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2017 DIGILAW 334 (GAU)

Foyez Uddin Ahmed Laskar v. Gauhati High Court

2017-03-16

PARAN KUMAR PHUKAN, UJJAL BHUYAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : Ujjal Bhuyan, J. 1. Heard Mr K.K. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr K.M. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. None has appeared for the respondents. 3. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 19.10.2009, passed by the Registrar (Vigilance), Gauhati High Court, imposing the penalty of deduction of a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,000/- from the pension of the petitioner. 4. Be it stated that petitioner was a Judicial Officer and at the relevant point of time, he was posted as Member Secretary, Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA). A show cause notice dated 26.09.2008 was issued to the petitioner by the Registrar (Vigilance) under Rule 9 of the Assam Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1964 (1964 Rules), read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India, as to why any of the penalties prescribed under Rule 7 of the 1964 Rules would not be imposed on him on the 2 (two) charges mentioned therein. Prior to that, petitioner was placed under suspension on 21.05.2008. The gist of the 2 (two) charges were that acting on a letter dated 12.03.2008 of the Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), petitioner identified 10 (ten) districts in the State of Assam for setting up mediation centres including one in the office of the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) and communicated the same to the Member Secretary, National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) on 13.03.2008, without placing the matter before the Patron-in-Chief and Executive Chairman of Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA). Thus, petitioner was charged with committing gross misconduct, indiscipline and failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. This was Charge No. 1 and as per Charge No. 2, service of the petitioner was recalled by the Gauhati High Court and then released by the State Government as per approval dated 16.05.2008 of the Patron-in-chief and Executive Chairman of Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA). Registrar (Judicial) Gauhati High Court was directed to take over charge of the office of the Member Secretary from the petitioner. When the Registrar (Judicial) approached the petitioner over telephone for handing over charge, he ignored the said request and refused to hand over charge. Petitioner was accordingly charged with committing gross misconduct, indiscipline and failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. When the Registrar (Judicial) approached the petitioner over telephone for handing over charge, he ignored the said request and refused to hand over charge. Petitioner was accordingly charged with committing gross misconduct, indiscipline and failure to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty. This was Charge No. 2. The charge memo was accompanied by a statement of allegation, list of documents and list of witnesses. 5. In his written statement dated 15.10.2008, petitioner stated that he was very much involved in legal services activities particularly regarding functioning of mediation centres. When he received the letter of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) dated 12.03.2008 by fax on 13.03.2008, at 11:30 am, he could find out on enquiry that the Executive Chairman was not in station and his return would take a few days. Since the matter related to release of funds before 31.03.2008, petitioner admitted that he became over enthusiastic regarding setting up of the mediation centres and promptly submitted his reply disclosing his opinion so that there was no delay in release of funds. In this connection, petitioner referred to Rule 4 (C) of the Assam State Legal Services Authority Rules, 1996, by which he claimed he was empowered to take such decision. Petitioner acknowledged that out of his enthusiasm and over exuberance, he forgot to obtain prior approval of the list of districts from the Patron-in-Chief and Executive Chairman and stated that this mistake was unintentional. He also added that following his prompt response to the letter of the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), an amount of Rs. 32, 00,000/- was transferred by the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) to the account of Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) on 31.03.2008, through electronic mail. Meeting of the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) on 27.05.2008, approved the proposal of the petitioner for setting up of mediation centres in the identified districts and in the office of the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) as per letter of the NALSA received on 13.03.2008. 5.1. Regarding Charge No. 2, petitioner stated that Legislative Department, Government of Assam had issued notification on 16.05.2008, pursuant to letter of the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court dated 15.05.2008 recalling his service, releasing the petitioner and placing his service at the Judicial Department for further placing him at the disposal of the Gauhati High Court. 5.1. Regarding Charge No. 2, petitioner stated that Legislative Department, Government of Assam had issued notification on 16.05.2008, pursuant to letter of the Registrar General, Gauhati High Court dated 15.05.2008 recalling his service, releasing the petitioner and placing his service at the Judicial Department for further placing him at the disposal of the Gauhati High Court. But he received his release order issued by the Secretary to the Government of Assam, Judicial Department only on 28.05.2008. On the other hand, the Registrar (Judicial), Gauhati High Court telephonically asked him to hand over charge to her on 19.05.2008, but on that day, there was no written document to show his transfer to Gauhati High Court. He, therefore, requested the Registrar (Judicial) to issue necessary directions from the Gauhati High Court so that handing over and taking over of charge could be done in accordance with law. 6. It appears that written statement of the petitioner was not accepted by the Gauhati High Court, where after, it was decided to hold enquiry. By order dated 26.02.2009, issued by the Registrar (Vigilance), Sri D.K. Mahanta, the then District and Sessions Judge, Kamrup, was appointed as the Enquiry Officer and Sri Mazed Ali, the then Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court (FTC), Kamrup, Guwahati, was appointed as the Presenting Officer. 