JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. P.P. Majmudar for the petitioner and learned AGP Ms. Amita Shah for the respondent No. 1. Perused the record. In compliance of order dated 2.12.2016 and 29.12.2016, learned AGP is producing letter dated 23.1.2017 received by her from the office of the Superintendent of Police, Rajkot (Rural), with two tabular statements, which are to be taken on record. Such statements contain comparative details of several employees of the respondents, who were also involved in similar charges under the Prohibition Act. 2. The petitioner has sought indulgence under Articles 14, 16 and 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 29.8.2003 by the Superintendent of Police, Rajkot (Rural), so also order dated 30.12.2003 by the Special D.I.G., Rajkot Division, Rajkot whereby punishment of removal from service has been imposed upon the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police and such order of removal has been confirmed in appeal by order dated 30.12.2003. Therefore, petitioner has been terminated from the services of the respondents w.e.f. 30.12.2003. It seems that petitioner has also challenged such order dated 30.12.2003 before the competent authority, which has also while rejecting the revision of the petitioner, by order dated 29.4.2006, confirmed the order of removal of the petitioner from his service and thereby, confirmed the order dated 29.8.2003. The petitioner has also challenged the said order dated 29.4.2006 before the Home Secretary. However, the Home Secretary has also by order dated 8.12.2010 while rejecting the revision application of the petitioner, confirmed the previous order, including order dated 29.4.2006 and therefore, petitioner has challenged all such orders, amongst which the last order is dated 8.12.2010. 3. The undisputed fact between the parties is to the effect that petitioner was serving as a Police Constable with the respondents since long, but when he was involved in one case under Prohibition Act on 26.6.2000, an FIR was lodged with Jetpur Police Station, which was registered as C.R. No. 5164 of 2000 u/ss. 66(1)B, 85(1)(3) of the Prohibition Act. Pursuant to such FIR, petitioner was placed under suspension w.e.f. 30.6.2000. However, w.e.f. 14.5.2001, such suspension was removed though departmental proceedings and criminal case against him were pending. 4. 66(1)B, 85(1)(3) of the Prohibition Act. Pursuant to such FIR, petitioner was placed under suspension w.e.f. 30.6.2000. However, w.e.f. 14.5.2001, such suspension was removed though departmental proceedings and criminal case against him were pending. 4. It seems that for the so called incident of 26.06.2000, a charge-sheet was filed only on 29.03.2001 and after completing departmental inquiry, the inquiry officer has filed his report on 25.08.2002. If we peruse the report of inquiry which runs in more than twenty closely handwritten pages, it becomes clear that department has examined as many as nine witnesses and produced ten documentary evidence before the inquiry officer whereas petitioner being delinquent, has examined two witnesses and produced ten documentary evidence to prove their respective claim. Thereafter the inquiry officer has recorded his finding by scrutinizing such evidence and discussing crux of all such evidence in his inquiry report but finally he came to the conclusion that department has failed to prove the charges against the petitioner and therefore held that none of the charges is proved against the petitioner. 5. If we peruse the issue raised by the inquiry officer, in such departmental inquiry then again, it would be visualize and clear on record that practically, department has not only failed to prove the charges against the petitioner but it gives an impression that even FIR and charges are concocted one. There is reason to say so because the issue No. 1 in such departmental inquiry is to the effect that whether petitioner has left the place of his duty at 4:00 p.m. on 26.06.2000 from Navagadh Cross Road to Octroi Post at Dhoraji bypass on national highway. The inquiry officer has concluded that such issue is not proved by the department and thereby there is reason to believe that petitioner has not left the place of his service at the relevant time. Therefore next issue regarding presence of petitioner in drunken condition at the octroi check-post of Dhoraji bypass highway can never be proved because when presence of petitioner is not proved at particular place, then his condition or status regarding his condition can never be proved, since it becomes irrelevant, and therefore even second issue is also held to be not proved by the department during such departmental inquiry. Pursuant to negative finding on both above issues, the third issue regarding commission of offence by the petitioner was also negativated. Pursuant to negative finding on both above issues, the third issue regarding commission of offence by the petitioner was also negativated. During departmental inquiry, when there is an issue regarding absence of the petitioner at particular place and his presence at some other place is pleaded then it is necessary for the department to prove it if not beyond reasonable doubt then at least by prima-facie evidence, it is to be proved that petitioner was not available on his duty and he was found from some other place. Whereas the inquiry officer has categorically observed and held in his report that department has failed to produce any evidence to prove the absence of the petitioner from the place of his duty. As against that, petitioner has in his defence produced as many as five receipts of penalty imposed by him on different vehicle drivers at the relevant time which are recorded by inquiry officer at Ex-111 to 118 on record. Therefore on scrutiny of available oral evidence and such documentary evidence, when petitioner was able to prove his presence at particular place, inquiry officer has no option but to hold that petitioner has not left his place. So far as panchnama of the body of petitioner is concerned, there is categorical evidence on record before the inquiry officer that panchnama was not prepared at the place as per record but it was prepared only in the police station and there is no explanation before the inquiry officer that why panchnama was prepared in police station and though it was prepared in police station, why it was entered in panchnama that it was prepared at the relevant place. This categorically shows and proves the attitude of the respondent towards dealing with the legal requirement of conducting inquiry and that too, against one of their employees. 