JUDGMENT : Samapti Chatterjee, J. 1. In this present writ petition following issues are to be determined:- (i) Whether the petitioners have right to file the writ petition before this Hon'ble Court against the impugned order or the petitioners remedy is to approach before the Land and Land Tenancy Tribunal? (ii) Whether the State Authority without following due process of law can takeover petitioners' lease hold land measuring of 185.08 acres out of the total lease hold land in the tea garden? (iii) Whether pursuant to the order issued under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 perpetual lease under Form-I (Schedule-F) granted in favour of the Tea Estate, the renewal thereof is at the option of the lessee and the lessee have the same right as owner of the property to get the lease hold land renewed? (iv) Whether the petitioners have any right to enjoy compensation for the acquisition of any portion of such tea garden land at the instance of Government Authorities without offering compensation with effect to the petitioner (v) Whether the District Magistrate by the impugned order dated 6th August, 2013 could refuse to consider the claim of the petitioners for demarcations of the tea garden land covered by the lease and for permitting them to use the said land as the State Government is regularly collecting rent from the petitioners for such portion of the land not used by the petitioner but used by other Government Authorities? The petitioners' case in a nutshell is as follows:- On 2nd December, 1963 by an order of the competent authority under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 M/s. Great Gopalpur Tea Company Private Limited was allowed to retain 1029.78 acres of tea garden land. Subsequently vide order dated 10th December, 1963 under section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 the said tea estate was allowed to retain 505.12 acres of tea garden land. Sometime in the year 1972 the United Bank of India as a creditor of the said tea company filed a Title Suit before the Hon'ble High Court Calcutta claiming inter alia for creation of equitable mortgage of the tea estate previously known as Rupali Tea Estate in their favour. On 20th December, 1974 the State Government initially resumed 77.20 acres of land while using the retention orders. On 20th December, 1974 the State Government initially resumed 77.20 acres of land while using the retention orders. But subsequently vide Memo No. 24422-L. KEF/IL-64/60 the State Government further resumed 52.71 acres of land out of 1029.78 acres thereby the said tea estate was allowed to retain 977.07 acres in Hai Hai Pathar-II and Hai Hai Pathar-III, over and above the said 50.12 acres as was permitted to be retained by the said tea estate by the order dated 10th December, 1963. Pursuant to the orders passed in the said suit on 26th March, 1976 the Government of West Bengal executed two formal lease deeds in Form-I (Schedule-F) in favour of the United Bank of India as mortgagee to M/s. Great Gopalpur Tea Company Private Limited for the said two tea garden land of 505.12 acres and 977.07 acres effective from 24th February, 1967 and 20th February, 1967 respectively. Further by a registered indenture dated 14th October, 1977 the said M/s. Great Gopalpur Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. with the consent of United Bank of India transferred the said Rupali Tea Estates along with all its assets and liabilities to M/s. Kamini Tea Company Private Ltd. On 18th April, 1979 the said M/s. Kamini Tea Company Private Limited by a registered indenture sold and transferred all the lands, buildings including plantation garden and factories of the said Rupali Tea Estate comprising of the said 505. 12 acres and 977.07 acres including their lease hold interest in favour of the petitioner No. 1 along with the liabilities of United Bank of India. As a result thereof on 10th June, 1981 the name of the petitioner No. 1 was incorporated in the land revenue record in respect of the said tea garden land. On 25th May, 2001 by a order the Collector Jalpaiguri found that there was a delay of 1099 days in applying for the renewal by the petitioner No. 1. Therefore, the petitioner No. 1 was directed to pay penalty of Rs. 200/- for each day's delay amounting to a sum of Rs. 2,19,800/-. On 15th June, 2001 the United Bank of India filed a memorandum of complete satisfaction of the charge with the registrar of companies West Bengal upon settlement of their dues and payment of Rs. 1.5 crores by the petitioner No. 1. 200/- for each day's delay amounting to a sum of Rs. 2,19,800/-. On 15th June, 2001 the United Bank of India filed a memorandum of complete satisfaction of the charge with the registrar of companies West Bengal upon settlement of their dues and payment of Rs. 1.5 crores by the petitioner No. 1. In the year 2001 the petitioner No. 1 duly applied for the renewal of lease/leases in respect of the said Tea Garden land of 505.12 acres and 977.07 acres. Those applications were duly accepted on deposit of fine by the petitioner No. 1. Since renewal were not granted therefore, the petitioner without finding any alternative approached before this Hon'ble Court by filing a writ petition being W.P. No. 15277. (W) of 2008. The said writ petition wad disposed of on 7th August, 2009 by this Hon'ble Court thereby directing the respondent No. 2 and 5 to dispose of the representation of the petitioners dated 21st October, 2002 within eight weeks from the date of communication of the order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner No. 1. On 15th February, 2012 the District Magistrate and the Collector Jalpaiguri held a personal hearing of the petitioner and it was observed by the District Magistrate that the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer Malbazar Sub-Division District-Jalapiguri shall conduct a survey on an urgent basis by employing extra hands along with the management of the Raja Tea Estate to earmark the boundary of the leasehold land measuring about 1,412.19 acres for which the land rent and all related cesses are being regularly paid by the tea estate. On 22nd February, 2012 pursuant to the said direction of the District Magistrate the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer Malbazar District-Jalpaiguri informed the petitioner company that the survey would be held on 5th March, 2012. Therefore, the petitioner and all parties were directed to be present there. Since the reconnaissance survey was not held as per the schedule date by the respondent authorities therefore, on 12th April, 2012 the petitioners made a representation to the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer, Malbazar. The petitioners also made representation before the District Magistrate ventilating grievances on 19th May, 2012. Thereafter the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer on 14th January, 2013 informed the petitioners that the survey would resume from 21st January, 2013. The petitioners also made representation before the District Magistrate ventilating grievances on 19th May, 2012. Thereafter the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer on 14th January, 2013 informed the petitioners that the survey would resume from 21st January, 2013. Again as no survey had resumed in the presence of the representative of the petitioner company on 21st January, 2013, therefore, the petitioner company lodged complaint before the BL & LRO on 22nd February, 2013. On 22nd February, 2013 the Manager of the Tea Estate was surprised to receive a communication from the BL & LRO intimating that survey/field work is already complete. On 25th march, 2013 the petitioner company filed an objection to the BL & LRO stating, inter alia, that no reconnaissance survey was done or completed by the Block Land and Land Reforms Officer. In the said letter the petitioner company also prayed for a personal hearing. Again on 13th May, 2013 the petitioner made further representation to the District Magistrate thereby pointing out the encroachment of their land by the Mal Tourist Lodge upon construction of a new boundary wall on the northern side of the petitioner's land. Vide order dated 25th June, 201.3 passed in the writ petition No. 15924 (W) of 2013 the Hon'ble Court for determination of the compensation against the initial requisition by the defence and subsequently subject to acquisition of the land measuring about 51.61 acres and 28.09 acres were under RAIP Case No. 12/86-87 and Case No. 21/86-87 under the provisions of Requisitions and Acquisitions of Immovable Properties Act, 1952 referred the matter to the arbitration. On 31st July, 2013 the District Magistrate vide his notice under Memo No. 187(5)/TZ asked one of the directors of the petitioner company to appear before him on 12th August, 2013 along with all documents pursuant to the order dated 25th June, 2013 passed by this Hon'ble Court. On 12th August, 2013 the representative of the petitioner company duly appeared before the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri and found that representatives of the State Government and North Frontier Railway were also present. Since the BL & LRO failed to submit relevant documents therefore the District Magistrate fixed the matter on 20th August, 2013 thereby directing the BL & LRO to submit a complete survey report with map. Since the BL & LRO failed to submit relevant documents therefore the District Magistrate fixed the matter on 20th August, 2013 thereby directing the BL & LRO to submit a complete survey report with map. Again on 6th September, 2013 further meeting was held and it appeared from the record that an alleged survey report was received from BL & LRO Mal by the District Magistrate and the District Magistrate on the basis of such survey report passed his order. Ultimately on 24th April, 2014 the petitioner No. 1 finally made a representation before the Land Reforms Commissioner and Additional Chief Secretary Government of West Bengal along with all relevant documents but to no effect. Hence the present writ petition. 2. Mr. Pranab Kumar Datta, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent authority took the point of jurisdiction. He contended that the impugned order was passed under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, therefore, petitioners have to assail the said order before the Land Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. 3. Mr. Datta further contended that this Act is a specified Act therefore jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is very remote. 4. Mr. Datta referred to Clause 4(a) Rule 4 and Clause 6(c) appearing at page 55 and also referred to Clause 8 Clause 13 (b & C) appears at page-56 and Clause 15 appearing at page 57 of the lease deed which are quoted below:- "Clause-4(a)-That the Lessee/Lessees shall at all times observe and conform to the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules for the time being in force. Clause-6(c) That except with the prior permission of the Collector, the Lessee shall not bring under cultivation of tea any land which was not under such cultivation at the date of commencement of the lease and shall not make any construction for use as factory, office building or quarters for labourers on any land on which there was no such construction at such date; and where permission under this sub-clause is given by the Collector, the Lessee shall be liable to pay from the date of such permission such additional rent, over and above the rent herein reserved, for the land brought under cultivation of tea or, as the case may be the land on which construction is made, as may be determined by the Collector in accordance with the provisions of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 42. Clause-8-That if on any such resurvey or otherwise it shall be found that the Lessee/lessees is/are in possession of lands, in excess of the said lands and hereditaments, the Lessor shall be entitled forthwith to recover possession of such excess area and the Lessee shall forthwith deliver over possession of the same. The Lessor may however allow the Lessee to continue in occupation of such excess area in which case such excess area shall be deemed to be included in this demise and the Lessee in such case shall be bound and liable to pay, in addition to the rent therein reserved, such rent for the excess are as may be determined by the Collector in accordance with the principle laid down in section 42 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (Act I of 1954) The rent so determined for the excess area shall be payable form the date of granting or renewal of the lease or from the date from which the land is proved to have been occupied by the Lessee. Clause-13(b)-That the lease-hold interest shall be heritable. (c) That in case of a transfer of such lease-hold interest, whether in full or in part, the same shall be subject to the provision of any law for the time being in force and applicable thereto and also subject to prior consent of the Collector. Clause-13(b)-That the lease-hold interest shall be heritable. (c) That in case of a transfer of such lease-hold interest, whether in full or in part, the same shall be subject to the provision of any law for the time being in force and applicable thereto and also subject to prior consent of the Collector. Clause-15-That on the expiration of the period of the lease or earlier determination thereof, the Lessee/Lessees shall forthwith make over quite vacant and peaceable possession of the said lands and hereditaments to the said Collector on behalf of the Lessor." 5. Mr. Dutta also submitted that this Estate Acquisition Act is a specified Act as referred under Article 323(B) of the Constitution of India. He also referred Article 31(1) of the Constitution of India. Article 323(B) is quoted below:- "Article 323B- (1)-Tribunals for other matters.- (1) The appropriate Legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) with respect to which such Legislature has power to make laws. Article 323(B) is quoted below:- "Article 323B- (1)-Tribunals for other matters.