JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. The writ petition was filed at a point of time when the construction of pay and use toilet in front of the entrance gate of the petitioner was under process, but during pendency of the writ petition and the report submitted in terms of the order passed therein, the same is virtually complete. 2. On the first day of moving the writ petition it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the construction of pay and use toilet not only blocked the free access to his premises but would also emit foul and dirty smell, which would render the petitioner as well as the other inhabitants of the said premises unable to live. 3. It was submitted by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation that the said pay and use toilet is constructed after obtaining the consent from the brother of the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner cannot raise any objection or challenge such action of the Corporation in constructing the said public utility. 4. It was informed to the Court that previously the premises was un-partitioned and after the partition is effected the brother of the petitioner, who is allotted a portion thereof, is not affected by the construction of the said public utility as the same is being constructed opposite to the entrance of the petitioner's portion. 5. This Court directed the Corporation to see whether any other suitable place can be found out within the circumference of 500 meters from the existing site so that the said public utility can be shifted to avoid any nuisance and annoyance to the petitioner because of the emission of foul smell. It was further indicated whether ventilators facing the property of the petitioner can be shifted to some other place. 6. The report filed by the Corporation suggests that there is no place available within the periphery of 500 meters from the existing site and the ventilators have been shifted from the side of the petitioner's property to some other place. 7. At this juncture, the matter took a different turn, as an argument was advanced by the petitioner that the provisions of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'said Act') prohibits such construction without seeking a previous sanction from the Mayor-in-Council and the approval of the State Government. 8. 7. At this juncture, the matter took a different turn, as an argument was advanced by the petitioner that the provisions of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as 'said Act') prohibits such construction without seeking a previous sanction from the Mayor-in-Council and the approval of the State Government. 8. Since the point raised by the petitioner is pure question of law, this Court, therefore, proceeded to decide the writ petition without inviting the affidavits from the Corporation. 9. The petitioner says that the classification of public streets in Kolkata includes the footpath and in view of Section 353 of the said Act the same cannot be permanently or temporarily closed for public interest or for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the said Act unless a previous sanction of Mayorin-Council and the approval of the State Government is obtained. It is, thus, submitted that the post-facto approval of Mayor-in-Council does not cure the incurable defects and makes the illegal act valid in view of the language used in Section 353 of the said Act. It is, thus, submitted that the words 'may' and 'shall' are interchangeable to ascertain its nature whether mandatory or directory depending upon the object and purposes for which the same has been inserted. 10. On the other hand, the Corporation says that though the public utility is constructed on footpath but the same was with the permission of Basti Department and the moment the attention of the authorities are drawn to the provisions contained under Section 353 of the said Act, the Mayor-in-Council has subsequently granted sanction and, therefore, there is a substantial compliance of the aforesaid provision. It is further submitted that a substantial amount has been invested for construction of the public utility taking into account the interest of public at large and, therefore, any order in the nature of demolition would not only cause the loss to the public exchequer but will also deprive the public at large to be benefited from such facility. In other words, it is submitted that once the sanction has been accorded by the Mayor-in-Council, even if the construction is made without any previous sanction, it cannot be rendered invalid and/or illegal, as there is no disapproval by the competent authority. 11. In other words, it is submitted that once the sanction has been accorded by the Mayor-in-Council, even if the construction is made without any previous sanction, it cannot be rendered invalid and/or illegal, as there is no disapproval by the competent authority. 11. On the conspectus of the aforesaid submissions advanced at the Bar, the only point involved in the instant writ petition is whether the post-facto sanction by the Mayor-in-Council would validate the previous act and be treated as a sufficient compliance of the provisions contained under Section 353 of the said Act. 12. As the facts narrated herein above are undisputed and have been sufficiently narrated to address the core issue involved in the instant writ petition, this Court, therefore, proceeded to decide the pure question of law without exchange of affidavits. 13. Section 346 of the said Act classifies the public streets in different categories and category VI thereof includes footpaths. The aforesaid provision is quoted as under: "346. Classification of public streets.-(1) the Mayor-in-Council shall classify all public streets in [Kolkata] in one or other of the following categories: (a) category I - arterial roads. (b) category II - sub-arterial roads, (c) category III - collector roads, (d) category IV - local roads, (e) category V - pedestrian pathways, and (f) category VI - footpaths. (2) The classification shall be done with due regard to the traffic role of the particular public street and the nature and volume of traffic on it, its existing width, and abutting land uses: Provided that the different names of public streets which essentially constitute parts of a continuous traffic corridor shall not come in the way of their placement in any particular category. (3) The Mayor-in-Council shall, from time to time, specify the minimum widths of different categories of public streets without regard to the existing widths of such streets as may be included in such categories: Provided that the minimum width of any public street falling under category I or category II or category II or category IV shall not be less than ten meters including any public street falling under category VI and that of a public street falling under category V, not less than six meters: Provided further that such minimum widths may be revised by the Mayor-in-Council at an interval of not less than five years. (4) The classification of the public streets in different categories may be revised from time to time." 14. There is no difficulty in arriving at the position that the pedestrian pathways and the footpaths are included within the periphery of the public streets and are to be treated and dealt with in such status. 