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2017 DIGILAW 328 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Shashikant Motibhai Machhi

2017-02-08

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 15.5.2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Panchmahal at Godhra in Sessions Case No. 255 of 2005 whereby present respondents-original accused were acquitted of the charges levelled against them. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on 27.2.2002 pursuant to the Godhra train carnage, the respondents accused armed with deadly weapons formed an unlawful assembly and on 1.3.2002 at about 11'0 clock, at Village Munpur, Taluka Kadana, District Panchmahal, created an atmosphere of terror and the mob has set on fire the houses as well as the shops belonging to the complainant Yusufbhai Satarbhai Shaikh as well as witnesses Mahammad Yusuf, Salim Sattar and Rauf Sathar Shaikh and looted jewellery and cash of Rs. 15,68,800/- and ultimately caused damage to the tune of Rs. 9,17,000/- and thereby committed the offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 436, 395, 398 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and as the respondents are alleged to be the assailants in committing the commission of crime, a complaint came to be lodged at Ditwas Police Station being C.R. No. I-27 of 2002. Investigating Officer in pursuance to the said complaint has carried out investigation by recording statements of relevant witnesses, arresting the accused persons pursuant to the material found against them and recovering the muddamal by drawing panchnama and upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet came to be filed against the accused persons on 5.6.2005. 2.1 As some of the accused persons were not arrested, a separate charge sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate. Since the further investigation was required to be carried out pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, an application also came to be given for the same and pursuant thereto, a further investigation came to be conducted. 2.2 As the case in question was triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to Court of Sessions where it was numbered as Sessions Case No. 255 of 2005. The learned Sessions Judge has framed charge against the accused at Exh. 3 on 15.2.2006 for the specific offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 436, 395, 396 and 120B of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge has framed charge against the accused at Exh. 3 on 15.2.2006 for the specific offences punishable under sections 143, 147, 436, 395, 396 and 120B of IPC. The charge was read over and explained to the original accused to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 2.3 The prosecution with a view to prove and establish the case against the respondents accused has led the oral as well as the documentary evidence. Initially, the prosecution has examined the oral evidence in the following manner:- P.W. No. Name of witness Exhibit 1 Vipulkumar Navinchandra Sevak No. 2 Jesingbhai Shanabhai Damor 12 3 Ramabhai Bhurabhai Damor 14 4 Jayantibhai Hajirabhai Damor 18 5 Rajnikant Chunilal Panchal 19 6 Bhadreshkumar Manilal Bhatia 22 7 Surmabhai Bhurabhai Vagdiya 24 8 Salambhai Satharbhai Shaikh 26 9 Raufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh 27 10 Yusufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh 28 11 Fatmabibi Mahammad Yusuf Shaikh 30 12 Javed Mahamhad Yusuf Shaikh 32 13 Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh 35 14 Imtiyaz Mohammad Yusuf Shaikh 40 15 Babubhai Valjibhai Guniya 46 16 Madhavsinh Samatsinh Charan 49 17 Sursinh Tajsinh Ravat 53 18 Mehulkumar Valjibhai Kikani 54 19 Ranjitsinh Khumansinh Chauhan 63 The prosecution has also led the documentary evidences in the following manner:- Description Exhibit No. Panchnama of scene of offence 13 Panchnama of TI Parade of accused 15 Panchnama of TI Parade of accused 16 Panchnama of TI Parade of accused 17 Recovery panchnama 20 Panchnama of recovery of muddamal 21 Panchnama of body position of accused 23 Complaint 31 Letter to remain present for TI parade 38 Letter to remain present for TI parade 43 Copy of wireless message 50 Order for fresh investigation 56 Order for further investigation 57 Copy for conducting TI parade 58 Copy for conducting TI parade 59 Copy for conducting TI parade 60 2.4 Having adduced the evidence, a closing pursis has been given by the prosecution and then accused persons have been given an opportunity to tender further statements under Sec. 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter issues came to be framed and ultimately, after analysing the evidence on record and after conducting the entire trial, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Panchmahal at Godhra, in exercise of power under section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. has granted benefit of doubt and acquitted the respondents accused. Thereafter issues came to be framed and ultimately, after analysing the evidence on record and after conducting the entire trial, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Panchmahal at Godhra, in exercise of power under section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. has granted benefit of doubt and acquitted the respondents accused. It is this judgment and order of acquittal against the respondents accused which is giving rise to present appeal by the State. The appeal came to be admitted as back as in the year 2007 and now it has come up for final hearing. 