- (1) The appropriate Legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) with respect to which such Legislature has power to make laws. (2) The matters referred to in clause (1) are the following, namely:- (a) levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax; (b) foreign exchange, import and export across customs frontiers; (c) industrial and labour disputes; (d) land reforms by way of acquisition by the State of any estate as defined in article 31A or of any rights therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights or by way of ceiling on agricultural land or in any other way; (e) ceiling on urban property; (f) elections to either House of Parliament or the House or either House of the Legislature of a State, but excluding the matters referred to in article 329 and article 329A; (g) production, procurement, supply and distribution of foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oils) and such other goods as the President may, by public notification, declare to be essential goods for the purpose of this article and control of prices of such goods; (h) rent, its regulation and control and tenancy issues including the rights, title and interest of landlords and tenants; (i) offences against law with respect to any of the matters specified in sub-clauses (a) to (h) and fees in respect of any of those matters; (j) any matter incidental to any of the matters specified in subclauses (a) to (I) 3. A law made under clause (1) may- (a) provide for the establishment of a hierarchy of tribunals; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals; (c) provide for the procedure (including provisions as to limitation and rules of evidence) to be followed by the said tribunals; (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under article 136, with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals; (e) provide for the transfer to each such tribunal of any cases pending before any court or any other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as Would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment; (f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as the appropriate Legislature may deem necessary for the effective functioning of and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals. (4) The provisions of this article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force." 6. Mr. Dalta further emphasized that after formation of the Tenancy Tribunal since the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 is a specified Act, therefore, challenge to any order passed under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act matter should be filed before the Land & Land Tenancy Tribunal. Mr. Datta relied on Hon'ble Apex Court decision reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 Paragraphs-91, 93 & 99 (Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others). He also referred to section 6 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 which is quoted below:- "Section-6-Limitation on transfer: (1) The State Government shall he entitled subject to the provisions of section 8 to take over, by order made in this behalf, any land owned by a raiyat, whether as a result of transfer or otherwise, in excess of the limits prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 4: Provided that the raiyat shall have the option of choosing the land to be retained by him within such limits. (2) In all cases where the State Government takes over any land under sub-section (1), there shall be paid to the raiyat as compensation an amount equal to the market value of the interest of the transferor in the land on the date of the transfer." Mr. Datta further referred to section 2(r) section 6(a) & (d) and also section 7 and 8 of the West Bengal Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 which are quoted below:- "Section 2(r) "specified Act" means. (i) the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (W. 13 Act I of 1954); or (ii) the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (W.B. Act X of 1956); or (iia) the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973 (W.B. Act XXIII of 1973): or (iii) …………. (iv) the West Bengal Acquisition of Homestead Land for Agricultural Labourers, Artisans and Fisherman Act, 1975 (W.B. Act XLVII of 1975); or (v) ………. (vi) the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 (W.B. Act XXXVII of 1997) (vii) The West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001." Section-6(a)-any order made by an Authority under a specified Act (d) Applications relating to matters under any provision of a specified Act or matters relating to any constitutional validity of any Act under the provisions of a specified Act. Section-7-Exercise by. Tribunal of jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable by court-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this/act, the Tribunal shall, with effect from the date appointed by the State Government under section 6, exercise all the jurisdiction power and authority exercisable immediately before that day by any court including the High Constitution exercised by a Division Bench of the High Court, but excluding the Supreme Court, for adjudication or trial of disputes and applications relating to land reforms and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and other matters arising out of any provisions of a specified Act. Section-8-Exclusion of jurisdiction of courts.-On and from the date from which jurisdiction power and authority become exercisable under this Act by the Tribunal the High Court, except where that Court exercises writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a Division bench, or any civil court, except the Supreme Court, shall not entertain any proceeding or application or exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any provision of a specified Act." 7. Mr. Datta further emphasized that against the impugned order petitioners' remedy is to file the application before the Land Tribunal and not before this Hon'ble Court. In support of his contention he relied on a Hon'ble Supreme Court decision reported in (2009) 4 SCC 453 (State of West Bengal And Others v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited And Others). 8. Mr. Datta further contended that the renewal of the lease is within the domain of the Estate Acquisition Act therefore, even against the rejection of renewal no writ lies before this Hon'ble Court. Petitioners have to challenge, if aggrieved, before the Land Tribunal. 9. Mr. Datta also vehemently urged that though jurisdiction point has not been taken at the initial stage of moving of the writ petition and also not taken in the affidavit in opposition still the respondents are not debarred to take the jurisdiction point at the time of argument stage. In support of his contention Mr. Datta relied on a Hon'ble Supreme Court decision reported in 2013 (9) SCC 659 (S. Subramaniam Balaji v. State of Tamil Nadu And Others), 2000 (4) SCC 440 (Amresh Tiwari v. Lalta Prasad Dubey And Others) & (2005) 10 SC 110 (State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy And Others). 10. Mr. Datta further strongly argued that since the matter relates to section 6(1)(c) section 6(3) section 4(f) and section 5 of the Estate Acquisition Act therefore petitioners should approach before the land tribunal challenging the impugned order. 