15. Section 347 of the said Act makes imperative on the Corporation to ensure that all the public streets coming within the category I to III above have adjoining footpaths and sub-section (2) thereof vests power upon the Mayor-in-Council to specify different minimum widths for the footpaths, which are adjacent to the aforesaid public streets, to be not less than 1.5 meters on each side in any case. 16. Section 353 of the said Act contains the extensive provision relating to the permanent closure of public street, park, square or garden and disposal of land, as evident from the head note. It is apposite to reproduce the said provision, which is as under: "353. Permanent closure of public street, park, square or garden and disposal of land.-(1) The Municipal Commissioner may, with the previous sanction of the Mayor-in-Council, and subject to the approval of the State Government, permanently or temporarily close the whole or any part of a public street, park, square or garden in the public interest or for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act: Provided that the Municipal Commissioner shall give a public notice of such closure by insertion in at least three local newspapers and the notice shall specify the date on and from which the closure shall be effected. (2) For the purpose of carrying out any development work in any public street, park, square or garden or any part thereof, such public street, park, square or garden or the part thereof or the sub-soil thereunder may be dealt with or settled or transferred, as the case may be, either temporarily or permanently by way of grant of lease or licence, as the case may be, and on such terms and conditions and for such period as the Municipal Commissioner may, with the prior approval of the Mayor-in-Council and subject to the approval of the State Government, determine and for such development work the public street, park, square or garden or any part thereof may be closed temporarily or permanently, as the case may be, and in such case a public notice shall be given in the same manner as in sub-section (1) specifying the date from which the closure shall be effected: Provided that the site of so much of the roadway or footpath as would not be require for using as a public road or public thoroughfare by reason of providing better and alternative public road or public thoroughfare including footpath shall be dealt with or settled or transferred on lease or licence. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "development work" shall include all works for development and improvement by way of proper and adequate or better utilisation, either underground or on the surface, of a public street, park, square or garden." 17. Sub-Section (1) of Section 353 of the said Act permits the Municipal Commissioner to close whole or any part of the public street, park, square or garden in the public interest or for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act, either permanently or temporarily, subject to the previous sanction of the Mayor-in-Council and subject to the approval of the State Government. Proviso inserted thereto requires a public notice of such closure be given by the Municipal Commissioner in at least three local newspapers. 18. The Municipality and the Corporation is entrusted to maintain and provide civil amenities to the inhabitants of their area and also to regulate and control the buildings to give better life to the people at large. 19. Proviso inserted thereto requires a public notice of such closure be given by the Municipal Commissioner in at least three local newspapers. 18. The Municipality and the Corporation is entrusted to maintain and provide civil amenities to the inhabitants of their area and also to regulate and control the buildings to give better life to the people at large. 19. Chapter XXX of the said Act relates to environmental sanitation and public safety and duties entrusted upon the Corporation in relation to the environmental sanitation and improvement of insanitary huts and sheds. The said chapter further imbibes within itself the responsibility of the Corporation relating to the public conveniences and the utilities to be provided and Section 504 of the said Act signifies such duties and powers of the Municipal Commissioner in this regard. 20. The harmonious reading of the aforesaid provisions leave no doubt in my mind that on one hand it is a duty and responsibility of the Municipal Commissioner to maintain and provide sufficient numbers of public utilities at the convenient places in order to avoid any nuisance being caused in this regard; on the other hand, it restricts the exercise of such duties and responsibilities if such public utility has to be constructed on the public streets, which includes footpaths without previous sanction of Mayor-in-Council and subject to the approval of the State Government. 21. The existence of the Corporation is through the said Act and being the statutory body they cannot act in derogation thereof. The source of existence cannot be undermined or belittled for its in adherence and the action to be made valid by subsequent act. 22. The language used in Section 353 of the said Act is imperative and the Municipal Commissioner cannot close, either wholly or in part, the public street either in the public interest or for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Act without previous sanction of Mayor-in-Council and subject to the approval of the State Government. Had the language being used "sanction of the Mayor-in-Council and subject to the approval of the State Government", this Court do not find any difficulty in regularizing the act already undertaken by post-facto sanction or approval obtained from the Mayor-in-Council and the State Government. The legislature do not use the word unnecessary as each word carries definite meaning and percolates the purpose and object for its incorporation. 23. The legislature do not use the word unnecessary as each word carries definite meaning and percolates the purpose and object for its incorporation. 23. There is no difficulty in ascertaining the primary duty and responsibility of the Corporation to provide public convenience utilities as one of the fundamental duties under the said Act. On the other hand, it bridles the power of the Mayor-in-Council to permanently or temporarily close any public streets by way of construction for the purpose of the act. The word 'previous' appearing before the sanction of the Mayor-in-Council should be given a meaning and the interpretation sought to be given by the Corporation, if accepted, would frustrate and/or make such expressions otiose and redundant. 24. The importance of the words 'prior' and 'previous' appearing before the approval or permission and/or sanction have come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Ashok Kumar Das and others v. University of Burdwan and others, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 616 . While the Supreme Court distinguished the words 'approval' and 'permission' yet proceeded to held that if there is a prefix to the aforesaid words, either as prior or previous, it is mandatory on the part of the administrative or statutory authorities to take such approval and/or permission before the action is taken. 