JUDGMENT : S. K. SAHOO, J. 1. This revision petition has been filed by the petitioner Kamal Kumar Nanda with a prayer to quash the impugned order dated 19 07.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bolangirin C.T.R Case No 1 of 2012 in framing charge under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereafter'1988 Act') and Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code. 2. The petitioner was the complainant-decoy in a trap case vide C.T.R. Case No. 5 of 2008 which arises out of Sambalpur Vigilance P.S. Case No. 25 of 2007 in the Court of learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bolangir in which one Subhanath Majhi, Junior Engineer was the accused who was chargesheeted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1 )(d) and section 7 of the 1988 Act During course of trial, the petitioner was examined as a witness but he retracted from his previous statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. and the accused Subhanath Majhi was acquitted of the charges. After the order of acquittal passed on 04.05.2011, one Sabitarani Panda, Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Sambalpur Division, Sambalpur lodged a first information report before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Sambalpur on 30.06.2011 against the petitioner for giving false evidence in Court in C.T.R Case No,5 of 2008 and accordingly, Sambalpur Vigilance PS. Case No 55 dated 30.06.2011 was registered under Section 12 of the 1988 Act and Sections 182, 192 and 211 of the Indian Penal Code. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the petitioner for such offences. 3. At the time of framing of charge on 16.02.2016, the petitioner filed a petition under Section 239 of Cr.P.C. for discharge. The learned Trial Court rejected the petition vide order dated 19.07.2016 and framed charge against the petitions on the very day under Section 12 of the 1988 Act and Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code which is impugned in this revision petition The charge was read over and explained to the petitioner who refuted. the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried: The charge framed by the learned Trial Court is extracted herein below: "That you on 23rd day of March, 2011 abetted the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the PC. the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried: The charge framed by the learned Trial Court is extracted herein below: "That you on 23rd day of March, 2011 abetted the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) and Section 7 of the PC. Act by Subanath Majhi, who was a public servant and the entire prosecution case rested on your testimony regarding demand and acceptance of the bribe and you also lodged the first information report stating about demand of bribe by Subanath Majhi. to prepare bills but the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution created considerable doubt on the prosecution case and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act; 1988 and within my cognizance. That you on 23rd day of March, 2011 being legally bound by an oath to state the truth, on a certain subject i.e. to prove demand of bribe money of Rs 2,800/- by Subanath Majhi, being a public servant, did make to such public servant touching that subject, a statement which was false and which you knew to be false and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 181 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. That you on 22nd day of May, 2007 lodged F.I.R. before D.S.P., Vigilance, Bolangir who is a public servant that Junior Engineer Subanath Majhi was demanding bribe from you, falsely intending D.S.P. Vigilance to investigate the matter which he would not have investigated had he known that your allegation is false and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 182 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance." 4. Mr. H.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the impugned order dated 19.07.2016 passed by the learned Trial Court in framing the charge, emphatically contended that it suffers from non-application of judicial mind and the ingredients of the offences are not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case and the charge has been framed in a mechanical manner without keeping in view the provisions laid down under Section 195(1 )(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. and Section 132 of the Evidence Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of R. Dineshkumar @ Deena v. State reported in A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1816. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of R. Dineshkumar @ Deena v. State reported in A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1816. Mr Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department on the other hand supported the impugned order for framing charge by the learned Trial Court and assiduously contended that the petitioner who was the star witness on behalf of the prosecution and at whose instance, the prosecution was launched stated falsehood before the learned Trial Court on oath in favour of the accused retracting from his previous statements under Sections 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C. which led to the acquittal of the accused and his statement that he forcibly thrust the tainted money into the pocket of the accused and while he was returning back, the accused brought out the money from his pocket and called him and told him to take back the money and at that time the vigilance officials arrived there and challenged the accused to have demanded and accepted the bribe money from him, is contrary to the statements made before the police and Magistrate and therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in framing the charge The learned Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra reported in A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 938.. 