JUDGMENT & ORDER : This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 12-4-2013 passed by the learned Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, West Tripura, Agartala in T.S.(W/C) No. 12 of 2011 awarding a compensation of Rs.5,38,704/- with interest for the injuries caused to the claimant-respondent during the course of employment payable by the appellant-insurer. 2. The facts giving rise to the appeal may be noticed at the outset. The case of the claimant-respondent is that on 24-12-2010, when she along with other laborers were engaged by the respondent No. 3 herein (the opposite party No. 2 in the claim petition) for maintenance of work of road which ran from Langcharra Chowmuhani to Kalinjoy para under Sidhai Police Station, for pouring water on the wheel of the road roller, the road roller suddenly ran over her left leg and sustained injuries. She alleged that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving by the driver of the road roller and that at that time, she was working under the respondent No. 3, who was performing the contract work under the respondent No. 2 (opposite party No. 1 in the claim petition). As a result of the accident, her left leg was amputated on 18-1-2011. She was discharged from the hospital on 11-2-2011. She claimed that due to the amputation, she has become permanently disabled and could no longer work as before. The police registered Sidhai P.S. Case No. 17 of 2011 U/s 287/338 IPC against the driver of the road roller. According to her, she earned Rs.150/- per day, i.e. Rs.4,500/- per month, by working as a laborer at the time of the accident. She stated that the respondent No. 2 is her principal employer, while the respondent No. 3 is the contractor. According to the claimant-respondent, the respondent No. 2, being the principal employer, is liable to pay the compensation to her. Claimant-respondent asserted that she was 36 years old at the time of the accident, incurred a sum of Rs.35,000/- for her treatment and, therefore, claimed a compensation of Rs.8,35,000/- from the appellant and other respondents with 12% interest. 3. The claim petition was resisted by the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 3 and the appellant by filing their respective written statements. The respondent No. 2 was the registered owner of the road roller. He admitted the averments made by the claimant-respondent in her claim petition. 3. The claim petition was resisted by the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 3 and the appellant by filing their respective written statements. The respondent No. 2 was the registered owner of the road roller. He admitted the averments made by the claimant-respondent in her claim petition. He averred that in his construction work, the 8 laborers employed by him were insured against accidental risk at the time of the accident and that if any compensation was to be paid, the same should be paid by the insurer-appellant. The insurer disputed and denied the claim of the claimant-respondent. According to the insurer, the insurance policy covered only his paid driver as a workman of that vehicle, but the claimant-respondent was engaged by him in his construction work and could not, therefore, be termed as workman of the offending vehicle. It was asserted by the appellant that the road roller used in the construction work was a slow moving vehicle and the question of rash and negligent driving did not arise and that the claimant-respondent sustained injuries otherwise than in an accident. The claim petition was liable to be dismissed. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the learned Commissioner: (a) Whether the petitioner Smti Mangali Munda alias Bengjuya (respondent 1) was the workman under the opposite party No. 2 (the respondent No. 3) who performing (sic) the contract work of the OP No. 1 (respondent 2) and whether she sustained injuries on 24-12-2010 in course of her employment under the opposite parties? (b) Whether the petitioner (respondent 1) is entitled to get any compensation and, if so, what shall be the reasonable amount? (c) Who shall make the payment of compensation, if any? 5. In the course of trial, the respondent No. 1 examined herself as PW-1 and exhibited some copies of documents which were marked as Exbt. 1 series. The respondent No. 3 examined himself as OPW-1 and exhibited Xerox copies of some documents which were marked as Exbt. A-series. At this stage, it may be noticed that the learned Commissioner dispensed with service of notice upon the opposite parties U/s 10 of the Act as the factum of accident was within their knowledge. At the conclusion of the trial, the impugned judgment was passed awarding the compensation. Aggrieved by this, this appeal has been preferred by the insurer. A-series. At this stage, it may be noticed that the learned Commissioner dispensed with service of notice upon the opposite parties U/s 10 of the Act as the factum of accident was within their knowledge. At the conclusion of the trial, the impugned judgment was passed awarding the compensation. Aggrieved by this, this appeal has been preferred by the insurer. At the time of admission of the appeal, this Court formulated the following points as substantial questions of law:- 1. Whether the appellant Insurance Company can be held responsible for making the payment of compensation while the alleged employee was working under the employer and the petition has been filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act? 2. Whether the assessment of compensation awarded by the Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation is not according to the provisions prescribed in Schedule 1 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act? 6. Though the substantial question of law No. 1 so formulated was not happily worded, both the parties proceeded to argue their respective cases on the correct assumption that the question to be determined was whether the insurer is liable to satisfy the award when the employee was working under the respondent No. 3 and not under the respondent No. 2? 