JUDGMENT : G.R. Udhwani, J. 1. Rule. Respondents waive service. 2. This Court had issued notice for final disposal returnable on 17th July, 2015. Accordingly the matter has been taken up for final hearing and is being disposed of by this judgment and order. 3. The short issue involved in the petition is in relation to the scope and authority of the competent authority under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "I.D. Act"). 3.1 A demand reference at the instance of the union being Reference (I.T.) No. 178 of 2011 was pending when the application for approval of the dismissal of the respondent workman was filed before the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. The said application was necessitated on account of the order of dismissal dated 23.4.2014 passed by the petitioner on establishment of the charge against the workman for his having misbehaved with his superior officer. Considering the nature of dispute, it is not necessary to delve upon the other irrelevant facts in detail in this judgment. 3.2 The approval has been declined by the Industrial Tribunal while recording the findings that AWS Shri Pradipbhai Shah, ATI Shri S.S. Patel and the driver who was present at the time of incident in question as also the conductor were not examined in the departmental inquiry and the reporter whose statement was recorded and was examined during the inquiry was not the eye-witness to the incident. The findings rendered in the departmental inquiry were described as perverse by the Tribunal in absence of the evidence in support thereof. 4. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the contesting parties, it is required to be considered as to whether it was open for Tribunal to reappreciate the evidence in a case where concededly the legality and validity of the procedure adopted in the inquiry was not in question and was in fact given up by the workman by making a specific statement to that effect. It is also required to be considered as to whether the pay given to the workman a day earlier than the order of termination would amount to non-compliance of the conditions for approval contemplated in Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 5. It is also required to be considered as to whether the pay given to the workman a day earlier than the order of termination would amount to non-compliance of the conditions for approval contemplated in Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 5. Before deliberating in detail on the above issues, it would be germane to consider the requirements under Section 33(2) (b) for approval of order of dismissal based on misconduct. The relevant extract of Section 33(1) and Section 33(2)(a) and (b) of the I.D. Act is thus: "Sec.33 Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings:- (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall:- (a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. (2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute [or, whether there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman] - (a) alter, in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman: Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer." 6. Thus, during the pendency of the specified proceedings, the employer can act in accordance with the standing orders applicable to the workman concerned with the specified dispute, and in absence of such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract between him and the workman, the employer can alter in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the service conditions applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of the specified proceedings or for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, the employer can discharge or punish by dismissal or otherwise the workman concerned after paying wages for one month as also the employer can make an application to the authority before which the proceeding may be pending, for approval of the action taken by him. Thus the plain reading of sub-sec.(2) of Section 33 indicate that the dismissal can be effected on satisfaction of the conditions: (1) payment of wages for one month and (2) application for approval by the employer in the pending proceedings. In absence of the pendency of the proceedings as contemplated in Section 33 of the I.D. Act, it goes without saying that the employer would have the authority to take disciplinary or non-disciplinary action against its employees within the bounds of its authority without seeking the approval from the specified authority under Section 33 of the Act. Thus it is an absolute domain of the employer to deal with his employee in accordance with law, without any intervention from any court. The approval under sub-sec.(2) of Section 33 seems to be necessitated to safeguard the interest of the workman against unfair labour practice, victimisation or mala-fide action or the likes for his having raised the demand against the employer or having instituted any other proceedings under the I.D. Act raising industrial dispute. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the scope of inquiry under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act would be confined to preserving and safeguarding the interest of the workman to the above referred extent, and if the order of dismissal is found to be bona-fide; backed by relevant material, interference on merits or procedural lapses during the inquiry would not be warranted, for 'discipline' is absolute domain of the employer and the expression 'approval' used in the provision cannot be equated with the expression 'adjudication'. In an approval application, the workman cannot agitate the merits of the subject matter of approval. Thus when no adjudicatory process is involved, there is no question of entering into merits of the subject matter of approval. In fact the 'industrial dispute' may be raised only on grant of approval and such a dispute may eventually be referred as an industrial dispute under Section 10 of the I.D. Act. Thus when subject matter of the approval is not an 'industrial dispute', there can be no adjudication of 'non-existent' industrial dispute. 