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2017 DIGILAW 32 (MAN)

State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang

2017-11-27

KH.NOBIN SINGH

body2017
JUDGMENT Kh. Nobin Singh, J. - Heard Shri R.S. Reisang, the learned Sr. Government Advocate appearing for the applicants/appellants and Shri R.T. Rebirthson, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This is an application filed on behalf of the applicants/appellants, the State respondents praying for condonation of delay of 312 days in preferring the Regular First Appeal on the ground of bonafide mistake namely, the Applicants/Appellants did prefer an appeal against the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 18-07-2016 before the learned District Judge, Imphal West which was rejected on 28-07-2017 by it on the ground that it had no appellate pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The relevant paragraphs 2 to 5 of the application are reproduced herein below:- "2. That, on 9th August, 2017, the Government Advocate (High Court), Manipur received an order for preferring an appeal against the Judgment and Decree dated 18-07-2016 passed in O.S. No. 4 of 2015 (5 of 2016) passed by the Ld. Civil Judge, Sr. Division, Chandel, Manipur from the Law Department, Government of Manipur. 3. That, on receipt of the aforesaid letter by the Office of the Government Advocate (High Court), Manipur, the matter was discussed for preparation of drafting RFA along with Misc. Application for condonation of delay. A copy of the said order dated 9th August, 2017 is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure - M/1. 4. That, the Applicants/Appellants preferred an Appeal against the impugned Judgment and Decree dated 18-07-2016 before the Ld. District Judge, Imphal West, Manipur along with Judl. Misc. Case No. 32 of 2017 vide Application dated 15-06-2017 praying for condonation of delay. However, the Application was rejected on 28-07- 2017 on the ground that the Hon'ble Court has no Appellate pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the Appeal as well as the Judl. Misc. Case for condonation of delay. Hence, in approaching the wrong Forum was a bonafide mistake committed by the Government Advocate (District). A true copy of the order dated 28-07-2017 is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure-M/2. 5. That, while preparing the Memo of Appeal along with Misc. Application for condonation of delay, some days have been consumed for preparation of Memo of Appeal and Misc. Application for condonation of delay." 3. A true copy of the order dated 28-07-2017 is enclosed herewith and marked as Annexure-M/2. 5. That, while preparing the Memo of Appeal along with Misc. Application for condonation of delay, some days have been consumed for preparation of Memo of Appeal and Misc. Application for condonation of delay." 3. In order to contest the application, an affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the respondent wherein it has been submitted that there is no cogent reason or any sufficient cause for having preferred the appeal after a long time. After the Judgment and Decree being passed on 18-07-2016, the respondent filed an Execution Case being E.C. No. 2 of 2016 in which the defendants therein namely, the applicants/appellants herein participated in the proceedings through their counsels. Since the applicants/appellants have the knowledge of the judgment and decree being passed on 18-07-2016, the lapse and inaction on their part shall not be the ground for condoning the delay without proper explanation. The respondent has denied the averment that the delay was due to bonafide mistake and that it is a lame excuse just to cover up the mala fide attitudes, negligence and dilatory pleas of the applicants/appellants. Although the judgment and decree having been passed on 18-07-2016, the applicants/appellants approached the learned District Judge only on 15-06-2017 after a lapse of about 11 (eleven) months and there is no explanation for not preferring the appeal prior to 15-06-2017. 4. Relying upon the various decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Shri R.S. Reisang, the learned Senior Government Advocate, has submitted that the State being an impersonal machinery, this court while considering the application for condonation of delay, may take into account the fact that since the State is required to take a collective decision, it always takes time while doing that. The first decision relied upon by him is the one in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 wherein the question was whether same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test be applied to all the litigants regardless of their personality. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of justice. The fact that it was the "State" which was seeking condonation and not a private party, was altogether irrelevant. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. In State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, AIR 2000 SC 2306 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, held: "12. It is notorious and common knowledge, that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this court - be it by private party or the State - are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay or procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of altitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. The expression "sufficient cause' should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or whether cases required adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision to give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." In Divisional Manager, Plantation v. Munmi Barrack, (2005) 2 SCC 237 wherein there was delay of 103 days in filing the appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in a case of that nature where serious questions of law were raised, the Division Bench of the High Court should have taken a liberal view on the application for condonation of delay filed by the appellant wherefor the respondent workmen could have been adequately compensated on monitory terms. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to its earlier decisions, held: "15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants." 5. On the other hand, Shri Rebirthson, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has relied upon the decisions rendered in P.K. Ramachandra v. State of Kerala AIR, 1998 SC 2276 wherein an application for condonation of delay of 565 days was allowed and in the appeal by way of special leave, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order (supra) that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory which is essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay. 4. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order (supra) that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for the delay was either reasonable or satisfactory which is essential pre-requisite to condonation of delay. 4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12-5-1995 is: "at that time the Advocate General's office was fed up with so many arbitration matters equally important to this case were pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 2-9-1995." 5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge, Kollam on 30-10-1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18-01-1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order we are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent-State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. 6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs." In Pundlik Jaiam Patil v. Executive Engineer Jaigaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 wherein one of the issues was as to whether the averments disclosed any sufficient cause to condone the inordinate delay of 1724 days in filing the appeals, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: "31. It is true that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In a given case if any such facts are pleaded or proved they cannot be excluded from consideration and those factors may go into the judicial verdict. In the present case, no such facts are pleaded and proved though a feeble attempt by the learned counsel for the respondent was made to suggest collusion and fraud but without any basis. We cannot entertain the submission made across the Bar without there being any proper foundation in the pleadings." He has placed further reliance in Basawaraj anr. v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the expression "sufficient cause' and held: "9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, Parimal v. Veena and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai.) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause". 11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao.) 12. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao.) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.-The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn., Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project.) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. 15. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tant-amounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. 6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides that any appeal or application except the one mentioned therein, may be admitted after the expiry of prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. As has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. The expression "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word "sufficient" is "enough" for a particular purpose or as much as one needs. Similarly, the word "cause" means "reason". The expression "sufficient cause" is not defined in the Act. The dictionary meaning of the word "sufficient" is "enough" for a particular purpose or as much as one needs. Similarly, the word "cause" means "reason". In some cases as mentioned hereinabove, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has examined the expression "sufficient cause" and has held that it means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case and in other words, the expression "sufficient cause" means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. The point that needs to be considered for by this court is with regard to the principles to be followed while examining the sufficient cause in respect of an application for condonation of delay keeping in mind the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that what constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules and in particular, as regards the application for condonation of delay filed by the State. In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Officer, Anantnag (supra) and G. Ramegouda Majorete v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court took the view that State or its instrumentalities must receive liberal consideration in matters relating to condonation of delay, while the Hon'ble Supreme Court, by taking a slightly contrary view, held in the case of Union of India v. Tata Yadogawa Ltd ors., 1988 (4) JT 472 that even giving that latitude namely, the delay on account of movement of files, there must be someway or attempt to explain the cause for such delay. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court, considering the manner in which the government decisions are taken, held that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient case" should therefore be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default, no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient case" should therefore be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. It appears that while laying down the said law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a similar view as that of the one in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case (supra) but did not take into account the decision rendered in Union of India v. Tata Yadogawa's case (supra). In Pundlik Jaiam Patil v. Executive Engineer Jaigaon Medium Project (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to examine the issue relating to condonation of delay and has held that when the State and its instrumentalities are the applicants seeking condonation of delay, they may be entitled to certain amount of latitude but the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. The Limitation Act does not provide for a different period to the Government in filing appeals or applications as such. It would be a different matter where the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In Basawaraj anr. v. the Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the decision of which is rendered recently in the year 2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court revisited the expression "sufficient cause" and after referring to its earlier decisions, summarised the law as mentioned hereinabove. 7. In the instant case also, the subject matter in issue relates to the condonation of delay in preferring the appeal by the State and in particular, when no explanation is given by the State for the delay. Having considered the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by both the counsels appearing for the parties, it is seen that in matters relating to application for condonation of delay, there is hardly any difference between a citizen and the State. Having considered the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by both the counsels appearing for the parties, it is seen that in matters relating to application for condonation of delay, there is hardly any difference between a citizen and the State. The only difference, appears to be that keeping in mind the circumstances in which the governmental decisions are taken, certain amount of latitude is permissible subject to the condition as observed in Pundlik Jaiam Patil's case (supra) that the Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross purposes with it. In the present case, the judgment and decree was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division on 18-07-2016 and according to the applicants/appellants, the appeal ought to have been preferred within 90 days therefrom. Instead of preferring an appeal before this court within 90 days as submitted by the applicants/appellants, an appeal was preferred before the learned District Judge, Imphal West along with an application being Judl. Misc. No. 32 of 2017 dated 15-06-2017, about 11 months from the date of judgment and decree, which was dismissed on 28-07-2017 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. After the said application and consequently, the appeal being dismissed by the learned District Judge, Imphal-West, the Government Advocate, High Court was directed vide order dated 09-08-2017 to prefer an appeal before this court and accordingly, the instant appeal has been preferred on 25-08-2017 along with the application for condonation of delay wherein it is stated that the delay is due to bonafide mistake for having approached the wrong forum. It is not in dispute that the State did approach the learned District Judge, Imphal-West by way of an appeal on 15-06-2017 which was dismissed on 28-08-2017 and thereafter, the instant appeal is preferred before this court on 25-08-2017. The time taken by the State between 15-06-2017 and 25-08-2017 can be said to have occurred due to bonafide mistake and sufficient cause has been shown thereof. But there is no explanation at all for the time taken by the State between 18-07-2016 and 15-06-2017, about 11 months, nor is there any averment made in respect thereof in the application warranting a latitude in its favour. But there is no explanation at all for the time taken by the State between 18-07-2016 and 15-06-2017, about 11 months, nor is there any averment made in respect thereof in the application warranting a latitude in its favour. The question of latitude will arise only when at least one reason is given for the delay. It is not done so in this case. Moreover, it is nowhere mentioned in the application that the delay has occurred owing to acts of fraud or collusion on the part of its officers or agents which may ultimately result in the suffering of the public interest. In the absence of even a cause or a reason leave alone sufficient, the delay cannot be condoned by this court with the result that the instant application is not sustainable in law. In other words, no attempt has been made by the State to show as to what prevented it from preferring the appeal between 18-07-2016 and 15-06-2017 and therefore, the application being devoid of any merit, is liable to be dismissed. 8. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the application for condonation of delay in preferring the appeal fails and is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.