7. It is the contention of Mr. S. Lodh, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the appellant was not the insurer of the respondent No. 1 (claimant) inasmuch as the claimant was engaged as workman by the respondent No. 3, who, in turn, was performing the contract work under the respondent No. 2 for maintenance of road and for execution of the work in connection therewith; the respondent No. 2 used the road roller, which was insured with the appellant. In other words, when the respondent No. 1 was not the employee/workman/laborer of the said road roller, the impugned judgment in so far as it directed the appellant to satisfy the award, cannot be sustained in law. Secondly, he contends that the learned Commissioner committed grave error of law in holding that the loss of earning capacity of the respondent No. 1 resulting from amputation of the knee of the respondent No. 1 below his knee as a result of the accident was 100% by overlooking the provision of Part-II of Schedule-1 to the Act. Moreover, it has escaped the attention of the Tribunal. Moreover, it has escaped the attention of the Tribunal. He, therefore, submits that the impugned judgment with the infirmities pointed out above is bad in law and is liable to be set aside. Mr. D.R. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 supports the impugned judgment and submits that the impugned judgment was passed by the learned Commissioner after duly considering the evidence on record and after correctly applying the settled legal positions holding the field in this behalf. Strong reliance is placed by him on the decision of this Court dated 24-11-2015 in MAC Appeal No. 11 of 2012 (The State of Tripura & 3 others v. Sri Jiban Das and another) to buttress his contention. He maintains that the appeal has no merit and is liable to be dismissed. 8. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the rival parties, the first point for consideration is whether the appellant is correct is fastening the liability to satisfy the award upon the appellant and not upon the respondent No. 3. The facts are not in dispute. The respondent No. 3 is the registered owner of the offending road roller, which was registered with the appellant-insurer and that the respondent No. 3 was engaged in the construction work of the respondent No. 2 at Sidhai at the relevant time. There is also no dispute that the deceased was engaged by the respondent No. 3 as the driver of the offending road roller with a valid driving license and sustained the injury on her person when she was in the course of employment of the respondent No. 3. It is also admitted by the respondent No. 3 that eight of his laborers in his contract work were insured by him with the ICICI Lombard Insurance Company Ltd. when the accident occurred. At this stage, it may be appropriate to refer to Section 12 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (the erstwhile Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923), which reads thus: “12. At this stage, it may be appropriate to refer to Section 12 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 (the erstwhile Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923), which reads thus: “12. Contracting.— (1) Where any person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the principal) in the course of or for the purposes of his trade or business contracts with any other person (hereinafter in this section referred to as the contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the execution of the work any compensation which he would have been liable to pay if that workman had been immediately employed by him; and where compensation is claimed from the principal, this Act shall apply as if references to the principal were substituted for references to the employer except that the amount of compensation shall be calculated with reference to the wages of the workman under the employer by whom he is immediately employed. (2) Where the principal is liable to pay compensation under this section, he shall be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor, or any other person from whom the workman could have recovered compensation and where a contractor who is himself a principal is liable to pay compensation or to indemnify a principal under this section he shall be entitled to be indemnified by any person standing to him in the relation of a contractor from whom the workman could have recovered compensation,] and all questions as to the right to and the amount of any such indemnity shall, in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. (3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as preventing a workman from recovering compensation from the contractor instead of the principal. (4) This section shall not apply in any case where the accident occurred elsewhere than on, in or about the premises on which the principal has undertaken or usually undertakes, as the case may be, to execute the work or which are otherwise under his control or management.” 9. The scope of Section 12 of the Act came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in Koodalingam v. Superintending Engineer, PWD, 1995 ACJ 282 and this is what the Hon’ble High Court said: “7. The scope of Section 12 of the Act came up for consideration before the Kerala High Court in Koodalingam v. Superintending Engineer, PWD, 1995 ACJ 282 and this is what the Hon’ble High Court said: “7. Interpreting the provisions of Section 12 of the Act, this Court has held in the decision reported in Vijayaraghavan v. Velu, 1973 ACJ 158 (Kerala), that four essential conditions have to be satisfied before Section 12 can be applied. The four conditions are thus: (i) That the person (called the principal) is carrying on a trade or business and, in the course of or for the purpose of that trade of business, engages a contractor to execute the work. (ii) That work is ordinarily a part of the trade or business of the principal. (iii) The accident which gives rise to the liability for compensation must have occurred on, in or about the premises on which the principal has undertaken, or usually undertakes, to execute the work or which is in his control or management. (iv) The accident must have occurred while the workman was in the course