5. Section 12 of the 1988 Act reads as follows : "12, Punishment for abetment of offences defined in Section 7 or 11- Whoever abets any offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment fora term which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine." Section 7 and Section 11 of the 1988 Act read as follows : "7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act-Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavor to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than [three years] but which may extend to [seven years) and shall also be liable to fine. Explanations- (a) "Expecting to be a public servant". If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) "Gratification". The word "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) "Legal remuneration". The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organization, which he serves, to accept (d) "A motive or reward for doing". A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and, thus, induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section. 11. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and, thus, induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section. 11. Public servant obtaining valuable thing, without consideration from person concerned in proceeding or business transacted by such public servant Whoever, being a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration, or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by such public servant, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine." 6. Section 12 of the 1988 Act makes it clear that for a person to be guilty there under, it is not necessary that the offences mentioned therein should have been committed pursuant to the abetment or in other words, it is immaterial whether or not the offence was committed in consequence of the abetment. 'Abetment' has not been defined under the 1988 Act; therefore profitably referring to its exhaustive definition in section 107 of the Indian Penal Code, it enumerates that person abets the doing of a thing when he does any of the acts mentioned in the following three clauses; (i) instigates any person to do that thing, or (ii) engages with one of more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or (iii) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. 7. 7. So far as the first two clauses are concerned, it is not necessary that the offence instigated should have been committed. For understanding the scope of the word "aid" in the third clause, it would be advantageous to see Explanation 2 in Section 107 I.P.C. which reads thus : "Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act." 8. It is thus clear that under the third clause when a person abets by aiding, the act so aided should have been committed in order to make such aiding an offence In other words, unlike the first two clauses, the third clause applies to a case where the offence is committed. 9. Abetment under the Indian Penal Code involves active complicity on the part of the abettor at a point of time prior to or at the time of the actual commission of the offence, and it is of the essence of the crime of abetment that the abettor should substantially assist the principal culprit towards the commission of the offence. Nowhere concurrence in the criminal acts of another without such participation therein as helps to effect the criminal actor purpose is punishable under the Code. 10. Therefore, it is apparent that unless there is clinching material available on record that a person has abetted any offence punishable under Section 7 or Section 11 whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, he cannot be prosecuted under Section 12 of the 1988 Act. 11. In this case, the accusation as per Sambalpur Vigilance P.S. Case No. 25 of 2007 is not that the petitioner abetted the commission of crime by Junior Engineer Subhanath Majhi. He was the complainant in the case and merely because during course of trial, he resiled from his previous statements and did not support the prosecution case will not be construed that he has abetted the commission of offences under Section 7 and 11 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 12. On perusal of the heading of the charge framed under Section 12 of 1988 . 12. On perusal of the heading of the charge framed under Section 12 of 1988 . Act, it appears that the learned Trial Court has mentioned that the petitioner has abetted the commission of offences punishable under Section 13(2) and section 7 of 1988 Act. Abetment of offence under Section 13(2) of 1988 Act is not punishable under Section 12 of the Act. Only abetment of offence punishable under section 7 or Section 11 is punishable under Section 12 of the Act. It is further mentioned under the heading of such charge that the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution created considerable doubt on the prosecution case. If that be so, it is not understood as to why charge was framed against the petitioner under Section 12 of the 1988 Act. 13. Law is well settled that statement of a witness recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. during the investigation is not a substantive piece of evidence and in view of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 162 of Cr. PC., such statement can be used only for the limited purpose of contradicting the maker thereof in the manner laid down in the said proviso. Similarly statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can never be used as substantive evidence of truth of the facts but may be used for contradiction and corroboration of a witness who made it. The statement made under Section 164 Cr.P.C. can be used to cross examine the maker of it and the result may be to show that the evidence of the witness is; false. It can be used to impeach the credibility of the prosecution witness. When a witness gives a statement to the Magistrate under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and later during the trial disowns it and gives a different version, either the statement given by him before the