7. Without entering into details at this stage, it appears that the enquiry was conducted, where after the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Registrar (Vigilance), Gauhati High Court. In so far Charge No. 1 was concerned, after holding the said charge as proved, opinion of the Enquiry Officer was that it was for the disciplinary authority to consider as to whether the imprudence on the part of the petitioner to obtain prior approval of the Patron-in-Chief and Executive Chairman while submitting the proposal for establishment of mediation centres to the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) could be pardoned. In so far Charge No. 2 was concerned, the Enquiry Officer after holding that the said charge was duly established, observed that it was for the disciplinary authority to consider whether failure to handover charge was a result of some communication gap between the relieved officer and the relieving officer. 8. In so far Charge No. 2 was concerned, the Enquiry Officer after holding that the said charge was duly established, observed that it was for the disciplinary authority to consider whether failure to handover charge was a result of some communication gap between the relieved officer and the relieving officer. 8. Registrar (Vigilance), Gauhati High Court, vide his letter dated 19.06.2009, forwarded a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and informed him that the Gauhati High Court had accepted the findings on the charges recorded in the enquiry report and proposed to impose the penalty of deduction of a lump sum amount of Rs. 5,000/- from his pension. Petitioner was asked to submit his reply to the proposed penalty within 15 (fifteen) days. 9. In his reply dated 23.06.2009, petitioner requested the Registrar (Vigilance) to consider his initial written statement as well as his unblemished service career before taking any final decision. 10. It may be mentioned that in the meanwhile, petitioner had retired from service on 30.11.2008 while still under suspension. 11. Thereafter, notification dated 19.10.2009 was issued by the Registrar (Vigilance), Gauhati High Court, stating that Gauhati High Court was pleased to impose the penalty of deduction of a lump sum of Rs. 5,000/- only from the pension of the petitioner. 12. Appeal filed by the petitioner was rejected, which was conveyed to the petitioner by the Registrar (Vigilance) vide letter dated 23.02.2010. By a subsequent notification dated 11.01.2011 issued by the Registrar (Vigilance), suspension period of the petitioner was treated as spent on duty. 13. Aggrieved, present writ petition has been filed. 14. This case was admitted for hearing way back on 22.07.2011. Till date, no affidavit has been filed by any of the respondents. As noticed at the outset, there is also no representation today on behalf of the respondents. 15. Submission made by Mr Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel has been considered. Mr Mahanta primarily argued that imposition of the penalty was in violation of the principles of natural justice and that Registrar (Vigilance) was not the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. 16. We have already noticed the 2 (two) charges framed against the petitioner. 15. Submission made by Mr Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel has been considered. Mr Mahanta primarily argued that imposition of the penalty was in violation of the principles of natural justice and that Registrar (Vigilance) was not the disciplinary authority of the petitioner. 16. We have already noticed the 2 (two) charges framed against the petitioner. In so far the first charge is concerned, it related to an action of the petitioner in promptly responding to a letter from the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA), identifying 10 (ten) districts and the office of the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) for setting up of mediation centres. The charge was that this was done by the petitioner without obtaining the approval of the Patron-in-Chief and the Executive Chairman. We have perused the reply of the petitioner. Petitioner had acknowledged that it was a result of his over exuberance and also having regard to the fact that as 31st March was approaching, he had taken the step to ensure prompt release of fund; the indiscretion was unintentional. That apart, Executive Chairman was not at station and ordinarily Patron-In-Chief is not involved in the day-to-day administration of the State Legal Services Authority. As a matter of fact, this decision of the petitioner was subsequently ratified by the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA). Not only that, based on the response of the petitioner, a sum of Rs. 32,00,000/- was transferred to the account of the Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA) by the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) for establishment of the identified mediation centres. Thus, Charge No. 1 was at the most a minor indiscretion on the part of the petitioner which was done keeping in mind the best interest of the institution and that was borne out by the subsequent turn of events. 17. In so far the second charge is concerned, it has come on record that when the Registrar (Judicial) telephonically requested the petitioner on 19.05.2008 to hand over charge of the office of Member Secretary, Assam State Legal Services Authority (ASLSA), there was no official document of the Judicial Department, Government of Assam placing the service of the petitioner at the disposal of the Gauhati High Court or any order of the Gauhati High Court directing the petitioner to hand over charge to the Registrar (Judicial). Such document was received by the petitioner only on 28.05.2008. Such document was received by the petitioner only on 28.05.2008. In the absence of any such official document, petitioner could not have handed over charge of his office to the Registrar (Judicial), that too, on telephonic instruction. 17.1. Regarding both the charges, opinion of the Enquiry Officer is quite significant. While holding both the charges as proved, he went on to observe that it was for the disciplinary authority to consider whether imprudence of the petitioner could be pardoned and whether the incident of not handing over of charge was as a result of communication gap. To our mind, strictly speaking, there was no misconduct as such on the part of the petitioner. 18. Moving ahead, the letter of the Registrar (Vigilance) while forwarding a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner is quite significant. The letter dated 19.06.2009, reads as under:- "Sir, With reference to the letters cited above, I am directed to send, herewith, the photocopy of the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceeding drawn against you and to inform you that the Hon'ble High Court has been pleased to accept the findings on the charges recorded in the enquiry report and propose to impose the penalty of deduction of a lump sum of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) only from your pension. You are, therefore, informed to submit your reply to the proposed penalty aforesaid to this Registry within a period of 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of this communication." 