7. There may not be any problem when occasion for approval arises before authorities other than judicial or quasi-judicial forums, for by very nature of the proceedings before them, it is plain that they are not adjudicating authorities. The problem may arise when such occasion arises during the pendency of the proceedings before adjudicating authorities like Arbitrators, Labour Courts, Tribunals or National Tribunals. These authorities are obligated to adjudicate the disputes when they act under Section 10 read with Section 7 and other relevant provisions of I.D. Act. Problem arises when they are called upon to deal with non adjudicatory proceedings like the one under Section 33(2) of I.D. Act. It is crucial for such authorities to be mindful about the nature of jurisdiction they are called upon to exercise under such provisions rather than being swayed away by the fact that they are adjudicators; forgetting the fact that they are not to exercise adjudicatory jurisdiction under Section 33(2). It must be borne in mind that discipline is absolute domain of the employer and it is only after the grant of approval that the disciplinary action would conclude rendering the option to the employee to have recourse to the machinery including Section 10 read with Section 7 of the I.D. Act for redressal of his grievance, if any. It is only at that juncture that the adjudicatory/quasi-adjudicatory forums would be entitled to exercise appropriate adjudicatory jurisdiction. If this distinction between the powers under Section 33(2) and Section 10 read with Section 7 is borne in mind, it would be easier for the authorities referred to under Section 33(1) of the I.D. Act to decide the application under Section 33(2). The very nature of jurisdiction under Section 33(2) requires such authorities to presume that the employer is entitled to take disciplinary action against its erring employee. The very nature of jurisdiction under Section 33(2) requires such authorities to presume that the employer is entitled to take disciplinary action against its erring employee. Whether the employer has erred in the matter of discipline should better be left to be adjudicated under the appropriate provisions of law as and when such occasion arises. For grant or refusal of approval, the authorities under Section 33(2) must begin with the question whether subject matter of approval is influenced by pendency of the principal industrial dispute or conciliation proceedings or is it an attempt of the employer to dissuade or discourage the workman from pursuing the remedy resorted to by him or is it bona-fide action falling in the domain of employee. With such question, it must proceed to examine the relevant record already produced by employer or may require it to produce and find out whether cause for taking disciplinary action exists on the file of the employer and whether there is material in support of such a cause. If answer is in the affirmative, then adequacy of such cause or adequacy of the material should not be gone into under Section 33(2). If the disciplinary action is shown to have been supported by material on record and is not found to be perverse or imprudent, there can be no reason for denial of approval on satisfaction of other relevant conditions enumerated in Section 33(2) of the I.D. Act. Having said that; the proposition of law in this regard emerging from various judicial pronouncements relied upon by the respective learned counsel may now be referred to thus: 7.1 In The Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the proposition of law case is indicated in para 15 and 17 thus: "15. ..... ..... ..... It is clear from the contentions raised before the Tribunal and the pleas specifically raised by the respondents in their statement of case before this Court that both parties agreed that the application in question had been properly made under the proviso; and the only point at issue between them is about the validity and propriety of the order under appeal having regard to the limited jurisdiction of the enquiry under s. 33(2)(b), and it, is to that question that we must now return. Before we do so, however, we ought to add that our attention had been drawn to three decisions of this Court in which, without any discussion of the point, the validity of the employers' applications made under s. 33(2)(b) appears to have been assumed though the said applications were presumably made after the employers had dismissed their employees. They are: Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 ; Management of Swatantra Bharat Mills, New Delhi v. Ratan Lal, Civil Appeal No. 392 of 1959 decided on 28.3.1960 and Central India Coal fields Ltd. Calcutta v. Ram Bilas Shobnath, Civil Appeal No. 162 of 1959, decided on 31.3.1960. We wish to make it clear that these decisions should not be taken to have decided the point one way or the other since it was obviously not argued before the Court and had not been considered at all. "17. It has been urged before us by the appellant that in holding the present enquiry the Tribunal has assumed powers of an appellate court which is entitled to go into all questions of fact; this criticism seems to us to be fully justified. One has merely to read the order to be satisfied that the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to enquire if the conclusions, of fact recorded in the enquiry were justified on the merits. It