of his employment in executing the work." 8. The unchallenged findings recorded by the Court in its order would show that conditions 1, 3, and 4 are satisfied in this case. As regards condition No. 2 also there cannot be much dispute. The work for which the deceased workmen were engaged and in the course of which they lost their lives is the work of construction of irrigation canals as part of the Kuttiadi Irrigation Project undertaken by the PWD of the State Government. Construction of irrigation canals as part of a major irrigation project is certainly one of the principal concerns of the PWD of the State Government. As such the work in question can only be treated as part of the business of the first opposite party. The view which we take in this mater is supported by the decisions reported in P.W.D v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, 1981 Lab IC 493 and Sardara Singh Niranjan Singh v. S.D.O., Chandpur, 1958-65 ACJ 280 (Punjab), wherein construction of road by the Public Works Department of Government and the construction of irrigation canals by the Irrigation Department were respectively held to be business of the principal, namely the respective departments of the Government. In the circumstances, we are of the view that in this case the second condition is also satisfied and as such Section 12 would apply to the facts of this case. 9. If Section 12 of the Act is applicable to the facts of the case on hand, there cannot be any doubt about the legal position that the first opposite party is also liable to pay compensation payable under the Act to the workmen even if workmen were engaged actually only by the second opposite party. As such the Court ought to have made the first opposite party also liable to pay the compensation applying the provisions of Section 12 of the Act. The Court while passing the impugned order has clearly committed an error in not noting the provisions of Section 12 and giving effect to it by making the first opposite party also liable to pay the compensation determined in the case. 10. Section 12(2) in unambiguous terms confers a right on the principal who is made liable to pay compensation under the said Section to get himself indemnified by the contractor. As such, we would hold that the first opposite party as principal will be entitled to be indemnified by the contractor by virtue of Section 12(2) of the Act and to recover the amount of compensation, if any, paid to the workmen, from the second opposite party in execution of the orders passed in the two cases itself. We say so because in this case the first opposite party has specifically contended that as per Clause 15 of the agreement entered into between the department the contractor, the contractor has expressly undertaken the responsibility for payment of compensation under the Act and the court as per the impugned order has accepted the above contention and held the second opposite party exclusively liable to pay the compensation found due. Though notice was issued to the second opposite party, he has remained ex parte before the court below and in this Court. In the circumstances, we would hold that the first opposite party is entitled to recover the amounts, if any, paid to the appellants in the two cases from opposite party No. 2 by way of indemnity.” 10. Though notice was issued to the second opposite party, he has remained ex parte before the court below and in this Court. In the circumstances, we would hold that the first opposite party is entitled to recover the amounts, if any, paid to the appellants in the two cases from opposite party No. 2 by way of indemnity.” 10. In the instant case also, the respondent No. 3 was engaged by the respondent No. 2 for the maintenance work of the road, which runs from Langcharra Chowmuhani to Kalinoy para under Sidhai Police Station. The claimant-respondent No. 1 was engaged by the respondent No. 3 along with others to pour water on the wheel of the road roller; her leg was crushed by the road roller while pouring water on the wheel of the road roller, which, according to her, was driven by the driver in a rash and negligent manner. It is not disputed that the accident took place when she was working under the respondent No. 3, who, in turn, was at that time performing the contract work of the respondent No. 2. Thus, it can truly be said that the respondent No. 2 was the principal employer of the claimant-respondent at the time of the accident. Therefore, by the operation of Section 12 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, the respondent is liable to pay the compensation. There is no dispute in the bar that the road roller was insured with the appellant-insurer. Therefore, the appellant is liable to satisfy any award passed by the Tribunal irrespective of whether the claim petition was filed under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the Employee’s Compensation Act (the erstwhile Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923). If there is any lingering doubt in this behalf, I may conveniently cite the decision of the Allahabad High Court in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner/Regional Asstt. Labour Commissioner, Bareily and others, 1996 (73) FLR 1541 , with which I am in respectful agreement. In that case, the Allahabad High Court, after reviewing numerous case-laws, held in the following manner: “9. These questions as to whether in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act the liability of the insurer can be fixed, arose in many cases before different High Courts. There are contrary views of different High Courts. In that case, the Allahabad High Court, after reviewing numerous case-laws, held in the following manner: “9. These questions as to whether in a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act the liability of the insurer can be fixed, arose in many cases before different High Courts. There are contrary views of different High Courts. One view precludes the authority from fixing the liability of the insurer while the other view is just opposite. In the case of United India Fire and General Insurance Company v. Joseph Marium, 1979 ACJ 349 Division