6. This categorically shows and proves the attitude of the respondent towards dealing with the legal requirement of conducting inquiry and that too, against one of their employees. 6. So far as second issue regarding consumption of liquor is concerned, there is positive evidence, oral and documentary before the inquiry officer in the form of medical report and deposition of Doctor that there is no evidence of consumption of liquor by the petitioner but his condition was because of other medicines taken by him pursuant to advice by an Ayurvedic Doctor and on inquiry, from such Ayurvedic Dispensary, on the contrary evidence supporting the version of the petitioner was not only found correct but it was proved on record by the petitioner, which confirms that in fact, Doctor has prescribed certain medicine and pursuant to consumption of such medicine, there may be particular result of blood test, it cannot be considered as consumption of liquor whereas percentage of alcohol found from the blood of the petitioner was also insufficient for proceeding further and therefore, inquiry officer had no option but to hold that charges are not proved against the petitioner. 7. However, though there is detailed order by inquiry officer concluding that charges are not proved against the petitioner and thereby though, petitioner is entitled to continue his services on same post without any hindrance or disturbance, unfortunately, the office of the superintendent of police, Rajkot Rural at Rajkot, as being disciplinary authority, reconsidered the case of the departmental inquiry and without offering reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to represent his case, after issuing a show-cause notice dated 20.11.2002, but without considering the reply to such show-cause notice, came to the conclusion against reasoned order of inquiry that all charges against petitioner are proved and therefore, the punishment of removal of service was imposed by impugned order dated 29.08.2003. 8. If we peruse such impugned order surprisingly on page 1 itself after recording the basic fact of the charge-sheet, the Superintendent of Police has, even before discussing the available record and evidence suggested punishment of removal from services. This shows that the department has pre-decided to remove the petitioner before considering his case on merit and even before calling upon him to defend himself. This shows that the department has pre-decided to remove the petitioner before considering his case on merit and even before calling upon him to defend himself. The perusal of such order of removal shows that the Superintendent of Police, Rajkot Rural has after narrating the details of the charge-sheet and story and history of the incident, as per the charge-sheet and the evidence and witness of prosecution by the department only, i.e. without referring the evidence adduced by the petitioner and thereby, without considering such evidence by the petitioner, by discussing certain conceptual sentences, held that petitioner was guilty and charges are proved against him. While doing so, the Superintendent of Police has simply considered the basic concept that in criminal proceedings, there must be necessity of cogent and reliable evidence whether any departmental proceeding prima facie evidence is sufficient. However, the disciplinary authority has failed to realize that when witnesses of department could not prove and support their say during departmental inquiry, so also in criminal case before Court, the statement of witnesses alone, cannot be relied upon in a departmental inquiry but there must be some prima facie evidence for confirming commission of any offence of misconduct. At this stage, it would be necessary to record and recollect that in Criminal Case No. 1514 of 2000, the competent Court has acquitted the petitioner by its judgment and order dated 23.09.2002 i.e. before the impugned order dated 29.08.2003. However, even before the judgment of acquittal in Criminal Case, Inquiry Officer has already held that there is no evidence to prove the misconduct, misdeed or commission of any offence by the petitioner. Even Judicial Magistrate First Class has, in the criminal case, held that the prosecution could not prove condition of the petitioner as drunken, the Superintendent of Police had the audacity to say that reading the report of complainant namely L.B. Chudasama is also a Police officer, it transpires that petitioner had consumed some liquor at the relevant time. Such practice and attitude is not permissible under law. In all such cases, written submission of witness or officer may not be treated as evidence to punish someone in departmental inquiry. The law is well settled that there is difference between statement of a witness and evidence before competent authority. Such practice and attitude is not permissible under law. In all such cases, written submission of witness or officer may not be treated as evidence to punish someone in departmental inquiry. The law is well settled that there is difference between statement of a witness and evidence before competent authority. There are catena of judgments by different Courts including the Hon'ble Supreme Court that any decision cannot be taken based upon report or statement alone i.e. in absence of any prima facie evidence during any departmental inquiry and cogent and reliable evidence in criminal case. Therefore, prima facie it becomes clear from the record that respondents have failed to follow the legal and oral procedure before awarding punishment that too, of removal from services after exoneration of petitioner from departmental inquiry and also from criminal trial. 