3. Learned APP, Mr. J.K. Shah, appearing for the State has contended that a serious error has been committed by the learned trial Judge in passing the order of acquittal. There was no justifiable reason to grant even the benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. While contending this, Mr. Shah has drawn the attention of this Court to a charge which has been framed on 27.2.2002 and further has drawn the attention to the deposition of the complainant-Yusufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh, P.W. No. 10 and contended that though this witness has substantiated the case of the prosecution, the learned Judge has misconstrued this evidence and wrongly given benefit of doubt. Mr. Shah has further taken us to the evidence of P.W. No. 8, Salambhai Satharbhai Shaikh, examined at Exh. 27 and contended that though this witness has not supported the case of the prosecution, a reasonable inference can be drawn from the version of this witness in co-relation with other material on record. Mr. Shah has further taken us to the evidence of another witness, Raufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh, P.W. No. 9 and raised similar contention that though this witness has been declared as hostile, his examination to some extend is supporting the case of the prosecution and therefore, a serious error is committed by the learned trial Judge. In addition thereto, Mr. Shah has taken us to other parts of evidence brought to be pressed into service to prove the case and for that, P.W. No. 13, Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh, examined at Exh. 40 is also stated to have supported the case of the prosecution. The entire narration of this witness, according to Mr. In addition thereto, Mr. Shah has taken us to other parts of evidence brought to be pressed into service to prove the case and for that, P.W. No. 13, Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh, examined at Exh. 40 is also stated to have supported the case of the prosecution. The entire narration of this witness, according to Mr. Shah, is establishing the guilt of the respondents accused and since this deposition has not been appreciated in its proper perspective, the finding arrived at by the learned trial Judge is perverse to the record. Similarly, Mr.Shah has drawn attention to the deposition which is produced at Exh. 53 of P.W. No. 17, Sursinh Tajsinh Ravat, who at the relevant point of time was Mamlatdar of Kadana and looking to this deposition, Mr. Shah has contended that he has substantially supported the case of the prosecution. The entire narration of evidence of this witness clearly indicates that a serious error is committed by the learned trial Judge. Further material fact which has been pointed out by Mr. Shah is that the respondents accused have been identified indirectly by the witness so much so that evidence of hostile witnesses no doubt cannot be relied upon, but a reference is coming out about the incident in question which the respondents accused are very much alleged to have committed and therefore, the learned trial Judge has straightaway in a slip slot manner given benefit of doubt without assigning any cogent reason and therefore, such an error of exercise of jurisdiction requires to be corrected by this Court and ultimately by referring to these witnesses and the evidence collected by the prosecution, Mr. Shah has requested the Court to allow the appeal by quashing and setting aside the impugned order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge. 4. To oppose this stand taken by learned APP, learned advocate, Ms. Dharithri Pancholi, appearing for M/s. H.L. Patel Advocates, for the original accused has vehemently contended that the prosecution in the present background has not proved the case of the prosecution. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that the witnesses who have been examined and pressed into service cannot be said to be eye witnesses looking to their depositions taken during the course of trial. Ms. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that the witnesses who have been examined and pressed into service cannot be said to be eye witnesses looking to their depositions taken during the course of trial. Ms. Pancholi has further submitted that the witnesses have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution and even assuming without admitting that the version of the hostile witnesses can be relied upon for the purpose of interfering with the order of acquittal, then also, the version of these hostile witnesses on record is not sufficient enough to establish the responsibility and guilt of the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt and it is the obligation on the part of the prosecution to establish the case against the accused, otherwise, the benefit must be passed on to the accused. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that the prosecution has heavily relied upon the deposition of the complainant, Yusufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh, examined as P.W. No. 10 and contended that he cannot be said to be an eye witness and has not at all identified the accused persons, so much so that he has not named anybody out of these accused persons and in addition thereto, the date of incident which this witness is referring to and the time of occurrence is not matching with the version given by P.W. Nos. 11, 12 and 13, who are Fatmabibi Mahammad Yusuf Shaikh, Javed Mahammad Yusuf Shaikh and Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh respectively and by referring to these evidences, Ms. Pancholi has contended that no case is made out against the respondents accused. She has further contended that not only the witnesses have not identified any of the present respondents accused but the test identification parade is also not legally held and even after the order of reexamination pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, no further material is collected by the prosecution which can prove the case against the respondents accused and therefore, when the link is not established against the respondents accused, the learned trial Judge has rightly given benefit of doubt. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that case is not supported by independent witnesses in any manner. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that case is not supported by independent witnesses in any manner. The complainant himself has not supported the case and other witnesses have turned hostile and therefore, the present case has remained as that of no evidence and therefore, in such a situation, when no cogent evidence is supporting the version of the prosecution, it is dangerous to collect the piece of evidence from hostile witnesses and convict the respondents accused. In the absence of any corroboration to the specific role against the respondents accused, no benefit of doubt can be taken away which has been given by the learned trial Judge. Ms. Pancholi has further contended that the entire evidence is not supporting the case of the prosecution and further, the learned trial Judge had an advantage to see the demeanor of witness and therefore, his evaluation of the evidence and the assessment thereof cannot be discarded even if any plausible view is emerging from the record and therefore, looking to the well defined scope of exercise of appellate jurisdiction, no interference is called for in the background of present material and evidence and therefore, since no error is committed by the learned trial Judge, order deserves to be confirmed and the State appeal is required to be dismissed. Ms. Pancholi has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shyamal Saha and another v. State of W.B. reported in (2014) 12 SCC 321 and contended that the decision of the trial court is not required to be interfered with. Relying upon this decision, Ms. Pancholi has pressed into service the extracts made in paragraphs Nos. 17 to 20 of the said decision which are reproduced hereinafter: "17. The crucial issue for consideration, therefore, relates to interference by the High Court in an acquittal given by the Trial Court. Recently, in Joginder Singh v. State of Haryana it was held, after referring to Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor that: (Joginder Singh case, SCC P. 344, paras 21-22) "21. Before we proceed to consider the rivalised contentions raised at the bar and independently scrutinize the relevant evidence brought on record, it is fruitful to recapitulate the law enunciated by this Court pertaining to an appeal against acquittal. 22. Before we proceed to consider the rivalised contentions raised at the bar and independently scrutinize the relevant evidence brought on record, it is fruitful to recapitulate the law enunciated by this Court pertaining to an appeal against acquittal. 22. In Sheo Swarup (supra), it has been stated that the High Court can exercise the power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal in cases where it finds that '..... the lower court has "obstinately blundered" or has "through incompetence, stupidity or perversity" reached such "distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice" or has in some other way so conducted or misconducted himself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result.'" Unfortunately, the paraphrasing of the concerned passage from Sheo Swarup gave us an impression that the High Court can reverse an acquittal by a lower court only in limited circumstances. Therefore, we referred to the passage in Sheo Swarup and find that what was stated was as follows: "There is in their opinion no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some Courts in India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in which the lower Court has "obstinately blundered," or has "through incompetence, stupidity or perversity" reached such "distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice," or has in some other way so conducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result". The legal position was reiterated in Nur Mohammad v. Emperor after citing Sheo Swarup and it was held:(Nur Mohammed case, LW P. 481) "Their Lordships do not think it necessary to read it all again, but would like to observe that there really is only one principle, in the strict use of the word, laid down there; that is, that the High Court has full power to review at large all the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed". We are mentioning this only to dispel the possibility of anyone else getting an impression similar to the one that we got, though nothing much turns on this as far as this case is concerned. 18. The entire case law on the subject was discussed in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka beginning with perhaps the first case decided by this Court on the subject being Prandas v. State. It was held in Chandrappa as follows: (SCC P. 432, para 42) "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court". 19. The principles laid down in Chandrappa were generally reiterated but mainly reformulated in Ganpat v. State of Haryana though without reference to Chandrappa and by referring to decisions not considered therein. 19. The principles laid down in Chandrappa were generally reiterated but mainly reformulated in Ganpat v. State of Haryana though without reference to Chandrappa and by referring to decisions not considered therein. The reformulation of the principles in Ganpat is as follows: (SCC P. 62, para 15) "(i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and to come to its own conclusion. (ii) The appellate court can also review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iii) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons may set aside the judgment of acquittal. (iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (v) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. (Vide Madan Lal v. State of J and K, Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of M.P. Hand Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana.) 20. Undoubtedly, we are suffering from an overdose of precedents but be that as it may, from the principles laid down, it appears at first blush that the High Court is entitled to virtually step into the shoes of the Trial Court hearing submissions of learned counsel and then decide the case as a court of first instance. Perhaps this is not what is intended, notwithstanding the broad language used in Chandrappa and Ganpat. Otherwise, the decision of the Trial Court would be a meaningless exercise and this Court would become a first appellate court from a decision of the High Court in a case of acquittal by the Trial Court. Realistically speaking, although the principles stated are broad, it