learned Magistrate may be true or his deposition before the learned Trial Court may be true, but both may not be true. The statement of a witness under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. The statement of a witness under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. is recorded being sponsored by the investigating agency. If on compulsion by the investigating officer, a witness implicates an accused in the crime in his 164 Cr.P.C statement but during trial, he states differently and exonerates the accused and further states that on compulsion, he gave the 164 Cr.P.C. statement, it would be travesty of justice to prosecute such witness for giving false evidence. Similarly a witness cannot be prosecuted for perjury for resiling from his statement recorded by police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. ' 14. If a witness deposing during trial deviates from his previous statements recorded either under Section 161 or Section 164 of Cr.P.C., it cannot be said that he has abetted the accused who is facing trial for the commission of an offence. Therefore, on the face of the accusation, I am of the view that framing of charge under Section 12 of the 1988 Act suffers from non-application of mind and cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 15. Coming to the other charges i.e. under Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code, the two sections read as follows : "181. False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person authorised to administer an oath or affirmation-Whoever, being legally bound by an oath [or affirmation] to state the truth on any subject to any public servant or other person authorised by law to administer such oath [or affirmation], makes, to such public servant a other person as aforesaid, touching that subject, any statement which is false, and which he either knows or believes to be false or does not believe to be true, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 182. 182. False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person-Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant- (a) to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or (b) to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both." 16. Section 195(1 )(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Obviously offences under Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code come within the purview of Section 195(1 )(a)(i) of Cr.P.C.) This section is one of the sections which prohibit a Court from taking cognizance of certain offences unless and until a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person As the section creates an absolute bar against the Court taking cognizance of the offence except in the manner provided by the section, if the Court takes cognizance against the provision, the cognizance should be illegal and without jurisdiction. Once the order of taking cognizance is held to be illegal, the subsequent order of framing charge is also illegal and liable to be quashed. 17. Once the order of taking cognizance is held to be illegal, the subsequent order of framing charge is also illegal and liable to be quashed. 17. In the present case, when no complaint as described under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C. has been made either by the public servant concerned i.e. Junior Engineer Subanath Majhi or by any other public servant to whom Subhanath Majhi was administratively subordinate, the prosecution against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of the first information report lodged by Sabitarani Panda, Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Sambalpur Division, Samablpur cannot be sustained in the eye of law and therefore, I am of the view that the submission of charge sheet against the petitioner under Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Panel Code and consequential order of framing of charge by the learned Trial Court under such offences is not proper and justified. 18. Coming to the Section 132 of the Evidence Act, it reads as follows ; "132. Witness not excused from answering on ground that answer will criminate-A witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind : Proviso-Provided that no such answer, .which a witness shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be provided against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer." 19. In case of Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR. : 1968 S.C. 938 while analysing this provision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ; been pleased to held as follows : "7. Now there can be no doubt that Ethyl Wong was a competent witness Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act all persons are competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them for reasons indicated in that section. Now there can be no doubt that Ethyl Wong was a competent witness Under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act all persons are competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are prevented from understanding the questions put to them for reasons indicated in that section. Under Section 132 a witness shall not be excused from answering any question as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any criminal proceeding (among others) upon the ground that the answer to such question will incriminate or may tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind. The safeguard to this compulsion is that no such answer which the witness is compelled to give exposes him to any arrest or prosecution or can it be proved against him in any criminal proceeding except a prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. In other words, if the customs authorities treated Ethyl Wong as a witness and produced her in Court, Ethyl Wong was bound to answer all questions and could not be prosecuted for her answers. Mr. Jethmalani's argument that the Magistrate should have promptly put her in the dock because of her incriminating answers overlooks Section 132 (Proviso). In India, the privilege of refusing to answer has been removed so that temptation to tell a lie may be avoided but it was necessary to give this protection. The protection is further fortified by Article 20(3) which says that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. This article protects a person who is accused of an offence and riot those questioned as witnesses A person who voluntarily answers questions from the witness box waives the privilege which is against being compelled to be a witness against himself because he is then not a witness against himself but against others. Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act sufficiently protects him since his testimony does not go against himself." 20. In case of R. Dineshkumar alias Deena v. State reported in A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1816, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "36. On the other hand, both Justice Ayyar and Justice Kernan opined that the compulsion is the obligation arising out of law, but not the compulsion imposed by the Judge. In case of R. Dineshkumar alias Deena v. State reported in A.I.R. 2015 S.C. 1816, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows : "36. On the other hand, both Justice Ayyar and Justice Kernan opined that the compulsion is the obligation arising out of law, but not the compulsion imposed by the Judge. "It seems to me that the Legislature in india adopted this principle, repealed the law of privilege, and thereby obviated the necessity for an inquiry as to how the answer to a particular question might criminate a witness, and gave him an indemnity by prohibiting his answer from being used in evidence against him and thus secured the benefit of his answer to the cause of justice, and the benefit of the rule, that no one shall be compelled to criminate himself, to the witness when a criminal proceeding is instituted against him. The conclusion I come to is that Section 132 abolishes the law of privilege and creates an obligation in a witness to answer every question material to the issue, whether the answer criminate him or not. and gives him a right, as correlated to that duty, to claim that the answer shall not be admitted in evidence against him in a criminal prosecution." (per Muttusami I Ayyar, J.) XXX 46. Section 132 existed on the statute book from 1872 i.e. for 78 years prior to the advent of the guarantee Under Article 20 of the Constitution of India. As pointed out by Justice Muttusami Ayyar in Gopal Doss (supra), the policy Under Section 132 appears to be to secure the evidence from whatever sources it is available for doing justice in a case brought before the Court. In the process of securing such evidence, if a witness who is under obligation to state the truth because of the Oath taken by him makes any statement which will criminate ortend to expose such a witness to a "penalty or forfeiture of any kind etc.", the proviso grants immunity to such a witness by declaring that "no such answer given by the witness shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding". We are in complete agreement with the view of Justice Ayyar on the interpretation of Section 132 of the Evidence Act." 21. We are in complete agreement with the view of Justice Ayyar on the interpretation of Section 132 of the Evidence Act." 21. Section 132 of the Evidence Act abolishes the law of privileges and creates an obligation on a witness to answer any question material to the issue, whether the answer criminates him or not, and gives him a right, as correlated to that duty, to claim that answer shall not be admitted in evidence against him in criminal prosecution The proviso to the section lays down that if a witness is compelled to give an answer, he shall not be liable for arrest or prosecution on that statement and that statement will be not proved in any criminal proceeding except for perjury for that very statement. Of course, the witness is protected only if he gives the answer under compulsion but if he answers voluntarily, he loses the protection Therefore, when a witness is summoned in a criminal case, he is legally bound to answer the questions including the questions which are likely to criminate him directly or indirectly but no answer in criminal case given by a witness on compulsion can criminate him accordingly. However, if a witness during course of his examination in Court, voluntarily states something and thereby gives certain incriminating answers, such answers will subject him to criminal prosecution and in such case, the proviso to Section 132 of the Evidence Act will not come to his rescue. Section 132 of the Evidence Act does not apply to a statement made by a person during an investigation under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. rather it refers to a person who enters the witness box and is sworn as a witness. 22. In the present case, even though it is accepted for the sake of argument that the petitioner deposed before the learned Trial Court voluntarily and not on compulsion but in absence of any incriminating statements and the fact that the previous statements given by the petitioner before the investigating officer and the Magistrate are not the substantive piece of evidence, the learned Trial Court erred in framing the charges. 23. 23. Even though strong suspicion is sufficient to frame charge but when the materials available on record taken on its face value do not disclose the ingredients of the offences under which the charge has been framed and the mandates under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of Cr.P.C. have not been followed, I am of the view that the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 24. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19.07.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Bolangir in C.T.R. Case No. 1 of 2012 in framing charge under Section 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 181 and 182 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner stands quashed.