25. The difference in languages in other statutes without having any prefix like prior or previous is further noticed by the Supreme Court and it has been laid down that the post-facto permission and/or approval, in the event it is not approved, will rectify and/or valid the action already taken. The generic meaning of the word 'sanction' includes both, approval or permission, whereas the approval means an act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning or consenting to some act or thing done by another and whereas permission is defined as a conscious act signifying the consent or an order by use of an authority. It is profitable to quote the observations recorded by the Apex Court in the above noted decision in this regard, which runs thus: "10. The learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 3, on the other hand, submitted that Section 21(xiii) used the expression "approval of the State Government" and not "prior approval of the State Government" and it has been held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. The learned counsel for Respondents 1 to 3, on the other hand, submitted that Section 21(xiii) used the expression "approval of the State Government" and not "prior approval of the State Government" and it has been held by this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. and High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh that when an approval is required, an action holds good and only if it is disapproved it loses its force. He further submitted that promotions made on the basis of Resolution of the Executive Council of the University adopted on 26-6-1995, therefore, hold good and now that the State Government has approved the Resolution of the Executive Council of the University adopted on 26-6-1995 by Order dated 10-10-2002, the promotions made on the basis of the Resolution dated 26-6-1995 of the Executive Council of the University hold good and cannot be set aside by this Court. 11. In Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edn.), the word "approval" has been explained thus: "Approval.-The act of confirming, ratifying, assenting, sanctioning, or consenting to some act or thing done by another." Hence, approval to an act or decision can also be subsequent to the act of decision. 12. In U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad this Court made the distinction between permission, prior approval and approval. Para 6 of the judgment is quoted here-in-below: (SCC pp. 458-59) "6. This Court in LIC v. Escorts Ltd., considering the distinction between 'special permission' and 'general permission', 'previous approval' or 'prior approval' in para 63 held that: (SCC p.313) '63. ...we are conscious that the word "prior" or "previous" may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such implication into Section 29(1) [of the Act].' Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission is that in the first case the action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous act. As to the word 'approval' in Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Workmen, that the management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous act. As to the word 'approval' in Section 32(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Workmen, that the management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. The requirement that the management must obtain approval was distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain permission, of which mention is made in Section 33(1)." 13. Following the decision in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, this Court again held in High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh in para 40: (SCC p. 255) "40. When an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it is disapproved it loses its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become effective till permission is obtained. (See U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd.)" 14. Section 21(xiii) of the Burdwan University Act, 1981 is quoted here-in-below: "21. Powers and functions of the Executive council.-Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Executive Council shall exercise the following powers and perform the following functions: (i)-(xii) * * * (xiii) to determine, with the approval of the State Government, the terms and conditions of service of Librarians and non-teaching staff," 15. The words used in Section 21(xiii) are not "with the permission of the State Government" nor "with the prior approval of the State Government", but "with the approval of the State Government". If the words used were "with the permission of the State Government", then without the permission of the State Government the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff. Similarly, if the words used were "with the prior approval of the State Government", the Executive Council of the University could not determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff without first obtaining the approval of the State Government. But since the words used are "with the approval of the State Government", the Executive Council of the University could determine the terms and conditions of service of the non-teaching staff and obtain the approval of the State Government subsequently and in case the State Government did not grant approval subsequently, any action taken on the basis of the decision of the Executive Council of the University would be invalid and not otherwise." 26. In view of the proposition of law laid down in the above report, the post-facto sanction by the Mayor-in-Council cannot validate and/or cure the defects in proceeding with the construction of public utility. Though the disapproval has not come yet such approval did not come before the action is taken, which is one of the mandatory requirement under Section 353 of the said Act because of the word 'previous' being used before the sanction of the Mayor-in-Council. 27. Had it been a case that prior sanction was obtained from the Mayor-in-Council but the approval of the State Government was not taken, since such approval is not preceded with the word 'prior' and 'previous', the subsequent approval would take sufficient care of the aforesaid provision and shall not render the action void or in contravention to the provisions of the Act. 28. Since the previous permission of the Mayor-in-Council was not taken before embarking to construct the public utility, may be for the purpose of the Act or in the public interest, yet it falls on the parameters of the aforesaid provision and, therefore, cannot be allowed to remain. 29. There is no difficulty on the part of the Court to mould the relief, if by subsequent action or the act, in course of the writ petition if it becomes inappropriate. 30. Since the post-facto permission surfaced during pendency of the writ petition and this Court finds that it would not validate or render such action legal in view of the special expressions appearing in Section 353 of the said Act, this Court, therefore, directs the Kolkata Municipal Corporation to remove and/or demolish the public utility constructed in front of the entrance gate of the petitioner within two months from date. 31. The writ petition is, thus, disposed of. 32. In view of disposal of the writ petition nothing remains in the connected application filed under CAN 280 of 2017 and the same is also disposed of. 33. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.