JUDGMENT & ORDER : This revision is directed against the order dated 27-8-2014 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala in NI Case No. 147 of 2013 discharging the respondent from the liability of the offence of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“the Act” for short) as amended from time to time. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner is that he extended loan of Rs.1,50,000/- in cash to the respondent on 5-2-2012, which was repayable within one year. When the respondent did not repay the loan amount, the petitioner requested the respondent to return the amount from the month of January, 2013. The respondent, however, failed to do so. Ultimately, the respondent issued a cheque for Rs.1,50,000/- drawn on IDBI Bank on 10-4-2013 to the petitioner with a request to encash the cheque on or before 10-6-2013. The petitioner accordingly deposited the cheque in his SB A/C No. 8002012109758 at Tripura Gramin Bank, Bardowali Branch on 8-6-2013, but the same was dishonoured and was returned to the petitioner on 12-6-2013 for insufficiency of fund as reported by IDBI Bank, Kaman Chowmuhani Branch. The petitioner thereafter issued pleader‘s notice U/s 138 of the NI Act on 28-6-2013 to the respondent intimating him of the dishonour of his cheque and demanding immediate repayment of the loan within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice failing which appropriate legal proceeding would be initiated against him. The notice was, however, returned to the pleader of the petitioner on 5-7-2013 with the report of the postman “Refused for incomplete address”. Similar notice was again issued to the respondent on 12-7-2013 at the Civil Secretariat where he was reportedly working, but the same was also returned on 25-7-2013 with the report that “[T]he addressee on leave for long without intimation.” The petitioner again issued similar notice to the respondent on 2-8-2013 by registered post, which was again returned with the endorsement “Refused’ as the official designation had been changed. Another notice was sent by him to the respondent on 14-8-2013 which was returned on 18-8-2013 with the report of the postman “Refused, incomplete address. Returned to sender”. Another notice was sent by him to the respondent on 14-8-2013 which was returned on 18-8-2013 with the report of the postman “Refused, incomplete address. Returned to sender”. After ascertaining that the address was same, another notice was issued by his pleader on 23-8-2013 by registered post, but the same was returned to the pleader of the petitioner on 2-9-2013 with the postal endorsement “Refused’ by the respondent. 3. The petitioner thereafter filed a complaint before the learned Chief Judicial magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala and the same was numbered as N.I. No. 147 of 2013, but the same was made over to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate/West Tripura for further proceedings. The respondent put in his appearance before the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate through his counsel on 27-8-2014 to answer whether he pleaded guilty to the charge or not. The trial court, however, by misreading the statement of the petitioner recorded U/s 200 Cr.P.C. held that there had been absence of valid notice as the notice was not served within the statutory period and thereupon discharged him. Aggrieved by this, this revision is now filed by the petitioner. 4. It is the contention of Mr. D.R. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the statutory notice was duly served lastly on 29-8-2013 when the respondent refused to receive the notice without any further remark unlike on other occasions; the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate ought to have held that the statutory notice was duly served lastly on 29-8-2013 by his refusal to receive the notice without any remark unlike earlier occasions when he used to avoid the notice. He, therefore, submits that the trial court has acted illegally in discharging the respondent from the case; this calls for the interference of this Court. Strong reliance is placed by him on D. Vinod Shivappa v. Nanda Belliappa, (2006) 6 SCC 456 to fortify his submissions. Mr. S. Sarkar, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, supports the impugned order and submits that there is no merit in the criminal revision, which is liable to be dismissed. Per contra, Mr. D. Bhattacharya, the learned counsel for the private respondent submits that the impugned order was passed by the trial court after duly examining all the materials available on record and does not warrant the interference of this Court. 5. Per contra, Mr. D. Bhattacharya, the learned counsel for the private respondent submits that the impugned order was passed by the trial court after duly examining all the materials available on record and does not warrant the interference of this Court. 5. To appreciate the controversy, it will be beneficial to refer to the provisions of Section 138 the Act, which read thus: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.— Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 6. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.” 6. Thus, under Section 138 of the Act, where a cheque issued by the drawer in the discharge of any debt or any other liability is returned by the bank unpaid due to insufficient balance, the drawer is deemed to have committed an offence. This is, however, subject to proviso to Section 138 which provides that the cheque should have been presented to the bank within the period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. The payee must also make a demand for the payment of the said amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 30 days of the receipt of the information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid. If despite this demand, the drawer fails to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice, a cause of action arises for prosecuting him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Section 142 provides that the court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act upon receipt of a complaint in writing made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. Such complaint, however, must be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. Discretion is nevertheless given to the court to take cognizance of the complaint even after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within such period. It is not disputed that the drawer of the cheque makes himself liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Act if he fails to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice given by the drawee. His failure to make the payment within the stipulated period gives rise to a cause of action to the complainant to prosecute the drawer under Section 138 of the Act. 7. In the instant case, the petitioner apparently came to know about the bouncing of the cheque on 12-6-2013. His failure to make the payment within the stipulated period gives rise to a cause of action to the complainant to prosecute the drawer under Section 138 of the Act. 7. In the instant case, the petitioner apparently came to know about the bouncing of the cheque on 12-6-2013. That means, he had thirty days to issue demand notice in writing to the respondent with effect from 13-6-2013. His case is that he issued the demand notice for repayment of the loan amount to the respondent within 15 days through his advocate on 28-6-2013, which is obviously within the time permitted by law, failing which legal proceeding would be initiated against him. The notice was issued to him in his office address of the Civil Secretariat where he was performing duty, but the notice was returned on 5-7-2013 with a report of the Postman “refused incomplete address return to sender.” He got further information that the respondent was working in the same Civil Secretariat under the Secretary, Fisheries. He again issued the notice through his advocate on 12-7-2013, but the Postman returned the notice unserved with a report “Addressee on leave for a long time without intimation so returned to the Sender’. On getting such report, notice was again