 100 on the ground that the PCI-R.2 is granting approval only for 100 intake and said action challenged by the petitioner in W.P.No. 18788 of 2016 which is still pending. The Saint Mary's College of Pharmacy is in fact established in 2007 by the 1st petitioner with intake of 50 seats. Later as per the policy of AICTE-R.3 from different colleges of same society imparting different courses of study can be grouped together as group institutions to allow each college to share common amenities in very same premises to avoid duplication of infrastructure, various courses of study imparted by the institutions run by the 1st petitioner clubbed together into a group of institutions titled so and the Saint Mary's college of Pharmacy is merged into Saint Mary Group of Institutions, Guntur (P2), pursuant to the policy issued by the JICTE dated 06.02.2010. The AICTE-R.2 granted therefrom approval for the incorporated campus into name Saint Mary institutions. Guntur to various courses to conduct undergraduates and post-graduate of different streams including engineering, MCA, MBA and Pharmacy and from the academic year 2010-11 there is also corrigendum in this regard dated 02.01.2014. The 2nd petitioner was granted approval for B. Pharmacy course with an intake of 150 seats for the academic years 2007-08 to 2009-10 by AICTE, whereas the PCI approved only for intake of 60 seats. Further from what AICTE increased from 100 to 180 seats, PCI increased from 60 to 100 seats only. The 2nd petitioner was granted approval for B. Pharmacy course with an intake of 150 seats for the academic years 2007-08 to 2009-10 by AICTE, whereas the PCI approved only for intake of 60 seats. Further from what AICTE increased from 100 to 180 seats, PCI increased from 60 to 100 seats only. The PCI-R.2 was granting its approval under the Pharmacy Act on its own and separate norms to the limited intake (60 seats from 2007-08 to 2011-12 increased to 100 seats from 2012-13, 2016-17) against AICTE approved intake of 180 seats. The PCI issued public notice stating institutions intending to start B. Pharmacy/D. Pharmacy courses are required to apply 9 months in advance of supporting the course for consideration of approval and state policy of Pharmacy Council will be strictly adhered to from the academic session 2010-11 and it also notified for prior approval requirement before starting the courses from the academic i year 2010-11 onwards and those institutions i which already started D. Pharmacy/ B. Pharmacy courses are also clarified to apply to the Pharmacy Council without fail for approval under section 12 of the Pharmacy Act. 5. The petitioners filed Writ Petition No.26286 of 2013 in this Court contending that in case of any conflict between the Pharmacy Act, 1948 and the AICTE Act, 1987, later will prevail and said writ petition is pending. Similar issue was raised before the Apex Court in Indira Bahuuddeshiya S. Sanstha v. Directiorate of Technical Education vide SLP(C) No.24625 of 2013, where there was a provisional permission to admit students without any equity in favour of the students on 02.08.2013. A transfer petition was filed by the PCI therein before the Apex Court vide T.P.(s) No.87101 of 2014 for transfer of the W.P.No.26286 of 2013 pending before this Court to decide along with SLP No.24625/2013. It is while so however the very SLP has been withdrawn by the private college whereas, the Transfer Petitions are still pending with the Apex Court. 6. It is while so however the very SLP has been withdrawn by the private college whereas, the Transfer Petitions are still pending with the Apex Court. 6. The PCI is granting approval to the limited seats referred supra conditionally subject to giving of affidavits duly attested of not to admit more than what they sanctioned to say not more than 100 from 2012-13 and to neutralize excess admissions if not pursuant to the earlier order in the Writ Petition of this Court covered by the Transfer Petition supra, though the AICTE sanctions intake of 180 seats and the JNTU-R.4 even granted for academic 2016-17 initially for said intake of 180 seats in B. Pharmacy to the petitioners college however subsequently it is reduced to only 100 seats on the ground of PCI granted approval only for 100 seats and said action is challenged in W.P.No.18788 of 2016 which is also pending. Even initially the admission and Fee Regulatory Committee also considered 180 seats in Pharmacy for counseling in the 2nd petitioner's institution for the academic year 2016-17, subsequently on receipt of the communication of JNTU restricted its affiliation to 100 seats they also instructed to the limit of intake of 100 seats from the revised affiliation of the JNTU supra. The PCI communicated the decision of its Central Council meeting dated 14/15.11.2016 to grant approval to the petitioners for 100 seats from 2015-16 in the light of 3rd surprise inspection wherein verified the faculty, infrastructure facilities for 180 intake and indicated certain deficiencies which in fact even complied with by the 2nd petitioner. The 2nd petitioner made representation to PCI to accord full approval so as to enable the students to pursue, however, the PCI reiterated its decision by letter dated 26.12.2016 referring to Section 32 of the Pharmacy Act and the 2nd petitioner also submitted a detailed reply to the PCI on 03.04.2017 referring to their letter dated 01.07.2016 & 26.12.2016. 7. The 2nd petitioner made representation to PCI to accord full approval so as to enable the students to pursue, however, the PCI reiterated its decision by letter dated 26.12.2016 referring to Section 32 of the Pharmacy Act and the 2nd petitioner also submitted a detailed reply to the PCI on 03.04.2017 referring to their letter dated 01.07.2016 & 26.12.2016. 7. The 2nd petitioner was granted approval by the AICTE for intake of 180 seats for B-Pharmacy course even for the academic year 2017-2018 by the proceedings F.No.South-Central/1-3325956323/ 2017/ EOA, dated 30.03.2017 and the 2nd petitioner therefrom submitted a representation to the PCI through e-mail dated 24.04.2017 about the regulations 1991 did not speak about Pharmacy programme and new Education Regulations incorporated Pharmacy Programme dated 10.12.2014 came into existence only for the academic year 2015-16 and the PCI-R.2 cannot regulate the admissions made before 10.12.2014 and thereby the PCI shall grant the registration for all said students who have been admitted before 10.12.2014 as per the earlier Pharmacy Education Regulations 1991 till new Regulation came into force in 2014 December. The JNTU-R.4 by letter dated 09.06.2017'granted affiliation to 2nd petitioner with an intake of only 100 seats which is prior to the approval for 180 seats granted by the AICTE. Under AICTE Act, 'technical education' defined in Section 2(g) includes Pharmacy, which is a comprehensive definition and Section 3 of the AICTE Act, envisages