did not hold that the enquiry was defective or the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied in any manner. On the other hand it has expressly proceeded to consider questions of fact and has given reasons some of which would be inappropriate and irrelevant if not fantastic even if the Tribunal was dealing with the relevant questions as an appellate court. "The script in which the statements have been recorded" observes the Tribunal, "is not clear and fully decipherable". How this can be any reason in upsetting the finding of the enquiry it is impossible to understand. The Tribunal has also observed that the evidence adduced was not adequate and that it had not been properly discussed. According to the Tribunal the charge-sheets should have been more specific and clear and the evidence, should have been more satisfactory. How this can be any reason in upsetting the finding of the enquiry it is impossible to understand. The Tribunal has also observed that the evidence adduced was not adequate and that it had not been properly discussed. According to the Tribunal the charge-sheets should have been more specific and clear and the evidence, should have been more satisfactory. Then the Tribunal has proceeded to examine the evidence, referred to some discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses and has come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry should not have recorded the conclusion that the charges have been proved against the workmen in question. In our opinion, in making these comments against the findings of the enquiry the Tribunal clearly lost sight of the limitations statutorily placed upon its power and authority in holding the enquiry under s. 33(2)(b). It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate court which is entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the court is limited as under s. 33(2)(b). It is conceivable that even in holding an enquiry under s. 33(2)(b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, only in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer or not; but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence. Having carefully considered the reasons given by the Tribunal in its award under appeal, we have no hesitation in holding that the appellant is fully justified in contending that the Tribunal has assumed jurisdiction not vested in it by law, and consequently its refusal to accord approval to the action taken by the appellant is patently erroneous in law." (Italics supplied) 7.2 In Cholan Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam, (2005) 3 SCC 241 heavily relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, the question was in relation to Section 33(2)(b) and Section 10 of the I.D. Act as also the question of applicability of the Evidence Act in domestic inquiry amongst other issues like res ipsa loquitur were addressed and it was held thus in paras 13 and18. "13. It is neither in doubt nor in dispute that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act is a limited one. The jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal under Section 33(2) (b) cannot be equated with that of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act..... 18. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal while considering an application for grant of approval has succinctly been stated by this Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, AIR 1958 SC 79 . While exercising jurisdiction under Section 33(2(b) of the Act, the Industrial Tribunal is required to see as to whether a prima facie case has been made out as regard the validity or otherwise of the domestic enquiry held against the delinquent; keeping in view the fact that if the permission or approval is granted, the order of discharge or dismissal which may be passed against the delinquent employee would be liable to be challenged in an appropriate proceeding before the Industrial Tribunal in terms of the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. In Martin Burn's case (supra) this court stated: "A prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case which can be said to be established if the evidence which is led in support of the same were believed. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. While determining whether a prima facie case had been made out the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion in question and not whether that was the only conclusion which could be arrived at on that evidence. It may be that the Tribunal considering this question may itself have arrived at a different conclusion. It has, however, not to substitute its own judgment for the judgment in question. It has only got to consider whether the view taken is a possible view on the evidence on the record. (See Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. The Workers of the Company, (1952) Lab. AC 490(F)." 7.3 In Ishwarbhai Shankarbhai Parmar v. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation decided in Letters Patent Appeal No. 420 of 2016 in Special Civil Application No. 14503 of 2014, the decision of Cholan Roadways (supra), inter alia, was reiterated for the proposition that the jurisdiction of the specified authority under Section 33 of the I.D. Act is limited. 