ORDER : 1. The present writ petition arises from order dated 16.05.2011 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.382/2010 as modified in review application No.14/2011 dated 25.07.2011 preferred by the Petitioners. 2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that quantum of punishment is the prerogative of the employer and the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the order of dismissal as affirmed by the appellate authority. At best the matter could have been remanded to the for passing fresh orders if the punishment was considered disproportionate. The Tribunal did not return any finding of procedural impropriety in the conduct of the departmental proceedings. The jurisdiction in judicial review over an order of punishment passed in a departmental proceeding is limited to examination of procedural irregularity only. Both the orders under challenge are therefore unsustainable and deserve to be set aside. 3. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Tribunal originally passed an order for compulsory retirement which was not one of the punishments provided under Rule 9 of the Gramin Dak Sewak (Conduct and Employment) Rules, 2001 and only modified the same in the review jurisdiction to reconsider appropriate punishment less than removal from service in accordance with law. It calls for no interference. 4. We have considered the respective submissions. 5. Normally an order of punishment passed in pursuance of a departmental proceeding can only be examined for procedural irregularity which may have caused prejudice. The quantum of punishment is indisputably the jurisdiction of the employer. If the Court considers the quantum to be excessive or disproportionate, the normal order to be passed is for remanding it to the authorities to reconsider the quantum of punishment. But there are exceptions to this rule well settled by judicial precedents. If the quantum of punishment appears to the Court to be excessive and disproportionate, the conscience of he Court is shocked, instead of remanding it, the Court can in an appropriate case order appropriate punishment. But for this purpose, the application of mind and reasons for interference must be apparent from the order. It cannot be the ipse dixit of the Court to interfere with the quantum by merely reciting the words that it was shocking to the conscience. 6. The Respondent is alleged to have delayed distribution of letters and money orders by a few days while discharging his duties as a Postman. It cannot be the ipse dixit of the Court to interfere with the quantum by merely reciting the words that it was shocking to the conscience. 6. The Respondent is alleged to have delayed distribution of letters and money orders by a few days while discharging his duties as a Postman. There is no procedural impropriety in the conduct of the departmental proceeding. But one of his defence was being overburdened due to shortage of staff leading to assignment of additional duties to him. This was not denied by the Petitioner and on the contrary was acknowledged. 7. The Tribunal has rightly opined it to be a case of negligence. Negligence will have to be different from misconduct. If a Government servant is not careful in the discharge of his duties and commits errors which may have not been intentional but for reasons beyond control displaying human fallibilities, it will fall in the category of negligence. For negligence to amount to a misconduct warranting a serious punishment as dismissal, the conduct has to be wanton, deliberate, and callous, with full awareness of the consequences which are serious but completely unmindful of the same. In other words, it would be an absolute reckless conduct bordering on brazenness and defiance. 8. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is not possible for the Court to arrive at any finding of a gross misconduct as different from negligence due to human fallibilities. The Tribunal has adequately ascribed reasons on this aspect. In (2002) 3 SCC 443 State of U.P. v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik, it was observed in paragraph 14 as under :- "14. ………………………………..In any case, we find that nature of charges in the present case is different which cannot be said to be mere omission on his part or it may be attributed to lack of competence or inaptitude etc. ……………………………..." 9. In the present case, the order of dismissal dated 29.01.2009 holds that the delay in distribution of letters and the money orders were indicative of his not being dutiful in discharge of duties. ……………………………..." 9. In the present case, the order of dismissal dated 29.01.2009 holds that the delay in distribution of letters and the money orders were indicative of his not being dutiful in discharge of duties. In this context, we may appropriately refer to the following passage from (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 408 H. L. Gulati v. Union of India :- "21.……………………………..We are further satisfied, that the punishing authority could have passed such an order after arriving at the conclusion that the appellant/delinquent was either guilty of "grave negligence" or of "grave misconduct". The punishing authority recorded, while passing the punishment order that the appellant was found to have committed acts of "grave misconduct". Having perused the charges proved against the appellant, we have already concluded above, that the delinquency established against appellant was of negligence, and not of misconduct. Therefore, the finding recorded in the impugned order that the appellant had committed acts of "grave misconduct" cannot be accepted. The above conclusion, in the impugned order being unacceptable, is hereby set aside. In the absence of the conclusion of "grave negligence", the punishment order is liable to be set aside, and is accordingly set aside. " 10. Reliance on an order dated 29.08.2016 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No.4425/2016 Gangawasi Sharma v. The Union of India is completely misplaced as it related to a serious misconduct of having applied for one day casual leave but leaving the headquarters without permission. It is completely distinguishable on its own facts. 11. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. 12. The writ petition is dismissed.