is the obligation of the High Court to consider and identify the error in the decision of the Trial Court and then decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. Realistically speaking, although the principles stated are broad, it is the obligation of the High Court to consider and identify the error in the decision of the Trial Court and then decide whether the error is gross enough to warrant interference. The High Court is not expected to merely substitute its opinion for that of the Trial Court only because the first two principles in Chandrappa and Ganpat permit it to do so and because it has the power to do so - it has to correct an error of law or fact significant enough to necessitate overturning the verdict of the Trial Court. This is where the High Court has to exercise its discretion very cautiously, keeping in mind the acquittal of the accused and the rights of the victim (who may or may not be before it). This is also where the fifth principle laid down in Chandrappa and Ganpat comes into operation." Ultimately, Ms. Pancholi has requested to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the evidence on record in co-relation with the findings arrived at by the learned trial Judge, following stinching facts are not possible to be ignored by this Court while dealing with the appeal which are summarised in the following manner: 5.1 A specific charge is framed against the respondents accused that pursuant to Godhra train carnage episode, these respondents accused have formed an unlawful assembly on 1.3.2002 around 11 0 clock and created an atmosphere of terror armed with deadly weapons and set on fire the houses and the shops and looted the utensils, jewelleries and cash from the houses of the complainant Yusufbhai Satarbhai Shaikh as well as witnesses Mahammad Yusuf, Salim Sattar and Rauf Sathar Shaikh and this incident is made the subject matter of complaint lodged before Ditwas Police Station being C.R. No. I-24 of 2002. 5.2 In the context of this complaint, it appears from the record that the prosecution has tried to prove the case against the respondents accused by examining several witnesses including the complainant and other witnesses. The prosecution has examined one Mr. Vipulkumar Navinchandra Sevak, P.W. No. 1 examined at Exh. 12, who is a panch witness taken in aid at the time of drawing panchnama of scene of offence. The prosecution has examined one Mr. Vipulkumar Navinchandra Sevak, P.W. No. 1 examined at Exh. 12, who is a panch witness taken in aid at the time of drawing panchnama of scene of offence. This witness has not only not supported the case of the prosecution but has denied the factum of execution of panchnama in his presence. He asserted that he was called alone at the police station and has not visualised anybody nor is aware about another witness who is a panch and therefore, a reading of this evidence is not sounding any confidence which can convey any support to the prosecution. 5.3 It has been further revealed that another panch witness, who was taken in assistance for the purpose of drawing panchnama related to identification of accused persons is P.W. No. 2, Jesingbhai Shanabhai Damor examined at Exh. 14. This witness has been declared hostile and he has not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, from this evidence, it can be seen that the identification of the respondents accused is not proved substantially by the prosecution. No doubt, the evidence of hostile witness can be considered proportionally if any part thereof is substantiating the case of the prosecution but, unfortunately, here, no such scenario is emerging and therefore, this witness is not reliable to the prosecution and therefore, identification appears to have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 5.4 If further examination of P.W. No. 3, Ramabhai Bhurabhai Damor examined at Exh. 18 is analysed, it appears that this witness is again a panch witness arranged for drawing the panchnama of identification, but this witness has also not supported the case of the prosecution. In cross-examination of this witness, he has specifically denied the factum of putting his signature by identifying the accused persons and therefore, from the reading of this witness, it is emerged that even test identification parade appears to have not been established by the prosecution. 5.5 Further, leading to the other evidence of witnesses, the prosecution has made an attempt to prove the recovery from the accused persons and for that, the recovery panchnama came to be drawn. To prove the recovery panchnama, the prosecution has examined one Jayantibhai Hajirabhai Damor as P.W. No. 4 at Exh. 19, who is one of the panch witnesses to the recovery panchnama. To prove the recovery panchnama, the prosecution has examined one Jayantibhai Hajirabhai Damor as P.W. No. 4 at Exh. 19, who is one of the panch witnesses to the recovery panchnama. Unfortunately, this witness is also declared as hostile by the prosecution and as such, the recovery is also not independently supported so cogently as panchas have turned hostile. This witness has conveyed that he has not gone along with accused persons nor has conveyed that in his presence, the recovery is made at the instance of accused and therefore, the very recovery panchnama drawn at Exh. 20 is not supported by the witness in whose presence it appears to have been drawn. Similar is the case with other witness as well but then the prosecution went further to make an attempt to establish the case. 5.6 The arrest panchnama has also resulted with the same fate as Rajnikant Chunilal Panchal, who was examined as P.W. No. 5 at Exh. 22 has also not supported the case of the prosecution nor supported by another witness, Bhadreshkumar Manilal Bhatia, P.W. No. 6 examined at Exh. 24. This process in its entirety appears to have not been corroborated by any of the panch witnesses and therefore, from the above fact, the prosecution is left with no choice but to insist upon the reliance upon stray observations from the deposition of aforesaid witnesses. 5.7 From the record, if the other witnesses, who can be said to be material witnesses to the prosecution, are analysed independently so as to find out whether any cogent support is still emerging from the record to the case of the prosecution and for that purpose, we have gone through the deposition of P.W. No. 8, Salambhai Satharbhai Shaikh, who has been examined at Exh. 27. This witness, who is the bother and who after Godhra carnage is stated to have left the place and went along with other persons in the agricultural fields and in their absence, it appears to have asserted that the mob has set ablaze their property. This witness unfortunately has categorically stated that he has not identified any of these respondents accused despite his statements having been recorded on two or three occasions. He, still, has maintained that he does not know any of the respondents accused. This witness unfortunately has categorically stated that he has not identified any of these respondents accused despite his statements having been recorded on two or three occasions. He, still, has maintained that he does not know any of the respondents accused. The cross-examination of this witness has no doubt stated the names of the respondents accused who participated in the commission of crime but has not held them responsible for the commission of actual crime by attributing specifically. On the contrary, he has stated that at Village Monpur, a mob of 300-400 persons gathered but from his cross-examination, he has admitted specifically that Shashikant Modi, Ramabhai Dalabhai and Babubhai Nathabhai have saved them from being victimized and therefore, this witness is asserting that these respondents accused Nos. 1, 5 and 4 on the contrary, have saved them and in further cross-examination, he has categorically stated that still they are residing even after that episode peacefully in the very same Village and therefore, this deposition of witnesses on the contrary is indicating that these respondents accused have helped and saved them. No doubt, the incident appears to have occurred but from the evidence of this witness, no responsibility or guilt is reflecting in so far as the respondents accused are concerned. 5.8 Now yet another evidence led by the prosecution is in the form of P.W. No. 9, Raufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh, examined at Exh. 28, who is another brother. This witness has categorically stated that he has not seen the house which was set ablaze. He has no doubt stated that pursuant to return of Somabhai Hirabhai Patel from Ayodhya, the persons have gathered for facilitating him but then, this witness is not attributing anything to the commission of crime of the respondents accused. On the contrary, he has not identified anybody though on 2-3 occasions, his statements have been recorded but then has specifically denied the role of the respondents accused. If his cross-examination is seen further, this witness though declared hostile has specifically admitted that after the incident in question, till date, they are residing peacefully with their entire family in this very Village. No doubt, on 1/3/202, the incident occurred, but then this witness is not supporting the case of the prosecution in any form. If his cross-examination is seen further, this witness though declared hostile has specifically admitted that after the incident in question, till date, they are residing peacefully with their entire family in this very Village. No doubt, on 1/3/202, the incident occurred, but then this witness is not supporting the case of the prosecution in any form. 5.9 With a view to ascertain the specific role if visualizing from any manner to the evidence as a whole on record, we have further gone through the evidence of P.W. No. 10, Yusufbhai Satharbhai Shaikh examined at Exh. 30, who is the complainant and this complainant, who was put for establishing the case by the prosecution, is specifically deposing that he has not seen the episode personally nor is identifying any accused. From the evidence of this witness, if we examine further even in the subsequent statements which have been recorded, he has categorically stated that he has not given names of these respondents accused nor has declared anything about personal knowledge to the incident and has categorically stated that whether these respondents accused are responsible or not, involved or not cannot be said by this witness. It is further reflected from this evidence that scene of offence panchnama appears to have been drawn more than after a period of 14-15 days from the date of complaint. Further statements have also been recorded of this complainant but then he has denied that he has given names of any of these respondents accused. On the contrary, from further examination, it can be seen that twice the incident in question has occurred in the Village one, on 1.3.2002 and another, after a period of 2 days and about the second incident, this witness has stated that the house was covered in the subsequent event but then despite the fact that about four times, his statements have been recorded, he is denying to have given specific name of anybody. On the contrary, though the incident in question has occurred, this witness on his own has stated that police has forced and insisted him to give the names and therefore, from the summary of this evidence, it can be said that there is no specific assertion or attribution or participation of these respondents accused reflecting nor anything is coming out which can support cogently the case of the prosecution. Therefore, this very complainant who put the machinery in motion has not supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, from the aforesaid evidence of witnesses, who can be said to be important witnesses to the prosecution, have chosen not to support the case. 5.10 To get assistance from another witness, the prosecution has examined Fatmabibi Mahammad Yusuf Shaikh as P.W. No. 11 at Exh. 32. This witness has not thrown much light on the case of the prosecution, on the contrary, she has chosen to depose in contradictory form that she has not seen the accused persons but her son has seen. She has pleaded ignorance as to who has played which role in the commission of crime and more particularly from cross-examination of this witness, it is revealed that she has given the names on account of say of people as well as her husband and Javed and therefore, this witness is not possible to be relied upon so cogently to believe the case of the prosecution. 5.11 Another witness namely, P.W. No. 12, Javed Mahammad Yusuf Shaikh, examined at Exh. 35 appears to have conveyed that out of the mob of around 70 people, he has seen accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 and he has stated this pursuant to recording of further statement by the police authority. This witness in cross-examination has admitted that at the time of deposing before the Court, on account of mental disturbance, he is on the medical treatment. In cross-examination further, this witness has denied that after bailable warrant being issued, he came to depose and to justify, he is projecting this cause of mental disturbance and then, in further examination, he is stating that whatever written in the complaint is properly written and has conveyed, rather admitted, that in his application earlier, he has narrated that the incident had occurred on 28/2/2002 and in further statement also on 15/1/2005, he has narrated that the incident had occurred on 28/2/2002 but, he has now clarified that actually, the incident had occurred on 1/3/2002. This entire deposition appears to be self-contradictory and appears to be converse to his earlier stand. This is coming out in his further stand being taken before the police. 5.12 The prosecution has also relied upon other witness namely, P.W. No. 13, Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh examined at Exh. 40. This entire deposition appears to be self-contradictory and appears to be converse to his earlier stand. This is coming out in his further stand being taken before the police. 5.12 The prosecution has also relied upon other witness namely, P.W. No. 13, Mahammad Yusuf Abdul Rahim Shaikh examined at Exh. 40. It appears that pursuant to the direction, a further examination has taken place since, according to this witness, there was no investigation for a period of three years and though the incident in question had occurred on 1/3/2002, his examination is taking place on 17/4/2007 i.e. almost after a period of more than five years. A reading of evidence of this witness is suggesting that some applications have been given and pursuant to those applications, further process appears to have been carried out. The deposition of this witness reveals further that applications at Lunavada came to be typed. It further reveals that discussion has also taken place with other members of the Village but, then witness is denying. It appears that his application dated 28/2/2002 is not correct as stated by him and therefore, in the year 2005, after almost a period of three years, his further statement came to be recorded by the police. The entire version of this witness is reflecting that pursuant to some general directions, when further steps have been taken by the police authorities, this witness has made an attempt to rope the respondents accused but then has not substantially corroborated the case of the prosecution. This witness in cross-examination has admitted that test identification parade at Exh. 17 was already prepared on which his signature was taken by the police authority. This witness has conveyed that after the incident with the family members, they have left Village Monpur but then has asserted that the names which are mentioned in his application at Exh. 41 are given whether at the instance of other people or not is not being recollected by him and then the entire tenor appears to be that he is half-heartedly deposing before the Court which is not cogently supporting the case of the prosecution. 5.13 In the context of this incident in question, the prosecution appears to have relied upon the evidence of Executive Magistrate named as Sursinh Tajsinh Ravat, P.W. No. 17 examined at Exh. 53. 5.13 In the context of this incident in question, the prosecution appears to have relied upon the evidence of Executive Magistrate named as Sursinh Tajsinh Ravat, P.W. No. 17 examined at Exh. 53. This witness has narrated that he has not read any circular of the Government as to what procedure is to be adopted at the time when test identification parade is to be held. He has also deposed before the Court in the form of admission that three panchas, who were brought, were got prepared. Prior thereto, proforma was prepared and thereafter, blanks were filled in as per the need. He has also deposed before the Court that yadi for identification of suspicious persons which have been given was on account of instruction from Special I.G. But then, in the said yadi, no details have been provided about the age, identification marks etc. of the accused persons and even in the panchnamas, which have been altered by addition or alteration, no counter signature has been made at appropriate place which has been admitted by this Officer and therefore, to rely upon substantially such kind of witness is putting the Court to caution and therefore, in the absence of any other cogent corroboration, heavy reliance may not be possible. 5.14 Yet another witness, P.W. No. 18, Mehulkumar Valjibhai Kikani examined at Exh. 54 appears to have undertaken the task of further examination from the instruction dated 27/10/2004. This police witness i.e. Investigating Officer has stated that pursuant to instructions of Vadodara Range and Vadodara Range IGP and pursuant to the direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of further examination, he has recorded certain further statements. At one point of time in this evidence of witness, though it has been denied, a question was put and asserted that whether on his own he has recorded the statements of witnesses and further he has also admitted that on 4/1/2005, the witnesses have stated that for the moment, they do not want to record anything but after discussion inter se at house, the statements came to be recorded. He has specifically admitted in his deposition that the statements of third parties which have been recorded are not supporting or corroborating the version of victim and therefore, from the reading of this evidence, it appears that further recording has taken place after almost a period of three years in which the names of the respondents accused have been introduced. The overall view of the evidence therefore suggests that there is no concrete support made available by independent version of witnesses even after reexamination and reinvestigation. It appears that the case of the prosecution is not succinctly getting corroborated from the evidence of any of the witnesses examined by the prosecution. 5.15 In the light of aforesaid position prevailing on overview of evidence, we have also examined the analysis of evidence at the instance of trial court and on the reading of said evidence, we found that three witnesses i.e. Mahammad Yusuf, Fatmabibi and Javed of the very same family have not opined anything nor attributed specifically as to which role is played by which accused and further, their initial version is not in favour of the prosecution but subsequently made an attempt to arraign the respondents accused which aspect has been considered by the learned trial Judge in paragraph No. 17 of the impugned judgment. We are mindful of the fact that the trial court had an opportunity to see the demeanor of the witnesses who were examined by the prosecution. 5.16 In furtherance of this, even the panchnamas which have been drawn have also been drawn in a stereotype manner in which only the blanks have been filled in and thereafter, the prosecution has attempted to arraign the respondents accused. Now if the evidence of the panchas namely P.W. No. 2, Jesingbhai Shanabhai Damor examined at Exh. 14 and P.W. No. 3, Ramabhai Bhurabhai Damor examined at Exh. 18 with respect to panchnama of test identification parade at Exh. 60 as well as other panchnamas at Exhs. 15, 16 and 17 are perused, it is clearly appearing that the panchas are not supporting the case of the prosecution as they have been declared as hostile. 6. The trial court has also considered all the aspects of the matter and therefore, after considering every material led before it, has passed an order which is impugned in the present acquittal appeal. 6. The trial court has also considered all the aspects of the matter and therefore, after considering every material led before it, has passed an order which is impugned in the present acquittal appeal. Further reading of the judgment also makes it clear that the case is not established against the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt and the learned trial Judge has considered each and every evidence and then came to a conclusion on each aspect which has been pressed into service by the prosecution. In substance, this is not a case where we found that any error is committed by the learned trial Judge in not considering the witness or non-dealing of any of the materials. The learned trial Judge has examined every aspect which has been brought to his notice and then came to the conclusion that no case is made out against the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. Had there been a circumstance or any material aspect not touched by the learned trial Judge, we understand that any different view could have been possible on the basis of same material. It is a settled position of law that while dealing with an acquittal appeal, re-appreciation is definitely to be dealt with. But from the basis of same material which has been considered by the learned trial Judge, if any plausible view is reflecting, the normal circumstance remains that such plausible view cannot be substituted qua that of the learned trial Judge as the learned trial Judge had an opportunity see the demeanor of witnesses. The present case appears to be based on series of circumstances and from the overall reading and overview of the evidence, the chain is not getting so cogently completed which may permit us to take a different view of the matter. 7. The present case appears to be based on series of circumstances and from the overall reading and overview of the evidence, the chain is not getting so cogently completed which may permit us to take a different view of the matter. 7. As we have discussed above that our independent analysis of the evidence also suggests that the view taken by the learned trial Judge is a possible view and therefore, sitting in an acquittal appeal, we refrain ourselves from taking a different view in the absence of any extra-ordinary unimpeachable circumstances and therefore, looking to the aforesaid set of circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the present case is not such which may call for any interference and we are mindful of the following propositions of the Hon'ble Apex Court to deal with a situation in which acquittal appeal is to be dealt with. 7.1 The power of appellate jurisdiction is laid down succinctly right from the beginning and one of such propositions is reported in AIR 1974 SC 606 in the case of Ram Jag v. State of U.P. wherein it has been observed in part of paragraph No. 9 as under: "9. ..... Due regard to the views of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses in matters resting on pure appreciation of evidence and the studied slowness of the appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses where such seeing and hearing can be useful aids to the assessment of evidence, are well-known principles which generally inform the administration of justice and govern the exercise of all appellate jurisdiction. They are self-imposed limitations on a power otherwise plenary and like all voluntary restraints, they constitute valuable guidelines. Such regard and slowness must find their reflection in the appellate judgment, which can only be it the appellate court deals with the principal reasons that influenced the order of acquittal and after examining the evidence with care gives its own reasons justifying a contrary view of the evidence. It is implicit in this judicial process that if two views of the evidence are reasonable possible, the finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed." 7.2 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. It is implicit in this judicial process that if two views of the evidence are reasonable possible, the finding of acquittal ought not to be disturbed." 7.2 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs. State of Kerala & Anr. reported in (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 7.3 Further, in the case of Chandrappa Vs. State of Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:- [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 7.4 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar Vs. State of Haryana reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:- (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994." 7.5 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph 15 of case of Basappa Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (2) SCC (Cri) 497. 7.6 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "(17) In the case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731 this Court observed; "21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 7.7 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama Vs. State of Karnataka reported in 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 7.8 In another decision, the Hon'ble Court has clearly opined that mere disagreement with reasonable and possible view of the trial court on complete independent analysis of evidence on record is not a sound basis to set aside the order of acquittal and though every fact arrived at or every reason given by the trial court need not be dealt with but, decision of the trial court cannot be ignored or treated as non-existent. A clear reference to this as reflected in paragraph Nos. 18 and 19 of the decision reported in (2014) 12 SCC 321 in the case of Shyamal Saha and another Vs. State of West Bengal, which is a reiteration of the principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra), reads thus: "18. The entire case law on the subject was discussed in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka beginning with perhaps the first case decided by this Court on the subject being Prandas v. State. It was held in Chandrappa as follows (SCC P. 432, PARA 42): [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." "19. The principles laid down in Chandrappa were generally reiterated but mainly reformulated in Ganpat v. State of Haryana though without reference to Chandrappa and by referring to decisions not considered therein. The reformulation of the principles in Ganpat is as follows: SCC P. 62, para 15) "(i) There is no limitation on the part of the appellate court to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded and to come to its own conclusion. (ii) The appellate court can also review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. (iii) While dealing with the appeal preferred by the State, it is the duty of the appellate court to marshal the entire evidence on record and by giving cogent and adequate reasons may set aside the judgment of acquittal. (iv) An order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are "compelling and substantial reasons" for doing so. If the order is "clearly unreasonable", it is a compelling reason for interference. (v) When the trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declaration/report of ballistic experts, etc. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. (Vide Madan Lal v. State of JandK, Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of M.P. Hand Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana.)"" 7.9 In a recent decision in the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. the appellate court is competent to reverse the decision of the trial court depending on the materials placed. (Vide Madan Lal v. State of JandK, Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., Chandra Mohan Tiwari v. State of M.P. Hand Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana.)"" 7.9 In a recent decision in the case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa reported in 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 7.10 In another recent decision, the Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. Vs. State of Assam & Anr. reported in (2015) 11 SCC 242 has held in Paragraph Nos. 6, 7 and 8 as under: "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of P.W. 4 and P.W. 5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of P.W. 8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. vs. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court." 7.11 Yet in another recent decision in case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court." 7.11 Yet in another recent decision in case of Upendra Pradhan Vs. State of Orissa reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed in paragraph Nos. 14 to 18 and 22 as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of P.Ws. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 8. Therefore, considering the aforesaid propositions, we see no compelling and substantial reason to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge in the present case and therefore, upon overall analysis, we are of the view that the State appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 9. The appeal being found meritless is hereby dismissed. Therefore, considering the aforesaid propositions, we see no compelling and substantial reason to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge in the present case and therefore, upon overall analysis, we are of the view that the State appeal being meritless deserves to be dismissed. 9. The appeal being found meritless is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 15.5.2005 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 4, Panchmahal at Godhra in Sessions Case No. 255 of 2005 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings shall be sent back forthwith to the trial court. Appeal Dismissed.