composition of AICTE with Members appointed by the Central Council of India that include a Member of the Pharmacy Council. Section 10( I )(c) of the AICTE Act, empowers the AICTE(R.3) to grant approval of any technical institution in technical education to the exclusion of any other body to deal with the aspects within the framed statutory norms and standards to be complied with and the State Government also grants permission under section 20 of the AP Education Act and the JNTU is affiliating being the examining body for confirming the degree in Pharmacy. Apart from the Pharmacy Act is a pre-constitutional enactment for establishing the PCI-R.2 to prescribe the basic minimum standards of education and approved courses of study and examinations for Pharmacists and for maintenance of Registers of qualified Pharmacists and making Pharmacy councils' responsible. Apart from the Pharmacy Act is a pre-constitutional enactment for establishing the PCI-R.2 to prescribe the basic minimum standards of education and approved courses of study and examinations for Pharmacists and for maintenance of Registers of qualified Pharmacists and making Pharmacy councils' responsible. Sections 2 of the Act, defines registered Pharmacist as a person whose name for time being entered in the register of the State where he is residing or carrying on his profession or business of Pharmacy. No doubt representative of AICTE (R.3) is also one of the members of PCI under the Pharmacy Act. Sections 3(f) and 10 of the Act contemplate Central Council and subject to approval of the Central Council it is to make regulations in education prescribing minimum standards for classification as Pharmacist. Section 12 of the Act contemplates approval of study examinations. If the authority, which conducts course of study for Pharmacists has to apply for approval of the course and if Central Council is satisfied after enquiry that said course of study is confirmed with Educational Regulations, then to declare said course of study as approved course for the purpose of admission for under graduates in Pharmacy.' The qualification prescribed for registered pharmacists under Diploma in Pharmacy (D-Pharmacy) or Graduation in Pharmacy (B. Pharmacy) or Post Graduation in Pharmacy (Pharma-D). Thus Pharmacy Act and AICTE Act both laid down the norms and standards for the course of study in Pharmacy by occupying the same field from the above and of which the AICTE Act, 1987 is a post-constitutional and subsequent enactment referred in Entry-66 of List -1 of Schedule -7 of the Constitution of India whereunder 'technical education' includes Pharmacy and the composition of the Counsel under the AICTE Act Section 3(4)(m)(v) is including with a representative of PCI to say the AICTE Act prevails over the Pharmacy Act, 1948, in the matter of securing approval for conduct of the course. The only area of operation left in the PCI is registration of Graduates in Pharmacy or the undergraduates in Pharmacy as Pharmacist under said Act in accordance with the regulations having framed by the PCI. Thus, the AICTE Act covers the field covered by the Pharmacy Act in laying down norms and standards for students in the field of Pharmacy. 8. In the Writ Petitions W.P. Nos. Thus, the AICTE Act covers the field covered by the Pharmacy Act in laying down norms and standards for students in the field of Pharmacy. 8. In the Writ Petitions W.P. Nos. 4248/ 2001 and 20477/2001, the subject matter was relating to refusal by Pharmacy Council who reduced Pharmacists on the ground that the institution from which such students graduated did not have approval from PCI. Wherein the Madras High Court held that since the AICTE Act covers same field covered by the Pharmacy Act that prevails as if Pharmacy Act is not there and thereby to that extent the provisions of the Pharmacy Act yield to the AICTE Act from both the enactments are traceable to the power of same legislation and on the same subject thereby Sections 10 to 15 of the Pharmacy Act shall be deemed to be inoperative so far as they related to Pharmacy course of study and examination and for that matter approval for Pharmacy course. Secondly the AICTE Act provisions alone regulate and control the colleges in the matter of laying down norms and standards for course in Pharmacy. 9. The Apex Court in Godawat Pan Masai a Products I.P. v. Union of India, 2004 AIR SCW 4483 held that in case of conflict between special law and general law even if both are indicated by same legislative authority, special law must displace the general law to the extent of inconsistency. Even Pharmacy Act treated as special enactment, AICTE Act also a special enactment that prevails over the Pharmacy Act to the extent of irreconcilability of conflict between the two by implied repeal and the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd, (2003) 7 SCC 389 held about the implied repeal even it is not expressly provided so to infer by necessary implication. This Court in B. Laxmi v. Govt. of A.P., 2003 (5) ALT 715 : 2003 (6) ALD 425 also held that it is impermissible for the PCI not to consider registration of students under PCI, to secure degree in B. Pharmacy from the affiliated University. Further in batch of Writ Petitions including W.P. Nos. 24260 of 2016 and 13436 of 2016 there were directions to the authorities to allow admissions in accordance with the approved intake of AICTE. 10. Further in batch of Writ Petitions including W.P. Nos. 24260 of 2016 and 13436 of 2016 there were directions to the authorities to allow admissions in accordance with the approved intake of AICTE. 10. It is averred that the petitioner earlier filed writ petition before the Apex Court at a stage prior to the regulation of affiliation by the PCI and the Supreme Court dismissed the same as withdrawn with a liberty to approach this Court including to challenge the subsequent developments in the instant case covered by the rejection. The petitioners in the factual matrix having no other alternative thereby constrained to file the writ petition for the prayers referred supra. 11. There is nothing specific written instructions submitted and no any even counter filed by any of the respondents but for oral submissions particularly by the 2nd respondent and the 1st respondent that the PCI, constituted under the Pharmacy Act is a special law that prevails over the subsequent legislation covered by the AICTE Act 1987 which is a general law and what is the intake permitted by the PCI done that ultimately prevail and placed reliance on the expression in Godawat (1 supra). Whereas the 3rd respondent-AICTE covered by the AICTE Act submits that the AICTE Act prevails over the Pharmacy Act in both considered as special laws for same is not a general law being special law in technical education which includes Pharmacy education, to say to the extent of irreconcilability the provisions of the AICTE Act prevails. The learned counsel for the JNTU-R.4 left it to the decision of the Court so also by the learned Govt, pleader for Higher Education representing the 6th and 7th respondents. 