Bench of Kerala High Court had held that the liability of insurer is only confined to those specified in Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act and except those cases the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to issue any direction to the insurer for payment. Whereas in the case of United India Insurance Company Limited v. Roop Kamvar, 1991 ACJ 74, the Rajasthan High Court had held that it is correct that Section 14 of the Compensation Act specified the liability of the Insurance company but that does not mean that the insurance company is liable to pay compensation only in case the employer becomes insolvent. The insurer is also liable, by reason of the provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act and if the person chooses his remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act the insurer cannot avoid his liability and the authority under the Workmen's Compensation Act may fix the liability of the insurer. Similar view was taken by Orissa High Court in the case of Bhajan Lal Padia v. Baijnath, 1986 (62) Cuttak Law Time, 13. In the case of New India Insurance Company Limited v. Darshani Devi, 1984 Lab I.C. 489 while dissenting from the decision in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company v. Garim Singh 1973 Lab. I.C. 1066 this Court has held that the liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act is necessarily included in the statutory liability which is required by Section 95(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to be covered under the policy of Insurance. Hence the insurer cannot shirk such liability by contending that its liability under the policy was merely a liability under the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot be extended to the liability incurred under the provision of Workmen's Compensation Act. Hence the insurer cannot shirk such liability by contending that its liability under the policy was merely a liability under the Motor Vehicles Act and cannot be extended to the liability incurred under the provision of Workmen's Compensation Act. The same view has been expressed in the case of Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company v. Matisourla, 1986 ACJ 732 by the Orissa High Court. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has also expressed that Section 14 of the Act is not the only provision imposing the liability on the insurer in the case of New India Insurance Company v. Dujia Bai MANU/MP/0064/1982 : 1983 ACJ 601 MP; United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Alphonso 1988 (I) LLN 1023; Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company v. Nonibala Devi 1987 (2) TCT 107; National Insurance Company v. Narainan Nair, 1973 FJR 58 Kerala supported the same view. In the case of United India Insurance Company v. Gangadharan Narain, 1986 53 FLR 606, it was held that Section 14 purports to mention the circumstances that the right of the workman shall not be defeated even when employer becomes insolvent and in such event the insurer can be substituted in the place of employer. It does not operate as prohibition against proceeding before the Commissioner involving the insurer, who is liable under the Insurance to discharge the liability of employer to compensate the workman, according to the provisions of the Act. Karnataka High Court in the case of United Fire and General Insurance Company v. Machinery Manufacturer Corporation 1987 (I) LLN 321 had held that Section 14 of the Act does not enable the Insurance company to avoid its liability under the Policy issued specially, for covering the liability of the workman under the Act on the ground that the insured employer has not become insolvent or has made composition or scheme of arrangement or being a company winding up proceeding has not commenced. However in the case of National Insurance Company v. Favinbi (MANU/MP/0108/1984) Madhya Pradesh High Court has expressed the contrary view. “10. It appears that the Motor Vehicles Act Clearly lays down that the person entitled to compensation on account of accident arising out of the use of Motor Vehicle may pursue his claim either under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but not entitled to have it from the authorities under both the Acts. “10. It appears that the Motor Vehicles Act Clearly lays down that the person entitled to compensation on account of accident arising out of the use of Motor Vehicle may pursue his claim either under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, but not entitled to have it from the authorities under both the Acts. Therefore the person claiming compensation out of an accident for use of Motor Vehicles under the Compensation Act cannot be said to be precluded from claiming the benefit which is available before the other authority. This mutual exclusion clearly implies that the Legislature had never intended that when the claimant in respect of an accident for the use of Motor Vehicles lodges his claim before the authority under the Compensation Act negatives the liability of the insurer under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the insurer cannot be concerned under which provision the claim is lodged. The insurance policy does not specify that it will pay compensation only when it is claimed under the provision of Motor Vehicles Act. The liability of the insurance arises out of a contract of insurance between the insurer and the insured. The liability is the general liability. The same can be invoked even in a Civil suit without the aid of any of the authorities under the said two Acts if it can be invoked without aid of any of these authorities then it cannot be conceived that the insurer will be liable only when a particular procedure is adopted. The liability of the insurer continues to indemnify the insured on account of liability arising out of the contract for insurance. The Insurance company cannot defeat the claim of the claimant simply because the claimant has preferred to espouse his cause under the Compensation Act. The Workmen's Compensation Act also does not preclude in specific terms that the insurance company cannot be liable even if