11. Before parting with his argument Mr. Datta additionally submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which deserves interference by this Hon'ble Court. 12. Per contra, Mr. 11. Before parting with his argument Mr. Datta additionally submitted that there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order which deserves interference by this Hon'ble Court. 12. Per contra, Mr. Kalyan Bandyopadhyay, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order was not passed under section 6(2) and section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Those sections are quoted below:- "Section 6(2)-An intermediary who is entitled to retain possession of any land under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to such terms and conditions as may be prescribed and subject to payment of such rent as may be determined under the provisions of this Act and as entered in the record of rights finally published under Chapter V except that no rent shall be payable for land referred to in clause (h) or (i) Provided that if any tank fishery or any land comprised in a lea garden, orchard, ill, factory or workshop was held immediately before the date of vesting under a lease, such lease shall be deemed to have been given by the State Government on the same terms and conditions as immediately before such date subject to such modification therein as the State Government may think fit to make. Section 6(3)-In the case of land comprised in a tea garden, mill factory or workshop the intermediary, or where the land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain only so much of such land as, In the opinion of the State Government, is required for the tea garden, mil, factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, be deemed to be an intermediary: Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks fit so to do after reviewing the circumstances of a case and after giving the' intermediary or the lessee, as the case may be, an opportunity of being heard, revise any order made by it under this sub-section specifying the land which the intermediary or the lessee shall be entitled to retain as being required by him for the tea garden, ill factory or workshop, as the case may be." 13. Mr. Mr. Bandyopadhyay conceded that if the order was passed under Estate Acquisition Act then the petitioner has no right to move the said writ petition before this Hon'ble Court, but the present case has been filed not assailing any order under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. 14. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also relied on the Explanation (i)(ii) of section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 which are quoted below:- "Explanation-I-The expression "land held under a lease" includes any land held directly under the State under a lease. Explanation-II-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression "revise any order" mentioned in the proviso to this sub-section, shall notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any agreement or in any decree, judgment, decision, award of any court, tribunal or other authority, include revision of an order of retention made under this sub-section, at any time after such order of retention so made, if the intermediary or the lessees the case may be, fails to use or ceases to use the whole or any part of the land for the purpose for which it has been retained i.e. for tea-garden, mill factory or workshop as the case may be, by him, so as to resume such land as being surplus to his requirement, by the State Government in the manner laid down in this proviso." 15. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that 183 acres of land is illegally occupied by some third parties. Therefore, when the petitioner approached before this Court earlier by filling a writ petition the Hon'ble Court disposed of that writ petition on 7th September, 2009 thereby directing the respondent authorities to consider the petitioners' representation and pass a reasoned order. 16. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that no appeal was preferred against that order but admittedly the order has been acted upon by giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Assailing the decision of the hearing the present writ petition has been filed. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the impugned order was passed under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 as sought be projected by Mr. Datta taking the point of jurisdiction. 17. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further vehemently urged that no one can be evicted by any executing order without due process of specific rule of law. In support of his contention Mr. Therefore, it cannot be contended that the impugned order was passed under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 as sought be projected by Mr. Datta taking the point of jurisdiction. 17. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further vehemently urged that no one can be evicted by any executing order without due process of specific rule of law. In support of his contention Mr. Bandyopadhyay relied on a Apex Court decision reported in AIR 1961 (SC) 1570 Paragraphs 11 & 14 (Bishan Das and Others v. State of Punjab and Others). Both the paragraphs are quoted below:-- "Para-11-We consider that both these contentions are unsound and the petitioners have made out a clear case of the violation of their fundamental rights. There has been some argument before us as to the true legal effect of the sanction granted in 1909 TO Ramji Das subject to the conditions adverted to earlier: whether it was a lease in favour of the firm Fawir Chand Bhagwan Das; whether it was a licence coupled with a grant or an irrevocable licence within the meaning of s. 60(b) of the Basements Act, 1882. These are disputed questions which we do not think that we are called upon to decide in the present proceeding. The admitted position, so far as the present proceeding is concerned, is that the land belonged to the State with the permission of the State Ramji Das, on behalf of the joint family firm of Fquir Chand Bhagwan Das, built the dharmasala, temple and shops and managed the same during his life time. After his death the petitioners, other members of the joint family, continued the management. On this admitted position the petitioners cannot be held to be trespassers in respect of the dharmasala, temple and shops: nor can it be held that the dharmasala, temple and shops belonged to the State, irrespective of the question whether the trust created was of a public or private nature. A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law. He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law. He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. It is by now well settled that the maxim, what is annexed to the soil goes with the soil, has not been accepted as an absolute rule of law of this country; see Thakoor Chunder Parmanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee, 6 Suth WR 228, Beni Ram v. Kundan loll, 26 Ind App 58, and Narayan Das v. Jatindranath, 54 Ind App 218; ( AIR 