12. Heard at length both sides and perused the material on record which no way requires repetition. 13. The main issues involved herein from the above are:- (i) whether the AICTE Act, 1987, the post-constitutional Central Legislation covered by Entry 6 List 1 of Schedule 7 of the Constitution of India prevails over the pre-constitution Pharmacy Act, 1948 provisions to the extent of irreconcilability between the two enactments in relation to the admissions of the intake of the students in Pharmacy or vice versa? (ii) whether the R.4-JNTU is bound to consider to permit the intake prescribed by the AICTE or by the PCI? (iii) To what result? 14(a). (ii) whether the R.4-JNTU is bound to consider to permit the intake prescribed by the AICTE or by the PCI? (iii) To what result? 14(a). As per Article 366(10) of the Constitution of India, in this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say- "existing law to mean any law, ordinance, order, by-law, rule or regulation passed or made before the commencement of this Constitution by any legislature, authority or person having power to make such a law, ordinance, order, by-law, Rule or Regulation " 14(b). The Article 372 of the Constitution of India says: (1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in Article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority. (2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order 1 make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law. (3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed- (a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration of 2[three years] from the commencement of this Constitution; or (b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause. Explanation I.- The expression "law in force" in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. Explanation I.- The expression "law in force" in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas. Explanation II.- Any law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution had extra-territorial effect as well as effect in the territory of India shall, subject to any such adaptations and modifications as aforesaid, continue to have such extra-territorial effect. Explanation III.-Nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this Constitution had not come into force. Explanation IV.- An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of a Province under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, unless withdrawn by the Governor of the corresponding State earlier, cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the first meeting after such commencement of the Legislative Assembly of that State functioning under clause (1) of Article 382, and nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any such Ordinance in force beyond the said period. 372A.(1) For the purposes of bringing the provisions of any law in force in India or in any part thereof, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, into accord with the provisions of this Constitution as amended by that Act, the President may by order made before the first day of November, 1957, make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall be deemed to prevent a competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause. 15(a). (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall be deemed to prevent a competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause. 15(a). The Bombay High Court in, In Re Amina v. Unknown (4) AIR 1991 Bombay 214 held on the scope of the Article 372 of the Constitution of India, with reference to the expression of the laws in force includes not only the enactments of the Indian legislature but also the common law of the land which was being administered by the Courts in India and inclusive of the personal laws. 15(b). The Apex Court on the scope of Article 372 of the Constitution of India in John Vallamattam v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 2902 held that the Article 372 per se does not make a pre-constitutional statutory provision to be unconstitutional. The said conclusion was in relation to the Indian Succession Act, 1925 in conflict with the Charities Act of 1960 on the procedure envisaged under Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act of the unreasonable restrictions against the Christians when compared to Hindus and Muslims etc., thereunder the Christian cannot make bequeaths of religious or charitable purpose without fulfilling the conditions in Section 118 and thereby same is held as unconstitutional. 15(c). The Apex Court in the subsequent expression in M/s Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (6) AIR 2012 SC 573 : (2011) 9 SCC 354 held by also referring to Article 13 that the pre-constitutional law can continue provided it is not inconsistent with that the provisions of part-3 of the Constitution and Article 372 also permits the continuation of such laws. 15(d). 15(d). The similar issue came before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Lalit Kumari v. Govt, of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 (5 JB) of the pre constitution Police Act, 1861, particularly in reference to Section 44 imposed duty on the police officers to keep a General diary in the prescribed form and the post constitutional CrPC 1973 (which repealed old CrPC-1872) and even under the repealed CrPC Section 112 and 139 it was referring to the complaint should be reduced to writing and the substance thereof to be entered in a diary/book), by correlating to Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. 1973 which uses the word book in the prescribed form to be kept, to enter therein the information relating to commission of a cognizable offence is whether in conflict, in saying from paras-37 to 67 of the expression, of said diary or book uses in the old Code and the Police Act, is nothing but to reconcile as FIR book in the new Code. In that way it can be said even the pre-constitutional enactment provisions to the extent of not in conflict to the post-constitutional law can be reconciled. 15(e). It is making clear from the above that the provision covered by the pre-constitutional law to the extent not reconciled and in conflict with post-constitutional law, though both are within the meaning of existing law, from the reading of Article 366(10) r/w 372 of the Constitution of India, the post-constitutional law has to prevail as a later legislation, unless it is found the pre-constitutional is a special law and the post constitutional law is a general law even with in the same legislative competence. 