the insured is liable under the Motor Vehicles Act. In case compensation is asked for from an employer who might be insolvent and take advantage of insolvency, Section 14 of the Act has been provided to protect the interest of the claimant namely that on account of insolvency of the employer the claimant's claim may not be defeated. This very provision indicates that the Act was concerned with protection of the claim of the claimant. This very provision indicates that the Act was concerned with protection of the claim of the claimant. The Act was never concerned as to who would make payment. The Act was always concerned for securing payment of compensation to the claimant if the employer is insured in that event insurer becomes also equally liable to indemnify the employer to the extent of contract of the insurance which can be taken note of. The authority deciding the claim has the jurisdiction to apportion payment or direct as to what amount is to be paid by the insurance and insurer respectively. “11. Furthermore the Motor Vehicles Act 1988 in Section 143 provides that the provisions of Chapter X of the said Act which deals with "no fault liability" shall apply to a claim under the Workmen's Compensation Act resulting from an accident of the nature referred to in Section 140 to the said Act. The provisions of Chapter X aforesaid has overriding effect on any other law by reason of Section 144 of the said Act. The right to claim compensation under Section 140 is a right in addition to any other right under the provision of the said Act or under any other law. Now chapter X deals with the liability on the principle of fault. Incorporation of Section 167 in the said chapter indicates the intention of the legislature that the claim arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act can also be claimed under the Compensation Act. It is very difficult to conceive that the liability under an insurance policy would be defeated if the claim is lodged under the Compensation Act. Inasmuch as if such a proposition is accepted, then it would be very difficult to reconcile the savings provided in Section 141(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is an established principle of interpretation that a statute has to be given a harmonious construction which leads to a consistent effect. Inasmuch as if such a proposition is accepted, then it would be very difficult to reconcile the savings provided in Section 141(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It is an established principle of interpretation that a statute has to be given a harmonious construction which leads to a consistent effect. It cannot be conceived that when the benefit is made available under Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act even in a claim under the Compensation Act with over-riding effect as provided in Sections 143 and 144 of the said Act the benefit under Chapter XI which is saved under Section 141(1) of the said Chapter would not be available in a claim under the Compensation Act when Section 167 of the said Act provided in Chapter XI leaves the choice or option to the claimant to make such claim in either of the two forums. “12. In order to appreciate the situation we may refer to Section 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act which runs as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923(8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this Act and also under the Workmen's Compensation Act 1923 the person entitled to compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such compensation under either of those Acts but not under both". “13. The Section begins with a non-obstanti clause which indicates that a claim which arises under the Motor Vehicles Act and also under the Compensation Act, be espoused under either of the Acts meaning thereby an overriding effect. Without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X a person entitled to compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act and also under the Compensation Act may claim such compensation under either of the Acts. This clearly presupposes that even despite absence of any provision in the Compensation Act, the liability of the insurer as provided in the Motor Vehicles Act can equally be enforced under the Compensation Act. “14. Over and above the compensation is payable on account of a liability arising out of use of a vehicle at a public place. Such liability is covered under the insurance policy by the Insurer. The provision under the Motor Vehicles Act makes it mandatory for owners of vehicle to cover his vehicle under such insurance policy. “14. Over and above the compensation is payable on account of a liability arising out of use of a vehicle at a public place. Such liability is covered under the insurance policy by the Insurer. The provision under the Motor Vehicles Act makes it mandatory for owners of vehicle to cover his vehicle under such insurance policy. The compensation is payable for the liability arising out of the use of the vehicle on behalf of the insured who is so indemnified by the insurer by reason of the contract or the policy. It covers the class of person specified in the policy. It makes little difference if the person affected is an employee of the insured if such class of person is covered by the policy. Therefore the insured does not stand on any different footing when the compensation is claimed under the Compensation Act.” 11. This then takes us to the issue concerning the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Commissioner. It may at the outset be noted that the Disability Board, West Tripura issued the Certificate of Disability certifying that the disability is permanent in nature to the extent of 40% as her leg was locomotor. The findings of the learned Commissioner to this effect are that the claimant-respondent was a daily laborer by occupation, for which both his legs were essential, but she could no longer work after his other leg had been amputated and that no employer was likely to engage her on payment of full wages. He, therefore, held that she should be treated as suffering from total disablement with 100% loss of