19. From the aforesaid letter, what transpires is that before copy of the enquiry report was given to the petitioner and his response sought for, the High Court had already accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proposed to impose the penalty of deduction of Rs. 5,000/- from the pension of the petitioner. In other words, based on the enquiry report petitioner was held guilty of the charges and it was only on the question of penalty his reply was sought for. 20. The disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was drawn up under Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Article 311 of the Constitution had undergone substantial change post 42nd amendment. 20. The disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was drawn up under Rule 9 of the 1964 Rules read with Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Article 311 of the Constitution had undergone substantial change post 42nd amendment. As per the amended Article 311 (2), no person employed in civil capacity under the Union or the State shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which, he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. As per the first proviso, in the event it is decided to impose such penalty on the person concerned, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during the enquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. 21. Article 311, particularly, the first proviso thereto, which was incorporated post 42nd amendment was the subject matter of deliberation by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Md Ramzan Khan; reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . Thereafter, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court deliberated upon this provision in the case of Managing Director, ECIL v. B Karunakar; reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . Supreme Court has explained that before arriving at a finding holding the delinquent guilty or otherwise, copy of the enquiry report has to be furnished to the delinquent and response of the delinquent on the enquiry report is required to be considered. However, once he is held guilty thereafter, no fresh notice is required to be issued to the delinquent on the question of imposition of penalty. This aspect of the matter was gone into by this Court in a recent decision in the case of Utpal Rajkonwar v. Dibrugarh University; reported in (2015) 2 GLR 765, relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder with approval:- "20. Before adverting to other grounds of challenge, it would be apposite to first attend to the challenge made on the ground of non-furnishing of copy of the enquiry report to the petitioners before acceptance of the findings of the Enquiry Committee as any decision on this ground, one way or the other, would have a decisive bearing on the outcome of the present proceeding. 21. 21. Article 311 of the Constitution deals with dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or the State. Prior to the 42nd amendment of the Constitution, Sub-Article (2) of Article 311 read as under:- "311. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose on him any such penalty, until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed, but only on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry." 22. Following the 42nd amendment made in the year 1976, Sub-Article (2) now reads as under:- "311.(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed, after such inquiry, to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed." 23. Prior to the 1976 amendment, Article 311 (2) provided for opportunity of hearing at 2 (two) stages, i.e., at the stage of enquiry into the charges and consequently before imposition of penalty on the basis of findings of the enquiry. The 1976 amendment eliminated the provision providing for second opportunity of hearing before imposition of punishment. 24. In Ramzan Khan (supra), the question, which fell for consideration before the Apex Court was whether after the 42nd amendment, the delinquent had lost his right to entitlement to a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceeding. The Apex Court, on due consideration took the view that deletion of the second part of issuing notice did not bring about any material change in regard to the requirement of furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "15. The Apex Court, on due consideration took the view that deletion of the second part of issuing notice did not bring about any material change in regard to the requirement of furnishing a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:- "15. Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311(2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 311(2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary and to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done here which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the series of pronouncements of this Court making rules of natural justice applicable to such an inquiry are not affected by the forty-second Amendment. We, therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendation, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof. The forty-second Amendment has not brought about any change in this position." 25. The question as to whether the enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer, who was appointed by the Disciplinary Authority to hold enquiry into the charges against the delinquent, was required to be furnished to the delinquent to enable him to make proper representation to the Disciplinary Authority before such authority arrives at its own final decision with regard to the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent and the consequent punishment proposed was referred to the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL (supra). Reference was made in view of what was thought to be conflicting decisions in Ramzan Khan (supra), and an earlier decision in the case of Kailash Chander Asthana v. State of U.P.; reported in (1988) 3 SCC 600 . The question, which was referred has since been authoritatively decided by the Constitution Bench in Managing Director, ECIL (supra). It has been held that right to receive the Enquiry Officer's report and to show cause against the enquiry report was independent of the right to show cause against the penalty proposed. Acknowledging that there was some confusion between the two rights, the Apex Court