15(f). Here besides considering as to which of the two legislation's is special or general or both are special laws as the case maybe, it is also to consider whether the pre-constitutional legislation when not specifically coming under any of the three lists how to reconcile or hold from any irreconcilability as to which is to prevail?. The expression of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers ' College (8) (2002) 8 SCC 228 , holds that: 'The power to legislate is engrafted under Article 246 of the Constitution and the various entries for the three lists of the Seventh Schedule are the "fields of legislation". The expression of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers ' College (8) (2002) 8 SCC 228 , holds that: 'The power to legislate is engrafted under Article 246 of the Constitution and the various entries for the three lists of the Seventh Schedule are the "fields of legislation". The different entries being legislative heads are all of enabling character and are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative competence of the Union and the State legislatures. They neither impose any restrictions on the legislative powers nor prescribe any duty for exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner. It has been a cardinal principle of construction that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable and while interpreting an entry of any List it would not be reasonable to import any limitation therein. The rule of widest construction, however, would not enable the legislature to make a law relating to a matter which has no rational connection with the subject matter of an entry. When the vires of enactment is challenged, the court primarily presumes the constitutionality of the statute by putting the most liberal construction upon the relevant legislative entry so that it may have the widest amplitude and the substance of the legislation will have to be looked into. The Court sometimes is duty bound to guard against extending the meaning of the words beyond their reasonable connotation in anxiety to preserve the power of the legislature. It is further a well-settled principle that entries in the different lists should be read together without giving a narrow meaning to any of them. Power of the Parliament as well as the State legislature are expressed in precise and definite terms. While an entry is to be given its widest meaning but it cannot be so interpreted as to over-ride another entry or make another entry meaningless and in case of an apparent conflict between different entries, it is the duty of the court to reconcile them. When it appears to the Court that there is apparent overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of a legislation and the entry within which it would fall. When it appears to the Court that there is apparent overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of a legislation and the entry within which it would fall. In case of conflict between entries in List I and List II, the same has to be decided by application of the principle of "pith and substance". The doctrine of "pith and substance" means that if an enactment substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature which enacted it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. When a law is impugned as being ultra-vires of the legislative competence, what is required to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. If on such an examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature then it must be held to be valid in its entirety even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. In order to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire Act, its object and scope and effect, is required to be gone into. The question of invasion into the territory of another legislation is to be determined not by degree but by substance. The doctrine of "pith and substance" has to be applied not only in cases of conflict between the powers of two legislatures but in any case where the question arises whether a legislation is covered by particular legislative power in exercise of which it is purported to be made". 15(g). In fact, Article 254 of the Constitution of India speaks on what law to prevail 'in case of inconsistency between the laws made by Parliament and laws made by Legislatures of the States'. 15(g). In fact, Article 254 of the Constitution of India speaks on what law to prevail 'in case of inconsistency between the laws made by Parliament and laws made by Legislatures of the States'. It says (1) If any provision of a law made by the legislature of a State is repugnant to any provisions of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the concurrent list contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State; Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter in including a law adding to, amending, Varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State. 15(h). Article 246(2) speaks that notwithstanding anything in clause (3) (State list), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1) (Union list) the legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the List-Ill (Concurrent list) in the Seventh Schedule. 15(i). 15(h). Article 246(2) speaks that notwithstanding anything in clause (3) (State list), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1) (Union list) the legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in the List-Ill (Concurrent list) in the Seventh Schedule. 15(i). Article 251 speaks as to what law prevails where there is inconsistency between laws made by Parliament under Articles 249 and 250 (power of Parliament to legislate to a matter in the State list in the national interest and or during proclamation of emergency in operation), and laws made by the legislatures of States as follows: Nothing in Articles 249 and 250 shall restrict the power of the legislature of a State to make any law which under this Constitution it has power to make, but if any provision of a law made by the legislation of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament has under either or the said articles power to make, the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the legislature of the State, shall prevail, and the law made by the legislature of the State shall to the extent of the repugnancy, but so long only as the law made by Parliament continues to have effect, be inoperative. 15(j). From combined reading of clauses 1 and 2 along with the proviso of Article 254 together with Articles 246(2) and 251 of the Constitution of India, it is crystal clear that in the Concurrent list even the law made by the State Legislature which received the assent of the President as a subsequent Legislature to the Central Legislation should prevail as per the proviso of the Article 254; any subsequent legislation made by Parliament later again shall prevail even to the earlier State Legislation received the assent of the President. It is to say in case of any repugnancy with irreconcilability earlier State Legislation with the assent of the President and subsequent Central Legislation under the concurrent list as per the above Article for the Central Legislation shall prevail. 