income. It is the contention of Mr. S. Lodh, the learned counsel for the appellant-insurer, that the quantum of compensation payable to the claimant-respondent should be worked out in accordance with the principle laid down in Schedule I Part 2 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, which is a statutory provision dealing exclusively with the subject in question and not in accordance with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in cases governed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. On perusal of the record, I find that the application for compensation was filed by the claimant-respondent U/s 4/4A/22 of the Act, 1923 (now renamed as “Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923”), and the compensation was not paid by the employer suo motu under Section 8 of the Act. Under the circumstances, it can be said that the claimant-respondent has taken a conscious decision and opted to claim the compensation under the Compensation Act. There cannot be two views that once the claimant has exercised his option for the remedy under the Compensation Act, he is debarred from claiming compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This legal position has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Dyamavva and others, (2013) 9 SCC 406 with the following observations: “17. The procedure under Section 8 aforesaid (as noticed above) is initiated at the behest of the employer “suo motu”, and as such, in our view cannot be considered as an exercise of option by the dependants/claimants to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. The position would have been otherwise if the dependants had raised a claim for compensation under Section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. In the said eventuality, certainly compensation would be paid to the dependants at the instance (and option) of the claimants. In other words, if the claimants had moved an application under Section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, they would have been deemed to have exercised their option to seek compensation under the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Suffice it to state that no such application was ever filed by the respondent claimants herein under Section 10 aforesaid. In the above view of the matter, it can be stated that the respondent claimants having never exercised their option to seek compensation under Section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, could not be deemed to be precluded from seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.” 12. In the above view of the matter, it can be stated that the respondent claimants having never exercised their option to seek compensation under Section 10 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, could not be deemed to be precluded from seeking compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.” 12. Once the claim petition was lodged by the claimant-respondent with learned Commissioner under the Compensation Act, and the compensation was not paid suo motu by the employer under Section 8 of the Compensation Act, the quantum of compensation payable to him was to be restricted to, and assessed by the learned Commissioner in accordance with, the provisions of Schedule I, Part II of the Compensation Act. The leg of the claimant was admittedly amputated up to mid foot as per the disability certificate issued by the District Disability Board. The claimant was also found to be 34 years on the date of accident and earning a sum of Rs.4,500/- per month by way of wages. As her leg was amputated up to mid foot, her case would, as rightly held by the learned Commissioner, be covered by Serial No.19 of Schedule 1 Part II of the Compensation Act. The findings of the learned Commissioner are as follows: “Now as prescribed in Section 4(1)(b) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, let us take 60% of the monthly wages of Rs.4,500/- which stands to Rs. 2,700/- and the amount is to be multiplied with the relevant factor as applicable to the age of the petitioner. In the instant case, the age of the petitioner was 34 years at the time of the accident and according to the age of the petitioner, the factor is 199.40 and the amount stands at Rs. 2,700 X 199.40 = Rs. 5,38,380/-. Now the total compensation comes to Rs. 5,38,704/- (Rs. 324 + Rs. 5,38,380/-).” 13. In my considered view, the total amount of compensation so awarded cannot be said to be wide of the mark had the assessment been done in accordance with Compensation Act though the possibility of some room for disagreement here and there cannot be entirely ruled out. This does not call for the interference of this Court. As already held by me earlier, the respondent No. 2 is, by the operation of Section 12 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, is liable to pay the compensation. This does not call for the interference of this Court. As already held by me earlier, the respondent No. 2 is, by the operation of Section 12 of the Employee’s Compensation Act, is liable to pay the compensation. The learned Commissioner has also correctly held that the appellant is liable to satisfy the respondent No. 2 as the offending road roller was insured with it at the time of the accident. The claimant respondent is entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. It is, however, made clear that if there is any clause in the agreement entered into between the respondent No. 2 and the respondent 3 for indemnifying the insurer for satisfying the award, it shall always be open to the latter to recover the same from the respondent No. 3. 14. The result of the foregoing discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed. The appellant-insurer is, therefore, directed to deposit a sum of Rs.5,38,704/- together with interest at rate of 9% per annum with effect from the date of the claim petition to this Registry within two months from the date of receipt of this judgment for payment to the claimant-respondent. The impugned judgment stands modified to the extent indicated above. No cost. Supply a copy of this judgment to the appellant. Transmit the record forthwith.