1927 PC 135 ). These decisions show that a person who bona fide puts up constructions on land belonging to others with their permission would not be a trespasser, nor would the buildings so constructed vest in the owner of the land by the application of the maxim quicquid plantatur solo, solo credit. It is, therefore, impossible to hold that in respect of the dharmasala, temples and shops, the State has acquired any rights whatsoever merely by reason of their being on the land belonging to the State. If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resumption of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action for the purpose. Even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appropriate legal action of the removal of the trustee as was opined by the State's legal Remembrancer. It is well recognised that a suit under s. 92 Civil Procedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property, or against persons who deny the validity of the trust. Para-14-Yiefore we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. Para-14-Yiefore we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law. The facts and the position in law this clearly are (1) that the buildings constructed on this piece of Government land did not belong to Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and (3) that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated. In these circumstances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands and dispossession the petitioners by the display force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule of law apart from what-might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peaceful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1955 1 SCR 408 ; AIR 1954 SC 415 the State or its executive officers cannot interfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their acts. In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. State of Bihar, 1953 SCR 1129; ( AIR 1953 SC 215 ), this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a autocratic act which deprives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee, Barnala, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only. The reasons given for this extraordinary action are, to quote what we said in Sahi" case (supra), remarkable for their disturbing implications." On the same point Mr. Bandyopadhyay also relief on another Apex Court decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1493 Paragraphs 18 and 21 (State of West Bengal v. Vishnunarayan and Associates (P.) Ltd. and Another). 18. Mr. The reasons given for this extraordinary action are, to quote what we said in Sahi" case (supra), remarkable for their disturbing implications." On the same point Mr. Bandyopadhyay also relief on another Apex Court decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1493 Paragraphs 18 and 21 (State of West Bengal v. Vishnunarayan and Associates (P.) Ltd. and Another). 18. Mr. Bandyopadhyay also vehemently argued that respondent authority cannot improve their case by way of filling affidavit or by making submission from the bar. On that point he relied on a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1978 (SC) 851 Paragraph-8 (Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & Others). Paragraph-8 is quoted below:- "Para-8-The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must he judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji ( AIR 1952 SC 16 ) (at p. 18): "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 19. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that no proceeding was initiated against the petitioners under the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act. 20. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that the respondent authority relied upon the Government Grant Act, 1958 which is not applicable in the present case. 21. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submitted that Article 300A also cannot be given go bye. Article 300A is quoted below:- "Article 300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." 22. Mr. 21. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further submitted that Article 300A also cannot be given go bye. Article 300A is quoted below:- "Article 300A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law." 22. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that the District Magistrate at the time of considering the petitioners' representation on the basis of the Hon'ble Court order for demarcation of their tea garden land as leased out to them and for permitting them to use the entire land traveled beyond his jurisdiction by embarking into a field for which no competence, authority and/or jurisdiction was restricted upon the District Magistrate either under the provision of West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 or any other law for the time being in force. 23. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further contended that by the impugned order the District Magistrate had virtually refused the order of retention of the land made by the competent authority under section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 which is not at all permissible in law. 24. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further emphasized that in any event the dispossession of the tea estate from their land took place at a time when the retention orders originally passed under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 were in force and there was valid lease for the entire 1482.19 acres of tea garden land. Therefore, in such circumstances the respondent authorities cannot escape from their liabilities of payment of compensation for the acquisition of tea garden land made from the tea estate of the petitioners. 25. Mr. Bandyopadhyay further vehemently contended that the respondent authorities have no right to acquire 186.68 (approximately) acres of tea garden land from the total lease hold area of land of the petitioners by the different Government authorities including the defence, N.F. Railway, Indian Oil and State Government without due process of law and without making the payment of compensation. In conclusion Mr. Bandyopadhyay submitted that the order dated 6th August, 2013 passed by the District Magistrate and the Collector Jalpaiguri in proceeding No. Misc/HC/02 of 2011-12 is bad in law therefore, shall be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. 26. In conclusion Mr. Bandyopadhyay submitted that the order dated 6th August, 2013 passed by the District Magistrate and the Collector Jalpaiguri in proceeding No. Misc/HC/02 of 2011-12 is bad in law therefore, shall be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. 