9. Surprisingly, Police Sub Inspector, who has recorded the FIR at some other police station then the police station within which the alleged offence has committed, tried to explain with reference to the recording of FIR that offence has been committed within the limits of Jetpur City Police Station only, though concerned place of incident was within Jetpur Taluka Police Station. The Superintendent of Police has admitted that the Investigating Officer Mr. L.B. Chudasama, Police Inspector has not drawn the panchnama of the place of incident i.e. where it is alleged that petitioner was fount in drunken condition and, therefore, when panchnama was not drawn at the place of alleged offence, place of incident is not proved, so as to initiate proceedings in particular police station under particular officer. 10. Again, surprisingly, while discussing the issue No. 10 at internal page 7 of impugned order dated 29.08.2003, the Superintendent of Police, Rajkot (Rural) has made absolutely contradictory statement that though petitioner was given a chance, he did not change his attitude and, therefore, punishment of removal from service is imposed. Unfortunately, so far such chances are concerned, the Superintendent of Police has given examples of some other persons who were given such chances. Therefore, it seems that such orders are being signed and issued without taking proper care and without applying mind and even on such count, in addition to such ground the impugned order cannot sustain. 11. Unfortunately, so far such chances are concerned, the Superintendent of Police has given examples of some other persons who were given such chances. Therefore, it seems that such orders are being signed and issued without taking proper care and without applying mind and even on such count, in addition to such ground the impugned order cannot sustain. 11. But the most surprising reason assigned by the Superintendent of Police Rajkot (Rural) being Disciplinary Authority who has imposed punishment of removal from services, being harsh punishment stated altogether new fact which is never disclosed or available on record of departmental proceedings. Surprisingly now disciplinary authority has relied upon one another FIR being I C.R. No. 5080 of 2001 registered with Jasdan Police Station on 07.08.2001 i.e. almost after 14 months of 1st FIR dated 26.06.2000. Though, such dates are very much clear that it is after 14 months from the date of first FIR, it is recorded that within three months of first FIR, petitioner has involved in second offence and, therefore, they tried to justify the punishment. It is also evident from record that though petitioner has produced a certificate disclosing that he met with an accident and having a fracture and that therefore he could not represent his case properly through his advocate and asked for time, disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order of removing him from service which cannot sustain because of what is discussed herein above. 11.1 When such order was appealed before the competent authority, the competent authority has gone one step ahead in criticizing the judgment of the Criminal Court dated 30.12.2003 at annexure D. Surprisingly the competent appellate authority of the Department has stated in such impugned order that the Criminal Court has not discussed the issue regarding involvement of the petitioner with reference to report and complaint filed by Mr. L.B. Chudasama. It is really a surprising issue that the higher police officer does not understand that the Court has to rely upon the oral evidence before it and the Court cannot depend upon report of investigating officer alone. L.B. Chudasama. It is really a surprising issue that the higher police officer does not understand that the Court has to rely upon the oral evidence before it and the Court cannot depend upon report of investigating officer alone. When Court and the Inquiry Officer have relied upon the evidence of Doctor as a witness of the petitioner, the impugned order states that when statements are recorded by the senior officer because of mental tension, certain facts may not be recorded in such statement, but thereby, it cannot be said that the case is wrongly initiated against the petitioner and, therefore, determined that the documents collected during the departmental proceedings should be relied upon. There are no words to comment on such observations and determination, except to make it clear that here is the higher police officer who makes a statement in writing that senior officers are working in mental tension and, therefore, they may forget to take requisite information in statement of witness recorded by them or in their deposition before the Court. I have no words to comment on such observation. But the fact remains that none of the authorities are permitted to take the matter so lightly and that too when punishment is highest punishment of removal of service and that too without any evidence against the employee to prove the charges. When it is also recorded in such order that otherwise petitioner has received 11 awards during his services of 22 years and when there