15(k). It is to say in case of any repugnancy with irreconcilability earlier State Legislation with the assent of the President and subsequent Central Legislation under the concurrent list as per the above Article for the Central Legislation shall prevail. 15(k). On the above scope of Articles 254 read with 251 and 246(2) of the Constitution of India (under Part 11 Chapter-I Articles 245 to 255), it was well considered and laid down in catena of expressions by the Apex Court, viz., Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay (9) AIR 1954 SC 752 , Tika Ramji v. State of UP.(10) AIR 1956 SC 676 , Karunanidhi v. Union of India (11) AIR 1979 SC 898 , Deepchand v. State of UP. (12) AIR 1959 SC 648 , State of Assam v. Horizon Union (13) AIR 1967 SC 442 , Municipal Corporation v. Siva Sanker (14) AIR 1971 SC 815 , Bar Councill v. State of U.P. (15) AIR 1973 SC 231 , Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (16) (1983) 1 SCC 177 , Raghubir v. State of Haryana (17) AIR 1981 SC 2037 , Western Coalfields Limited v. Special Area Development Authority (18) AIR 1982 SC 697 , Gowri Shanker v. State of U.P. (19) AIR 1983 SC 150 , Lingappa v. State of Maharastra (20) AIR 1985 SC 389 , Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala (21) (2009) 4 SCC 94 , Zameer ALR Shaik v. State of Maharastra (22) AIR 2010 SC 2633 , Manoj Yadav v. Pushpa (23) AIR 2011 SC 614 , K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. and another v. State of Karnataka (24) AIR 2011 SC 3430 = 2012 (2) ALT 26.3 (DN SC), leave about the other expressions with reference to Article 245 clause (2), Article 251 and Article 254 where it was held that even prevails from assent of the President the subsequent State Legislation over earlier Central legislation; when under Article 254 clause (2) with reference to Article 254 clause (1) if one reads that Article 246 clause (2) and Article 251 of the Constitution of India, from the proviso, as the Parliament may at any time make a law into the matter by adding to or amending or varying or repealing the law, so made by the Legislature of the State, the later Central Legislation as per the proviso shall prevail over the earlier State Legislation received the assent of the President to determine the repugnancy are stated as follows: 1. It must be shown that the two enactments contain inconsistent and irreconcilable provisions so that they cannot stand together or operate in the same field. 2. There can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes. 3. Where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results. 4. 2. There can be no repeal by implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes. 3. Where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes operating in the same field without coming into collision with each other, no repugnancy results. 4. Where there is no inconsistency but a statute occupying the same field seeks to create a distant and separate offence, no question of repugnancy arises and both shall continue to operate in the same field. 15(l). The expressions clarified further that in particular from Barai (16 supra) in dealing with West Bengal Amendment to the Food Adulteration Act with imprisonment upto life and as triable by Court of Sessions and later Parliament amended the earlier Central legislation by grading the offences with different kinds of sentences all below life and as triable by Magistrate that was upheld as prevailing by the Bench of the Calcutta High Court referring to Article 254 holding earlier State Amendment is impliedly repealed by later Central Amendment that shall prevail. The Apex Court confirmed said conclusion. 15(m). The above is since not an answer directly to deal with the issue on hand, it is even taken for arguments sake, the pre-constitutional enactment is at par with the Central legislation made by the Parliaments within its Central List, it is to consider among the two legislation's of the parliament as to which one shall prevail to the extent of irreconcilability from the conflict between the two. 15(n). 15(n). Now coming to the same, the Apex Court in Dharangadara Chemical Works Ltd. v. Dharangadara Municipality and another (25) AIR 1985 SC 1729 (2JB) held with reference to Octroi duty must pay to the Municipality under the Rules and bye-laws, 1965 framed under Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901 (pre-constitutional law adopted by the Government of Sourashtra) and continued under the Gujarat Municipalities At, 1963 and the Octroi ordinance called Sourashtra Terminal Tax and Octroi ordinance, 1949 which came into force w.e.f. 31.08.1949 (Bombay Act) and Gujarat Act for proving that the repeal by implication is not ordinarily favoured by the Court but the principal of which the rule of implied repeal raised has been stated in Maxwell on interpretation of statutes (12th Edition) page 193 that if further provisions of law enactment are so inconsistent with repugnancy to the provisions of the earlier one when the two cannot stand together, the earlier is taken as abrogated by the later, vide Kutner v. Philips (26) 1891 (2) QB 267 and the Apex Court in Zaverbai Amaidas v. State of Bombay (27) (1955) 1 SCC 799 approved the principle in the context of two pieces of legislation namely Essential supplies temporary Powers Act, 1946 amended by the Act 42 of 1950 Central Act and the Bombay Act, 1360 of 1947 in the context of enhanced lease amount when repugnant 4o each other holding both the acts constituted a single Special matter thereby under Article 254(1) of the constitution, the Act 42 of 1950 Central enactment will prevail by concluding with approval Goddar's observations in Smith v. Benabo (28) 1937 (1) KB 518 of the well settled rule of construction that if a later statute again describes an offence created by a previous one, and imposes different punishment, or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by the later statute. It is also observed by the Apex Court referring to its earlier expression in T. Barai (16 supra) of the said principle of implied repeal referred supra has been approved and applied. 15(o). It is also observed by the Apex Court referring to its earlier expression in T. Barai (16 supra) of the said principle of implied repeal referred supra has been approved and applied. 