sent on 2-8-2013, which was also returned unserved with the report “refused because Dilip Acharjee designation change so returned to Sender” dated 6-8-2013. The petitioner once again through his advocate sent the notice on 14-8-2013 in the same address and was again returned on 18-8-2013 unserved with a report “refused incomplete address. Returned to Sender”. Thereafter, the petitioner through his advocate again sent a notice to the respondent on 21-8-2013 by registered post with A/D card, but again the Postman returned the said notice on 2-9-2013 with the report “Refused”. To recapitulate, except for the notices dated 2-8-2013 and dated 21-8-2003 sent by registered posts with A/D cards, there is no evidence to show that the earlier notices sent by him by post were unequivocally refused by the respondent. It was a case of “refused because of incomplete address” or “addressee on long leave” or “refused because Dilip Acharjee designation change, so returned to Sendor” or something like that. In so far as notices sent by ordinary posts are concerned, there can be no presumption of service of notices upon the respondent even if he was actually correctly addressed. It was a case of “refused because of incomplete address” or “addressee on long leave” or “refused because Dilip Acharjee designation change, so returned to Sendor” or something like that. In so far as notices sent by ordinary posts are concerned, there can be no presumption of service of notices upon the respondent even if he was actually correctly addressed. In C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed and another, (2007) 6 SCC 555 , the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had an occasion to discuss the nature of presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act and under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and pointed out as to how these two presumptions are to be used while considering the question of service of notice under Section 138 of the Act. This is what it said: “13. According to Section 114 of the Act, read with Illustration (f) thereunder, when it appears to the court that the common course of business renders it probable that a thing would happen, the court may draw presumption that the thing would have happened, unless there are circumstances in a particular case to show that the common course of business was not followed. Thus, Section 114 enables the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Consequently, the court can presume that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. When applied to communications sent by post, Section 114 enables the court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: “27. But the presumption that is raised under Section 27 of the GC Act is a far stronger presumption. Further, while Section 114 of the Evidence Act refers to a general presumption, Section 27 refers to a specific presumption. For the sake of ready reference, Section 27 of the GC Act is extracted below: “27. Meaning of service by post.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post, whether the expression ‘serve’ or either of the expression ‘give’ or ‘send’ or any other expression is used, then, unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post, a letter containing the document, and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.” 14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement “refused” or “not available in the house” or “house locked” or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”, due service has to be presumed. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement “refused” or “not available in the house” or “house locked” or “shop closed” or “addressee not in station”, due service has to be presumed. (Vide Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 ; State of M.P. v. Hiralal, (1996) 7 SCC 523 and V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu., (2004) 8 SCC 774 ) It is, therefore, manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the accused or that the accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved. 15. Insofar as the question of disclosure of necessary particulars with regard to the issue of notice in terms of proviso (b) of Section 138 of the Act, in order to enable the court to draw presumption or inference either under Section 27 of the GC Act or Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is concerned, there is no material difference between the two provisions. In our opinion, therefore, when the notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing the drawer of the cheque, the mandatory requirement of issue of notice in terms of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act stands complied with. It is needless to emphasise that the complaint must contain basic facts regarding the mode and manner of the issuance of notice to the drawer of the cheque. It is well settled that at the time of taking cognizance of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, the court is required to be prima facie satisfied that a case under the said section is made out and the aforenoted mandatory statutory procedural requirements have been complied with. It is then for the drawer to rebut the presumption about the service of notice and show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address or that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the letter was never tendered or that the report of the postman was incorrect. It is then for the drawer to rebut the presumption about the service of notice and show that he had no knowledge that the notice was brought to his address or that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the letter was never tendered or that the report of the postman was incorrect. In our opinion, this interpretation of the provision would effectuate the object and purpose for which proviso to Section 138 was enacted, namely, to avoid unnecessary hardship to an honest drawer of a cheque and to provide him an opportunity to make amends.” 8. In the case at hand, this Court can ignore the pleader‘s notice sent by ordinary posts on earlier occasions as there can be no presumption of service even if there was unequivocal refusal on the part of the respondent to receive the notice unless the petitioner with clinching evidence proves to the contrary. However, it is with respect to the demand notice dated 2-8-2013 sent by the Advocate of the petitioner by registered post with A/D that it can be said that there is presumption of service of notice upon the respondent under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act even though it was returned with postal remark “refused because Dilip Acharjee designation change, so returned to Sender” on the authority of Alavi Haji case (supra). If the respondent received the notice demanding payment on 2-8-2013 or, at any rate, on 6-8-2013 and if he failed to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice, then the petitioner was required to file the complaint within one month from the date of expiry of the said fifteen days as envisaged in clause (c) of Section 142. Obviously, the complaint was not lodged by him within the said one month as evident from the subsequent demand notices sent by him by post with or without registered post with A/D cards; he lodged the complaint only on 12-9-2013, i.e. much beyond the stipulated period of one month. The net result of these findings is that the complaint filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. Consequently, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate did not commit any jurisdictional error in not framing the charge against the respondent U/s 138 of the Act and in discharging him from the case. 9. The net result of these findings is that the complaint filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. Consequently, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate did not commit any jurisdictional error in not framing the charge against the respondent U/s 138 of the Act and in discharging him from the case. 9. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this criminal revision, which is hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. Transmit the LC record.