is no other complaint or adverse remarks regarding his services, it seems that there is some substance in the submission by the learned advocate for the petitioner that probably some officers do not like the petitioner and, therefore, department wants to punish him by any reason and at any cost. 12. Since there is another Criminal Case against the petitioner wherein he was convicted and Criminal Appeal against such case is pending, I have restricted to comment anything against officers of the respondent but considering the available details on record it seems that in a given case there must be adverse remarks against those who have endorsed such reasons and determination in office order while punishing the person by removing from services and thereby playing with career of a person though there is no evidence against the petitioner. Therefore such order should be quashed and set aside with heavy cost. 13. Therefore such order should be quashed and set aside with heavy cost. 13. In next step an order dated 30.12.2003 was appealed before the higher appellate authority. The higher appellate authority again assigning same reasons, which were assigned in order dated 30.12.2003, thereby practically reproducing the contents of order dated 30.12.2003 only in different language, the appellate authority has also while rejecting the appeal confirmed the order of removal from service of the petitioner without any cogent and reliable evidence and reason on record. It is evident from such order dated 29.04.2006 that it is also based upon the report of the police officer rather than the evidence adduced before the criminal Court so also before the Inquiry Officer wherein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case and in departmental inquiry officer has said that charges are not proved, at all. 14. Since there was provision to prefer a revision before the Home department, petitioner has no option but to file revision before the Secretary, Home Department which was done on 18.05.2006 but when such revision was not heard for considerably long time i.e. upto 2010 i.e. for 4 years, petitioner has no option but to prefer one Special Civil Application No. 12819 of 2010. Before such petition, petitioner has already reminded the Home Secretary to decide the appeal at the earliest by his requests dated 09.08.2006, 19.09.2006 and 10.01.2008. Probably therefore, in SCA No. 12819 of 2010 respondents have to come forward with a statement that they will decide the revision within a period of 10 days and, therefore by order dated 02.12.2010 the co-ordinate bench has disposed of the petition but with a direction that respondent No. 1 i.e. Home department shall decide the revision application of the petitioner, which was filed on 08.05.2006, within a period of 10 days from the date of such order, as stated in their own letter dated 02.12.2010. Pursuant to such commitment, the Home Department has decided the revision application by its impugned order dated 08.12.2010; copy of which is at Annexure J. But, surprisingly, except narrating the history of the departmental proceedings, there is no sufficient reason to disclosed in such impugned order that why order or removal from service is being confirmed, though there is no evidence to prove the commission of offence as alleged in the charge sheet and more particularly when charges could not be proved by the department in departmental inquiry and thereby the inquiry officer has already held that charges are not proved, and thereby it becomes clear that though charges are not proved, the disciplinary authority and appellate authority so also home department have without considering the facts, circumstances and applicable law simply confirmed the order of removal of the petitioner. 15. The petitioner has reason to submit that the respondents are keen to remove the petitioner from services, since though respondents have right to challenge an order of acquittal, when respondents have not challenged the order of acquittal in any similar cases of Dashrathsinh Pravinsinh Jadeja, Jagdishkumar Digubha, Morardan Jilubhai Gadhvi and though most of them were also involved in similar cases under the Prohibition Act and though they all were punished by imposing minor punishment of stopping few increments only; in case of the petitioner, the judgment of acquittal by the Court of JMFC dated 23.09.2002 with reference to I - C.R. No. 5164 of 2000 with Jetpur (Rural) Police Station was challenged by filing a Criminal Appeal No. 81 of 2003 before this High Court. However such acquittal appeal has been dismissed by the High Court by its judgment dated 10.02.2009, confirming that the trial Court has after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence found that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against petitioner. It was also categorically observed that though the incident had taken place in the limits of Jetpur Taluka Police Station, the same was not communicated to such Taluka Police Station and FIR was registered in City Police Station. It was also categorically observed that though the incident had taken place in the limits of Jetpur Taluka Police Station, the same was not communicated to such Taluka Police Station and FIR was registered in City Police Station. It is also observed that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that panchnama was carried out at the place of incident and in presence of panchas and thereby when prosecution could not prove the commission of offence and when there are serious lacuna in evidence of prosecution, the coordinate bench has held that the respondent being appellant, could not prove the charges against petitioner and thereby judgment of acquittal was confirmed. Pursuant to such dismissal of acquittal appeal, now it becomes clear that there are no charges against petitioner so far as consumption of liquor is concerned. 