15(o). Further the Apex Court in Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd., (2 supra) in relation to Section 133 of the Cr.P.C. and Sections 30 to 33 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act Prevention and Control of Pollution, (Water Act) and sections 8,20 and 22(a) of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act,1981 (for short, 'the Air Act') observed from the area of operation of said legislative provisions of the three statutes that Section 133 Cr.P.C., is preventive in nature whereas, the provisions contained in the other two acts supra are not only curative but also preventive and penal which provisions are mutually exclusive and as such there is no question of one is deemed repealed or prevailed in between the two enactments (Water Act and Air Act). In this regard, on how to understand the doctrine of implied repeal, if any, it was observed that the doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the legislation which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions, therefore, when the Court applies the doctrine, it does not more than given effect to the intention of the legislation by examining the scope and object of the two enactments and by comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against applying any implied repeal, (a) unless the Act which is so bluntly repugnant to the other and that effect cannot be given to both at the same time a repeal will not be implied, (b) that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together to determine whether a later statute repeals by implementing its answer to scrutinize the terms and to treat amendment and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. It is also observed that presumption against implied repeal is based on the maxim 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express intention of one person or no such exclusion of another as illuminatingly stated in Gornet v. Brandle (29) 1878 (3) AC 944. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. It is also observed that presumption against implied repeal is based on the maxim 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express intention of one person or no such exclusion of another as illuminatingly stated in Gornet v. Brandle (29) 1878 (3) AC 944. Therefrom observed that a repeal of the earlier enactment from the later enactment to infer by necessary implication arises when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnancy with the provisions of the earlier Act and that too cannot stand together. It is also referred in this regard the expression of the Apex Court in R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka (30) AIR 1992 SC 81 . 15(p). Further, the Constitution Bench expression of the Apex Court in Ashoka Marketing Limited v. Panjab National Bank and others (31) AIR 1991 SC 855 (5JB), in relation to the interpretation of the provisions of Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants Act 40 of 1971 and Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 while referring to the source of the legislative power of both falls under concurrent list by repelling the contention of the 1971 Act, falls as if under Union list, in holding that the provisions of the Public Premises Act, to the extent they covered the premises following within the ambit of Delhi Rent Control Act, overrides the provisions of the Rent Control Act so that a person in unauthorized occupation of the public premises cannot invoke protection of the Rent Control Act though earlier to the Public Premises Act, 1971 there is no such provision in the Rent Control Act, 1948 of both under the Concurrent list. It is observed therefrom that one of the principles of statutory interpretation which is applied to resolve conflict in laws is contained in the Latin maxim 'Legas posteriaris priores centerarias abroganf (later laws abrogate the earlier contrary laws). This principle is subject to the exception embodied in the maxim 'generalia specialibus non derogant. It was observed with reference to the provisions of both the enactments, the Public Premises Act, and the Rent Control Act, both are the special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein and the contention of later one is a general one is untenable. It was observed with reference to the provisions of both the enactments, the Public Premises Act, and the Rent Control Act, both are the special statutes in relation to the matters dealt with therein and the contention of later one is a general one is untenable. Thus in case indicates of inconsistency between the provisions of the two enactments both of which can be regarded as special in nature and the conflict has to be resolved with reference to the provisions and policy underlying the two enactments and the clear intendment conveyed by the legislature of the relevant provisions therein. It is ultimately held that the Public premises Act provisions inconsistent with the Rent Control Act prevail. 15(q). From the above principles, coming to the scope of the Pharmacy Act and AICTE Act, which of the two are general or special or both are special laws to understand, the principle laid down by the Apex Court in RMD Chamarbangwalla v. Union of India (32) 1957 SCR 930 referring to the expression in River Wear Commissioners v. William Adamson (33) 1876-77 (2) AC-743 is that although the words occurring in a j particular statute are plain and unambiguous, they have to be interpreted in a manner I which would fit in the context of the other j provisions of the Statute and bring about the real intention of the legislature there from. 16. From the above, in the Pharmacy Act, a pre-constitution enactment, the statement of objects and reasons show that it is to establish a central Council of Pharmacy which will prescribe a minimum standard of education in approved course of study and examinations for Pharmacists and provisional Pharmacy Council which will be responsible for maintenance of provisional register of qualified Pharmacists the State Act was amended by the Act 70 of 1976 in fact, with an object to provide a wider representation in the PCI by providing representations of the Union territory, as also university Grants Commission and Ail India Council for technical education and also to empower the PCI to keep anything specialized members as members of its Committee. Section 3 provides for constitution and composition of Central Council which include representative of the University Grants Commission (UGC) and a representative of the AICTE. Section 3 provides for constitution and composition of Central Council which include representative of the University Grants Commission (UGC) and a representative of the AICTE. Section 10 provides that Central Council may subject to the approval of the Central Council, make regulations to be called education regulations prescribing minimum standard of education required for qualification as Pharmacist on the following and without prejudice to the power (a) the nature and period of study and practical training to be undertaken before admission to the examination, (b) the equipment and facility to be provided for students undergoing approved Course of study (c) the steps of examination and the standards therein to be attended and (d) any other condition of payment to examinations. Section 12 makes a provision for approval of course of study and