26. Considering the submissions advanced by the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and after perusing the records meticulously I find that by virtue of an order dated 2nd December, 1963 passed by the competent authority under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953, initially M/s. Great Gopalpur Tea Company Private Limited was allowed to retain 1029.78 acres of tea garden. Thereafter by order dated 10th December, 1963, the said tea estate was also allowed to retain 505.12 acres of tea garden land. 27. I also find that sometime on 18th April, 1979 the petitioner company purchased land, building including plantation garden and factories of the said Rupali Tea Estate comprised in 505.12 acres and 977.07 acres including their lease hold interest in favour of the petitioner No. 1 along with the liabilities of the United Bank of India. Accordingly on 10th June, 1991 the name of the petitioner No. 1 was incorporated in the land revenue record in respect of the said tea garden land by the Collector Jalpaiguri. Thereafter the petitioner company made application for renewal of the said lease/leases. Since there was some delay of 1099 days in applying for renewal by the petitioners, therefore, the Collector Jalpaiguri directed the petitioner company to pay Rs. 200/- for each day of delay amounting to a sum of Rs. 2,19,800/-. Accordingly the petitioners after making such payment duly applied for renewal of the leases in respect of the said tea garden land of 205.12 acres and 977.07 acres. Since the respondent authorities were sitting tight over the petitioners' application for renewal, the petitioner moved before this Hon'ble Court for direction upon the respondent authorities to renew petitioners' lease deed. That writ petition being No. 15277(W) of 2003 was disposed of by this Hon'ble Court on 7th August, 2009 thereby directing the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 to dispose of the representation dated 21st October, 2002 made by the writ petitioners within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in accordance with law by a reasoned order. 2 & 3 to dispose of the representation dated 21st October, 2002 made by the writ petitioners within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in accordance with law by a reasoned order. Thereafter by the impugned order dated 6th August, 2013, the District Magistrate Jalpaiguri rejected the petitioners prayer on the following grounds:- "The B.L. & L.R.O. Mal has duly surveyed the entire area of the case land of Mouza Haihaipathar T.G.I.J.L. No. 43, Haihaipathar T.G. II J.L. No. 45 and Tesimla, J.L. No. 46 and submitted his report in details, which made a part of the proceeding, from which it reveals that an area measuring 188.77 acres of land of Mouza R.S. Haihaipathar T.G.-I, J.L. No. 43 (CS Mouza Haihaipathar T.G.-I, J.L. No. 60 and Haihaipathar T.G. III J.L. No. 59) are not in possession of the T.G. authority. These 188.77 acres are being possessed as follows:- A. N.F. Railway 102.95 acres B. Indian Army 34.07 acres. C. Oil India Ltd. 8.34 acres D. Administrative Office. Park, Tourist Lodge, Bus stands etc 16.08 acres E. Public with R.R. & R Department 22.91 acres F. National High Way 31A 2.33 acres. It is also revealed from the report that only 955.72 acres are in possession of the Tea Co. in Mouza Haihaipathar T.G.-I, J.L. No. 43 (Old Haihaipathar T.G.-I, J.L. No. 60 and Haihaipathar T.G-II J.L. No. 59). 317.83 acres in Mouza Haihaipathar T.G.-II, J.L. No. 45 (Old Haihaipathar T.G.-III, J.L. No. 61) and 19.85 acres in Mouza Tesimla, J.L. No. 46 (Old J.L. No. 63) The matter is well known to the T.G. authority as it reveals from different correspondences made in this behalf as follows:- i. The Manager, Kamini Tea. Co. (P) Ltd. handed over possession on 12.12.1977 to the extent of 3.34 acres of land on plot No. 268 of Mouza Haihaipathar II, J.L. No. 59 to the then J.L.R.O. Mal ii. Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. vide their letter dated 11.12.1981 surrendered 1.04 acres of land on plot No. 138 of Mouza Haihaipathar-II, J.L. No. 59 (New J.L. No. 43) in favour of the Collector on behalf of Lessor for construction of Cinema Hall iii. Abhijit Tea Co. Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. vide their letter dated 11.12.1981 surrendered 1.04 acres of land on plot No. 138 of Mouza Haihaipathar-II, J.L. No. 59 (New J.L. No. 43) in favour of the Collector on behalf of Lessor for construction of Cinema Hall iii. Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. vide there letter 87/465 dated 3.12.1982 stated that an area measuring 71.41 acres are under occupation of Army, 25.47 acres are in unauthorized possession of general public and 20.93 acres surrendered to the Govt. for the purpose of Park, Super market, Tourist Lodge, Bus Stand, School, Administrative Buildings and Fire Services. iv. By a letter dated 3.1.2002, Abhijit Tea Co. (P) Ltd. stated that an area of 172.39 acres is not in possession of the Company although lease rent and ceases in respect of entire lease hold are of 1482.19 acres are being paid by the Company. Besides the above several correspondences have also been made in this regard. From the above it is revealed that it was in the knowledge of the Company that they had not got possession of full quantum of leased land as was evident from the sale deed between them and Kamini Tea Co. in 1979 where they had admitted such fact. They had paid excess rent with the knowledge that they did not possess full quantum of lease land and hence, they should not get any additional benefit for that. After hearing the prayer of the petitioner under W.P. No. 15277 (W) of 2003 the hon'ble High Court, Calcutta by an order dated 7.8.2009 directed the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri to consider and dispose of the representation dated 21st October, 2002 made by the Writ petitioner as per annexure P-3 to the Writ petitioner i.e. (1) Area of land under possession/demarcation (2) Extension of are under Tea cultivation. In view of the above it is hereby ordered that renewal of lease should be considered on the quantum of land possessed by the company as revealed from the report of the 13.L & L.K.O. and that the excess rent paid by the company should be refunded/adjusted against future rent and the Govt. in Land & Land Reforms Department should be moved accordingly. In this regard it is to mention here that change of area in Haihaipathar T.G-II during renewal is not resumption as it is often misunderstood. in Land & Land Reforms Department should be moved accordingly. In this regard it is to mention here that change of area in Haihaipathar T.G-II during renewal is not resumption as it is often misunderstood. This is assessment of land used by TG for the purpose of tea cultivation as per section 6(3) of the W.B.E.A. Act, 1953 and consequent renewal of that much quantum of land which is being used for the purpose of tea cultivation; which is perfectly in tune with the conditions laid down in the lease deed. There is no question of resumption involved in this case and hence, the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ratnagiri Engineering case of 2009 is not attracted. Regarding extension of area under Tea Cultivation, petitioner is at liberty to apply before the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri separately with plot details and documents as required by Clause 6(c) of Form I (Schedule F) of lease deed which is to be duly considered. Let a photo copy of this order be given to all concerned including the Registrar of the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta. Dictated & Corrected by me District Magistrate Jalpaiguri District Magistrate Jalpaiguri" Assailing the said order the petitioners filed the present writ petition. 