16. In view of above facts when there is no evidence before the Court or the departmental authority regarding commission of offence, there is no reason for respondents to impose the punishment of removal from services as done by the impugned order and thereby impugned order could not sustain. However, considering the settled legal position that the Court should not enter into quantum of punishment, it is also settled legal position that the Court can certainly look into the very nature of punishment and thereby, whether there is misuse of powers. Thereby if punishment is there even in absence of evidence and in cases where absolutely disproportionate punishment is imposed considering the nature of the alleged offence then irrespective of general restrain of not to interfere in quantum of punishment, the Court has ample powers to disturb the order of punishment when it is passed either in absence of evidence or without jurisdiction and if it is disproportionate to the actual misconduct if any committed by the concerned employee. 17. 17. It would be appropriate to recollect few decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as under on the subject:- "(a) S. Partap Singh v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1964 SC 72 ; (b) Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police reported in AIR 1999 SC 677 ; (c) Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri reported in AIR 2010 SC 75 ; (d) Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 ; (e) Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1999(7) SCC 739 ; (f) Kunj Bihari Misra case (Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra reported in 1998(7) SCC 84 ; (g) Nirmala Jhala v. State of Gujarat reported in 2013(4) SCC 301 ." 17.1 The sum and substance of all the above cases is quite clear that there is no absolute ban to review the decisions of Inquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority by the Court, more particularly, when findings of fact is based on no evidence or when a Court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power by any such authority. It is also clear that mere perverse statement of complainant or witness cannot be brought on record without supporting evidence and in such cases, if findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer or decision by the disciplinary authority are not supported by evidence and wholly perverse, then order of punishment is liable to be set aside. Even discretionary power of authority is exposed to judicial intervention, if it is exercised in a manner, which is out of proportion to the fault. 17.2 To verify any of above reasons, the Court has to scrutinize the entire proceedings of Departmental Inquiry so as to ascertain that there cannot be punishment even in absence of evidence or in arbitrary and discriminatory manner or for any reason as discussed herein above. 18. Therefore, when above discussion makes it clear that this is the case where punishment of removal of service was imposed without any evidence on record and that too relying upon altogether a new fact in form of second FIR, details of which was never conveyed to the petitioner so as to enable himself to defend himself, thus impugned order needs to be disturbed. 19. 19. In addition to what is stated and discussed herein above the petitioner has, by filing a further affidavit on 16.06.2011 now disclosed the apparent discrimination at the hands of the respondent while dealing with different employees involved in similar alleged offences and/or misconduct. Now respondent has came forward with a specific disclosure that though Dashrathsinh Pravinsinh Jadeja, Jagdishkumar Digubha, Morardan Jilubhai Gadhvi and Virendra Tavde were also involved in similar case under the Prohibition Act and amongst them at least against Virendra Tavde though there are three cases under the Prohibition Act, in case of all such employees ultimate punishment is only to the extent of stoppage of one or few increments whereas in case of Dashrathsinh Pravinsinh Jadeja and Morardan Jilubhai Gadhvi because of their death further proceedings were stopped but though specifically called, the respondents have not disclosed that what is resolution or outcome against such person i.e. whether all other benefits were released and that too more particularly based upon some facts may be in the form of second FIR against petitioner thereafter to issue fresh show cause notice either by adding charges of second offence in previous charge sheet or by initiating department inquiry for such offence before passing such order or removal from service. However, without following due process of law, new charge cannot be added in pending or continuous proceedings so as to impose major punishment and to that extent, show cause notice was issued though such notice cannot be treated as notice for second FIR and, therefore, when show cause notice is issued for punishment, such punishment is illegal and cannot sustain. 