7.4 In Central Bank of India Limited v. Prakash Chand Jain 1970 (20) Factories Law Report 203 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent - workman, the law in regard to the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act was indicated thus: "The jurisdiction and functions of a Tribunal under s. 33(2) (b) of the Act were 'explained by this Court in Bangalore Woolen, Cotton and Silk Mills Company Ltd. v. Dasappa, where it was held (at page 96):- "The settled position in law therefore is that permission should be refused if the tribunal is satisfied that the management's action is not bona fide or that the principles of natural justice have been violated or that the materials on the basis of which the management came to a certain conclusion could not justify any reasonable person in coming to such a conclusion. In most cases it will happen where the materials are such that no reasonable person could have come to the conclusion as regards the workman's misconduct that the management has not acted bona fide. A finding that the management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the management has reached. A finding that the management has acted bona fide will ordinarily not be reached if the materials are such that a reasonable man could not have come to the conclusion which the management has reached. In every case, therefore, it would be proper for the tribunal to address itself to the question, after ascertaining that the principles of natural justice have not been violated, whether the materials on which the management has reached a conclusion adverse to the workman, a reasonable person could reach such a conclusion." The point was again considered by this Court in the case of Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen (2) and it was held (at page 118) :- "In view of the limited nature and extent of the enquiry permissible under s. 33 (2)(b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee the employer has held a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the impugned order as a result of the said enquiry, all that the authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribed by s. 33(2)(b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. Do the standing orders justify the order of dismissal? Has an enquiry been held as required by the standing order? Have the wages for the month been paid as required by the proviso? and, has an application been made as prescribed by the proviso ?" The Court then proceeded to consider whether the Tribunal in that case had acted rightly, and noted that one had merely to read the order to be satisfied that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction in attempting to enquire if the conclusions of fact recorded in the enquiry were justified on the merits. The Tribunal did not hold that the enquiry was defective or the requirements of natural justice had not been satisfied in any manner. The Court then indicated that the Tribunal had proceeded to examine the evidence, referred to some discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses and had come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry should not have recorded the conclusion that the charges had been proved against the workmen in question. The Court then indicated that the Tribunal had proceeded to examine the evidence, referred to some discrepancies in the statements made by witnesses and had come to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry should not have recorded the conclusion that the charges had been proved against the workmen in question. It was then held that, in making these comments against the findings of the enquiry, the Tribunal clearly lost sight of the limitations statutorily placed upon its power and authority in holding the enquiry under s. 33(2)(b). The Court then indicated the principle applicable by saying: "It is well known that the question about the adequacy of evidence or its sufficiency or satisfactory character can be raised in a court of facts and may fall to be considered by an appellate court which 'is. entitled to consider facts; but these considerations are irrelevant where the jurisdiction of the court is limited as under s. 33(2)(b). It is conceivable that even in holding an enquiry under s. 33(2)(b) if the authority is satisfied that the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry is perverse in the sense that it is not justified by any legal evidence whatever, only in such a case it may be entitled to consider whether approval should be accorded to the employer or not; but it is essential to bear in mind the difference between a finding which is not supported by any legal evidence and a finding which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or satisfactory evidence." These decisions make it clear that, when an Industrial Tribunal is asked to give its approval to an order of dismissal under s. 33(2) (b) of the Act, it can disregard the findings given by the Enquiry Officer only if the findings are perverse. The test of perversity that is indicated in these cases is that the findings may not be supported by any legal evidence at all. The test of perversity that is indicated in these cases is that the findings may not be supported by any legal evidence at all. This principle was further affirmed in a different context in State of Andhra Pradesh V.S. Sree Rama Rao, where this Court had to consider whether a High Court, in a proceeding for a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution, could interfere with the findings recorded by departmental authority ill disciplinary proceedings taken against a Government servant, The Court held:- "But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Art, 226 of the Constitution." In this connection, reference was also made to some cases where this Court has held that a finding by a domestic tribunal like an Enquiry Officer can be held to be perverse in those cases also where the finding arrived at by the domestic tribunal is one at which no reasonable person could have arrived on the material before the tribunal. Thus, there are two cases where the findings of a domestic tribunal like the Enquiry Officer dealing with disciplinary proceedings against a workman can be interfered with, and these two are cases in which the findings are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived at on the basis of the material before the Tribunal. In each of these cases, the findings are treated as perverse. It is in the light of these principles that we have to see whether the Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, in the present case, was justified in refusing to accord approval to the order of dismissal which was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded by the Enquiry Officer, Mr. Tipnis." 