examinations. Section 12 sub-section (3) speaks that every authority which conducts an approved course of studies or hold on approved examination sheet furnished such information as the Central Council may, from time to time, required as to the Course of study and training and examination to be undergone, as to the ages at which stage course of study and examination. Section 13 provides the Central Council is empowered to withdraw the approval granted in the event of approved course of study and an approved examination does not continue to be in conformity with the education regulations. Section 15(a) provides maintenance of Central Register of Pharmacist which shall contain names of all persons entered in the Register and Section 15(b) provides Register of the Central Council on receipt of report of registration of a person in the Register for setting to enter is his name in the Central Register. Section 29 speaks every State Council shall prepare and keep a register of Pharmacists for the state. Section 3 1 provides qualification for entry in the register of State. 17. Coming to the AICTE Act, 1987, the AICTE was in fact set up in 1945 by the Government legislation as National Expert Body to advice the Central and State Councils for ensuring coordinated development of technical education in accordance with the approved standards. Section 3 1 provides qualification for entry in the register of State. 17. Coming to the AICTE Act, 1987, the AICTE was in fact set up in 1945 by the Government legislation as National Expert Body to advice the Central and State Councils for ensuring coordinated development of technical education in accordance with the approved standards. The aims and objects speak the council for the past three decades to the enactment (right from 1945 till 1987) has been functioning quite effectively with fundamental growth in the development of technical education and however in recent years a large number of private engineering colleges and Pharmacy colleges have come up in complete disregard to the guidelines laid down by AICTE and most of the institutions have serious deficiencies in terms of even the rudimentary infrastructure necessary for imparting proper education and training. Taking into account of the erosion of standards, the AICTE in its meeting held in 1981 came to a conclusion of it should be vested with the statutory' power to regulate and maintain standards of technical education in the country and therefrom based on the recommendations, the National policy of Education 1986 came into force which stipulate that AICTE will be vested with statutory authority for planning and formulation and maintenance of norms and accreditation funding and property, areas, monitoring, evaluation and maintenance service and authorities and sureties and ensure guarantee and integrated development of technical education and management. The Technical education defined in Section 2(g) of the Act means programmes of education research and training in engineering technology, architecture, town planning, management, Pharmacy and applied Arts and crafts and such other progress or areas as the Central Council may in consultation with the council, by notification in the official gazette, declare. Section 10 of the Act provides the Council to develop the technical education in the country at all levels and the Council has also power to promote innovations, research and development in establishments of new technologies, generation, adoption and adaptation of new technology so to meet developmental requirements and overall employment of educational processes. The Council is empowered to lay down norms and standards for courses to regulate, finalization and infrastructural facilities, staff pattern, staff qualifications and quality in instructions, assessment and examinations. The Council is empowered to lay down norms and standards for courses to regulate, finalization and infrastructural facilities, staff pattern, staff qualifications and quality in instructions, assessment and examinations. The Council has the power to grant approval for starting new technical institutions and for introduction, of new course and programmes in consultation with the agencies concerned. The Council is also empowered to provide guidelines to admissions of students to technical institutions and universities imparting technical education. Section 14 speaks on 4 regional committees in the country 'respectively. Section 23 empowers the AICTE to frame regulations. By virtue of I said power under section 23, the AICTE framed All India Council for technical education (for grant of approval for starting new technical institutions, introduction of courses and programmes and approval of intake capacity of the seats for the course or progress) Regulations, 1994. Regulation-2 relates to grant of approval for introduction of course or programme for intake capacity of seats and increase in annual intake capacity of seats and Regulation-4 prescribes requirement for grant of approval and regulation-6 relates to conditions for grant of approval. 18. Having regard to the above analysis of the provisions of both the Acts, viz; the Pharmacy Act and the AICTE Act, would lead to irresistible conclusion that what are the areas of operation of the Pharmacy Act occupying the field for regulating the provisions of Pharmacy also to some extent occupied by the AICTE Act as to the technical education defined in Section 2(g) of the Act which includes Pharmacy. The Pharmacy Act provides for framing of educational regulations under Section 10 of the Act as referred supra and pursuant to which education regulation 1991 has been framed for providing minimum qualification for admission to Diploma in Pharmacy, course of study, Syllabi, approval of the authority conducting course and conduct of examinations. As referred supra from the pleadings, the new education regulations incorporating Pharmacy programme came into force in 2014 w.e.f. 10.12.2014 for the academic year 2015-16 onwards with participation effects as can be seen therefrom. The petitioner also made representation pursuant to it to the PCI referring to the new regulations. Now coming back to the provisions the AICTE Act, which also provides for grant of permission to establish new courses of study, laying down norms and standards, Syllabi etc. The petitioner also made representation pursuant to it to the PCI referring to the new regulations. Now coming back to the provisions the AICTE Act, which also provides for grant of permission to establish new courses of study, laying down norms and standards, Syllabi etc. for the students to be admitted into the course, for the intake and the conducting of examinations. Thus, both the Acts laid down norms and standards for course of study in Pharmacy. Therefore, both the Acts are to treat as parliament enactments relating to coordination and determination of standards in the colleges