28. Now I have to deal with the jurisdiction point as raised at the outset by Mr. Datta in his argument though at the time of first admission of the writ petition this jurisdiction point was not taken by the respondent authorities and not even in the affidavit in opposition used by the respondent authorities. It is evident from the records that Hon'ble Court by order dated 7th August, 2009 directed the respondent authority to consider the petitioners' case within eight weeks after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioners in accordance with law by a reasoned order. This order was not appealed from. On the contrary this order was acted upon by the parties. Ultimately by the impugned order the District Magistrate rejected the prayer of the petitioners. It is pertinent to mention that State authority ought to have assailed the earlier order dated. 7th August, 2009 passed in the W.P. No. 15277(W) of 2003 thereby taking the jurisdiction point that the petitioners have no authority to file the writ petition but to file application before the West Bengal Land Tenancy Tribunal. It is pertinent to mention that State authority ought to have assailed the earlier order dated. 7th August, 2009 passed in the W.P. No. 15277(W) of 2003 thereby taking the jurisdiction point that the petitioners have no authority to file the writ petition but to file application before the West Bengal Land Tenancy Tribunal. That being the scenario challenging the impugned order dated 6th August, 2013 passed pursuant to the Hon'ble Court order the petitioners moved the present writ petition. 29. Therefore, the present writ petition is not filed by the writ petitioners challenging any order passed by the District Magistrate, Jalpaiguri under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. 30. It is also revealed that no case was initiated by the petitioners under section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Petitioners case in the earlier writ petition was to grant renewal of the lease in favour of the 505.12 and 977.07 acres of land since out of that land 188.77 acres are being illegally possessed by the I.N.F. Railway, 102.95 acres, II-Indian Oil 34.07 acres & III-Oil India Ltd. 8.34 acres. Therefore, the Hon'ble Court earlier directed the respondent authority to consider the petitioners' case in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing within a stipulated time. Since the petitioners' representation was not considered by the respondent authority therefore assailing the impugned order petitioners filed the present writ petition. It is also revealed from the record that impugned order was not passed in any proceedings under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. It was passed pursuant to the Hon'ble Court order. 31. Now I have to deal with the decisions cited by Mr. Datta on the point of jurisdiction. In S. Subramaniam Balaji case (supra) I find that promises was given in the election manifesto but was not complied with by the elected person therefore that act should be declared as a corrupted practice by the elected member. The Head Note L, Paragraphs-81 & 83 are quoted below:- "Head Note-L-Constitution of India-Arts. Datta on the point of jurisdiction. In S. Subramaniam Balaji case (supra) I find that promises was given in the election manifesto but was not complied with by the elected person therefore that act should be declared as a corrupted practice by the elected member. The Head Note L, Paragraphs-81 & 83 are quoted below:- "Head Note-L-Constitution of India-Arts. 32, 12, 226 and 136 Maintainability-Pleadings/New plea/Additional plea/Alternative plea-Objection as to subject-matter jurisdiction raised for first time in oral submissions before the Supreme Court-Although no such objection raised before the High Court or even in the pleadings before Supreme Court, entertained by Supreme Court-Question of subject-matter jurisdiction, held can be raised even in the appeal stage-It is totally distinct and stand on a different footing from matters relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, where the objection as to jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity Practice and procedure Jurisdiction/Jurisdictional Error-Subject-matter jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, distinguished. Para-81-The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent (State of Tamil Nadu) raised the issue of jurisdiction stating that political parties are not. "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore, no writ of any nature can be issued against them either under Article 226 or Article 32 of the Constitution of India or any other provision of the Constitution or any other law. The correct forum is the Election Tribunal and not the writ jurisdiction. Para-83-In the matters relating to pecuniary jurisdiction and territorial jurisdiction, the objection as to jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. But, this case relates to the jurisdiction over the subject-matter. This is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. As such, the question of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised even in the appeal stage. However, as this petition is fit for dismissal de hors the jurisdiction issue, the jurisdiction issue is left open." For any challenge or violation of any section of the Peoples' Representative Act only suit lies and that cannot be challenged in writ jurisdiction. Hut in the present case no proceedings has ever been initiated under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 either by the petitioners or by the respondent authorities. Hut in the present case no proceedings has ever been initiated under section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 either by the petitioners or by the respondent authorities. Since no proceeding was initiated under the said Act, therefore, question of filling application before the Land and Land Tenancy Tribunal in ray considered view does not arise. It is revealed from the record that the Hon'ble Court directed to consider the petitioners" representation which was illegally rejected by the respondent authorities. The case of Amresh Tiwari (supra) pursuant to preliminary order passed by the Magistrate under section 145(1) appellant filed application for dropping the proceedings under section 145 on the ground that in the Civil suit in respect of the same property was pending wherein order directing maintenance of status quo have already been passed. In the said matter since the competent Civil Court has already passed interim order of status quo therefore on the self same issue the Criminal Court subsequently passed some orders which was set aside by the Hon'ble High Court. Against that the appellant preferred appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court held inter alia that when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for adequate protection of the property during the pendency of the dispute the parallel proceeding i.e. section 145 should not continue. But in the case in hand no proceedings was initiated before any forum under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Furthermore, the impugned order is also not passed in a proceedings under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953. Therefore this cited case is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Furthermore, in the present case both parties have acted upon the High Court order thereby appearing before the District Magistrate. In the case of State of West Bengal v. Ashish Kumar Roy (supra) it is held that challenge to any order passed in proceedings initiated under Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 remedy lies before the West Bengal Land Premises & Tenancy Tribunal and thereafter challenging the tribunal order one can approach before this Hon'ble Court but in the present case no order has been passed under section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act. 32. 