7.5 In the last mention decision except the elements No. 2 and 7 which were also held to be perverse, other elements were also found to be perverse in absence of the direct evidence of the person in knowledge of facts. Tipnis." 7.5 In the last mention decision except the elements No. 2 and 7 which were also held to be perverse, other elements were also found to be perverse in absence of the direct evidence of the person in knowledge of facts. The findings based upon the statement of one Nand Kishor who had knowledge of fact in part was not held to be a good evidence and was held to be a hearsay evidence. 7.6 Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Limited and others, 1976 (49) Factories Journal Reports 253 heavily relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent - workman has no application in the facts of the present case for the simple reason that in that case the matter under consideration was not the one under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act simpliciter but the question was whether the purported simpliciter termination was a camouflage or not, and whether the specified authority under Section 33(2)(b) can pierce such veil and find out the real purport of such order. The case also dealt with the complaint made under Section 33A of the I.D. Act which is not the case here. Assuming that said decision can be pressed into service, like other cases discussed herein which indicated that the action of the employer must be bona-fide in invoking the jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act are in line with Mahendra Singh Dhantwal (supra) when it indicates that the bona-fide of the employer's action can be tested by specified authority under Section 33(2) (b) of the I.D. Act. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent workman also relied upon Karnataka Central Co-operative Bank Limited vs. Shri R.H. Gudagnur and others, 1997 LLR 547 wherein it was held that, for deciding the question of approval, the Industrial Tribunal has to find out whether there has been fair and proper inquiry and whether prima facie case has been made out or not. It was stated therein that the Tribunal naturally has to go into the evidence as adduced before the enquiry officer and also as recorded by the Tribunal itself, and if the other conditions prescribed under the proviso are satisfied, the Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer has ordered dismissal. It was stated therein that the Tribunal naturally has to go into the evidence as adduced before the enquiry officer and also as recorded by the Tribunal itself, and if the other conditions prescribed under the proviso are satisfied, the Tribunal would grant the approval which would relate back to the date from which the employer has ordered dismissal. If, however, the domestic enquiry suffers from any defect or infirmity, the Tribunal will have to find out on its own assessment on evidence adduced before it, whether there was justification of dismissal, and if it so finds, it will grant approval of the order of dismissal which will relate back to the date when the order was passed, otherwise can refuse to grant the approval of the application. In the opinion of this Court, the said observations are contrary to the judicial pronouncement of the Apex Court discussed hereinbefore. 9. From the above judicial pronouncements, the test for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33 of the Act can be culled out thus: "(1) Whether there existed some tangible material with the employer (its adequacy or sustainability being immaterial) justifying the action for which approval is sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. (2) Is that material not perverse i.e. is it prudent to say that if such material is taken at its face value, the employer is justified to take action for which approval is sought under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. (3) Whether the standing orders justified the order of dismissal. (4) Whether the inquiry was held as provided in standing orders. (5) Whether the wages for the month has been paid as required by proviso to Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. (6) Whether an application has been made as prescribed by the proviso." As would appear from the following discussion, in the instant case no dispute was raised as regards points No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 above. 