JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. Instant revision petition under Section 397 CrPC is directed against judgment dated 11.12.2015 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (II) Shimla, camp at Rohru, in Criminal Appeal No. 6-S/10 of 2015, partly modifying the judgment dated 27.8.2015 passed by Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, Shimla in Criminal Case No. 243-3 of 2011, whereby the learned trial Court while holding present petitioner-accused (hereafter, ‘accused’) guilty of having committed offence under punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, (‘Act’, for short) sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and further to pay compensation of Rs.80,000/- to the complainant. 2. Brief facts, as emerge from the record are that the respondent-complainant, (hereafter, ‘complainant’) filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Act in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohru stating therein that he was running a barber shop in the name of ‘4-in-one beauty parlour’, near Meat Market, Rohru. On 1.9.2011, accused approached him and demanded Rs.60,000/- as he was in dire need of money to run his mobile business. The complainant handed over Rs.60,000/- in cash to the accused and accused agreed to return aforesaid amount within two months. In order to discharge aforesaid legal liability, accused issued a cheque bearing No. 995319 amounting to Rs.60,000/- drawn on Punjab National Bank, Branch at Rohru. Accused at the time of handing over the cheque assured that he was having sufficient funds in his bank account and cheque would be encashed on presentation in the Bank. However, on presentation, same was dishonoured on account of ‘insufficient funds’ in the account of the accused. Accordingly, on 17.11.2011, complainant got issued a legal notice through registered A.D. to the accused, advising him to make payment within 15 days. Since accused failed to pay the amount as demanded by way of legal notice, complainant was compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act, in the trial Court. Learned trial Court, on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment and to pay compensation, as described above. 3. Learned trial Court, on the basis of material adduced on record by the respective parties, held accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act and accordingly, sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment and to pay compensation, as described above. 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment of conviction, accused filed an appeal before the Additional Sessions Judge, (II), Shimla, camp at Rohru, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No. 6-S/10 of 2015. Aforesaid appeal was dismissed by the first appellate Court, however, the amount of compensation was modified to Rs.70,000/-. Hence, this petition by the accused praying for acquittal after setting aside the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. 4. Mr. B.C. Verma, learned counsel representing the accused vehemently argued that the impugned judgments of conviction as recorded by the learned Courts below are not sustainable as the same are not based upon correct appreciation of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties and deserve to be set aside. Mr. Verma, while referring to the impugned judgments passed by the first appellate Court and trial Court, strenuously argued that a bare perusal of same suggests that the Courts below have failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result of which, erroneous findings have been recorded to the detriment of the accused, who successfully proved on record that no amount was payable to the complainant as claimed in the complaint filed under Section 138 of the Act. Mr. Verma while referring to the cross-examination conducted upon accused, forcefully contended that it is ample clear that cheque, if any, was issued as security and not towards any lawful discharge of his liability as claimed by the complainant. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Verma sought acquittal of the accused, after setting aside the judgments of conviction and compensation recorded by the Courts below. 5. Mr. Kulbhushan Khajuria, learned counsel representing the complainant, supported the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. While refuting aforesaid contentions having been raised by the learned counsel representing the accused, Mr. In the aforesaid background, Mr. Verma sought acquittal of the accused, after setting aside the judgments of conviction and compensation recorded by the Courts below. 5. Mr. Kulbhushan Khajuria, learned counsel representing the complainant, supported the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. While refuting aforesaid contentions having been raised by the learned counsel representing the accused, Mr. Khajuria invited attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the Courts below to demonstrate that each and every aspect of the matter has been dealt with meticulously by the Courts below and there is no scope of interference by this Court, especially in view of concurrent findings of facts and law recorded by the Courts below. Mr. Khajuria, also invited attention of this Court to the statement made on record by the accused under Section 313 CrPC, wherein he has admitted his signatures as well as issuance of cheque. While concluding his arguments, Mr. Khajuria also reminded this Court of its limited jurisdiction under Section 397 as far as re-appreciation of evidence is concerned. He has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in case State of Kerala versus Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri (1999)2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held as under:- “ In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 6. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and have carefully gone through the record made available. 7. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and have carefully gone through the record made available. 7. True, it is that while exercising the power under Section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code, this Court has very limited power to re-appreciate the evidence available on record. But, this Court solely with a view to ascertain that the judgments passed by both the Courts below are not perverse and the same are based upon correct appreciation of evidence available on record, undertook an exercise to critically examine the evidence available on record to reach fair and just decision in the case. 8. As far as scope of power of this Court while exercising revisionary jurisdiction under Section 397 is concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and another Versus Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality or sentence or order. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as under:- “8. The object of Section 483 and the purpose behind conferring the revisional power under Section 397 read with Section 401, upon the High Court is to invest continuous supervisory jurisdiction so as to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularity of the procedure or to mete out justice. In addition, the inherent power of the High Court is preserved by Section 482. The power of the High Court, therefore, is very wide. However, the High Court must exercise such power sparingly and cautiously when the Sessions Judge has simultaneously exercised revisional power under Section 397(1). However, when the High Court notices that there has been failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is not correct, it is but the salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of the process or miscarriage of justice or to correct irregularities/ incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order.” 9. During proceedings of the case, this Court had occasion to peruse the pleadings as well as entire record of the Court below, perusal whereof clearly suggests that there is no mis-appreciation and misconstruction of evidence by the courts below, as alleged by the learned counsel representing the accused, rather, close scrutiny of evidence available on record clearly suggests that both the learned Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and have rightly held accused guilty of having committed offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act. 10. After carefully examining the statement having been made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC before the learned trial Court, there can not be any dispute, if any, with regard to the issuance of cheque as well as signatures of accused on the same, because, he himself stated before the Court that he had to pay Rs.25,000/- to the complainant, which he had paid. Though he admitted his signatures on the cheque but denied that he had issued any cheque dated 3.11.2011 amounting to Rs.60,000/- in favour of the complainant to discharge his legal liability, rather, his defence simpliciter is that aforesaid cheque was unsigned and was paid as security towards amount of Rs.25,000/-, which he had taken from the complainant. On the other hand, complainant namely Shri Mohan Lal with a view to prove the averments made in the complaint, examined himself as CW-1 and also tendered his evidence by way of affidavit i.e. Ext. CW-2/A. Aforesaid witness categorically stated that he had advanced Rs.60,000/- to the accused on his asking. Accused had re-assured that amount would be returned within stipulated time. He further stated that accused issued cheque amounting to Rs.60,000/- in his favour but the same was dishonoured on presentation to the Bank, on account of ‘insufficient funds’. 11. This Court carefully perused the cross-examination conducted on this witness, perusal whereof nowhere suggests that defence was able to extract anything contrary to what was stated in the examination in chief. Much emphasis was laid on the answer given by the complainant to the suggestion put by the defence that blank cheque was issued but even to that suggestion, complainant replied in negative. Much emphasis was laid on the answer given by the complainant to the suggestion put by the defence that blank cheque was issued but even to that suggestion, complainant replied in negative. Hence, this Court sees no force in the averments as well as substance in the arguments having been made by the learned counsel representing the accused that there is admission on the part of complainant with regard to issuance of blank cheque in his favour. Apart from above oral evidence, accused also placed on record cheque Ext. CW-2/A, dishonouring memo Ext. CW-2/C, copy of legal notice Ext. CW-2/D, and postal receipt, Ext. CW-2/E, perusal whereof clearly suggest that cheque in question was presented to the Bank for encashment but the same was dishonoured on account of, ‘insufficient funds’. Similarly, perusal of Exts. CW-1/D and CW-1/E clearly suggests that after dishonour of cheque, legal notice was issued to the accused, to make payment within 15 days. 12. After carefully examining the oral as well as documentary evidence as discussed herein above, this Court has no hesitation to conclude that complainant successfully proved on record ingredients/requirements of Section 138 of the Act, required under law for proving his case. Though the learned counsel representing the accused vehemently argued that the learned Courts below failed to take note of the fact that cheque in question was issued as a security and not towards lawful discharge of the liability towards complainant but there is no evidence worth the name available on record suggestive of the fact that cheque in question was ever issued as security, rather own admission of accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, proves beyond doubt that cheque in question was issued towards discharge of lawful liability. 13. Perusal of judgment of the learned trial Court suggests that while holding accused guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act, it has rightly placed reliance upon judgment passed by Apex Court in Jugesh Sehgal vs. Shamsheer Singh Gogi reported in 2009 (2) SLJ (SC) 1385, wherein the Apex Court has laid down certain factors, which are to be weighed by the Court while ascertaining whether accused is guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act or not. 14. 14. In the instant case, though the accused has taken defence that cheque in question was issued as a security but as has been stated above, there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that cheque was ever issued as security. Similarly, accused has not led any evidence to demonstrate that he had not issued any cheque for the discharge of his lawful liability and as such learned Courts below rightly came to the conclusion that presumption in the instant case is required to be held in favour of the complainant under Section 118-A of the Act that cheque in question was issued by the accused to the complainant for discharge of his lawful liability. 15. After bestowing my thoughtful consideration to the material on record, I see no reason to interfere in the well reasoned judgments passed by the learned Courts below. 16. In view of above, the present revision petition is dismissed. Judgments passed by the trial court and appellate Court are upheld. Pending applications, if any are disposed of. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are cancelled.