32. It is evident from the records that the petitioner No. 1 duly applied for renewal of lease in respect of the said tea garden land of 505.12 acres and 977.07 acres. The applications were duly accepted on deposit of fines by petitioner No. 1 in the year 2001 but unfortunately the same are still pending before the competent authority and no renewal of lease deeds has yet been granted in favour of the petitioner. 33. It is also evident from record that an area of 185.08 acres of land have been reduced from the petitioners' lease hold area of 1482.19 acres i.e. petitioners have been allowed to retain lease hold area of 1,300 acres approximately. But the other establishments like N.E. Railway, Ministry of Defence, Indian Oil Corporation, Bus Stand Malpark, B.D.O. Office and National Highway have been allowed to enjoy the said 185.08 acres of the petitioners total lease hold property. Therefore, petitioners from time to time made representation before the authorities for demarcating the actual area under the said tea estate by virtue of two lease, deeds. 34. It is also pertinent to mention here that without due process of law no one can be allowed to enjoy the petitioners lease hold area but in the present case the above mentioned establishments have been allowed to enjoy approximately 185.08 acres of the petitioners' total lease hold area i.e. 1,482.19 acres and the petitioner company only have been allowed to retain 1,300 acres of land out of his total lease hold area i.e. 1,482.19 acres. But by the impugned order the petitioners' grievances have been rejected by the District Magistrate Jalpaiguri. 35. It is also not out of place to mention that the petitioner company is still depositing lease rent for the total are of 1,482.19 acres and the authorities are accepting the same. Therefore in my considered view the grounds cited by the District Magistrate Jalpaiguri in the impugned order are not at all sustainable. It is a trite law that without due process no one can be evicted or removed from his possession. Executive order is not sustainable to the order passed observing due process of law. Therefore in my considered view the grounds cited by the District Magistrate Jalpaiguri in the impugned order are not at all sustainable. It is a trite law that without due process no one can be evicted or removed from his possession. Executive order is not sustainable to the order passed observing due process of law. Admittedly, in the present case neither the establishments nor the state authority who are occupying 185.08 acres of petitioners lease hold adopted any due process of law to retain those part of land, out of the petitioners total lease hold land of 1482.19 acres. 36. It is clear in case of State of West Bengal And Others v. Ratnagiri Engineering Private Limited And Others (supra) cited by Mr. Bandyopadhyay that once an order is passed by the State Government under section 6(3) of 1953 Act the power under proviso to section 6(3) of the said Act can only be exercised if some fraud or misrepresentation was committed in obtaining order under section 6(3) of the said Act of 1953 or if there was a genuine and serious mistake caused by the State Government in passing the order under section 6(3) of the 1.953 Act. But in the present case such power under proviso of section 6(3) cannot be exercised on the ground that after the order of the State Government was passed under of section 6(3) of 1953 Act certain subsequent developments have taken place. Therefore, as per the view taken in Ratnagiri case (supra) the State respondents have no authority or legal right to direct the petitioner company by virtue of the impugned order to retain 1,300 acres of land instead of 1,482.19 acres of land on the ground of subsequent development i.e. that 185.08 acres of land of the lease hold land of the petitioners have been occupied by the N.F. Railway, Indian Oil and other establishments. 37. In my considered view if the respondent authorities want to retain that 185.08 acres of land of the petitioners total land for those establishments then the respondent authorities should acquire or takeover those lands thereby following due process of law. Without exercise of due process of law nobody can be removed from his property. 38. 37. In my considered view if the respondent authorities want to retain that 185.08 acres of land of the petitioners total land for those establishments then the respondent authorities should acquire or takeover those lands thereby following due process of law. Without exercise of due process of law nobody can be removed from his property. 38. It is evident that the petitioner company was possessing total lease hold area of 1482.19 acres of approximate land, but out of that 185.08 acres have been illegally occupied by different government and Central Government establishments against which petitioners made repeated representations. Ultimately by virtue of Hon'ble Court order hearing was held and by the impugned order the petitioners prayer has been turned down. 39. Therefore, based on the discussions as stated above and also considering the decisions cited above I am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 6th August, 2013 passed by the District Magistrate Jalpaiguri in Case No. Misc/HC/02 of 2011-12 cannot be sustained in the eye of law as also in the facts and circumstances of the case. 40. Accordingly the impugned order is hereby quashed and set aside. 41. In my considered view it is a fit case to direct the authority to take steps to takeover that portion of land of the petitioners by exercising due process of law after determining the amount of compensation for such portion of lands in accordance with law within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order. 42. The respondent authorities are also directed to take steps for renewal of lease in favour of the petitioners for the remaining portion of the lease area i.e. 1300 acres (approximately) in their possession within two weeks thereafter. This writ petitioner is disposed of without any order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties after fulfilling all the formalities.