20. In support of his case, petitioner is relying upon an unreported judgment of this Court dated 23.2.2016 in the case of D.K. Dave v. Secretary, Government of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 2092 of 2002, which is confirmed by Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1198 of 2016, wherein the Single Judge has after relying few judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, including the judgment of Punjab National Bank & Ors. v. Kunj Behari Mishra reported in (1998)7 SCC 84 held that opportunity of hearing granted to the petitioner can hardly be called effective or adequate when petitioner was unable to make a representation addressing those specific reasons for which punishment was confirmed. v. Kunj Behari Mishra reported in (1998)7 SCC 84 held that opportunity of hearing granted to the petitioner can hardly be called effective or adequate when petitioner was unable to make a representation addressing those specific reasons for which punishment was confirmed. It is undisputed fact that in the present case, the additional charge of second FIR was considered for deciding the punishment. Therefore, as observed in the cited case, such show-cause notice is in nature of an empty formality to show an outward compliance with the Rules and law and thereby, the principles of natural justice have clearly been violated, which results into prejudice and injustice to the petitioner. The Court has also reason to observe that the tone and tenor of the so-called reasons for disagreement given by the Disciplinary Authority makes it clear that a conclusion has already been arrived at after stating the Charge, which indicates the predetermined mindset of the Disciplinary Authority. Though, it is contended by learned AGP that show-cause notice is disclosing the reasons also, the overall facts and circumstances on the contrary confirms the observation in such cited case. 21. Petitioner is also relying upon the decision in the case of Bhana Guman Patel v. Dy. Conservator of Forests & Anr. reported in 1991(1) GLH 302 wherein also, though it was third offence of the petitioner before the Court, and when that department has considering that when it is third time, when departmental proceedings was initiated against the petitioner for his misconduct, passed an order of dismissal, this Court has set-aside the order on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and directly to reinstate the petitioner. However, the Court has allowed the respondents to proceed with the inquiry afresh or to initiate fresh inquiry in case of fresh misconduct. 22. Both above judgments, support the case of the petitioner, wherein few other judgments are referred and therefore, I do not want to discuss all the judgments again at this stage. 23. In view of above facts and circumstances, it is clear that there is no evidence to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner, either before the Criminal Court or any Departmental Inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority has determined the issue and concluded to punish the petitioner solely on the basis of second FIR. 23. In view of above facts and circumstances, it is clear that there is no evidence to prove the charges levelled against the petitioner, either before the Criminal Court or any Departmental Inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority has determined the issue and concluded to punish the petitioner solely on the basis of second FIR. It is admitted position that for such second FIR, charges were never added in pending departmental inquiry and fresh inquiry for such second FIR has never been initiated. Therefore, the decision of punishment by Disciplinary Authority is not based upon record of Departmental Inquiry wherein there is lack of evidence. Disciplinary Authority has also failed to consider that petitioner has been acquitted in criminal trial also. Therefore, it is clear that the Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment based upon second FIR. Details of second FIR is avoided to be discussed at this stage, since it would prejudice the pending appeal and since respondents may initiate appropriate proceedings based upon such second incident. However, at this stage, it becomes clear that there cannot be direct order of removal from services relying upon second offence for which no reasonable opportunity is extended to the petitioner to explain his case. Therefore, the petition deserves to be allowed as prayed for. 24. In view of above, the petition is allowed. Thereby, the impugned order dated 29.8.2003 by the Superintendent of Police, Rajkot (Rural), so also order dated 30.12.2003 by the Special D.I.G., Rajkot Division, Rajkot as well as order by the competent authority dated 29.04.2006 and order dated 08.12.2010 by the Home Secretary are hereby quashed and set-aside. Thereby, respondents shall reinstate the petitioner in services. However, considering the overall facts and circumstances and in absence of specific evidence on record, when petitioner has not served the respondent for intermediate period, there would be no order regarding any backwages or any financial benefits except to reinstate the petitioner as if he was on special leave from the date of his removal till the date of his reinstatement. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner as aforesaid within two months from the date of receipt of writ of this judgment. If respondents fail to do so, then, petitioner would be entitled to financial benefits as if he is reinstated after two months as per above directions. 25. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner as aforesaid within two months from the date of receipt of writ of this judgment. If respondents fail to do so, then, petitioner would be entitled to financial benefits as if he is reinstated after two months as per above directions. 25. It is made clear that for the reasons stated herein above, this Court has at this stage restrained from discussing anything with reference to second FIR lodged against the petitioner with Jasdan Police Station since the Criminal Appeal is pending against the conviction based upon such FIR. It is also made clear that though respondents have taken facts of such FIR as one of the ground for passing impugned orders, which is otherwise not permissible in law, now, when impugned orders are hereby quashed and set-aside, it would be open for the respondents to initiate appropriate proceedings against the petitioner, for such second incident FIR, but purely in accordance with law and rules. 26. Rule is made absolute. Direct service is permitted.