clarified that the right to receive the enquiry report and to represent against the findings recorded in it was inexplicably connected with the decision of the Disciplinary Authority and the nature of penalty proposed. Since the 42nd amendment dispensed with the requirement of issuance of notice against the penalty proposed, the Apex Court observed that some Courts took the view that the delinquent was deprived of his right to represent against the finding of his guilt as well. The confusion was on account of the failure to distinguish the 2(two) rights, which were independent of each other. The Apex Court explained the distinction between the two stages and held as under:- "25. While the right to represent against the findings in the report is part of the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of the inquiry viz., before the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings in the report, the right to show cause against the penalty proposed belongs to the second stage when the disciplinary authority has considered the findings in the report and has come to the conclusion with regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to award penalty on the basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the forty-second Amendment. 26. The first right is the right to prove innocence. The second right is to plead for either no penalty or a lesser penalty although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It is the second right exercisable at the second stage which was taken away by the forty-second Amendment. 26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer's findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it. 27. It will thus be seen that where the enquiry officer is other than the disciplinary authority, the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages. The first stage ends when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the basis of the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent employee's reply to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary authority decides to impose penalty on the basis of its conclusions. If the disciplinary authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage is not even reached. The employee's right to receive the report is thus, a part of the reasonable opportunity of defending himself in the first stage of the inquiry. If this right is denied to him, he is in effect denied the right to defend himself and to prove his innocence in the disciplinary proceedings." 26. Therefore, from a careful reading of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, it is clearly evident that before the Disciplinary Authority comes to its own conclusion whether to accept the enquiry report or not, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the Enquiry Officer's findings. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the evidence on record, the report of the Enquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against the report of the Enquiry Officer." 22. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority is required to consider the evidence on record, the report of the Enquiry Officer and the representation of the employee against the report of the Enquiry Officer." 22. In other words, the requirement of law is that before a decision is taken by the disciplinary authority whether the enquiry report has to be accepted or not, the delinquent has to be given a chance to make a representation against the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer. After all, report of the Enquiry Officer is one of the material documents to be taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority before accepting the guilt or otherwise of the delinquent. Therefore, as explained in Utpal Rajkonwar (supra), principles of natural justice require that before such decision is taken the delinquent is required to be afforded an opportunity to make his statement by way of representation on such report. Thereafter, it is for the disciplinary authority on the basis of the materials on record, including the enquiry report and the response of the delinquent, to take a decision as to whether the delinquent is guilty or not. Once the disciplinary authority holds the delinquent to be guilty of misconduct and decides to impose penalty, no fresh show cause notice is required to be given to the delinquent on the point of penalty. 23. Having noticed the legal position as above, let us revert back to what has been done in the present case. From the letter of the Registrar (Vigilance) dated 19.06.2009, as extracted above, it is seen that before copy of the enquiry report was given to the petitioner and his response sought for and considered, the High Court had already accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and proposed to impose the penalty. In other words, petitioner was already held guilty. It was only on the question of penalty that reply of the petitioner was sought for which is not the requirement of law. This fundamental flaw, in our opinion, has completely vitiated the penalty imposed. In so far prejudice is concerned, petitioner was certainly prejudiced by non-furnishing of copy of the enquiry report, inasmuch as, before the same was furnished and responded to, decision was already taken holding the petitioner guilty. This fundamental flaw, in our opinion, has completely vitiated the penalty imposed. In so far prejudice is concerned, petitioner was certainly prejudiced by non-furnishing of copy of the enquiry report, inasmuch as, before the same was furnished and responded to, decision was already taken holding the petitioner guilty. This is in violation of the principles of natural justice and has vitiated the order of penalty dated 19.10.2009, which in our view has been rendered legally unsustainable. 24. Since we have held the impugned penalty order dated 19.10.2009 to be legally unsustainable on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice and also by taking the view that there was no misconduct on the part of the petitioner stricto senso, we do not consider it necessary to deliberate upon the other ground urged by Mr Mahanta. 25. Accordingly and in the light of the above, impugned order of penalty dated 19.10.2009 is set aside and quashed. 26. In view of the penalty order being quashed, respondents shall now refund the penalty amount to the petitioner, within a period of 1(one) month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. 27. Before parting with the record, we may observe that we feel sorry that a senior judicial officer had to suffer this ordeal, that too, at the fag end of his long service career and had to superannuate from service with such ignominy. We say only this and no more. 28. Writ petition is accordingly allowed, but without any order as to costs.