while granting permission or for new course or for the intake and for other areas of regulating including in the course of Pharmacy by occupying the same field. Both can be said thereby as special enactments and thus it cannot be said that the AICTE Act is a general enactment and the Pharmacy Act is a special enactment, leave about the Pharmacy Act is a pre-constitutional law and the AICTE is a post-constitutional law but prevail over the Pharmacy Act by the AICTE Act, and its provisions indicate in case of any inconsistency. Even from the expressions referred supra in Kedia Leathers (2 supra) of the legislation making authority in making subsequent legislation is presumed to know the existing law did not intend to create confusion with conflicting provisions and thereby implied repeal to be inferred cannot be a matter of course. However from reading of the provisions of the two enactments as per the settled expressions from its scrutiny in understanding the spirit of the provisions of the two enactments and from the inconsistency and irreconcilability noticed above in the same area of operation, leave about some of the provisions without impediment one to the other operate any other respective fields. Now coming to the admissions and intake in particular covered by the present lis concerned from the conflict directly with irreconcilability between the provisions of the two Acts, the AICTE Act, 1987 provisions shall prevail. Also for the reason, irrespective of what is referred supra, from Section 3 of the Pharmacy Act which deals with the composition of the Central Council that consist representative of UGC and representative of AICTE also. Also for the reason, irrespective of what is referred supra, from Section 3 of the Pharmacy Act which deals with the composition of the Central Council that consist representative of UGC and representative of AICTE also. Here from the AICTE Act in constitution of the committee under Section 3 and Chapter 2 with title and establishment mainly PCI is one of the 7 Members as per Section 2(m) in taking decisions, the decision of the AICTE prevails over the decision of the PCI. The learned Single Judge of Madras High Court in A. Mahesh, S. Ananda Natarajan, R. v. K.K. College of Pharmacy (34) 2003 (4) CTC 657 in the common order dated 10.04.2002 in W.P.No.4248 of 2001 and batch also concluded so in holding the AICTE Act prevails over the Pharmacy Act in relation to area of admission and intake etc. and to that extent, the Pharmacy Act provisions shall yield to the AICTE Act. This Court also in the expression of learned Single Judge in V. Laxmi and others v. Govt, of India (35) 2003 (5) ALT 715 = 2003 (6) ALD 425 held that the AICTE Act empowers the AICTE to grant affiliation after satisfying the norms and reported to the concerned authority and having accorded provisional affiliation subject to conditions the Pharmacy Council cannot refuse to recognize the B. Pharmacy decrees obtained by the students from the college of Pharmacy in question. Though in that judgment it is not so vividly discussed as to which of the provisions of the two Acts shall prevail. The learned Single Judge of this Court by interim order in W.P.M.P.No.27643 of 2016 in W.P.No.22481 of 2016 in Sangu Laxmi Vidyapet v. Convener, of Telangana State EMCET Admissions, 2016 etc. by referring to B. Laxmi (3 supra) of this Court and A. Mahesh (34 supra) of Madras High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court in Gandhi College of Pharmacy, G.T. v. All India Council of Technical (36) AIR 1995 Punjab and Haryana 315 held that the AICTE Act prevails over the Pharmacy Act, and to the extent in conflict, the Pharmacy Act provisions deemed to be inoperative and once the AICTE has been granting necessary approvals to the petitioners including approval for academics of the year 2015-16, there is a prima facie case in directing suspending the impugned order outcome of PCI. Said writ petition is still pending as per the pleadings in the writ petition affidavit referred supra, as subject matter of transfer to the Apex Court to decide with another matter that was subsequently withdrawn and in saying the Transfer petition became infructuous. However, it is also relevant to refer the expression of the Apex Court in Shah Govardhan L. Kobra Teachers Association (8 supra) in referring to the distribution of legislative powers and Article 245 and 246 on doctrine of pith and substance in the fields of legislation under the three lists and its construction that indicates a conflict between the entries. 19. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Aurangabad in W.P.No.6702 of 2016 and C.A.No.7896 of 2017 of the Shirpur Education Society v. the State of Maharashtra and others, in which the AICTE and PCI also co-respondents, where it was held denying prayed intake composite capacity of the AICTE approval of the intake in the Pharmacy Course for the AICTE being the prime authority accorded sanction to the intake, is unjust in so directing sanctioned intake of the AICTE to permit and for that also referred the earlier Bench observations in Shri Vile Parle Kelvani Mandal v. State of Maharashtra and others in W.P.No.6259 of 2017 and Jijamata Shikshan Prasarak mandal's Kamlatai College of Architecture v. State of Maharashtra and others) in W.P.No.7706 of 2017 referring to the purpose and object of the AICTE and its supremacy also referred to orders passed by the Supreme Court in this regard in directing to grant affiliation to start the academic year with the sanctioned intake approval of the AICTE. 20. Having regard to the above and in the result, the writ petition is allowed by directing the 4th respondent-JNTU, Kakinada, to grant affiliation to the 2nd petitioner-St. 20. Having regard to the above and in the result, the writ petition is allowed by directing the 4th respondent-JNTU, Kakinada, to grant affiliation to the 2nd petitioner-St. Mary's Group of Institutions, Guntur, for the entire intake of 180 seats, permitted by the 3rd respondent-All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE), without limiting intake of 100 seats in said B. Pharmacy course pursuant to the restriction imposed by the Pharmacy Council of India (for short, 'PCI') for the provisions of the AICTE Act, prevails over the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, and AICTE is the ultimate authority competent among AICTE and Pharmacy Council of India, in permitting the intake with reference to the infrastructure and facilities for the purpose of granting intake of students to the technical course, which include Pharmacy, however by making it clear that this no way prevent the PCI in acting pursuant to the provisions of the Pharmacy Act, however to the extent not inconsistent with the AICTE Act, for the reason in the area of operation from any inconsistency, the provisions of the AICTE Act alone held prevail. There is no order as to costs.