10. In the instant case complaint came to be given by the person with whom the respondent-workman allegedly misbehaved. The complaint was thus recorded by him in his official capacity probabilising the occurrence in absence of enmity of the respondent - workman with the maker of the complaint. Thus the complaint was one of the crucial relevant material constituting an evidence warranting a departmental inquiry. The complaint was thus recorded by him in his official capacity probabilising the occurrence in absence of enmity of the respondent - workman with the maker of the complaint. Thus the complaint was one of the crucial relevant material constituting an evidence warranting a departmental inquiry. It therefore cannot be said that the departmental inquiry was held for no reason. The reporter who received the complaint was examined in the departmental inquiry. Thus the charge against the delinquent was sought to be supported by (1) a written complaint, (2) the witness recording a complaint. Applying the principle emerging from plethora of judicial pronouncements referred to hereinabove, it cannot be said that the inquiry against the delinquent lacked bona-fides. Adequacy of the material or the fact as to whether the guilt of the delinquent was brought home by material relied upon by the disciplinary authority was irrelevant given the limited scope of Section 33(2) which does not permit the adjudication of the correctness or validity of the charge levelled against the delinquent during the inquiry. In absence of the proceedings under Section 10 read with Section 7 of the I.D. Act, it was premature to say that the guilt of the delinquent was not brought home by proper evidence. There is marked difference between lack of evidence and unsustainable evidence. While finding rested without any evidence whatsoever may be branded as perverse finding, a perverse finding rested on unsustainable evidence may not be necessarily a perverse finding. As noticed in the foregoing judicial pronouncements, perversity can be reason for declining the approval under Section 33(2) of the Act, the inadequacy or unsustainability of the evidence cannot be a reason for denial of approval under the said provision. The reason is obvious; perverse finding may strike at the very bona-fides of the inquiry inasmuch as in absence of the material, an inquiry in such a case would not be justifiable; whereas the unsustainable evidence may render the finding vulnerable as and other questioned in the appropriate judicial proceedings. In case of perverse finding, it would be possible to say that the material for holding the inquiry itself was lacking justifying the denial of approval. In case of perverse finding, it would be possible to say that the material for holding the inquiry itself was lacking justifying the denial of approval. But, in case of unsustainable evidence, it is only after adjudication under Section 10 read with Section 7 of the I.D. Act that the finding that the inquiry was bad for want of adequate sustainable evidence can be recorded. 11. The Tribunal by rejecting the evidence in fact assumed the jurisdiction under Section 7 read with Section 10 of the Act which was impermissible under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act. It will however be relevant to address the question as to whether in a departmental inquiry evidence of eye witness is must or whether evidence of a person other than eye witness can be relied upon. The answer to the questions can be found in Cholan Roadways Limited v. G. Thirugnanasambandam (supra), in para 15 para 16 it was observed thus: "15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the principle of Evidence Act have no application in a domestic enquiry. 16. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and Others, (1991) 2 SCC 716 , it was held: "It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. ... There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. ... The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof, however, cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic inquiries." 11.1 Thus, bearing in mind above principle, it cannot be disputed that the complaint was a legally sustainable evidence and the reporter being a person who had recorded the complaint was also relevant witness and thus was legally acceptable witness. The findings based upon such evidence cannot be said to be perverse. What would tantamount to 'perversity' has been explained in Central Bank of India Limited v. Prakash Chand Jain (supra). At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that if the findings are not based on legal evidence or are such as no reasonable person could have arrived at on the basis of the material before it, the findings can be treated as perverse. It is essential to bear in mind the difference between the finding which is not supported by sufficient or adequate satisfactory evidence and the findings which may appear to be not supported by sufficient or adequate or sufficient satisfactory evidence. It is only finding which is not supported by sufficient or adequate evidence on the face of it or finding which could not have been arrived by any standard of prudence by considering the evidence as it is; without appreciating, it would constitute a finding not backed by evidence. In other words, to find out perversity, the material as it is must be taken to be correct and then the question must be asked whether the charge is supported by some evidence; may be inadequate or insufficient. 11.2 It appears that the evidence of the reporter was presumably discarded being hearsay evidence. In other words, to find out perversity, the material as it is must be taken to be correct and then the question must be asked whether the charge is supported by some evidence; may be inadequate or insufficient. 11.2 It appears that the evidence of the reporter was presumably discarded being hearsay evidence. As regards the applicability of rules of Evidence Act and hearsay evidence, this is what the Apex Court observed in para 4 in the case of State of Haryana and another v. Rattan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 1512 : "It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For the proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The 'residuum' rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence - not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal, Inspector of the flying squad, is some evidence which has relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground." 11.3 Examined in the light of the above proposition of law, the reporter who came to be examined during the departmental inquiry was not a total stranger to the proceedings. Even if his evidence is to be treated as hearsay evidence, it has a reasonable nexus and credibility inasmuch as he was a person who recorded the complaint and reported the incident to the disciplinary authority. 11.4 Another flaw found by the Tribunal in the inquiry that no reasons in support of the findings rendered by the Inquiry Officer were recorded is also not sustainable having regard to the scope of interference available to the specified authority under Section 33 of the Act. As indicated above, all these questions must be left for better appreciation in a full-fledged judicial proceedings. 12. A note of caution may be added here to an effect that the observations as regards perversity, sustainability of the evidence or acceptability of the evidence made by this Court are confined to explaining the error committed by the Tribunal while hearing the case under Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act, and as and when the occasion to question the inquiry in appropriate proceedings arises, none of the observations made herein shall be deemed to be concluding such question except the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act. 13. One of the dispute was that since the wages for the month was paid in advance by one day, it amounted to unfair labour practice since the dismissal of the employee was predetermined. 13. One of the dispute was that since the wages for the month was paid in advance by one day, it amounted to unfair labour practice since the dismissal of the employee was predetermined. Whether all the required acts under Section 33(2) (b) of the I.D. Act should be simultaneous in one go has been explained in Calcutta State Transport Corporation v. Md. Noor Alam, AIR 1973 SC 1404 more particularly in para 4 thereof while rejecting the similar contention. Para 4 can be reproduced for ready reference. "It has been argued before us and rightly that the Labour Court wholly misunderstood the true position both on facts and in law. Firstly the order of removal was merely recorded on the official file on May 18, 1967 and it was to be effective only from July 1, 1967. Before that period it was open to the competent authority to withdraw the order. Therefore the (late of dismissal of the workman could only be July 1, 1967 and not any prior date on which the order was recorded on the file. The wages were also received by the workman i.e. the respondent on the same date which was a Saturday. It was wholly immaterial when the Money Order was sent. The application was filed for approval on July 3, 1967 which was a Monday. It is obvious that no application could have been filed on a Sunday which was a holiday. The proviso to s. 33(2)(b) contemplates three things; (i) dismissal or discharge; (ii) payment of wages and (iii) making of an application for approval to be simultaneous and to be p art of the same transaction. The object is that when the employer takes action under s. 33(2)(b) by dismissing or discharging an employee he should immediately make payment to him or offer payment of wages for one month and also make an application to the Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be, for approval. The employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso are parts of the same transaction. [See Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Govind, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 618 : AIR 1962 SC 1500 . The employer's conduct should show that the three things contemplated under the proviso are parts of the same transaction. [See Strawboard Manufacturing Co. v. Govind, (1962) Supp 3 SCR 618 : AIR 1962 SC 1500 . In P.H. Kalyani v. M/s. Air France, Calcutta, (1964) 2 SCR 104 : AIR 1963 SC 1756 , the order of dismissal was passed on May 28, 1960 and was communicated to the employee on May 30, 1960. The wages were offered to him at the same time when the order was communicated. An application was made under s. 33 (2) (b) on the same day. It was held that the application was in accordance with the proviso to s. 33 (2) (b) This decision shows that similar action has to be taken in these matters but that does not mean that all the three things mentioned before should be done on the same day. It is the conduct of the employer that has to be considered from the point of view of finding out whether the dismissal or discharge, payment of wages and making of the application for approval form a part of the same transaction. A difference of a day in doing one thing or the other may not be of material consequence so long as it is clear that the employer meant to do all the three things as part of one and the same transaction. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in these matters. Each case must be decided on its own facts." 14. Besides on mere ground that the wages were paid in advance by one day, no inference of unfair labour practice can be drawn in absence of cogent evidence establishing as to how the unfair labour practice was resorted to particularly when the full-fledged inquiry was held and second show-cause-notice for dismissal was served upon the workman before payment of wages for the month concerned. Thus even on this count the Tribunal fell in serious error of jurisdiction. 15. In the result, the impugned order is not sustainable, the same is required to be quashed and set aside with the clarification that the observations made in this judgment are confined to the issue involved i.e. Section 33(2)(b) of the I.D. Act and may not be quoted as concluding the points discussed herein in other substantial proceedings that the workman may resort to. Accordingly the petition succeeds. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs.